From Japan to Arabia: Ayutthaya’s Maritime Relations with Asia

edited by Kennon Breazeale
prefaced by Yoneo Ishii Charnvit Kasetsiri
From Japan to Arabia: Ayutthaya’s Maritime Relations with Asia
Cover picture: mural in the ordination hall of Wat Maha Phuttharam, Bangkok, Thailand.

© 1999: The Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities Textbooks Project

This publication is in celebration of His Majesty the King's seventy-second birthday, 5 December 1999.

All rights reserved. This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form except by reviewers for the public press, without written permission from the publishers.

Breazeale, Kennon, editor.
From Japan to Arabia: Ayutthaya's Maritime Relations with Asia,
Bangkok: the Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities Textbooks Project, 1999.

ISBN 974-87183-5-2

Designed by Thamrongsak Petchlert-anan and Lamyuan Phetsaengsawang
Cover designed by Spa Advertising
Printed by Printing House of Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand.

The Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities Textbooks Project, 413/38 Arun-amarin Road, Bangkok 10700, Thailand
Tel./Fax. (662) 433-8713

Price : 450 Baht.
Contents

Preface ix
About the Authors xii
Map of Important Ports and Other Towns Near Ayutthaya xiii
Map of Trading Partners of Ayutthaya: Ports in Asia xiv

Thai Maritime Trade and the Ministry Responsible
Kennon Breazeale

Sailing Seasons
Ministry Structure and Responsibilities
  Royal Warehouses
  Eastern Maritime Affairs and Crown Junks
  Western Maritime Affairs
  The Two Maritime Trade Departments
  Territorial Responsibilities, Ambassadors
  and Diplomatic Functions
Imports and Exports
  Taxation on Maritime Trade
Imported Products
Exported Products
Political and Trading Relations
  China
  Ryukyu Kingdom
  Japan
  Vietnamese Coastline
  Philippines
  Sultanates of the Indonesian Archipelago
  Indian Ocean Rim
  Decline of Trade with South Asia
  European-Held Ports of Asia
Overland Relations
A Maritime Perspective for Future Research
Appendix: A Translation from the Civil Hierarchy Law
Origins of a Capital and Seaport:
The Early Settlement of Ayutthaya and Its East Asian Trade
Charnvit Kasetsiri

The Changing Landscape and Its Early Inhabitants
Settlement Policy
Pre-Ayutthayan International Trade and Chinese Settlement
Ayutthaya’s Early Trade with China
Monopoly Products
Structure and Functions of the Trading Bureaucracy
Conclusions

Ayutthaya, 1409-24: Internal Politics and International Relations
David K. Wyatt

Ayutthaya and Japan: Embassies and Trade in the Seventeenth Century
Nagazumi Yoko

Thai Embassies to the Court of the Shoguns
Japan-Thai Trade
Return of the Crown Ships to Japan

Mergui and Tenasserim as Leading Port Cities in the Context of Autonomous History
Sunait Chutintaranond

Centralist Historical Ideology
Trade and Thai Acquisition of Tenasserim
Central Administration with Local Autonomy
Central Power with Local Autonomy
Burmese Expansion and Conflict with the Thai
Toward a New Historical Ideology

Ayutthaya and the Persian and Indian Muslim Connection
Leonard Y. Andaya

The Islamic “Long” Sixteenth Century
Ayutthaya and the Muslim Connection
Conclusion
Power Politics in Southeast Asian Waters

Adrian B. Lapian

The Straits of Melaka and Singapore
The Gulf
The Sulu Sea
The Eighteenth Century

Ha Tien or Banteay Meas in the Time of the Fall of Ayutthaya

Yumio Sakurai and Takako Kitagawa

Preface
Materials and Abbreviations
The Rise of the Ha Tien Kingdom
  Chinese Expansion in the South China Sea
  from the End of the Seventeenth Century
  Mac Cuu Settles at Ha Tien
  Two Banteay Meases
Banteay Meas and Ha Tien in the Colonial Period
  Mac Cuu as the Leader of the Say Mat Phu Chinese
Establishment of Ha Tien
  Ha Tien as a Subordinate State of Vietnam
Vietnamese Expansion in the Eastern Part
  of the Mekong Delta
Formation of Ha Tien Territory
Fall of Ayutthaya and Ha Tien
  Threat of Invasion from Ayutthaya in 1766
  Fall of Ayutthaya in 1767
  Expansion of Ha Tien in the Gulf
  Struggle against Tocchiu Power
Confrontation with King Taksin
  Taksin’s Occupation of Chanthaburi in 1767
  Breakdown at the End of 1767
  Sack of Chanthaburi by Ha Tien in 1769
Fall of Ha Tien
  Taksin’s Invasion of Cambodia
    from the Northern Route
Taksin’s Expedition against Ha Tien
Taksin’s March to Udong
The Fall of Udong
Counter-offensive by the Vietnamese Army in 1772
Taksin’s Return to Thonburi
Peace between the Two Cambodian Kings
Tran Lien’s Retreat from Ha Tien
Epilogue: After the Fall of Ha Tien
and Death of Mac Thien Tu
Conclusions

References 221

Index 238

Message from the Toyota Thailand Foundation 248
Preface

From the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the period now known as “the Age of Commerce,” the Thai capital emerged as a flourishing entrepôt in Southeast Asia. The kingdom had convenient access, to the Bay of Bengal and the Coromandel Coast, by way of Mergui and Tenasserim, and to the great Chinese markets by way of the South China Sea. During the Ayutthaya period (1351–1767) of Thai history, the kingdom was known as Siam to the various European East-India companies, as Xien-Lo to the Chinese imperial court, as Sarnau or Shahr-i Naw to Arab traders and as Shamro to Japan’s “Vermilion-Seal” merchant marine. The capital city was undoubtedly one of the most powerful port-polities in this part of the world.

French and Dutch archives of the seventeenth century have been extensively explored for their richly detailed materials concerning Ayutthaya. But with these exceptions, scholars have paid relatively little attention to this important Thai kingdom. Indeed, the Thai capital during this period has not yet received the attention that it deserves from historians. Our impression in this regard seems to be supported by a recent survey of master’s theses produced in most of the Thai universities. The number of theses about Ayutthaya’s history is strikingly small, in comparison with the large number about other periods of Thai history.

Several factors help to explain the prevailing situation. The greatest barrier that prevents Ayutthayan historiography from gaining popularity is the nature of the source materials, which are unevenly distributed in every respect: chronologically, linguistically and geographically.

Contemporary Thai documents from the Ayutthaya period are extremely limited in number and variety. Stone inscriptions, unlike those of the Sukhothai kingdom, are far from abundant. Most of the royal chronicles of Ayutthaya are late creations. Even the earliest extant version was completed more than three hundred years after the founding of the city. The well-known Three-Seal Law Code, which contains numerous legal documents bearing dates of the Ayutthayan period, is contaminated with later modifications, and appropriate application of text-criticism is indispensable to justify its use.
The arrival of the Portuguese in Southeast Asia in the early 1500s resulted in the dissemination of informative publications by numerous Portuguese writers during that century. For the period prior to the beginning of these Western records, however, the only contemporary sources for research on Ayutthaya’s maritime relations are the Chinese Shi-lu (Veritable Records) and a small Ryukyuan archive discovered in Okinawa. The Chinese records are extremely useful for establishing or verifying the chronological framework of historic events. In particular, the records of tribute missions to China are now under reevaluation, thanks to their richly detailed contents, including the connection between Ayutthaya and China in Ryukyuan maritime trade. There is no need to emphasize here the importance of books and unpublished documents in Latin, Spanish, English, Dutch, Danish, French, Persian and German sources, which became available in rapid succession from the end of the sixteenth century onward, providing a wealth of detail that is entirely missing for the first half of the Ayutthaya period.

The dilemma for Thai historians is that most of the records are foreign, written in numerous foreign languages and often accessible only in foreign archives. To make effective use of them, students would have to be equipped with extraordinary linguistic talents, because of the diversity of the languages in which these materials are written. Under these circumstances, the best hope for further development of Ayutthayan historiography may be to rely on cooperative and collective research among specialists with complementary expertise.

This is one of the primary motivations for the contributions in this volume. For the advancement of historical research about Ayutthaya, we felt that it would be desirable to bring together an international group of scholars, so that the complicated array of resources could be explored. A three-day international workshop was thus held in the city of Ayutthaya in December 1995. Our aim was to discuss Ayutthaya not as a period of Thai history but instead in a much wider context: namely, as one of the major port polities in premodern Asia, and as a port that played a crucial role in maritime trade, particularly along the coastlines of the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea.

Thanks to coordination and financial support from the Core University
Program between Thammasat University and Kyoto University, under the auspices of the National Research Council of Thailand and the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, we were able to assemble numerous scholars for the workshop, from Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the United States and elsewhere. In 1997, the Office of the Vice-Rector for Thammasat Foreign Affairs published a limited number of copies of the workshop proceedings. To encourage interested students to delve further into this field of study, and to reach a wider range of audience, we decided to publish a selection of revised papers together with additional ones in the present book.

We are grateful to Police General Pow Sarasin, Yoshiaki Muramatsu and Hiroshi Imai of the Toyota Foundation, Thailand, who kindly provided financial support for this publication, especially on the auspicious occasion of 5 December 1999, His Majesty the King’s seventy-second birthday. We would also like to thank numerous individuals who have been very helpful: Hayao Fukui of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies in Kyoto, who acted as a tireless and understanding liaison person for the Workshop; and Leonard Andaya, Yahaya Abu Bakar, Sunaít Chutintaranond, Takeshi Hamashita, Adrian Lapian, Adisorn Muakpimai, Yoko Nagazumi, Anthony Reid, Yumio Sakurai, Muhammad Haji Salleh, W. M. Sirisena and David K. Wyatt, who participated in the conference and helped to shed more light on Ayutthaya’s history. Our appreciation goes to Narongchai Siriratmanawong and Preecha Phothi for making this second stage of our Ayutthaya project possible. Many thanks go to Thamrongsak Petchlert-anan and Lamyuan Phetsaengsawang for their book-making expertise, and last but not least to Kennon Breazeale, who meticulously edited the chapters.

Yoneo Ishii
Charnvit Kasetsiri
October 1999
About the Authors

Leonard Andaya is a professor of history at the University of Hawaii at Manoa in Honolulu.

Kennon Breazeale is a projects coordinator at the East-West Center in Honolulu.

Charnvit Kasetsiri is a professor of history at Thammasat University in Bangkok.

Adrian B. Lapian is a professor of history at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta and at Sam Ratulangi University in Manado, North Sulawesi.

Kitagawa Takako is a doctoral candidate in the Department of South and Southeast Asian Studies, History and Sociology, Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, Faculty of Letters, at the University of Tokyo.

Nagazumi Yoko is a professor of history at Josai University in Tokyo.

Sakurai Yumio is a professor in the Department of South and Southeast Asian Studies, History and Sociology, Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, Faculty of Letters, at the University of Tokyo.

Sunait Chutintaranond is a professor of history at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok.

David K. Wyatt is a professor of history at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York.

Yoneo Ishii is a professor of history and the Rector of Kanda University for Foreign Studies, Tokyo.
Important Ports and Other Towns Near Ayutthaya
“Iudea,” Anonymous Dutch School, c. 1650, Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. (courtesy of the Siam Society)

(courtesy of the Siam Society)
Looking from the Bejara Fort, the Chao Phraya River flows from Ayutthaya to Bangkok.

Bejara Fort and Wat Phanancherng at the juncture of the Pasak and the Chao Phraya Rivers at Ayutthaya.
“Carte du Royaume de Siam et des Pays” by R.P. Placide, c. 1686
"Siam ou Iudia Capitale du Royaume de Siam." Designé sur le lieu Par Mr. Courtaulin missre.
A postoliq. de la Chine ... 1686" (courtesy of the Siam Society)
"A Map of the City of Siam," from La Loubère, A New Historical Description of the Kingdom of Siam, 1693.
"A Plan of the City of Siam or Juthia," 1740.
Thai Maritime Trade  
and the Ministry Responsible

Kennon Breazeale

No Asian country can match the Thai kingdom for its far-flung and friendly relations with maritime Asia, during the period that Ayutthaya was the Thai capital. A book comparable to the present study could not be written about any other Asian nation. Shortly after the founding of Ayutthaya in the fourteenth century, representatives of the Thai court traveled along the coastline of East Asia, investigating trade in Chinese ports, the kingdom of the Ryukyu Islands, Korea and Japan. The lands of South Asia had long been known to the Thai, particularly in the context of Buddhist scholarship, and by the fifteenth century, Thai agents were exploring trading opportunities in the ports of India at first hand.

The seventeenth century brought a dramatic rise of trading and diplomatic exchanges with island courts of the Indonesian archipelago (Aceh, Jambi, Banten, Palembang, Riau) and with the great South Asian courts (Bengal, Golkonda, the Mughal Empire and Persia). Trading relations were maintained by this time with numerous ports on the coast of China, with Japan, with ports of the Indonesian and Philippine archipelago and with many ports of India. In addition to their active trade policy, the Thai monarchs were also among the most adventurous of all rulers of Asia in cultivating diplomatic relations during this period. From the beginning, Ayutthaya’s commercial doors were open, and foreign merchants were welcomed. Thai products thus reached marketplaces all across maritime Asia, from Japan on the east to the Arabian peninsula on the west.

One reason why Thai exports were so widespread is the geographical position of the kingdom. Its coastlines face east to the South China Sea and Pacific rim, west to the ports of the Indian Ocean and south to the archipelago. Its only potential rivals with similar geographical advantages were the sultanates of the Malay peninsula, Sumatra, Java and other islands. But none of those states created a network of trading and diplomatic contacts throughout maritime Asia comparable to Ayutthaya’s. Chinese mariners
ushered Ayutthaya into the Chinese trading world of Japan, the Ryukyu kingdom, China, Vietnam and the archipelago. Traders from ports as far west as the Arabian peninsula brought Ayutthaya into the embrace of the Muslim trading world of South Asia and the archipelago. Sailing ships from the archipelago itself provided the kingdom with even more extensive island contacts. During its final two centuries, the Thai capital was served by European coastal shipping between Asian ports. And Thai crown ships established their own network, with ports of call as distant as Nagasaki and the Persian Gulf. This combination of trading networks, together with the diplomatic initiatives of the Thai kings, was unique in all of Asia.

**Sailing Seasons**

The sailing ships came and went according to the annual cycle of the winds that governed Ayutthaya’s seaborne trade. Every trader knew roughly when his ship should arrive and when it had to depart. He also knew when ships coming from other directions would be in Thai waters. From the viewpoint of captains and merchants alike, the single factor that determined the rhythm of Ayutthaya’s dynamic trade interactions was the monsoon winds, which reverse themselves and blow in opposite directions every six months.

Junks bound for East Asia usually left Ayutthaya in June or July, to catch the winds that carried them to Chinese ports, the Ryukyu Islands or Japan. The return voyage was timed so that the junks reached Ayutthaya again in January or February (Damrong 1962: 80), and the same return winds carried ships south across the Gulf to Java and other islands. From mid- or late-February, the changing winds in the Gulf made it difficult to sail west toward Ayutthaya while in sight of the southeast coast, and a longer voyage then became necessary. During this season, late arrivals from East Asia sailed across the Gulf, setting their sights on the high peaks behind Pranburi, and then proceeded north along the coast of the peninsula to the mouth of the Chao Phraya River (Phakdi Wanit et al. 1969: 67).

Between these two seasons of northeasterly and northwesterly winds, conditions were best for communications with the Philippines. A voyage from Ayutthaya to Manila and back could be made during the period from
about April to June (Morga 1971: 309). Similarly, during the reversal of the winds from about October to December, the same voyages could be made again. None of Ayutthaya’s other trading partners had the advantage of two sailing seasons a year.

The prevailing winds to the west of the Malay peninsula likewise constrained the sailing times between that coast and India. Ships left Mergui by February or March each year to go to Indian ports, making the return voyage by August or September (Schorer 1931: 61, 64, Methold 1931: 37–8). If the winds changed early or if a ship sailed too late in September, the Andaman Sea turned into a formidable barrier—as a powerful French fleet discovered during two months of futile attempts to reach Mergui (Challe 1983 ii: 44–59). The Gujarati ships that sailed from India by way of the Maldivie Islands arrived in Mergui in June and July (Saris 1900: 222, Saris 1905 iii: 512). If a ship left India early enough, it could pass through the straits, around the Malay peninsula and sail all the way to Ayutthaya in a single season, reaching the Thai capital during July, August or September (Flores 1995: 89, note 29, Ishii 1998: 28).

These sailing patterns and weather conditions were beneficial for the trade across the northern part of the Malay peninsula, between Mergui and Phetburi. During the rainy season, from about June to September, overland travel was very difficult. But merchants who left India by early September could reach Mergui late in the rainy season and could then set out for Phetburi by oxcart or with pack cattle, thus reaching Ayutthaya or other ports on the Gulf during October or November. That gave them three months or longer to conduct their business in Ayutthaya and set out again for the west coast, in order to sail from Mergui by mid-March. The same limitations applied to South Asian ships that went directly to the Gulf, unless they remained in Gulf waters for more than a year and waited for the next westward sailing season.

The dilemma for South Asian merchants who carried goods destined for East Asia was the very short period in which the Chinese and Indian merchants were both present in Thai territory at the same time, assuming the South Asians had to make their voyages within a single year for financial reasons. Under these conditions, a merchant from India was in Ayutthaya or elsewhere along the Gulf coast from about November until early March at the latest, whereas the Chinese traders were in the same places from about
January to June. Sailing times thus restricted the overlap roughly to January and February, which must have been the months of the most intensive negotiations between traders from these two regions. The South Asian merchants, moreover, were at a disadvantage, because they had to leave within a short time after the Chinese junks arrived, and thus had no choice but to purchase their East Asian goods quickly. The Chinese, on the other hand, had three or four additional months ahead of them to seek customers and could hold out for higher prices in their early sales. The same pattern of interchange with South Asians applied to the Japanese junks that came to the Gulf ports for four or five decades until the 1630s. In the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, the development of direct India-China shipping undermined the profits from these exchanges in Thai ports and made them less important than they had been in previous centuries.

For voyages between Thai ports on the Gulf coast and Vietnamese ports along the coast of the South China Sea, the inland waterways across the Mekong delta provided more sheltered passage than the longer and sometimes stormy route around the tip of the peninsula. From the Gulf side, junks entered the canal at the Cambodian port of Banteay Meas, later called Ha Tien by the Vietnamese. They followed the canal to the western branch of the Mekong and continued along various river channels that connect to the eastern part of the delta, ultimately emerging at one of the mouths of the Mekong. In the early Ayutthaya period these inland waterways were all in Cambodian territory. Ships going to and from Ayutthaya could pass through this area without much hindrance until the seventeenth century, when the Vietnamese began to extend their control over the area around Saigon and to establish settlements in parts of the delta. Even as late as the Bangkok period, however, the canal from the Gulf to the Mekong continued to provide Thai vessels with access from the Gulf into Cambodia.

Vessels of all types and designs, from every part of coastal Asia, moved into and out of Thai ports in an annual cycle of ordered complexity. As Charnvit argues in his chapter, the rulers of Ayutthaya joined this seafaring world from the very beginning. Maritime trade brought increased prosperity to the Thai court, and a new branch of administration evolved to tap this source of wealth effectively.
Ministry Structure and Responsibilities

The maritime relations of Ayutthaya were invested in the minister popularly known as the Phra Khlang in Thai. There is no generally accepted translation for this term in English. This ministry is often imagined to be a treasury, because that is the present-day sense of the term and because his officials collected all the taxes on imports and exports. But this translation is not appropriate for the Ayutthaya period, when another minister was the chief treasurer (Gervaise 1989: 72). The hypothetical name Ministry of External Relations and Maritime Trading Affairs perhaps best conveys the idea of this ministry’s functions. This name, shortened to External Relations, will be used in this chapter.

The External Relations minister was responsible for all affairs concerning foreigners. Disputes and litigation between foreign residents were generally settled by their respective community heads in Ayutthaya, but the minister and his deputies served as appeal judges and as judges in cases between foreigners and Thai subjects. Ministry officials were also the intermediaries in any matter concerning foreigners that required the attention of other ministers or the king.

All the affairs discussed in the chapters of this book came under the purview of this ministry. It therefore seems useful to begin with an examination of the ministry’s structure and how it functioned. The basic structure of the ministry is outlined in the Civil Hierarchy Law of the Three-Seals Law Code. This law may have been first promulgated in 1466, although it is obvious from the content of the extant text (which was recompiled in 1805) that it was revised in later centuries.

The ministry was divided into four departments. The text of the law does not indicate what they were called in Thai, but the following hypothetical names convey a sense of their respective functions:

- Department of General Administration, Appeals and Records
- Department of Western Maritime Affairs
- Department of Eastern Maritime Affairs and Crown Junk
- Department of Royal Warehouses

The text of the law consists of nothing more than a list of titles of the officials in the ministry and an indication in most cases of their duties.
Charnvit, in his chapter, calls for future comparative research on the ministry and its counterparts in other ports of Southeast Asia. To facilitate such research, a tentative translation of the law is provided at the end of this chapter.

*Royal Warehouses*

The Department of Royal Warehouses is the best place to begin an exploration of the ministry, because it was the link between domestic trade-related administration and the maritime affairs managed by the ministry. This department tapped the internal movements of domestic products within the kingdom to secure supplies for the international markets. Governors and other officials in various parts of the kingdom were required to gather exportable local products and transport them to the royal warehouses in the capital, thus providing these goods to the state under the system of taxation-in-kind. Imported cargoes arriving on the king’s vessels were likewise deposited in these storage facilities. The royal warehouses were thus “treasuries” in a broad sense, filled not solely with money but with the most valuable trade goods.

Although the warehouses are placed last in the list of departments, and are therefore ranked lowest in the hierarchy, they may have been the first functional department to emerge within the ministry. As discussed by Charnvit, the state monopoly system for exports and imports of high-value goods was created about 1419 or shortly before. From that time onward, local products that were in greatest demand for export (such as sapan wood) could be bought only from the warehouses, and certain imported goods (such as Chinese porcelain) had to be sold to the warehouse authorities. Thus, by this date, some of the operations of this department were already in motion, even though the formal structure may not yet have been established.

The royal warehouse authorities were thus wholesalers in international trade. They purchased all the imported goods on the monopoly list, at prices fixed by the government, and sold them to merchants in the kingdom. They acquired domestic monopoly products of high value and either exported them as crown cargoes or sold them to merchants for domestic resale or private export.
Eastern Maritime Affairs and Crown Junks

The head of the Department of Eastern Maritime Affairs and Crown Junks (or Eastern Department for short) was a Chinese resident of Ayutthaya, who was responsible for maritime affairs in the Chinese sphere of shipping. He was thus in charge of shipping movements to and from ports in southern China, as well as affairs relating to other ports where junks were the predominant means of transport: Nagasaki in Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the ports of Vietnam. Privately owned Chinese junks that plied the sea lanes between Ayutthaya and all ports to the east, as well as ports in the Southeast Asian archipelago, from Sumatra to the Philippines, likewise came under the jurisdiction of this department head. During the final century of the Ayutthaya period, European ships were sometimes chartered to carry crown goods in this eastward trade. The operating language of the department was Chinese, which facilitated communications with this wide network of ports where the Chinese traded, as well as official correspondence with Chinese port authorities and, for political relations, the court in Beijing.

The department head had jurisdiction over all Chinese who resided or traded in the Thai kingdom, plus all the Japanese. As argued in the chapter by Charnvit, a Chinese trading community was already settled in the lower Chao Phraya basin before the founding of Ayutthaya in 1351. The beginnings of the Japanese community are not known precisely. Japanese junks were supplying the Thai market at least by the late 1580s, and it is possible that the Thai court recruited Japanese, possibly both samurai and pirates, to help defend the kingdom against successive Burmese invasions during the same decade. As the chapter by Nagazumi shows, the Japanese community in Ayutthaya grew rapidly in the early 1600s, peaked in the 1620s but dwindled after Japan began to close its ports during the 1630s and restrict contacts with the outside world.

Japan’s sole port of entry for junks from Ayutthaya after the 1630s was Nagasaki, and only Chinese junks and Dutch ships were allowed to trade there. From the Thai viewpoint, the Dutch were involved in a predominantly Chinese trade route, because one or more Dutch ships from Java stopped at Ayutthaya every year, to load additional cargo for the Japanese market, before proceeding to Nagasaki and then back to Java. The Dutch competed
for the same Thai exports carried on this route by the Japanese until the 1630s and by Chinese junks thereafter. For this reason, the Dutch were placed under the Eastern Department. They communicated with the assistance of interpreters, through combinations of the Dutch, Portuguese, Malay and Thai languages.

The Eastern Department was by far the most complex of the four, in terms of numbers of officials and specified duties. The majority of officials in this department, including all the lower-ranking ones, were employed on the crown junks.

Most crew members were Chinese, who resided in the Thai capital and sailed the crown junks to various ports in China and Vietnam, to Nagasaki in Japan and south to the archipelago. Individual crew members received appointments as government officials—not only the captain, navigator, records keeper and helmsman but also those with the modest duties of raising and lowering the sails, sounding the water’s depth and swabbing the decks. Forty-seven different positions are specified, and this list probably includes all the men necessary to operate an ordinary junk. This number may have been the minimum requirement and is about the same as the minimum crew aboard junks from Ayutthaya that arrived at Nagasaki.

Using Japanese data (tabulations from Ishii 1998 for 46 junks during 1687–1728), a few important features of the crown junks sent to Japan can be deduced. The smaller junks (many of which were privately operated carriers of Thai crown goods) had 44 to 79 crew members, and some of them had 1, 2 or 3 Thai passengers on board. The larger junks had 87 to 114 people (or 89 to 117 if Thai passengers are included). The average number for the 27 large junks is 101.5 (or 104 if Thai passengers are included). The crown junks constructed on the Chao Phraya River for use in state trading were unusually large, as shown by these data, because the average crew size on the smaller junks was only 62.5 (or 63.3 if Thai passengers are included). In each of eight years from 1689 to 1703, two larger ones arrived in Nagasaki, which indicates that two such junks were maintained by the ministry for regular service to Japan during this period, although only one seems to have been maintained thereafter. Since 41 percent of the junks were in the smaller category, and more than half of the smaller ones reported that they carried crown cargoes, the ministry obviously commissioned smaller junks
regularly for individual voyages, to supplement the cargoes of the crown junks.

**Western Maritime Affairs**

The counterpart for maritime relations with the rest of the world was the Department of Western Maritime Affairs, which overlapped geographically with the Eastern Department in island Southeast Asia. From the Thai perspective, western trade encompassed the whole of South Asia: the Arab states, Persia, the Indian subcontinent, Sri Lanka, the Maldives Islands and the shipping to Ayutthaya by Muslim traders from the Malay peninsula and the Southeast Asian archipelago.

The ministry was reorganized during the 1610s with the assistance of two prominent Muslim merchants who moved to Ayutthaya from the region of the Persian Gulf (Thiphakorawong 1939: 3). The basic division between trade with the Chinese network and trade with the rest of the world must already have existed before the reorganization. Yet it seems no coincidence that the new structural division placed all areas that were of primary concern to Muslim traders within a single department, encompassing all the ports on the northern and eastern rim of the Indian Ocean, as well as the Muslim trading centers of the archipelago. This vast trading network is surveyed in detail in the chapter by Andaya.

Some of the South Asian shipping to and from Ayutthaya wound its way through the long and difficult straits and around the tip of the Malay peninsula to the Gulf. But Ayutthaya's preeminent gateway for western trade was the island port of Mergui and the nearby provincial capital, Tenasserim. From this entry point, goods were transshipped across the peninsula. They were carried part way by riverboat on the western side of the watershed, and onward by oxcart or pack-cattle across the hills, passing through the towns of Kui and Pranburi on the Gulf side and terminating at the seaside town of Phetburi. Here, the goods were loaded on coastal vessels, which carried them to Ayutthaya and other Gulf ports. For goods of relatively high resale value and low bulk, the easiest contacts with the ports of northwest Sumatra (such as Aceh) were through the port of Mergui. Contacts with the rest of the archipelago—from southern Sumatra as far east as Timor and Maluku and
north to the Philippines—were easiest by the direct shipping routes across the Gulf.

The role played by Mergui and Tenasserim in South Asian trade is outlined in the chapter by Sunait and in other studies of this coast (for example Mills 1997), which was under Thai rule from about the 1460s until the start of the Burmese invasion in 1765. Tenasserim’s importance is reflected in the name of the kingdom’s chief station for collecting taxes on international trade. The station was on the west bank of the river, below the walls of Ayutthaya, and was called the Tenasserim Customs House (Boran 1969: 183).

Although all Europeans other than the Dutch were under the jurisdiction of the Western Department, the general Thai concept of western trade did not extend as far as Europe. Few ships sailed directly between European ports and Ayutthaya, and none without stopping elsewhere in Asia. Most European goods that reached the Thai market were transshipped through other ports in the sphere of the Western Department. Indeed, most of the cargoes brought to Ayutthaya by the Portuguese, Dutch, English and other Europeans consisted of goods from South Asia or the archipelago and formed part of the intra-Asian coastal trading network.

The only national groups who seem to be placed illogically within the framework of the ministry were the French (who were initially under the Eastern Department) and the Vietnamese (who were moved in the 1680s to the Western Department). But, as in the case of the Dutch, the reasons for these arrangements are obvious. Chinese junks called at both Thai and Vietnamese ports, and therefore coastal trading with Vietnam, together with jurisdiction over Ayutthaya’s resident Vietnamese community, which began to develop in the seventeenth century, were initially under the Eastern Department. The tiny French community in Ayutthaya consisted initially of French missionaries, who began to arrive during the 1660s. They were placed under the Eastern Department, because the Thai capital served at first as a convenient point of departure for missionaries bound for Vietnamese and Chinese ports and as a place where they could learn the languages of their assigned mission fields. Indeed, the Ayutthaya Mission itself was not formally established until 1673. By that time, the mission school and theological seminary had been in operation for several years, and the students
were mostly Vietnamese, plus some Chinese, who were destined to return to
their homelands for mission work. From the Thai viewpoint, the missionary
community was thus associated with affairs in East Asia. Placement in the
Eastern Department caused little difficulty in communications for the French,
because they employed local Christians as interpreters, and some priests
stayed temporarily in the Thai capital to acquire a knowledge of spoken
Chinese.

An incident in 1682 reversed this arrangement. A brawl occurred
between the Vietnamese students and some Chinese sailors who happened
to be in port. The Chinese department head, who was responsible for
settling such matters among these two groups of foreigners, supported his
own countrymen and treated the Vietnamese badly. The missionaries then
appealed to the minister, and jurisdiction over French and Vietnamese
residents was transferred to the Western Department (Launay 1920 ii: 93–4).
Trade with Vietnamese ports, however, remained under the Eastern
Department, because it was managed by Chinese junk operators.

The head of the Western Department was usually a Muslim from South
Asia, and the working language was predominantly Malay—the language of
the trading world of the archipelago. Malay was already used for trade and
diplomatic purposes when the first European mission reached the Thai court
in 1511 (Albuquerque 1880: 114), and its use is documented continuously
thereafter into the early nineteenth century. Portuguese was also an
important medium for dealing with Europeans in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. Successive generations of Portuguese-Asian
residents (Christians with mixed Portuguese, Thai, Mon, Indian and other
Asian ancestry) were frequently employed by the Thai government as
interpreters, helping to tie Ayutthaya into the diaspora of Portuguese-Asian
communities, which extended from the seat of the Portuguese viceroy at Goa
in India to Macau on the southern Chinese coast and to Timor in the eastern
part of the archipelago.

Three officials listed in the department hierarchy had duties relating
to specified foreigners, but the text is not at all clear with respect to the
division of responsibilities. It seems likely that the deputy head had general
responsibilities for all foreigners and that a convenient division was made
between his two subordinates. These two are called harbor masters (chaotha),
a title that shows they were responsible for inspecting cargoes and collecting taxes from all foreign ships. In addition, however, the first harbor master (the Luang Ratcha Montri) was in charge of the entire Christian community: Europeans (except the Dutch), Vietnamese, Armenians, and South Asian Christians. In this capacity, he gave orders to all resident Christians whenever labor units were required by the ministry for public works or other services (Launay 1920 ii: 166). The second harbor master (the Luang Nonthakhet) must therefore have been in charge of the Muslim community: Arabs, Persians, Indians, Malay and Indonesians.

If this assumption about the division of duties is correct, this structure was created only during the final century of Ayutthaya and may have been established in 1682, when the Vietnamese Christians were moved to this department. The posts of the first and second harbor masters may, moreover, have been reserved respectively for a Christian and a Muslim in government service. The minister, for example, resisted Muslim efforts in 1756 to secure the post of first harbor master, insisted that the post must go to a Christian and appointed a Portuguese-Asian official (Launay 1920 ii: 207).

*The Two Maritime Trade Departments*

Like many Thai institutions and official posts, the two maritime trade departments were called by paired names. The Eastern Department was known in Thai as the Krom Tha Sai (literally the harbor department of the left) and its counterpart was known as the Krom Tha Khwa (the harbor department of the right). These names do not appear in the text of the law but are derived from court protocol. Officials seated to the right as the king faced them were ranked higher than their counterparts seated to his left. Thus the department of the right (western trade) had the higher status of the two, and the department head’s rank was higher than that of his Chinese counterpart. The department’s size and composition in the 1805 version of the law certainly does not suggest such importance, but the department probably acquired its high status in the early seventeenth century. When the ministry was restructured in the 1610s with the assistance of the South Asian traders, one of whom was the founder of the prominent Bunnag family, their sphere of interest must have been the more important one.
The Western Department must have been larger and more complex during the seventeenth century, in the heyday of trade with Indian Ocean ports, than it was when the law was given its final form in the 1805 codification. In contrast to the detailed list of officials in the Eastern Department, only twelve posts are specified for western affairs: the department chief, his deputy, two harbor masters and eight interpreters. Moreover, there is no western counterpart to the crown junks division, although royal trading ships operated in western and southern waters, with crews of South Asians and Europeans in the employ of the Thai government.

There are several possible reasons for the differences in departmental structure as outlined in the text of the law. The crown ships built for journeys west of the Malay peninsula were of South Asian or European designs, not Chinese junks, and their home ports may have been Mergui and Ujung Salang (known in Thai as Thalang, at the northern end of Phuket Island). If that is correct, their operations may have been the responsibility not of ministry officials but of the viceregal governor of Tenasserim, who had jurisdiction over all Thai territory on the west coast of the Malay peninsula. Similarly, some ships of South Asian, European and Indonesian design on the east coast may have been under the governor of Nakhon Sithammarat, who exercised viceregal responsibilities over this coast.

It is also possible that the text was modified in 1805, and titles that had ceased to have any use by that time may have been eliminated. After three decades of unsuccessful efforts to regain control of Mergui, which the Burmese seized in 1765, the new administration in Bangkok may have accepted, by the turn of the century, that the cause was lost and that the transpeninsular trade route was permanently closed. If that is the case, all the titles of ministry officials involved in this route through Tenasserim, and the entire structure of responsibilities for trade along this route, must have been eliminated from the law. This explanation would account for the bare bones of a structure needed to deal with ships from the west, which at that time were very few in number and were all sailing around the peninsula directly to the Gulf ports.

Another way of interpreting the difference in department size is to eliminate the crown junks division, which accounted for the great majority of men with official ranks in the ministry. Only eight other officials are listed
in the Eastern Department: the department head, one harbor master and six interpreters, two of whom had administrative duties in the Chinese community. From this viewpoint, the basic department structure is a mere two-thirds the size of the Western Department.

The long list of posts in the crown junks division may have been added to the law only about the time that the law code was revised in 1805, even though the division itself had been in existence for most of Ayutthaya’s history. One possible reason for creating all these posts was a new privilege announced by the Chinese government in 1754, which allowed crown junks to trade every year in Guangzhou, instead of restricting them to once in three years. The Chinese regulations specified, however, that the junk operators had to be Thai, and a Chinese complaint was lodged in 1803 against the crown junks for flouting the rules (Promboon 1971: 302–3). To comply with the Chinese demand, the entire Chinese crew of each crown junk may have been given official positions in the hierarchy. This explanation would account for an apparent inflation in the size of the Eastern Department, at a time when the Western Department was facing a severe decline in trade in its geographical sphere.

After the Burmese march against Ayutthaya began in 1765, there was a drastic contraction of contacts with Europeans, although the causes have less to do with the abandonment of the Thai capital than with external factors in India and Europe. The Dutch—the only European traders to maintain an almost-continuous presence during the final century and a half of Ayutthaya’s existence—withdrew in 1765 and did not return. An archival search of Thai records during the half century following the sack of Ayutthaya uncovered only one official contact with a European government: the Portuguese in 1786 (FAD 1969a xxxiv: 211–20). The only other contact known is a friendly message from Portugal in 1811 (Wenk 1968: 120–1), and none thereafter until a new series of European contacts began in 1819. Some private trading by Europeans and South Asians continued at Ayutthaya, along with crown trade and especially exports of Thai elephants and tin, and imports of Indian printed cotton cloth from the Coromandel coast. Comparable searches of Thai and other sources have been made for trade and political relations with China (Promboon 1971, Viraphol 1977, Cushman 1993), and it is clear that Sino-Thai trade became the Thai government's most
important source of maritime-trade revenue during this period. The Western Department clearly shrank in importance during the late eighteenth century. The transpeninsular route, which had been a major link to the Indian Ocean, was completely cut, and most traders from South Asia had to sail directly to Bangkok, around the Malay peninsula. With the loss of Mergui’s role as a transit point, its prosperous trading community disappeared. Some transpeninsular trade did continue and was diverted primarily to the three best routes south of Tenasserim. One crossed the narrowest neck of the peninsula (the Isthmus of Kra), another from the west coast led to the inland lagoon above Songkhla and the third was a longer route from Pinang Island and Kedah to Songkhla and Patani.

Territorial Responsibilities, Ambassadors and Diplomatic Functions

Two apparent omissions from the law deserve attention: the territorial responsibilities of the ministry and its diplomatic arm. The minister supervised provincial administration in the peninsular provinces. These duties gave him jurisdiction over the entire transpeninsular route from Phetburi on the Gulf coast to Mergui on the Andaman Sea. Since governors wielded almost total power over all affairs in their respective provinces, tax collection and the operations of the royal warehouses were in the hands of the governor. During its first two centuries as a Thai port, Tenasserim was supervised by another minister (the Kalahom). After the transfer of these powers to the External Relations Ministry, apparently at some point during the final century of the Ayutthaya period, the Tenasserim governor received his instructions, including those issued by the king, from the External Relations Minister and reported directly to this ministry. This reorganization consolidated under a single minister all control over shipping, maritime taxes and royal monopoly trading. Perhaps most important, it gave the minister greater control over the royal warehouses in Mergui and Tenasserim, which had been built for the storage of royal trading goods in transit between the Thai ports of the Gulf coast and the ports of the Indian Ocean rim, from northern Sumatra to the Persian Gulf.

None of these responsibilities is reflected in the ministry structure outlined in the law. By 1805, when the law was recompiled, jurisdiction over
the remaining peninsular territories, from Kanchanaburi southward, was under the Kalahom Ministry (which in the early Bangkok period became a western-seaboard ministry for provincial administration). The old External Relations Ministry then retained jurisdiction over only the southeast coastal provinces, from the mouths of the Tha Chin (Suphanburi) and Chao Phraya Rivers to the Cambodian frontier. And all of the remaining west-coast territory, formerly under Tenasserim’s jurisdiction, had been transferred to the viceregal governor of Nakhon Sithammarat.

All officials outlined in the law on the External Relations Ministry, other than those in the general administration department, were involved in trade affairs. Yet the minister was also responsible for all foreign affairs of a political nature, and contacts with the majority of countries were by sea. The question that arises is thus: who were the officials responsible for diplomatic affairs and other communications with foreign governments? The answer appears to be that the minister and one or more of his department heads sufficed to deal with such matters case by case, in consultation with the king and senior ministers. There were no positions in the civil service for ambassadors, and there was no diplomatic corps. When ambassadors were sent out, individuals were suggested by the ministers on each occasion and were commissioned by the king to carry out a specific mission. As discussed below, some local trade representatives were given long-term appointments in important ports, and they managed local transactions for the sale of crown cargoes and the purchase of goods for shipment back to the royal warehouses.

**Imports and Exports**

*Taxation on Maritime Trade*

In addition to imposing monopoly trading rights on specified imports and exports, as mentioned above, the Thai government collected taxes on goods that were imported and exported by private traders. According to one report in the early 1500s, the export duty in Ayutthaya was 6.7 percent. Chinese traders paid 16.7 percent on imports and were thus in a favored position, because other foreign traders paid 22.2 percent (Pires 1944 i: 104–5). The tariff changed over time, and almost a century later the rate at
Ayutthaya was only 5 percent on imports as well as exports (Floris 1934: 37). Exactly the same rate was applied by Patani (Smith 1977: 165, n. 19), which was the nearest important rival port frequented by Chinese junks and by ships from the south and the west. On the opposite side of the peninsula, according to a 1662 report, the import duty collected in Mergui was 8 percent (Launay i: 1). The rate reported in the capital at the end of the Ayutthaya period was 3 percent for ships from countries that maintained friendly relations with the Thai and 5 percent for all others (Khamhaikan chao krung kao 1967: 280), but no mention was made of export duty in this source. No duty was collected on goods that were sold to the state for its own use, and that provision in the law may have given shippers an incentive to supply the royal warehouses with specific goods needed by the government.

By the mid-1500s, the Thai government began to impose a second type of tax, adopted about the same time also in China, which varied according to the size of the vessel (Cruz 1953: 204). In the Thai case, this anchorage fee was determined by measuring the widest part of the deck and was calculated according to a fixed formula. This tax tended to put Chinese junks and various sailing vessels from the archipelago in a favorable position, because they were usually narrower than ships that came from the west. The tariff at the end of the Ayutthaya period applied to vessels at least 8 meters (4 wa) wide and was charged at the rate of 6 baht (worth about 90 grams of silver) per meter for ships from countries with friendly relations and 10 baht per meter for all others (Khamhaikan chao krung kao 1967: 280).

The highly competitive position that crown junks enjoyed under the system of tribute-trading in Guangzhou is noted by Charnvit. Many of the goods they carried were acquired from provinces throughout the Thai kingdom, collected in the form of taxes paid in kind, and thus required no capital investment by the state. These junks paid taxes neither in Ayutthaya nor in Guangzhou. Crown junks were unusually large, and it may be assumed that official Chinese rules for tribute-trading at Guangzhou (limited in principle to three junks, once in three years) were circumvented by clever construction in the dockyards of the Chao Phraya River, which stretched the size of the hold far beyond the typical cargo capacity. Crown junks were also able to engage in trade at other Chinese ports, where they paid the same anchorage fees and import-export duties that private Chinese traders paid.
Private junk operators faced many costs that the crown traders did not incur. The heaviest, obviously, was the price of goods in Ayutthaya. They also had to pay the entire range of official charges: anchorage fees and import-export taxes in Ayutthaya, plus all the taxes in Chinese ports. Private traders had to accommodate themselves, moreover, to systems in which gifts and bribes to port authorities were regular (albeit unofficial) forms of taxation. Traders carrying goods into the interior of the country, as well as South Asians who came overland from Tenasserim, were likewise expected to offer judicious gifts to port officials and to local officials in each town along the route, whose duties included verifying the internal passports issued at the port of entry and inspecting the goods in transit through the town.

Imported Products

As Charnvit points out, the Thai tended to export mostly tropical products and to import manufactured goods from elsewhere in Asia. A brief survey of products imported by Ayutthaya from each of its major trading partners in Asia, together with the Thai products exported to those ports, was compiled in the mid-1680s (Chaumont 1997: 94–8). Some of the imported products available in the numerous marketplaces of the capital are listed in a Thai description of the city in its final years (Boran 1969). Other products in the following discussion are mention in random observations at various times during the Ayutthaya period.

Textiles were among the most important imports, particularly printed cotton cloth from the east coast of India. Thai consumers must have been linked to the international cloth trade long before the founding of Ayutthaya. Imports of textiles are recorded in Ayutthaya and every other important port in a Chinese survey of Southeast Asian trading centers in the early 1400s (Fei Hsin 1996). And cloth was still the chief import from India after Bangkok became the capital. The Thai themselves produced cheap cotton textiles, which were exported and sold to poorer people in the ports of southern Asia (Pires 1944 i: 108). Fashion played a role in this trade. Cottons were dyed and printed in India, with specific colors and designs that would appeal to the Thai consumer. Although the cloth had to be low enough in price to be affordable to ordinary Thai buyers, the volume was so great, and
the demand so regular, that cloth for ordinary consumers probably accounted for a larger share of Ayutthaya’s imports by value than any other product. The cloth trade also provided a large share of government revenue, because cloth was a royal monopoly good. The period in which this monopoly was established is not yet known. Silk may have been a monopoly good when the system was created in the early 1400s. The cloth monopoly in general, including South Asian cottons, is documented from the 1600s onward (Brummelhuis 1987: 44).

Many imported luxuries were consumed domestically in part and also reexported either east or west, depending on their origins. Luxury imports for rich Thai consumers included porcelain and lacquered goods from Japan and China, silks and satins from China, Vietnam and India, frankincense from Arabia, as well as gold, silver and precious gems. Carpets from Persia were used for seating officials and guests in the audience halls of kings, princes and high officials. Rose dew from India and musk from China were used as perfumes. Camphor from Malay and Indonesian sources had medicinal uses and was added to Chinese fireworks to create bright flashes of light. Edible birds’ nests from the Malay peninsula and the islands were a luxury food item in Ayutthaya and were also reexported to China.

Less glamorous but utilitarian imports for sale in Thai marketplaces included brass, copper and iron wares, costume jewellery from India, combs, crockery (plates, bowls, cups), metal pots, pans and other implements used in cooking, ingredients for Chinese medicines and even some imported foods: notably tea from China and Japan, and jars of pickled vegetables and preserved fruit from China.

Crown ships and private traders supplied arms of all sorts to the royal arsenal: cannons, firearms, swords, and metal blades for lances and pikes. The Thai cavalry imported horses from India and Java. Another strategic import was sulfur. It was mixed with domestic supplies of saltpeter to make gunpowder.

Exported Products

The Thai kingdom had no unique raw materials or manufactured goods to export and thus no unique competitive advantage. Everything the
Thai gathered in the forests or cultivated could be obtained at equally convenient ports elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Contemporary observers noted that the Thai were excellent artists and craftsmen, but no Thai middle class emerged, and no one else drew upon such skills to produce goods for foreign markets. Evidence from the mid-Ayutthaya period suggests that it was always difficult to find manufactured products that could be readily sold outside the country (Botero 1630: 603, Pires i: 104). Most exports were therefore unprocessed or semi-processed raw materials, although there are some exceptions, such as ceramic wares and the shipments of elephants to India.

Ayutthaya's success as a supplier to Asian markets was due to its multiple maritime trade networks, its network of suppliers and consumers in the interior, its ability to compete in terms of prices and the relatively free trading environment it provided in its ports. The following are the most frequently noted commercial exports to other ports in Asia. These goods were either produced in the central part of the kingdom or collected from other parts of the interior or ports on the Gulf.

Many materials for making clothing were exported, but the only manufactured item seems to have been cheap cloth. Other goods included raw cotton, the feathers of brightly colored birds (which were used in China for making fans and costumes) and products that yielded dyes (indigo for blues and sapan wood for yellows and reds).

The Thai must have produced leather goods, but only raw materials such as skins of deer, buffaloes, rays and sharks are documented as exports. These materials were in great demand in Japan and found their way not only into items of clothing but also into sword handles and armor. It seems probable that rare items such as tiger skins were sometimes exported. Another exotic export to China that has been documented is rhinoceros skin (Chang 1991: 164–86). An important complementary export for this industry was cutch (si-siat in Thai), from which the Chinese extracted a yellowish dye that was used in the tanning of dark leathers and also to dye cloth.

Ivory and numerous aromatic substances such as ambergris, civet, gum benjamin and other gums were among the items of relatively high value in relation to weight. Some the aromatics were ingredients for perfumes
and medicines alike. Other ordinary medicinal ingredients commonly reported were cutch (an astringent), chaulmoogra seeds (which produced an oil for treating leprosy) and bezoar stones (a concretion found in the stomachs of certain animals, which was used to treat fevers and as an antidote to poisons). Without doubt, a great number of other products valued by herbalists during the Ayutthaya period were shipped to various parts of Asia, although they are not documented.

The demand for some products was due to their supposed magical qualities. The most valuable item was rhinoceros horn, used as an aphrodisiac by the Chinese. The more exotic items found their way into potions that were believed to enhance virility or longevity. Among the notable ones were penises of tigers and stags, and gall bladders of bears. Another product with unusual properties was coral, which was polished to make jewellery and was also used as a household decoration. It was in demand in China at that time, because of the belief that it warded off devils and evil spirits. Thai exports of hawksbill turtle shells (called tortoise shells in contemporary records) were used to make jewellery that was similarly believed to have properties of warding off evil.

Among food products, rice became the most important Thai export in the eighteenth century, because of the great demand in China, although it was exported to ports in the Malay peninsula, Sumatra and even Java in previous centuries. Some exports such as cardamom and pepper were used in cooking as well as preparing medicines. Other important staples were coconut oil, dried fish, lucraban seeds (which produced an oil), sago flour, salt and unrefined sugar. Alcoholic drinks were made from various kinds of fruit, and among them the most noted export was nipa-palm wine.

Other utilitarian exports included cheap ceramic wares (such as water storage jars used on ships), gamboge (used in medicines, as a dye and to make yellow ink), deer and ox horns, black lacquer, wax, various kinds of resins and insect lac (which was processed into shellac, varnishes, red lac dye and sealing wax). Metal exports included iron, lead and tin. Copper imported from Japan was used domestically to manufacture bronzes, such as Buddha images, and was also reexported to South Asia.

By far the most costly wood found in Thai forests was aloes wood (Thai kritsana and trakhan), which was burned as incense or added to
perfumes and medicines. In terms of volume as well as value, sapan wood was the most important export to Japan, where it was used to extract a red dye for cloth and mixed with other dyes to produce violet. Exports for cabinet making included sandal wood, teak and probably other fine woods found in Thai forests, such as rose wood and ebony-like black woods. A less costly export for making furniture and for other uses was rattan.

The most important manufactured exports were usually overlooked by contemporary observers. Even before the founding of the capital, traders who visited the Chao Phraya basin surely recognized that the area had an abundance of the raw materials necessary for building ocean-going vessels. As shown by Sunait’s chapter, Mergui had equally fine natural advantages for shipbuilding. Many kinds of wood from the Chao Phraya basin, including teak, were used to construct junks that plied the seas from the Southeast Asian archipelago to Japan. The Thai reputation for good quality materials at low cost was so well known that the government of China encouraged its subjects in the 1740s to go to the Thai kingdom to build junks (Promboon 1971: 266). And in the 1750s, Spaniards from Manila established a shipbuilding enterprise in Ayutthaya. Ships of South Asian and European designs were constructed and repaired in the shipyards of Ayutthaya and Mergui, for service along the western trade routes. Indeed, the ship-repair industry in both ports was an important service provided to international shipping in every direction. Other manufactured goods that can be included in this export category, besides the ships and junks themselves, range from sails, riggings and wooden anchors to materials such as dammar, applied to the bottoms to make the vessels watertight.

This survey does not attempt to give an impression of how these trade goods changed in volume or variety as time passed. For such quantitative and qualitative changes, we will have to await comparative research in Japanese, Chinese and European records, to determine changes in trade flows and responses to changing prices and market demand. The present study attempts to go no further than to describe the main products exported and imported, with reference to the dynamics of trade at a few specific times during the Ayutthaya period.
Political and Trading Relations

Diplomacy cannot be separated from the commercial aspects of official Thai contacts with other governments during the Ayutthaya period. The following survey therefore examines both aspects of such missions together. This brief essay is intended only as a glance at broad patterns of trade and diplomacy, to serve as an introduction to the other chapters in this volume. It begins with China, whose relations with the Thai kingdom are the best and most continuously documented throughout the Ayutthaya period.

China

Ayutthaya’s earliest-known foreign relations began within two decades of its founding. Prior to that time, the rulers of two Thai kingdoms had sent a total of fourteen tribute missions to China, from 1289 to 1323 (Promboon 1971: 108). As Charnvit argues in his chapter, one of these was Lopburi, and the other (known as Hsien to the Chinese) was possibly a kingdom on the river that drains the western part of the central plain. Subsequently, no missions were sent to China for more than forty-five years. Then in 1370, only two years after a new dynasty took power in China, a Chinese delegation arrived in Ayutthaya on a mission to get the new Thai capital to restore the custom of sending tribute. The following year, the first ambassadors from Ayutthaya arrived in China. This exchange marks the beginning of Ayutthaya’s longest-lasting and most consistently recorded foreign relations.

As Charnvit shows in his chapter, Thai-Chinese exchanges were intensive during the first decades of the fifteenth century. The Ming court sent seventeen missions to Ayutthaya, and all but two arrived during the first half-century of Thai-Chinese relations. The last mission arrived in Ayutthaya in 1482, and none were sent by China subsequently (Promboon 1971: 64). Although Thai embassies to the Chinese court were not evenly distributed in time, they were sent on average nearly once every three years, for a total of 129 missions (Promboon 1971: 110–20). The last one reached Beijing in 1766, when Burmese forces were already besieging the Thai kingdom.

Chinese records and contemporary observations by Europeans show
that the Thai enjoyed a highly privileged trading position in the southern Chinese port of Guangzhou (Canton) and that junks arriving from Thai ports were treated very liberally by the Chinese authorities. The pattern of crown junk trading was determined largely by Chinese rules, which required Thai ambassadors to land at Guangzhou and proceed by land from there. The overland journey to Beijing and back took roughly six months. During this period, the cargoes of the crown junks that brought the ambassadors were sold in Guangzhou, and Chinese goods were acquired for shipment back to the royal warehouses in Ayutthaya.

Trade between Thai ports and Chinese ports can be divided into three basic categories: tribute-trade, crown trade in other Chinese ports and private trade. The privately owned junks can be subdivided into those based in Thai ports and those of merchants whose home ports were in China or other countries. Charnvit’s chapter explains the tribute-trade carried on by the crown junks that frequented Guangzhou: the sole port of entry for Thai tribute missions. Most of the privately owned junks, by contrast, seem to have avoided Guangzhou, perhaps because they could not compete with the crown junks in terms of price, although they may have been successful there with goods of lower unit value. The private junks from Ayutthaya went farther up the coast to Shantou (Swatow, a Teochiu-speaking area) and beyond to Xiamen (Amoy, a Hokkien-speaking area). Some went as far north as Ningbo and nearby Shanghai. Some stopped in Chinese ports to trade and load additional cargo, before proceeding to Japan (Ishii 1998: 99).

Junks that were owned by Chinese residents in the Thai kingdom, and were often built in Thai shipyards, were generally treated by the Chinese authorities as though they were coastal traders from other ports of China. Junks from Ayutthaya were thus able to operate in Chinese ports under the same tax regime and port regulations that applied to domestic Chinese junks. Thai crown junks and junks owned by Thai officials were likewise allowed to trade in these ports on the same terms.

The people involved directly or indirectly in trading ventures between Thai and Chinese ports can be divided into categories according to function, although the lines of distinction are not always clear (Cushman 1993: 97–8). There was no easily defined merchant class, because the people involved directly in trade represented many different levels of Thai society. They
included not only the Chinese captain and crew members who sailed a junk, but also investors (Thai government officials, royalty and other residents of Thai ports) who sent goods on consignment. Thai port authorities themselves were involved in this type of investment. Given the dual roles played in this respect by officials in the External Relations Ministry—as investors in the trading activities on which they themselves collected the taxes—it is easy to imagine complex relationships with junk operators that avoided taxation and government regulations.

The owner of a junk often hired the captain and others to sail his junk and transact his business in foreign ports. Sometimes the owner served as the captain and transacted business for himself as well as for others who sent goods on consignment. The roles were interchangeable, and the basic types of trading (tribute, crown and private) were interconnected by the role of the captains and others who were responsible for sales and purchases in foreign ports. One captain, for example, served as an officer on a junk that went to Japan in 1721. Two years later, he and his crew served on a tribute-trading mission to China with crown goods. The next year they engaged in private trade on a junk that sailed to Ningbo and back to Ayutthaya. The following season, he took the junk to Ningbo again before proceeding to Japan (Ishii 1998: 100–1).

During the 1700s, Chinese traders dominated Thai overseas trade, and trade with China seems to have expanded considerably. It is not yet clear, however, whether this expansion was great enough to counterbalance the decline in trade with South Asia, during the same period. Much research remains to be done on changes in Thai international trade in the eighteenth century, and at least four new features of the eastward trade deserve particular attention.

First, China briefly imposed a ban on trade with Southeast Asia (but not with Vietnamese ports) in the early eighteenth century. The ban did not halt trade with Thai ports, however, because junk operators found ways to circumvent the restrictions when they left their home ports in China, and went to Ayutthaya anyway (Ng 1983: 57). During the period of the ban, which was lifted after ten years, junks from Ayutthaya continued to call at Chinese ports, even as far north as Ningbo (Ishii 1998: 99–101).

Second, to meet domestic demand for rice, the Chinese government
began to encourage imports of Thai rice in the 1720s by offering exemptions from import duty. Subsequently the government continued to provide incentives and allowed duty reductions of up to 50 percent of the value of a junk's cargo, if a specified minimum amount of rice was included (Cushman 1993: 91). This policy was maintained, and rice became the most important Thai export to China, placing Sino-Thai trade in an even more favored position than ever (Promboom 1971: 262–3).

Third, a decree of 1754 allowed crown junks from Ayutthaya (as well as those from other tribute countries) to engage in special summer trading at Guangzhou. This measure increased the number of junks that the king could send to Guangzhou and also allowed trading every year, rather than the previously sanctioned rule of once in three years (ibid. 1971: 302).

Fourth, only ten years before the fall of Ayutthaya, China restricted all foreign trade to Guangzhou. Despite its outward appearance, the decree did not stop shipping between Ayutthaya and the other ports of China. Merchants in ports such as Xiamen continued to invest in overseas trade (Ng 1983: 58–9), and junks from Thai ports continued to trade as usual under the guise of Chinese coastal trading.

**Ryukyu Kingdom**

The fact that the Thai had relations with the island kingdom of Ryukyu was unknown until the 1930s, when scholars began to examine an archive preserved near Naha in Japan's Okinawa Prefecture. The documents were in Chinese and had been written and preserved by the local Chinese community that served the Ryukyuan kings in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The records concerning Ayutthaya are dated from 1425 to 1570 and have been published in their entirety, with an English translation and commentary (Kobata and Matsuda 1969). The archive is small: six letters (including one from the Thai king) to Naha during the years 1680 and 1681, thirty official letters from Naha to Ayutthaya and twenty-three voyage certificates issued to Chinese junk operators who were bound from Naha to Ayutthaya. There are also eight voyage certificates for Patani. These items represent more than half of the records concerning Southeast Asia, which suggests that Ayutthaya was ranked first among the Ryukyuan kings' trading
partners south of China.

Trade with Ayutthaya was initiated by the islanders at least by the mid-1390s. Successive Ryukyuan rulers recruited Chinese who lived in the island kingdom to operate junkos and carry goods in a triangular trade on behalf of the Ryukyuan crown. The basic pattern was to carry goods mostly of Chinese origin to the Thai capital, and to take back to Ryukyu the Thai goods that were in greatest demand in China. When the Ryukyuan tribute missions went to China, some Thai goods were offered as tribute, and the rest of the cargo was sold in exchange for Chinese goods. Goods from Ayutthaya were thus involved in a second tribute-trading operation in China, albeit indirectly through the Ryukyuans. This trade continued until 1570, after which time the islands were increasingly brought under the control of Japan, and the official exchanges with Ayutthaya ceased.

The documentation on this trade and the friendly relations between the two crowns consists of letters written in Chinese to Ayutthaya, plus a few replies in Chinese. Apparently most of the letters from the Thai kings and ministers to their counterparts in Ryukyu have disappeared, but they are mentioned frequently in the extant documents, along with the gifts that accompanied them, which included Thai goods of high value and some manufactured goods such as cotton cloth and carpets from South Asia (Kobata and Matsuda 1969: 65, 75–6, 87–92). The Ryukyuan kings sent gifts such as silks, porcelain, fans and swords to the Thai sovereign, and one item was sent as a gift to the Thai king on each occasion: sulfur. This item deserves close attention, because it implies a strong Thai interest, at the time of the earliest Ryukyuan record, in obtaining sulfur, which may have been used in medicinal preparations but was also used to manufacture fireworks and possibly gunpowder.

Japan

Formal relations were established relatively late with Japan, in comparison with the rest of East Asia, and did not begin for more than three decades after the last-recorded mission from Ryukyu. The exact period when the Japanese first began trading with Ayutthaya and settling there is still a matter of speculation. It is known, however, that in 1570, when the Spanish
took possession of Manila, twenty Japanese were living there (Blair and Robertson 1903 iii: 101). And the Japanese were trading at Melaka at least by the first half of the 1580s (Mendoza 1854: 318). Given these Japanese activities, it seems probable that Japanese traders were already investigating the Thai market and that they became established in Ayutthaya by the 1580s. They would have been especially welcome at that time, given the partial depopulation of the Thai kingdom and the shortage of manpower after the 1569 Burmese conquest. Moreover, Japanese fighting men may have been recruited by the young warrior-prince, Naesuan, who was seeking every possible means of strengthening the defenses of the kingdom against repeated Burmese invasions during the mid-1580s and early 1590s.

A Japanese ship with a cargo of arms for Ayutthaya was stopped in Manila and sequestered by the Spanish in 1589 (ibid. 1903 vi: 126). The weapons destined for Naesuan’s army thus fell into Spanish hands: about 500 arquebuses (the most modern firearms available at that time), 500 swords and other bladed weapons. This shipment shows that Japanese traders were well informed about the current market demand in Ayutthaya and the urgent need at that time for arming the Thai forces. There are detailed records of Japanese trade in Thai ports after the turn of the seventeenth century, when the Japanese government began to issue trading licenses. These permits were given to entrepreneurs in Japan (Japanese, Chinese, Dutch, English and Portuguese merchants) who were trading in Southeast Asian waters. Their vessels sailed to nineteen different countries, and almost 20 percent were bound for Ayutthaya (Ishii 1971: 162).

Japanese Christian families may have begun migrating to Ayutthaya around 1597, when anti-Christian measures were invoked by the Japanese government. By the end of King Naesuan’s reign in 1605, the Japanese community was probably substantial, comprising not only Christian refugees but also warriors and traders. Like other ethnic groups in the capital, the Japanese community was (or soon would be) organized under a Japanese leader, and the heads of the Japanese community soon acquired high positions in Thai government service. This community continued to grow in Ayutthaya until the 1630s, when Japan forbade all Japanese immigration and emigration (Smith 1977: 9).

As discussed in the chapter by Nagazumi, the initiative in opening
formal relations was taken by the Shogunate, which sent a letter to the Thai court in 1606. There were continuous friendly exchanges—letters at first, and later six Thai embassies to Japan during the period 1616–29. After King Prasat Thong seized the throne in 1629, however, the Shogunate refused to receive any official Thai missions, and diplomatic relations were never restored.

In the 1650s and 1660s, a new pattern of contact emerged, which characterized the final century of trade between Ayutthaya and Japan. After Japan closed its ports to most foreign trade in the 1630s, Chinese junks were still allowed to call at Nagasaki. Among the junks recorded from Southeast Asia, a large proportion were from Thai ports, and many of them openly identified themselves as junks commissioned by the Thai kings: in other words, carrying the cargoes of the External Relations Ministry for disposal in Japan, in return for goods manufactured by the Japanese. There were usually only a few Thai (most commonly two or three) on board the crown junks, and the business transactions at Nagasaki were handled exclusive by the Chinese. Some or all of the Thai passengers were almost certainly ministry officials and must have had a supervisory role in the transactions on the king’s behalf.

The nature of the trade that emerged in the second half of the seventeenth century is clear from the records of the Nagasaki port officers (Ishii 1998: 42–98). Thai crown cargoes predominated in this trade (twenty-four of forty-two cargoes from Ayutthaya during the period 1687–1719, or 57 percent of the total). Crown junks were unusually large and accounted for a larger percentage share of total cargo by volume than their numbers imply. They had an even larger share of trade by value, since they had greater access than private traders did to high-value monopoly goods in the royal warehouses. The principal beneficiary of this trade was thus the Thai treasury.

**Vietnamese Coastline**

Three states in the Eastern Department’s region are not yet well documented: the two Vietnamese kingdoms and the kingdom of Champa, which was overwhelmed by the gradual southward advance of the Vietnamese and eventually disappeared.
Vietnam, like other countries that were not contiguous with Thai territory, is scarcely mentioned in the Thai chronicles and only in the late Ayutthaya period. By the time that the Thai court began to take note of Vietnamese affairs in the seventeenth century, Vietnam was divided into two separate kingdoms. Both were ruled in the name of the Vietnamese emperor, who lived in the north, where the Trịnh family held power. The south was governed from the capital city of Huế by the Nguyễn family, and this division remained in place beyond the Ayutthaya period.

Nguyễn-rulled Vietnam had regular trading relations with the Thai during the early seventeenth century, when rice production in the Mekong delta was not yet great enough to meet the demand in the region of the capital (Li 1998: 88). In the 1630s, for example, traders from the Thai kingdom are mentioned among the Japanese and Chinese who flocked to Vietnamese ports at that time (Manrique 1927 ii: 60), and particularly to Hoi An. The court at Huế seems also to have maintained friendly political relations with Ayutthaya during the reign of King Prasat Thong. A Nguyễn crown junk was sent to Ayutthaya to purchase goods in 1632 (Li 1988: 76), and annual visits by envoys from Ayutthaya were reported in the 1630s (Li and Reid 1993: 31). By the 1650s, however, regular formal exchanges seem to have ceased. Even so, junks from the Thai kingdom were taxed at lower rates than most foreign vessels (Li and Reid 1993: 116), and they continued to visit Vietnamese ports for the rest of the Ayutthaya period, probably because the junk operators were part of the Chinese coastal-trading network in the region.

In Thai records, the Vietnamese are mentioned only in the context of Cambodia. Cambodian historians, for their part, have discovered little about Khmer-Vietnamese relations prior to the 1650s, partly because the two kingdoms were separated by Champa and thus not contiguous (Mak Phoeun 1995: 267). Vietnamese agricultural settlements were established in parts of Cambodia’s Mekong-delta territory in the seventeenth century. The Vietnamese presence soon brought the court of Huế into conflict with the Thai, in a struggle for influence in Cambodia. From the mid-seventeenth century onward, disputes between rival claimants to the Cambodian throne frequently pitted the Thai against the Vietnamese, each supporting a rival candidate. Intervention by the Vietnamese and the Thai in a succession

One result of the 1716–7 conflict was the destruction of the Cambodian port of Banteay Meas. The history of this port and the emergence of a semi-independent kingdom along this coast during the final years of Ayutthaya is examined in the chapter by Sakurai and Kitagawa. Their study provides new insights into Thai-Vietnamese relations with respect to both Cambodia and the Chinese residents in the southeast tip of the peninsula in the eighteenth century. It also illustrates some features of Thai relations with the court of Cambodia—a vassal state that had communications with Ayutthaya both by land and by sea.

European visitors to Vietnamese ports often observed ships from Thai ports, which seem to have been part of the Chinese network of trade in these waters and provided regular communications. In the early 1680s, junks from both northern and southern Vietnam were reported every year at Ayutthaya (Gervaise 1989: 232). At least some Thai crown ships were sent to Vietnam during this period, more of which were reported in the north than in the south (Chaumont 1997: 95–6). In the 1690s Chinese junk operators from Ayutthaya went to south Vietnam every year (Lamb 1970: 53). Indeed, one reason why the French bishops of this period chose Ayutthaya as a gathering place for missionaries in transit was the availability of passage on junks bound for various ports of Vietnam.

The rise of a community of Vietnamese in Ayutthaya during the seventeenth century did not provide a commercial base for trade with Vietnamese ports, unlike the case of the Chinese and ports in China. The Vietnamese quarter, adjacent to the French seminary and cathedral, was in part a refugee camp, settled by Catholics and others who had fled from religious persecution and other forms of oppression in their homeland. Sakurai and Kitagawa show, moreover, that relations between the Teochiu (the predominant Chinese group in Thai territory) and the Cantonese
(who had settled in Vietnamese territory) were a major source of conflict around the end of the Ayutthaya period, and ethnic differences among the Chinese themselves may have curbed the development of trade and other communications with Vietnam.

Early Thai-Vietnamese political exchanges in the 1630s and 1640s may have been formalities that were essential to trading missions at that time. Once official trading relations ceased, the Thai court had no further interests to pursue on a regular basis. Political relations thus became inactive, and Thai crown goods must subsequently have been carried on consignment, under the guise of ordinary Chinese junk trade. Near the end of the Ayutthaya period, the Nguyen government itself saw no purpose in formal relations with the Thai court. As indicated in the chapter by Sakurai and Kitagawa, the Nguyen ruler rejected a 1755 Thai proposal for an agreement to protect junks from pirates off the Vietnamese coast. Nonetheless, there is evidence of occasional friendly contacts at the diplomatic level. In 1682, for example, the Thai minister wrote a letter to his counterpart at the Nguyen court, introducing a French bishop (Launay 1920 i: 113).

Opportunities for Thai-Vietnamese trade were restricted by the lack of complementarity in demand for each other’s products. In the 1690s saltpeter, sapan wood, insect lac, mother of pearl, ivory, tin, lead and rice were supplied from Thai sources to Nguyen Vietnam (Lamb 1970: 53), although all of these products could be obtained elsewhere. The southern Vietnamese kingdom produced few goods that the Thai wanted to buy in return: notably silk and silk thread, but these goods were readily available from China, where the quality was better. The Chinese junk operators who shipped rice and other products to Vietnamese markets must therefore have been obliged to cast about for any return cargoes that seemed likely to turn a profit in Thai marketplaces. Their persistence, nonetheless, is reflected in the data provided by Sakurai and Kitagawa, showing that even in the midst of the 1771–2 Thai-Vietnamese war in Cambodia, Chinese junks from Thai ports continued to trade along the Vietnamese coast.

Philippines

The fragmentary nature of records relating to Thai relations with
island Southeast Asia is well illustrated by the case of the Philippines. Some early trade with the Thai can be deduced from evidence such as ceramic wares produced in kilns in the Thai kingdom, during the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries, and shipped to the Philippines (Lim 1987: 18–9). But first-hand observations and written records begin only with the arrival of the Spanish and the founding of Manila in 1570. At that time, Muslim Filipinos in the region from Panay to Mindanao were reported to be well aware of Ayutthaya as an important importing country (Blair and Robertson 1903 ii: 116–7). Direct trade between Ayutthaya and Manila is recorded as early as 1587 (ibid. vii: 35).

European sources, although invaluable for some facts, do not reflect events from the Thai viewpoint, and it is always essential to examine current Thai needs and circumstances before drawing any conclusions or making broad generalizations. In the 1580s, the factor relating to the Philippines is well known: the need to defend Ayutthaya against a series of repeated Burmese efforts to restore the control imposed by Burma from 1564 to 1584. At this critical juncture, two sources of potential aid appeared, both previously little known to the Thai: the Japanese (who were skilled warriors and swordmakers) and the Spanish (who were potential suppliers of all kinds of weapons, including artillery).

In 1594, King Naresuan sent a mission to Manila, ostensibly to enquire about one of his junks that had disappeared, but more probably to make overtures to a potential ally and to investigate trading possibilities. His representatives had instructions to buy Spanish goods, and brought Thai goods to exchange for them (Morga 1971: 81–2). King Naresuan clearly had some knowledge of Manila as a potential market for Thai goods and as a supplier of Philippine and European goods, and his main objective was probably weapons, particularly firearms and cannons. Another Thai mission was sent to Manila in 1595–6. The Spanish replies were friendly but did not encourage an alliance. In subsequent years, King Naresuan probably saw no benefit in pursuing these relations because of the changed circumstances in the late 1590s in Burma (which was no longer a threat to Thai security) and in Cambodia (where the Spanish had intervened briefly, but ceased doing so after Naresuan's candidate for the succession was placed on the throne).

One Spanish historian (Rodao 1997) has identified five periods in
which there are some detailed records of relations between Manila and Ayutthaya. The first is the period of friendly Thai-Spanish exchanges of the 1590s, which have been extensively studied and documented (for example Groslier 1958, Briggs 1949 and Morga 1971). A two-decade period of hostile relations (arising from a Spanish attack on a Dutch ship on the Chao Phraya River in 1624) was followed by another long hiatus in relations. An argument is made for a probable increase in trade contacts during the 1680s, when European trading in Ayutthaya reached its height in the reign of King Narai. After another long interval, a Spanish embassy was sent to Ayutthaya in 1718 and concluded a treaty of friendship and commerce between the Thai kingdom and the government of the Philippines. A few scattered references to subsequent contacts attest to efforts by traders from Ayutthaya to pursue the relations envisaged in the treaty, notably with duty-free trading as a reciprocal incentive. The last period revolves around a company founded in Manila in 1752 for the purpose of building ships in the Thai capital. A shipwright's yard was built in Ayutthaya, but only one ship is known to have been constructed there before the company failed. Each of these ventures began and ended quickly, and little continuity can be traced in these Philippine-Thai relations.

Spanish trade statistics nonetheless provide an indication of the pattern of trade between Thai ports and Manila, at least during the period 1657–1714 (Chauu 1960: 164–77). As shown in the examples above, traders were active both before and after the period of the Spanish data, but apparently no record was made of them. Given the hostility between Ayutthaya and Manila from the 1620s into the 1640s, regular trading may have become firmly established about the time that these records begin, or perhaps a decade earlier.

Only three ships are recorded after 1700, and the following observations therefore apply to the years 1657–1700. During this period, Philippine-Thai trade was limited in volume but very regular: at least thirty-nine vessels arrived from the Thai kingdom (the ports are not specified). Allowing for undercounting, which is noted in some entries, about one ship per year on average was involved in this trade. Among the twenty-eight vessels identified by type, 25 percent were junks and were probably operated by Chinese traders residing in either Philippine or Thai ports. The others
were of western design and were probably operated by European coastal traders, who must have resided in the Philippines, since Ayutthaya had no Spanish community. These statistics may, however, be obscured by three-way or four-way coastal trading with other ports in East Asia, thus undercounting the actual number of ships that called at both Manila and a Thai port.

The value of the goods imported on ships from Ayutthaya ranged from 0.7 to 3.6 percent of the total annual imports of Manila (five-year averages 1666–1700). Moreover, two early averages are very prominent: 6.7 percent in the second half of the 1650s and 17.1 percent in the first half of the 1660s (Chaunu 1960: 207–11). What kinds of Philippine and Spanish goods were carried to Ayutthaya? Spanish wine was reported to be the most common wine in Ayutthaya in the 1680s (Gervaise 1989: 89). Contraband silver brought from the mines of Peru and Mexico through the port of Manila found its way to various parts of Asia, and contraband silver seems to have been one of the most important features of the Ayutthaya-Manila link (Rodao 1997: 40). It is possible, moreover, that some Thai goods made their way on the Spanish galleons across the Pacific to various places in the Americas. The limiting factor in Ayutthaya-Manila trade was probably the same as the case of Vietnam: a lack of complementarity in goods.

In the cultural sphere, a few facts are known. Filipinos occasionally went to Ayutthaya to study at the French seminary—a hotbed of revolutionary thought that spread its ideas eastward from the 1670s onward. The seminary served also as a place of asylum for missionaries who were expelled from time to time from China and Vietnam. In this safe haven, they regrouped and launched new offensives into the mission fields of East Asia. Such intellectual exports deserve attention as a subject in their own right, because of long-term implications for undermining administrative authority in Vietnam and parts of China. Filipinos were trained and ordained at the seminary from its very beginning. These Filipino priests were destined, however, not for the mission fields of their homeland but for the mainland Asian missions under the jurisdiction of French bishops.
Sultanates of the Indonesian Archipelago

In the case of the Eastern Department of the Thai ministry, the most important political and trading relations can be traced chronologically, thanks to extensive documentation in Chinese, Japanese and Ryukyuan records. These sources, supplemented by European observations, provide a general impression of the network to the east in which junks from Ayutthaya were involved.

By contrast, source materials concerning Thai relations that came under the Western Department are fragmentary, lack continuity and often consist of nothing more than an occasional, casual observation. Even so, if the fragments of evidence are considered together, a general impression does emerge for both the Indonesian archipelago and the rest of South Asia.

The patterns of trade in this region are extensively documented in the general literature on Indonesian history, although Ayutthaya’s role in this trade is not well represented. Anyone reading only the extant Thai records would be almost totally unaware that the island world existed. European records, on the other hand, show that the Thai court had both political and commercial interests in some of the island ports. Doubtless the Thai ministry’s Western Department kept detailed records on each major port, but these documents, like most other Thai records, disappeared in the flames of 1767.

Official relations between the Thai court and the various sultanates in the archipelago are difficult to assess from the viewpoint of the Thai or the island courts, because the Thai records were destroyed and island records, if they still exist, have not yet shed light on this subject. Records that do exist tend to be random glimpses by Europeans, which contain very little detail. Specific years and places are known, concerning some Thai political relations and trade with the archipelago, particularly Aceh, Jambi, Riau, Banten, Borneo and Timor. But we may never know the actual context of the relations, the political issues that were involved and the goods that were traded. Rare examples of political motivations include the proposal by King Naresuan to the sultan of Aceh for a joint attack on the Portuguese at Melaka (Lancaster 1940: 103) and the queen of Aceh’s invitation to King Narai to join an alliance against the Dutch (Laumay 1920 ii: 154, Choisy 1997:

The earliest European observers noted the Thai concern with affairs throughout the Malay peninsula and Ayutthaya’s historical claim to suzerainty over the entire peninsula. The Thai kings received token submissions from the rulers of some sultanates (such as Patani and Kedah) closest to the Thai provinces in the peninsula, but relations with those farther south on the peninsula seem to have been tenuous.

Other relations, such as those with Aceh, seem to have begun only during the second half of the Ayutthaya period: that is, after the Portuguese capture of the Melaka sultanate in 1511, the decline of Melaka as the chief regional entrepôt and the rise of other ports as important trading centers where Thai crown ships may have sought profitable exchanges. The sultans of Jambi in south Sumatra had relations with Ayutthaya and are reported to have sent the gold flowers (*bunga mas*) that were tokens of Malay-state vassalage to the Thai kings. French missionaries recorded the audience given by King Narai in October 1682 for ambassadors from Jambi (Launay 1920 ii: 115), but provided no details about the purpose of the mission. Dutch records, however, reveal that political affairs must have been involved, because a debate arose about whether Jambi was a vassal of the Thai crown or of the Dutch company (Vos 1993: 49).

The Thai strategy for establishing (or perhaps restoring) relations with Palembang is somewhat clearer. In the mid-1740s, when Palembang was suffering from a shortage of rice, the sultan announced that rice imports from Thai ports were essential, to prevent starvation. In 1744 a Thai crown ship arrived in Palembang with a cargo of rice. The sultan was informed that the Thai court could supply all of his needs but that he should send the traditional gold flowers when he made his request. Palembang had never sent tribute to Siam before, but the sultan might have complied, had the Dutch not intervened. The Dutch provided the rice and subsequently prevented ships of Thai origin from entering the river and pursuing talks with Palembang (Vos 1993: 37, 49).

Javanese traders were well aware of the early Ayutthaya kingdom and the extent of its territory, as shown by a Javanese map of the Asian coastline in the early 1500s (Earle and Villiers 1990: 149). In the mid-1680s, Ayutthaya had a small community of Javanese (Chaumont 1997: 84), and some
Javanese were living in the kingdom at the beginning of the twentieth century (Interior Ministry 1910: 142). The Civil Hierarchy Law, moreover, specifically mentions jurisdiction over the Javanese, which demonstrates that they were distinguished in some way from other resident foreign communities in Ayutthaya. Javanese activities in Thai trade could be a rewarding subject of study, if sources can be found.

Indian Ocean Rim

Trade contacts with ports in India and Arabia long predate the founding of Ayutthaya, since the Chao Phraya basin was not far from the routes across the Malay peninsula that led from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea. The inclusion of frankincense in Ayutthaya’s 1386 tribute to China (Ishii 1992: 81) demonstrates that Ayutthaya was already supplied by the trade network extending as far west as the Arabian peninsula. The earliest Arab text that describes the geographical position of Ayutthaya accurately is dated 1462 (Tibbetts 1979: 193). It is not surprising that, by this time, the new Thai capital was well known to Arab navigators and other South Asian traders. When this text was composed, the Thai had recently extended their control over part of the west coast of the Malay peninsula, in the area around Tenasserim, which offered relatively short, quick, overland communications with the Gulf coast and the capital. The port of Mergui, moreover, gave Ayutthaya’s rulers direct access to the ports around the rim of the Indian Ocean, through the network that already existed at Mergui before the Thai took control.

Sunait in his chapter describes the early prosperity of this port and the economic rivalry in the sixteenth century that drew the Thai into conflict with the expanding Burmese empire. As a result, overland trade through Tenasserim was disrupted or stopped completely several times during the second half of the 1500s. The following century, by contrast, was a period of relative peace and rapid expansion of South Asian trade with Ayutthaya, as discussed in the chapter by Andaya. Commercial records give the impression of a large influx of South Asian traders to Ayutthaya in the 1610s (Smith 1977: 50). Thai records, moreover, show that South Asians from the Persian Gulf area moved to Ayutthaya at this time and assisted in reorganizing the External Relations
Ministry (Thiphakorawong 1939: 3), no doubt giving more prominence than ever to trade with South Asia.

These changes took place shortly after the beginnings of Japanese trading activities and the establishment of the Japanese community in Ayutthaya. The combination of these two phenomena seems to have contributed to dynamic growth in Ayutthaya’s maritime trade. The Muslims bound the Thai into the Islamic trading world as far west as the Arabian peninsula. The Japanese, for their part, bought Thai goods as well as goods in transit from South Asia, and carried them to the ports of Vietnam and Japan. This burst of Indo-Japanese activities lasted through the 1620s. Trade with Japan was temporarily disrupted during the next two decades, and the Japanese community at Ayutthaya dwindled. Meanwhile, the South Asians grew increasingly influential at the Thai court and promoted their trade interests accordingly, using the Chinese network for their trade with East Asia. The number of South Asians residing in Ayutthaya may have reached a peak in the 1670s or early 1680s, before King Narai took action against many corrupt South Asian officials in his service and expelled them (Chaumont 1997: 81). Nonetheless, he continued to maintain relations with South Asian and other Muslim courts, and the trading community remained active.

In the mid-seventeenth century, King Narai sent an embassy to the ruler of Golconda at Hyderabad, as Andaya mentions, but records of such relations are sparse. French observers (Chaumont 1997: 110–3, Gervaise 1989: 227) noted that ambassadors from the Shah of Persia and the Mughal emperor were received by the Thai king at a higher level of court protocol than were ambassadors from lesser countries—presumably meaning the island sultanates and the Lao—but provide no details of the context of the missions. Mughal officials invested heavily in trading ventures from Bengal, which went to ports such as Tenasserim, and trading relations seem the most likely motive for all these missions.

The best known exchanges were with Persia. King Narai’s ambassadors to the Shah reached Persia in 1669 (Vajirana 1916 ii: 92–8). And a return Persian embassy, which stayed in the Thai capital almost the entire year 1686, is documented in a diary kept by one member of the mission (O’Kane 1972).

Other exchanges in the 1600s, as shown in the chapter by Andaya, are
known thus far only through random observations made either in Ayutthaya itself or in various places in India. Very little is known yet about Ayutthaya’s political relations with South Asia during the 1700s, although trading relations are relatively well documented, especially those with the port of Mergui (Prakash 1998: 289). The only archives that once documented these political affairs comprehensively were the Thai king’s secretariat, where letters from all foreign sovereigns were kept (Gervaise 1989: 228), and the External Relations Ministry. Both archives were destroyed during the Burmese sack of the Thai capital.

Sri Lanka developed a special relationship with the Thai kingdom. No trading relations were established, and at the end of the Ayutthaya period, there was no direct shipping between the island and Thai territory, not even to Mergui. The two kingdoms nonetheless were economic competitors, because both exported elephants to sell in Indian markets (Bowrey 1905: 179–8). Cultural relations between the Thai and Sinhalese began, as noted by Charnvit, before the founding of Ayutthaya, when Thai monks went to study in the Buddhist island kingdom. Sri Lanka was well known to the Thai, not only for its religious scholarship but also as the site of sacred relics: the two major reasons why Thai monks have embarked on pilgrimages to the island over the centuries.

These ecclesiastical relations took a political form during the final decades of Ayutthaya, when a serious decline in the Sinhalese Buddhist Order led the Sinhalese king to seek help. After making two contacts with the Thai court during the 1740s, and receiving positive assurances both times, he sent the customary royal letter with three ambassadors, royal gifts and monks, who were formally received at the Thai court in 1751. King Barommakot reciprocated with an embassy to Sri Lanka, which included the Thai monks who were needed to perform ordinations and restore the Buddhist Order in the island. At least two other groups of Thai monks were sent to Sri Lanka later in the 1750s. These relations were deemed important enough by the Thai chroniclers to warrant a rare reference to South Asia: an entry recounting the 1751 audience for the Sinhalese (Damrong 1973 ii: 235). Although these political relations were short-lived, Thai monks pursued the ecclesiastical exchanges and continued to make pilgrimages to Sri Lanka (Damrong 1916: 15–6).
No official relations were sought by the Thai court with the Maldives Islands, but the Maldives were an important source of one imported item that was used by even the poorest of Thai people. Gujarati ships regularly sailed south from India to the Maldives and then went to Tenasserim (Saris 1900: 222). One reason for taking this route was to load a cargo of cowries: small, glossy and sometimes brightly marked sea shells, which were used in place of coins in Thai marketplaces. The Philippines and Maluku were reported to be other sources of Ayutthaya’s cowries (Gervaise 1989: 120, Fryer 1909: 219). Their use in the Thai capital early in the fifteenth century was noted by Chinese explorers (Fei Hsin 1996: 43), at a time when Thai coins had not yet been minted. These shells were similar in shape to the first Thai silver coins: the bullet-shaped (or perhaps more correctly, cowrie-shaped) baht that were introduced in the mid-fifteenth century (Wicks 1992: 182). Despite the introduction of coins, cowries continued to be used for transactions of small value in Thai marketplaces throughout the Ayutthaya period.

Most of the Thai trading representatives mentioned in extant records were sent on ad-hoc missions to specific ports to promote friendly relations with the local ruler and his court, but their primary objective was probably to seek the best possible terms for Thai crown trade, particularly reductions or waivers of taxation. The Western Department in the Ayutthaya period also appointed some merchants, who resided in the ports of greatest importance for Thai crown trade, to act as managers of royal trading transactions. According to a 1674 report (Launay 1920 ii: 70), one of the leading Muslim merchants in Masulipatnam was also the royal Thai trading agent. As noted by Andaya, another agent of the Thai crown resided in Golkonda. These are rare examples of a long-term official presence on behalf of the Thai king in foreign ports, although such agents must have been appointed in numerous trade centers during this period and in the following century. Since such appointments were often reciprocal, agents of South Asian rulers may likewise have resided and traded in Mergui and Ayutthaya.

Our lack of knowledge about Thai relations with South Asian governments (other than Sri Lanka) during the 1700s may be due in part to a lack of basic research. Nonetheless, the existence of a few resident trading agents of the crown is known: one at San Thomé in the suburbs of Madras (Basset 1989: 633), others in Surat and Masulipatnam, and a group of traders
sent from Ayutthaya to reside in Batavia (Brummelhuis 1987: 43).

*Decline of Trade with South Asia*

The decline of trade with South Asia was already apparent by the mid-1680s, in the final years of King Narai's reign. Contemporary observers attributed the slump in trade to two factors in Thai policy. First, many South Asians were expelled from the kingdom. Second, the royal monopolies encompassed virtually all international trade goods (Chaumont 1997: 81, 97–8). Historians have tended to interpret the events surrounding the death of King Narai in 1688 as a turning point, beyond which the Thai court became inward looking, discouraged foreign traders and depressed western trade further. But the internal factors most often cited—trade policy and widespread resistance to Phet Racha's usurpation in 1688—had no more than short-term effects on trade.

If domestic explanations are needed, a far more serious factor, with long-term consequences, was the smallpox epidemic of 1695 (Launay 1920 i: 290–1). It persisted into 1696, reduced the population and must have had a strongly negative effect on demand for imported goods for everyday use, such as cloth from South Asia and inexpensive household goods from China. The numbers of Chinese junks arriving during this time may be an indicator of sudden change. During the 1696 trading season, when the effects of the epidemic became apparent, at least thirteen junks from China were reported at Ayutthaya; in the next season, only two seem to have arrived; and in each of the following two years, only six or seven came. By 1703, however, the number had risen to about ten (Ishii 1998: 74–83), and imports from China were recovering.

In the case of South Asian trade, external factors seem to be more important than internal events in explaining the decline. One author offers the following general impressions from the viewpoint of South Asian merchants who exported to Tenasserim, Phuket and other west-coast ports during this period. He concludes that

the decline of the Bengal-eastward trade ... was ascribable entirely to the withdrawal from high-seas trade by Mughal state officials engaged in
trade in addition to their other activities. The volume of eastward trade carried on by the ordinary merchants registered no particular decline. (Prakash 1998: 236–7)

This view is supported by reports that ordinary South Asian traders continued to ply the overland route to Ayutthaya from Tenasserim near the end of King Narai’s reign (Ishii 1998: 41, 54), in spite of the expulsions of Muslim officials. Likewise during the 1680s and 1690s, coastal trading by some Europeans continued without interruption (Chaunu 1960: 171–3), although most English and French traders left temporarily. Moreover, Narai’s comprehensive trade monopoly seems to have been abandoned quickly. His two immediate successors both encouraged European traders to come, and offered trade concessions as incentives (Launay 1920 ii: 93, Prakash 1998: 289), although with only modest success.

Mergui continued to play the major role in trade with South Asia. After a short period of interruption, following the sudden exodus of most Europeans and the death of King Narai, Mergui regained its former standing and was second only to Pegu in importance in country trade with Madras (Mills 1997: 45). In the early 1700s, Muslim merchants again dominated the import trade in Indian cotton cloth at Mergui, and European coastal traders found it increasingly hard to compete in this market (Prakash 1998: 224). European ships nonetheless went to Mergui regularly, because of the resources available for repairs (Launay 1920 ii: 98).

In the 1700s, as in the previous century, the most profitable Thai exports to India were elephants and tin (both crown monopolies), and Indian printed cottons (likewise monopoly goods) were the imported items in greatest demand in Thai markets. Crown ships pursued the trade in these same three goods into the early nineteenth century (Damrong 1969: 134–7). Trade with South Asia offered no institutional tax advantages comparable to those with China, and unlike the Thai supplies of topical goods that satisfied a continuing demand in China, the Thai had few products that could be sold for a good profit in South Asian markets. Moreover, Ayutthaya’s old competitive advantages as an entrepôt for Chinese goods in transit to South Asia began to disappear in the course of the 1600s and 1700s. Direct shipping between India and China became more developed during this
period, and European companies began to manufacture and supply fine-quality silk and porcelain to India.

By the 1700s, it is not obvious what the Thai markets had to offer South Asian merchants, other than elephants and tin. But individual Muslim merchants continued to trade actively. Mid-century observers spoke of the great affluence of the Muslim merchants in Mergui (Launay ii: 144). In Ayutthaya itself during its final days, there were about seventy-eight separate marketplaces within the capital’s walls, and four of these were clearly identified as markets in which Muslims were concentrated (Boran 1969: 203–4). Indian cloth was sold in two of them, and South Asian traders may also have worked in other markets that specialized in specific kinds of cloth. In one area, they sold cheap brass goods such as bracelets, anklets, decorative hair pins, rings and small bells. In another, their wares were household goods such as baskets, rope, woven mats and wire. Thus, in spite of their reputation primarily as cloth traders, they offered an array of inexpensive goods for everyday use.

**European-Held Ports of Asia**

The histories of Asian ports that were controlled by Europeans during the Ayutthaya period have been extensively documented: the Portuguese in Goa, East Timor and Macau, the Dutch in Batavia, the Portuguese (and later Dutch) in Melaka, the Danes in Tranquebar, the French in Pondichery and the English in Madras. Ayutthaya’s trade extended to all these ports, either directly by ship or indirectly by way of the transpeninsular route through Tenasserim. So much has been published about European trading activities that they need no introduction here and will be mentioned only briefly, in the context of intra-Asian trade and communications.

After an initial flurry of interest in the 1510s and 1520s, Portuguese officials concluded that Ayutthaya would not be an important source of goods for Portuguese crown trade, and Portuguese involvement in Ayutthaya was left to private traders thereafter. The Portuguese seem to have sent ships every year between the Coromandel Coast and Tenasserim until the middle of the sixteenth century, although there is little documentation about these activities (Flores 1995: 34). The emergence of this trade may be one of the
economic factors in the Burmese-Thai rivalry of this period, which is the subject of the chapter by Sunait.

Similarly, trade between Thai ports and Portuguese Macau did not offer any special advantages to Thai and Chinese entrepreneurs in Ayutthaya. Prices were higher in Macau than in Guangzhou, but one crown junk went to Macau each year, according to a report in the 1680s (Chaumont 1997: 95). Portuguese ships were sometimes chartered to carry crown goods (Brummelhuis 1987: 35), which may have been one way of obtaining better terms of trade at Macau. Macau nonetheless was part of the intra-Asian network of communications with Ayutthaya. It served as a safe port for some people in transit, especially French missionaries during the final century of the Ayutthaya period. Some of the missionaries stayed briefly in Ayutthaya for language training and then passed through Macau, sometimes accompanied by seminary students, en route to missions in Vietnamese and Chinese territory. Voyagers from South Asia sometimes were able to get passage on Portuguese ships to Macau, when no ships were bound for Ayutthaya, and on Portuguese ships or Chinese junks from Macau to Ayutthaya. The Dutch at Batavia played such an important role in this network that even the Catholic missionaries often had to avail themselves of Protestant services, in order to reach their destinations. These communications—for carrying goods on consignment as well as carrying passengers—thus linked Thai ports into the wider coastal network that included Dutch, French, English, Portuguese and other Europeans.

Overland Relations

Although maritime relations are the subject of this book, brief mention should be made of contacts by land, because the External Relations Minister was responsible for overland as well as maritime diplomatic relations. These exchanges were with the rulers of the kingdoms bordering on Thai territory: the Lao at Champasak, Vientiane and Luang Prabang, the Muang at Nan and Chiang Mai and the Mon at Pegu (until its incorporation into the Burmese empire in the sixteenth century). There were occasional contacts with Shan rulers, and at least one embassy is recorded from as far north as Chiang Rung, capital of the Lü kingdom of Sipsong Panna on the upper
Mekong (Klaproth 1832).

There were no normal political relations between the Thai and Burmese capitals, other than the period between 1564 and 1584, when Ayutthaya was a dependency state of the Burmese empire. The successive conflicts between the Thai and the Burmese, from the 1540s to the 1850s, have been extensively studied (Damrong 1963). Even during the four decades following the 1767 destruction of Ayutthaya, when relations were the tensest and most embittered, the two adversaries occasionally engaged in a dialogue. Letters were exchanged between ministers of the Thai and Burmese courts, as well as between governors on both sides of the frontier (Damrong 1964). The objective was to restore friendly relations, although the only positive result seems to have been a lessening of fears about renewed invasions. It seems likely that similar exchanges took place during the final century and a half of the Ayutthaya period. For example, in documents of the mid-1600s, there is some vague evidence of contact between the courts and an exchange of royal letters (Brummelhuis 1987: 39, 57).

The approach advocated by Sunait for seeking economic factors to explain historical events is equally applicable to the southeast frontier of the kingdom. After the fall of Angkor, the Cambodian capital was moved to a site near the Mekong and more accessible to ocean-going vessels. The new capital was destroyed, however, during the Thai invasion of 1594. Historians portray this war in the political terms that are outlined in the Thai and Cambodian chronicles. But economic motivations also played a role. Two decades earlier, the second Thai defeat by the Burmese (in 1569) was followed by a slump in Chinese trading activity, and during the 1580s and early 1590s, when the Thai capital was repeatedly besieged by Burmese forces, Ayutthaya was not an attractive port of call. Many Chinese and Japanese junks of this period probably turned to the peaceful Cambodian capital, where they could procure most of the goods that they would otherwise have purchased from the Thai market. One objective of the crushing blow delivered to the Cambodians in 1594 was surely to disrupt this flow of goods through Cambodia and regain Thai domination over this lucrative trade.

Similar considerations are treated in the chapter by Sakurai and Kitagawa, who examine the destruction of the Cambodian port of Banteay
Meas in 1717, its rise during the next half century as a Chinese-dominated trading center and its next destruction by the Thai in 1771. The authors outline further changes in trade and political power along the Cambodian coast in the eighteenth century, providing a new perspective on the southeast extremity of the Gulf area. They show how a virtually independent port-kingdom came into existence there, during the final decades of the Ayutthaya period, in territory that has usually been assumed to be under Thai domination.

They also discuss new agricultural settlements in the Mekong delta and the gradual extension of Vietnamese control in the direction of the Gulf coast. To complete their story from the Thai viewpoint, it should be added that the Thai court in the early Bangkok period maintained friendly relations with the heir to the Nguyen throne (the future Emperor Gia Long). King Rama I provided him with weapons and other material support for his struggle to defeat the Tay Son usurpers, who had seized both the north and the south of Vietnam during the 1770s and 1780s. King Rama I also agreed to acknowledge the Nguyen heir’s de facto control over Banteay Meas (Ha Tien), which was a strategic port of entry from the Gulf into the Mekong delta and for supplying Saigon—the Nguyen base of military operations from 1787 to the end of the century. As a result, the entire southeast coast of the Gulf passed peacefully out of the sphere of Thai authority.

Given the importance of trade in Ayutthaya’s early development, the theme of economic rivalry deserves careful attention, and major events such as these should be reassessed in future studies of relations between the Thai and their immediate neighbors.

A Maritime Perspective for Future Research

Dozens of books have been written about Ayutthaya’s political and commercial relations with Europeans. Indeed, European publications with a few details on this subject appeared as early as the sixteenth century in the first editions of Varthema (1510), Pigafetta (1525), Ramusio (1556), Barbosa (1563), Barros (1563) and Cruz (1569), to name but a few published prior to 1600. Given the predominance of contemporary European sources, both published and unpublished, and the near-absence of contemporary Thai
records, it is not surprising that successive generations of historians have
drawn upon these rich sources of information and have consequently placed
emphasis on relations with Europeans.

Much less attention has been paid to Thai relations with the other
countries of Asia. Japanese and Chinese historians have drawn upon their
respective records for the cases of Japan, China and the Ryukyu kingdom.
This book attempts to bring some of these research findings together, to fill
a little of the remaining gap in the literature and to provide a broad perspective
encompassing all of maritime Asia, from Japan in the east to the Arabian
peninsula in the west.

The chapters provide a chronological sampling that ranges across
Ayutthaya’s history. Wyatt and Charnvit examine the capital’s first century.
Sunait continues with the second half of the fifteen and part of the sixteenth
centuries. Andaya and Nagazumi survey the seventeenth century. And
finally, Lapian, Sakurai and Kitagawa examine important changes in the
eighteenth century. These contributions are intended as a modest beginning,
and it is hoped that they point the way to new areas of investigation and a
better understanding of Thai history from the perspective of its maritime
economy and diplomacy.

Appendix: A Translation from the Civil Hierarchy Law

The following is a translation of article 11 of the Civil Hierarchy Law
(phra aiyakan tamnaeng na phonlariiian) in the Three Seals Law Code
(Kotmai tra sam duang 1986 i: 189–93). It provides an outline of the structure
of the Ministry of External Relations and Maritime Trading Affairs at the
time the law code was revised in 1805. No ministry name appears in the text
of the law, nor does the popular title for the minister: the Phra Khlang.3 His
long formal title (the first entry in the law) was often shortened to Ok Phaya
(later Chao Phraya) Kosa Thibodi (or shortened further to Ok Phaya Kosa).

As a guide to reading the text, annotations have been added below
in square brackets by the translator. They do not appear in the original.
For research purposes, these annotations should be used with caution,
because they are the translator’s interpretation of the arrangement of the
names in the law. The divisions added below are based on the sakdina-ranks
(or simply *na*), which are the quantitative measures of official status. These are listed in descending order within each division of the hierarchy.

[Minister]
Ok phaya si thamma ratcha decha chat ammattayanuchit phiphit ratana ratcha kosa thibodi aphai phiriya bara krama phahu [who uses] the Lotus Seal [and] has the *sakdina*-rank of 10,000

[First Department. The Text does not indicate a department title. The titles of officials indicate that it was a Department of General Administration, Legal Appeals and Records.]

Phra Phiphat Kosa, the senior deputy minister, 1,000 *na*
Khun Phinit Chai, the deputy minister who sits as judge, 800 *na*
Khun Raksa Sombat, who affixes seals to petitions for distribution, 800 *na*
Khun Ratcha Akon, in charge [*?*] of the central registers [i.e., ministry bookkeeping], 800 *na*
Khun Thep, head of royal taxes, 600 *na*
Khun Yisan Saphayakon, chief record keeper, 600 *na*
Khun Thip Kosa, 800 *na* ¹
Khun Thanarat, who distributed the king’s remunerations [bia wat, annual or occasional grants of funds to individuals], 600 *na*
Eight *khun mün* [petty officials] who come under Khun Si Ratcha Akon, each having 300 *na*
Thirteen *khun mün* who come under Khun Thep Ratcha, each having 300 *na*
Khun Sombat Bodi, drum unit [*?*]: ⁵ four *khun mün* each having 600 *na*
Khun Kaeo Ayat, maritime legal clerk, 600 *na*
Khun Akson, scribe, 600 *na*

[Second Department. No department name is given in the text. This department was known popularly as the Krom Tha Khwa (literally the Ports Department of the Right) and was responsible for maritime affairs to the west (India and the rest of South Asia) and south (the Indonesian archipelago).]

Phra Chula Ratcha Montri [department head], 1,400 *na*
Khun Ratcha Setthi, the deputy head in charge of South Asians, Javanese, Malay, English [and so on?], $800$ na

Luang Ratcha Montri, harbor master, in charge of South Asians, English, Vietnamese and Portuguese (*khaek prathet angkrit yuam farang*), $800$ na


Luang Nonthakket, harbor master, in charge of Muslim (?) South Asians, $800$ na


[Third Department. No department name is given in the text. This department was known popularly as the Krom Tha Sai (Ports Department of the Left) and was responsible for maritime affairs to the east (China, the Ryukyu kingdom and Japan) and the Chinese trade network in general (including its ties with the archipelago). It also operated the crown junks.]

Luang Chodūk Ratcha Setthi, department head, $1,400$ na

Luang Thep Phakdi, harbor master, in charge of the Dutch, $600$ na


Khun Wora Wathi, French interpreter, $300$ na


Khun Wisut Sakhon, interpreter for translating for the [Chinese] junk captains at Paknam, $400$ na

Chinese, South Asian, Portuguese (*farang*) and English captains of large vessels of 4 *wa* or more [decks at least 8 metres wide], $300$ na [each]

Captains of vessels of more than 6 meters [deck] width, $200$ na [each]

Chun Chu, $9$ junk captain, $400$ na

Ton Hon, navigator, and La Ta, chief records keeper, $200$ na [each] for a large junk and $100$ na [each] for a small junk
Pan Chu, who repair and refurbish junks, and Tai Kong of the Left and Tai Kong of the Right, two helmsmen, 80 na each
[The next six crewmen, all of the same rank, are grouped together, perhaps to show the structure of this part of the crew.]
Sin Teng Thao of the Left and Sin Teng Thao of the Right, 2 middle-ranking records keepers, 50 na each
A Pan, [responsible for the] main mast, 50 na
Chong Kwa, who oversees all the men [?], 50 na
Tek Kho, who guards the cargo, 50 na
A Kung, junk’s carpenter, 50 na
[The next six crewmen are likewise grouped together.]
Iao Kong, who performs worship [buchaphra, also meaning paying homage to images or other sacred objects], 30 na
Tua Lia, in charge of the riggings of the rear mast, 30 na
Sam Pan, in charge of the riggings of the forward mast, 30 na
Chom Phu, 30 na [There is no indication of his duties in the text.]
Thao Teng, in charge of the anchor, 30 na
Hu Tiao, who sounds the water’s depth, 30 na
[The next twenty-two crewmen are likewise grouped together.]
It [number 1] Sian, Yi [number 2] Sian and Sam [number 3] Sian, who lower, 25 na [each] [These may be the men who raise and lower the sails.]
Chap Ka Thao, who swabs the junk, 25 na
Eighteen Boei Pan [term not identified], retainers of the Chun Chu, La Ta and Pan Chu, 25 na [each]
Seven lesser crewmen, who stand on guard, 16 na each

[Fourth Department. Royal Warehouses Department]¹⁰
Phra Si Phiphat Rattana Kosa [department head], 3,000 na
Luang Rattana Kosa, 800 na
Khun Phibun Sombat, 600 na
Khun Sawatdi Kosa, 600 na
Mün Sombat Bodi, 300 na
Mün Thanarat, 300 na
Notes

1. Lailert (1972: ch. 6) indicates the transfer took place between 1688 and 1767 but does not find evidence of an exact date. A missionary report dated January 1699 mentions that the deputy minister (Phraya Phiphat Kosa) was preparing instructions to be given to the governor of Tenasserim and the newly appointed governor of Mergui (Launay ii: 25). Orders to a provincial town were issued by the ministry responsible for administration in that area, and thus administrative responsibility for the peninsular area must have been given to the External Relations Ministry prior to 1699.

2. Missionaries were allowed to engage in trade to support themselves, although the French mission society did not permit its members to do so. Some of the early Ayutthaya-Manila coastal trading might be related in part to the presence of entrepreneurial Spanish, Portuguese and Italian priests in Ayutthaya.

3. European corruptions of the term *phra khlang* (such as *barcalon*) may give the misleading impression that it is derived from the title of minister's counterpart in a Muslim sultanate: the *shahbandar*. The Thai term *khlang*, however, is a Khmer loanword and refers to a storehouse or warehouse for goods or treasure. The more precise Thai term for the ministry's buildings is *khlang sin kha*, which refers specifically to a warehouse for trade goods. The prefix *phra* shows that it is a state institution.

4. Since the number 800 is out of descending numerical order, this official may have been the head of a subdivision comprising the positions that appear below his title. Or the number in the text may be an error for 600.

5. The term *klong chana sut*, if the spelling is correct, indicates something to do with a drum. This unit of four men may have been involved in communicating ministerial instructions, by going to a public place, beating a drum or gong to assemble the people and then reading the instructions aloud.

6. The translations of the terms for the nationalities named in this list (*khaek prathet chawa malayu angkrit*) are tentative and subject to considerable doubt. Ethnic definitions that were still familiar in the
early twentieth century appear in the 1909/10 census, which used the prefix khaek for eight categories of people: Malay, Javanese, Cham, Thet (meaning Muslims from India), Sikhs, Sinhalese, Hindus and Klings (Interior Ministry (1910: 142). The term khaek prathet in the 1805 law code may therefore have the meaning of “khaek of all nations” and may thus comprise all South Asians (defined here as people from Arabia, Persia, India, Sri Lanka, the Malay peninsula and the Indonesian archipelago), both Muslim and non-Muslim. See the text of the chapter for further discussion.

7. The translations of these terms (khaek prathet angkrit yuan farang) are likewise tentative. The term farang (meaning a person of European ancestry in modern Thai) was used in the Ayutthaya period for the Portuguese, who were virtually the only Europeans in the Thai kingdom for nearly a century. See for example a 1674 missionary report in Latin, which states that the Portuguese settlement was known locally as Ban Farang, or “village of the Farang” (Launay 1920 ii: 60). In the early Bangkok period, the ethnic category farang doem (“original Europeans” in modern translation) was still used for the Portuguese Christians.

8. This ethnic term (phram thet) literally refers to Brahmans of India (that is, Hindus) and perhaps includes other non-Muslims from India. But the evidence of a Hindu trading community in Ayutthaya is very slight. The market adjacent to the Great Swing of Siva (Sao Ching Cha, used in ceremonies by the court Brahmans) was called the Brahman District (Yan Phram). It sold household goods such as baskets, buckets, mats and wire (Boran 1969: 205) and was the only market with this ethnic identification. In spite of the written law text, this group may have comprised Muslims of Indian, Persian, Malay and Indonesian origin in the late Ayutthaya period. See the text of the chapter for further discussion on the division of responsibilities between the two harbor masters.

9. Beginning with Chun Chu and ending with Boei Pan, all the terms for individual crew members seem to be adopted from a Chinese dialect.

10. The duties of these officials are not stated in the text but can be deduced from their titles. The two officials with titles including the term sombat (“wealth” or “goods”) and the three officials with titles including the
term *kosa* (associated with maritime affairs) suggest that this department was responsible for the storage of royal trading goods, which were either imported or collected from the provinces for export. The name Royal Warehouses Department is conjectural.
Origins of a Capital and Seaport: The Early Settlement of Ayutthaya and Its East Asian Trade

Charnvit Kasetsiri

Ayutthaya was the first major political, cultural and commercial center of the Thai. It emerged in 1351 as the capital of a kingdom that lasted for more than four hundred years. The city was destroyed by the Burmese in 1767, and the capital was then moved to the area of Thonburi and Bangkok. The early history of the kingdom is striking in terms of its success as a new military power, which brought under its control an area comprising the lower reaches of all the large river basins that drain into the Gulf—roughly the whole of present-day central Thailand. During the first few decades of its existence, Ayutthaya’s leaders launched a series of wars and managed to overcome two of the most important kingdoms of mainland Southeast Asia: Sukhothai and Angkor. Sukhothai was invaded for the first time in 1354/5, and it fell to superior Ayutthayan forces in 1378/9 (Damrong 1973 i: 420). To the east, Thai armies repeatedly attacked Angkor, capturing the Khmer capital for the first time in 1369 and for the second time in 1388/9 (Wolters 1966: 44–89). In the following century, the territory once ruled from Sukhothai was successfully incorporated into the expanding new kingdom, and in 1419/20 Sukhothai became a vassal state of Ayutthaya. In 1431, Angkor was captured again and depopulated, forcing the Khmer to abandon the city and establish their capital in the southeast of Cambodia (Kasetsiri 1976: ch. 7). Thus, during the first half of the fifteenth century, Ayutthaya became a very powerful land-based state. At the same time, it was being drawn increasingly into international trading relations, particularly with China—which laid the foundations for its role as a trading partner with many nations of Asia during the next three centuries.

To understand how Ayutthaya became such an important center and why it emerged during this period in history, it is essential to consider not
only the political and economic factors that contributed to its power, but also the transformation of the landscape itself. This chapter examines, first, the early settlement of the site later to be named Ayutthaya, to suggest when and how this low-lying and swampy terrain became habitable. The chapter continues with major factors that contributed to the establishment of a city at this site and to its development, with emphasis on the location, the government’s settlement policy and the city’s early role as a maritime trading center. Subsequent sections examine how the government regulated and participated in trade, channeling valuable local products to export markets, swelling the revenues of the treasury and contributing to the long-term prosperity and stability of the kingdom.

The Changing Landscape and Its Early Inhabitants

The plain of central Thailand is bounded on the east by the Khorat plateau and on the west by the Tenasserim mountain range. Most of the major rivers in this area flow from north to south and all empty into the Gulf: the Bang Pakong on the east, the Chao Phraya in the middle (formed by the confluence of the Ping, Lopburi and Pasak Rivers at the site of Ayutthaya), the Suphanburi to the west (called the Nakhon Chaisi in mid-course and the Tha Chin in its lower reaches) and finally the Mae Klong, which drains the mountainous western rim of the central plain. These rivers bring the annual flood that covers much of the lower central plain during the monsoon rains, which fall from about June to October. Favorable natural conditions, including good soil quality, make the land very fertile, ideal for wet-rice cultivation and capable of supporting a large population. But the lower central plain did not always offer such advantages.

Archaeological evidence shows that the periphery of this area was inhabited as early as the Stone Age (FAD 1970: 5–9). The earliest inhabitants and societies that are of immediate concern to Ayutthayan history, however, are those of the Dvaravati period, from the sixth to the eleventh centuries of the Christian era, and those of the Lopburi period, from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries.
The Dvaravati kingdom dominated the central plain and parts of present-day north and northeast Thailand (Wales 1969: 20–8). It comprised loosely knit groups of small princely states, with Buddhism as the main religion. Central Dvaravati’s important towns can be divided into two groups. The eastern one included Chainat, Saraburi, Phetchabun and Lopburi. The western group included Nakhon Sawan, Singburi, Suphaburi, Uthong, Nakhon Pathom, Ratburi, and Phetburi (FAD 1969: 25).

Artifacts of the Dvaravati period have been discovered in all these places—but not in the immediate vicinity of Ayutthaya or elsewhere in the lower reaches of the Chao Phraya basin. The probable reason is that, until about the eleventh century, this area was not suitable for habitation. In fact, early in the Dvaravati period, this area was covered by sea water or brackish swamp, and the waters of the Gulf extended north of Ayutthaya. During the next few centuries, the shoreline gradually receded to the south, but the land was still subject to salination caused by the tides and was probably infested with malaria-carrying mosquitoes, making it highly undesirable for habitation, except perhaps by scattered fishermen and hunters. The early inhabitants of the central plain avoided this low-lying area and clustered instead on the higher terrain around its northern and western rim. Only after a long period of time, during which the landscape was transformed by natural processes, did the area become suitable for people to settle there in substantial numbers.

Some archaeological data have been gathered, but much more will be needed before a general theory and chronology of the physical changes and initial settlement of the area around Ayutthaya can be formulated. Although hard, scientific evidence will depend on archaeologists and their future discoveries, there are other sources of information (early historical texts, royal chronicles and legends) that point to tentative conclusions. The following discussion examines these written sources, in an attempt to provide a basic framework for Ayutthaya’s emergence from the grip of the sea.

One legend suggests the slow process that made it possible for people to live in the lower Chao Phraya basin. According to this source
Map of the Early Dvaravati-Period Coastline and Archaeological Sites
(a chronicle compiled in 1807/8), at some time after the year 1044 (assuming the date given by the writer is roughly accurate) a local king issued orders for a new city to be built in the area that later became known as Ayutthaya. His orders could not be carried out, however, because the water at the site was found to be too salty (Phongsawadan nüa 1962: 54). This legend may reflect a distant but accurate memory of an attempt to start a new settlement at or near the site of Ayutthaya, which failed because of salination by tidal action or because it was too close to lagoons that extended inland. It recognizes clearly, nonetheless, that adequate supplies of fresh water are essential, if a site is to support even a small urban population.

When did the area of Ayutthaya first become inhabited? It is possible that a small settlement of some kind was founded in the eleventh century, after the disintegration of the Buddhist Dvaravati kingdom and the assumption of power over this area by the Hindu Khmer rulers of Angkor. A leading Thai historian, Prince Damrong, suggested that a place called Ayōdhyā (the Hindu-Sanskritic form of Ayutthaya’s name) was founded by the Khmer, after Angkor gained control of Lopburi, an old Dvaravati town (Thep 1959: 24, Damrong 1973 i: 106). At first, therefore, the new settlement was only an outpost of Lopburi and an extension of Lopburi territory.

The early geographical texts of the Arabs do not seem to identify either Lopburi or its new outpost, which implies that these towns had little or no importance to the trade carried on by the Arabs between the northern rim of the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Relatively late Arab works dated 1462 and 1511, however, show that Ayutthaya was known at that time by the Arabic name Shahr-i Naw, meaning “New Capital” (Tibbetts 1979: 99,192–3). Possibly the Arabs were familiar with Lopburi and, by the mid-fifteenth century, referred to it as the “Old Capital,” to distinguish it from the new administrative center.

The connection with Lopburi was a vital factor in the growth of the new Thai kingdom. Lopburi’s control extended over some of the oldest settlements on the banks of the lower Pasak River, which emptied directly into the Gulf early in the Dvaravati period, as did the Lopburi River itself.
For many centuries, Lopburi served as a center of learning, where Buddhism and Hinduism were practiced. According to a local legend, the city was established in the year 459, and a century later it was visited by a Chinese official (Huan 1969: 17). By the middle of the seventh century, Lopburi had probably become an important Buddhist center, and it is credited with establishing a new city in the north that likewise became an important Buddhist center (Jayawickrama 1968: 96–7). By the end of the tenth century or the beginning of the eleventh, Lopburi had declined, fallen prey to powerful neighbors and become a contested area. According to a Thai source (Jayawickrama 1968: 103), the town was captured in 922 by a king of Nakhon Sithammarat, and it has been suggested (Coedès 1964: 136–7) that a son of this king later took control of Angkor, where he reigned as Suryavarman I (r. 1002–50).

Suryavarman I’s inscription is the earliest evidence of Khmer influence in the central plain. Other Khmer inscriptions at Lopburi show that the Khmer retained control of the area until the beginning of the thirteenth century (Coedès 1964: 136–7). During this time, the rulers of Lopburi repeatedly tried to regain their independence and were expanding their control into the area around the site of Ayutthaya. Local legends of such attempts are numerous. One, for example, states that a king of Lopburi gained his independence and tried to move his capital to the site of Ayutthaya in 1069 (Phongsawadan niia 1962: 49), only a decade and a half after the first attempt mentioned above. In 1088 a king of “Ayutthaya” (possibly meaning Prince Damrong’s Ayōdhya) refused to send tribute to Angkor and tried to drive the Khmer away (Huan 1969: 5). He is also reported to have sent his son to rule at Lopburi. In the middle of the twelfth century, Lopburi was again recaptured by the Khmer, who were then at the height of their power and building the great Brahmanic temple of Angkor Wat. A local Lopburi legend mentions a king known as Phra Ruang, who likewise opposed Khmer rule (Huan 1969: 5). In 1125 Chao Ju-kua, a Chinese, reported that Lopburi was still a dependency of Angkor. The last evidence of Khmer control in the town is an inscription dated 1195, which mentions that a son of Jayavarman VII (the Khmer king at that time) was ruling in Lopburi (Coedès 1964: 180–1).
The various roles of Lopburi, along with its importance in the history of the central plain, were eventually inherited by Ayutthaya. It is possible that Ayutthaya began to imitate these roles as early as the second half of the eleventh century, in the earliest stages of becoming a new political and cultural center. Lopburi itself continued to be a center of Buddhist learning and culture until the middle of the thirteenth century, and three famous Thai princes from the north are believed to have been educated there: Ramkhamhaeng (king of Sukhothai, Mangrai (king of Chiang Rai and founder of Chiang Mai), and Ngam Mùang (king of Phayao) (Phongsawadan yonok 1955: 326–7). During the first half of the fourteenth century, if not earlier, the area around Ayutthaya began to share Lopburi’s roles. In 1324/5 the great Buddha image of Phanan Choeng Monastery was constructed on the river bank, opposite the site of the future walled city of Ayutthaya (Prasoeot 1963: 130), and around 1344/5 a Sukhothai monk stopped there on his homeward journey from Sri Lanka (Griswold and na Nagara 1972: 143). These events show that the site had already acquired some religious importance and that it had a large enough population to support a monastery and undertake the casting of a colossal image.

We may conclude tentatively that the area around Ayutthaya first became inhabited in the middle of the eleventh century. Permanent settlement was made possible by natural transformations that occurred over a long period of time—the gradual southward spread of mangrove forests across shallow coastal waters and the silting of tidal lagoons, followed by the encroachment of new types of vegetation and eventual landscape modification. These changes produced new lands, slightly higher than sea level. The area was still subject to flooding—but now by fresh water that brought silt and other nutrients to enrich the soil during the annual rainy season. Eventually rice farmers were able to turn the lands around Ayutthaya into paddy fields.

The newly populated territory developed as a political and cultural extension of the old kingdom of Lopburi. Immediately prior to the ceremonial foundation in 1351, the new city was still sharing interchangeable roles that paired it with Lopburi, and it seems likely that the rulers of the two cities had the same origins. For these reasons, it was possible for
Lopburi to be the capital, at a time when the burgeoning settlement of Ayōdhya was still only an outpost, and at a later time for this relationship to reverse itself.

**Settlement Policy**

The site of Ayutthaya became habitable as the result of natural physical changes, which extended across many centuries and coincided roughly with the Dvaravati and Lopburi historical periods. The next important factor for the birth of the settlement was population. Since the area in the eleventh century had land suitable for wet-rice cultivation, it must have been an attractive site where rice farmers wanted to live. Under the existing social organization, however, people were probably not free to move around and farm where they wished. Houses did not spring up at the site of Ayutthaya as a result of spontaneous choices by farmers in search of good land. Any important new settlement had to be endorsed and supported by the ruling authority. Thus it can be assumed that the leaders in Lopburi actively sought to expand the territory that they controlled and to populate the vacant lands at the confluence of the three rivers and north of it. The birth of the new settlement must therefore be examined in terms of decisions made by the ruling class. And this subject, in turn, requires an understanding of how society was organized and controlled.

The basic element of social organization was the relationship between the rulers and the ruled: that is, the nai and phrai system. (The best available studies of this system are Wales 1965: 43–56, Kachorn 1967 and Rabibhadana 1969: chs. 5–6.) The ruling class comprised royalty and the appointed officials (the nai or masters); the majority of the men, who were mostly farmers, were classified as phrai or bondsmen. Each nai had some phrai assigned to serve him, the number of phrai varying according to the master’s rank and status. The phrai were subdivided into two categories: phrai som, who were assigned to individual royals and officials, and phrai luang, who served the king and were assigned to specific officials responsible for carrying out public works and other services for the state. The men in both categories were required to provide
their labor and skills for a total of six months each year. Thus, every adult male commoner had to be registered in the labor force, was attached to a specific master and, accordingly, was obliged to live near his master.

State management of the labor force made it difficult for people to move from place to place, except with official permission. Although no firm evidence has been found, it seems likely that this type of control over the labor force, which is well documented by the middle of the Ayutthaya period, extends back in time, long before the founding of the capital. If this theory is correct—that people were not free to choose where they lived during the Lopburi period—both the initial settlement at the site of Ayutthaya and its subsequent growth have to be examined in the light of government policy. If Ayōdhya was indeed established as an outpost in the eleventh century, by the Khmer who were ruling at Lopburi, individual officials from Lopburi and elsewhere must have been assigned to move there, taking their bondsmen with them. The town must have grown considerably in the latter part of that century, since local legends suggest repeated efforts to expand in that direction from the city of Lopburi.

The new site provided Lopburi with a convenient outlet to the sea. Lopburi itself could not have developed into a port, regardless of government policy, because the terrain is too high. The river is too shallow for large vessels, even during the annual floods, and the water level fell during the dry season (Gervaise 1989: 43–4). At the site of Ayutthaya, by contrast, the confluence of three rivers and deeper riverbed provided water deep enough for ocean-going vessels to reach year round. A decision must therefore have been taken to provide the site with a small population, so that it could be developed as the natural port paired with the administrative center upriver at Lopburi.

Gradually, after the eleventh century, the countryside at and north of the site must have reached an advanced stage of transformation, as successive annual floods left increasing amounts of silt, followed by the encroachment of a greater variety of vegetation. By the mid-fourteenth century, the land north of the site must have been cleared and used for wet-rice cultivation. During this span of three centuries, the area became an agricultural base that could support a large population. The annual
flooding of the plain brought an abundance of fish and fresh nutrients for the soil, but was not damaging to the rice crop, because varieties of rice were introduced that grew at about the same rate as the rise in the level of the floodwaters. These conditions are reflected in the legend of King Uthong, who was told, before he formally established his capital at Ayutthaya, that the area was rich in rice and fish (Khamhaikan chao krung kao 1967: 52), the two most important staples of the Thai diet.

The initial settlement at the site of Ayutthaya was the outcome both of slow changes in the landscape and of a policy implemented by the ruling elite—first the officials of Lopburi and later those of Uthong—to make use of these natural resources and the advantages that the site offered for improved communications by sea. Given its strategic geographical position—a sheltered river-port with a command of all the routes leading into the interior—it soon developed into a trading center. These advantages in turn attracted a lot of people involved in maritime trade. These immigrants were not yet part of the established system of political and social control but were soon inducted into it, to take advantage of their skills as seafarers and traders. The growth of the settlement was reinforced by the policy of the ruling class of Lopburi, who must have foreseen the administrative and economic benefits that they could gain from creating a new center at this site. For this reason, more than one attempt was made to populate the new area, until a substantial number of people finally became established there.

Pre-Ayutthayan International Trade and Chinese Settlement

Early in the Christian era, a major international trade route passed across the Malay peninsula. This route bore the main traffic between China’s southeast coast and the east coast of India, and it was preferred to the far longer route farther south, which wound through the straits of Singapore and Melaka (Curtin 1984: 101–3). Ayutthaya is tucked away at the northern end of the Gulf. It is a great distance from the main modern-day sea lanes, which pass through the straits and around the southern tip of the Malay peninsula. But the old international route passed closer to the
Chao Phraya basin, where there were two main participants in the trade. The first was Lopburi. While under Khmer domination, Lopburi occasionally had tribute-trade relations with China. It sent missions in 1115 and 1155 (Coedès 1968: 162). Lopburi probably became independent by the mid-thirteenth century, and it sent several more missions between 1289 and 1299. The second state, known to the Chinese as Hsien, was either downriver from Lopburi or in the Suphanburi River basin immediately to the west. It sent missions between 1292 and 1323, and it was involved politically in the Malay peninsula (Kasetsiri 1976: 87). This evidence shows that Hsien had access not only to coastal shipping down the east coast of the peninsula but also to ocean-going vessels that traded (and carried its envoys) as far as China.

One of Ayutthaya’s main advantages was its location. The site is a gateway between the vast hinterland and the sea. At the present time it is less than 100 kilometers from the Gulf, and the mouth of the river was even closer to Ayutthaya during the eleventh to fourteenth centuries. From the beginning, once the land became habitable, it was a natural site for a trading center. Goods from the hinterland could be carried and stored there, in preparation for shipping overseas, and imported goods could be distributed easily from Ayutthaya to all inland destinations, including the Mekong valley.

Ayutthaya was a city in the hinterland and at the same time a coastal city, but the majority of the Thai people had no navigating skills. How, then, was it able to enter maritime trade networks that were dominated by Chinese, Indians, Arabs, Malay and Indonesians? The answer for trade to the east is that Ayutthaya’s rulers used the services of the Chinese, a small but extremely important group of people who already lived and traded in the ports of the Gulf. Merchants and crew members of Chinese junks frequented these ports well before the thirteenth century (Skinner 1957: 2). Since the Chinese imperial court often restricted foreign trade in China itself, many Chinese merchants were obliged to settle in the lands to the south, where they could pursue their maritime trading activities. Trading centers thus sprang up around the South China Sea, where the Chinese became active resident traders. Such Chinese communities along the
shores of the Gulf were old settlements, and they became vital to the expansion of trade in Southeast Asia and its linkages with trade in China (Curtin 1984: 168).

The oldest extant historical texts (tamnan) of the Thai are full of legends about Chinese who arrived on these shores. A legend in Patani, for example, recounts the story of a Ming Chinese warrior who came to settle there and married a Muslim princess. His sister, Lim Ko-nia, followed and tried to persuade him to return to China. Unsuccessful in her entreaties, she made a curse that the main mosque of Patani would never be completed, and then she committed suicide. Lim Ko-nia was deified and became a guardian spirit for the local Chinese community. The mosque still remains unfinished.

There is a similar legend about a Chinese princess named Soi Dok Mak, who went to Ayutthaya to marry the local ruler. She, too, committed suicide—in her case because she was not treated with due respect and honor. As an act of atonement and merit-making, the king dedicated a Buddha image at the site of her cremation. The image, cast in 1324/5 at Phanan Choeng Monastery, became a place of pilgrimage for the Chinese. A century later, during the reign of King Sam Phraya (the seventh sovereign of Ayutthaya, r. 1424–48), a monastery was built in honor of the king’s two deceased brothers. The Chinese community participated in the construction, and Chinese writings, artifacts and wall paintings were placed in the crypt of the main stupa of the monastery (FAD 1959a).

Many Thai legends attest to the long-time ties between the Chinese and the central plain. Both Lopburi and Ayutthaya have places connected with legendary Chinese. It is probable that the Thai had long exploited their connection with the Chinese for economic advantage, because Chinese captains and crews provided the junks on which the earliest Thai envoys sailed to China. Accounts concerning King Uthong, the official founder of Ayutthaya, are related extensively to the Chinese (Kasetsiri 1976: ch. 4). A Dutch company merchant, who lived in Ayutthaya during the 1630s and early 1640s, compiled a history of the kingdom, using both oral accounts and Thai texts. According to his sources, the founder of Ayutthaya actually came from China and married a Chinese princess (Van Vliet 1975: 55–60).
Similar legends can be found in historical texts about a king of Sawankhalok, known as Phra Ruang (*Phongsawadan niua* 1962: 11–4, 50–3). These records show that, while Ayutthaya was on the rise as an administrative and trading center, the Chinese not only were active there but also had earned a place in local traditions about the origins of the city.

**Ayutthaya’s Early Trade with China**

Late in the reign of the founder of Ayutthaya, a new dynasty came to power in China. The first of the Ming emperors immediately took steps to revive the tribute missions, which had previously been sent to China from the Chao Phraya basin but had ceased for more than forty years. The Chinese envoy arrived in Ayutthaya in 1370 to demand tribute. King Uthong had died the previous year and was succeeded by his son, Ramesuan, who reigned less than a year before ceding the throne to his maternal uncle. Ayutthaya’s third king (Borommaracha I, also known as Pha-ngua, r. 1370–88) was therefore the one who complied with the Chinese demand and began to cultivate relations with the Ming court. During his eighteen-year reign, he sent eight missions to China, one of which (in 1377) included a Thai prince—the king’s nephew, who was to come to the throne three decades later as King Intharacha. The first Thai ambassadors carried local tropical products as gifts to China, along with curiosities such as elephants and six-legged turtles. In return, the emperor sent large quantities of Chinese silks and satins as gifts to the Thai king.

After Ramesuan returned to the throne (r. 1388–95), he sent a mission to China in every year of his reign but two. The peak of the Thai missions was reached in the first half of the fifteenth century, during the reigns of three great kings: Intharacha (r. 1409–24), Borommaracha II (r. 1424–48) and Trailok (r. 1448–88). These intensive relations coincided with two major events that had impacts on regional trade. The first was the founding of the sultanate of Melaka around 1400 and its rapid development as a regional trading entrepôt. The second was the seven Ming maritime expeditions from 1405 to 1433. During the twenty-nine-year period of the expeditions, twenty-two Thai missions were sent to China (an average of
three missions every four years), and eight Chinese missions were sent to Ayutthaya (Promboon 1971: 112).

The Thai themselves were not a seafaring people, except for coastal trading along the shores of the Gulf. Nonetheless, the Thai court was able to respond immediately to the Chinese demand for tribute, by drawing upon the skills of the Chinese who traded and resided in the country. Their knowledge of shipbuilding, junk operations, navigating long distances across open sea and trading in both Thai and foreign markets were invaluable assets from the beginning of Ming-Thai contacts. Even though prosperous trading relations soon arose between the two countries, that does not mean Siam was becoming an entrepôt for international trade between east (China) and west (India) at that time. Instead, early Ayutthaya exported to China some of the natural products gathered in its hinterlands and imported some Chinese luxury goods for its own use and for reexport to other places in the Chao Phraya basin, to the Mekong valley and overland to the west coast of the Malay peninsula.

The tribute-trading system had dual purposes: the political advantages accruing from recognition by the Chinese government and the economic advantages accruing from virtually free trade. One illustration of the friendly political relations that arose from this close relationship is the fate of a junk from Ayutthaya, which was on its way to the Ryukyu Islands in 1404 but was forced by a storm into a port in Fujian Province and detained by local officials. When the junk came to the attention of officials in China, the emperor intervened and sent orders for the provincial officials to assist in repairing the damaged vessel, to provide food for the crew and to let them continue on their voyage without hindrance (Kobata and Matsuda 1969: 64). The confidence that the Thai ambassadors enjoyed at the Ming court is further reflected in the fact that they were occasionally asked to act as intermediaries in conveying messages from China to other states in Southeast Asia.

Because of its official character, the tribute mission was subject to only a few restrictions. Thai diplomatic missions to any country usually comprised three ambassadors, and the embassies sent to China were usually carried there aboard three Chinese junks, belonging to or
commissioned by the crown, with a Chinese captain and Chinese crew in the employ of the Thai government. Since the prevailing winds on the South China Sea reverse themselves every six months, the best season to leave Ayutthaya was around late May or June. The junks sailed directly to Guangzhou (Canton) in south China, which was the only port that Thai ambassadors were authorized to enter. Once the junks arrived, the people aboard divided into two groups with separate objectives.

The Thai ambassadors proceeded overland to Beijing, carrying the royal letter from the king and costly gifts to be presented to the emperor. Of all the “barbarian” countries south of China, the kingdom of Ayutthaya seems to have been the most faithful in upholding the tradition of tribute. Ayutthaya’s kings sent tribute not only frequently but also in large quantity and variety. The selection of goods sent by Thai kings to the Ming court was more varied, by far, than that of any other tributary state. Ayutthaya at different times is credited with a total of 44 items, whereas Melaka sent 26, Bengal 24, North Sumatra 19, Sri Lanka 17, and Johor 15 (Grimm 1961: 1–20). Thai tribute included raw natural products such as sapan wood (used for making red dyes), aloes wood (used to make incense and also known as eagle wood and calambac), black pepper, and ivory. After the formal ceremonies at court, the ambassadors took their leave, carrying with them the rich presents that the emperor sent to the Thai king. Many months were thus spent on the long journey from Guangzhou to Beijing and back. Meanwhile, in Guangzhou, the commercial aspects of the mission were being carried out.

The lengthy absence of the ambassadors from Guangzhou left the king’s trading agents free for about six months to conduct their business. (Technically, tribute ships were supposed to complete their trading transactions within a restricted time period, but this rule was probably not enforced strictly.) The three junks were officially on a tribute mission, and all the goods that they carried could be sold in the Guangzhou market without being subjected to the taxes and other restrictions imposed on private traders. Since the traders from Siam had to stay in Guangzhou for at least a half year during each mission, they had an area assigned to them with their own house and warehouse, from which they could dispose of
their imported goods and where they could store the Chinese goods that they purchased for export to Ayutthaya.

If the ambassadors were not delayed on their return journey overland, they reached Guangzhou around the end of the year, in time for the junks to sail on the monsoon winds that would bring them to the Gulf and home again around February the following year. Some of the costly gifts from Beijing destined for the king—Chinese silks, satins, porcelains and other luxuries—were used in the palace, although the king often had some items, particularly textiles, presented to officials who had rendered important services.

The cargoes of Chinese goods that were acquired in Guangzhou, on the other hand, were transferred to the royal warehouses in Ayutthaya. Some of these goods might be used in the palace or put to other official uses. Others were sold to traders, who resold them in the domestic market places or reexported them in various directions: to the hinterland (Lanna, Nan, Lansang, western Cambodia), to the Malay towns of the peninsula, to the islands of the archipelago, and to the west coast of the Malay peninsula and onward to India. This aspect of the tribute-trading system brought great profit to the Thai treasury, either in the form of gold and silver coins or in the form of Thai goods or imports from elsewhere that the royal warehouses needed for use by the state or for export.

One great advantage was that the trading agents of the Thai government operated under tax-free conditions in both Ayutthaya and Guangzhou. Although the Chinese government eventually decided that such missions should be sent only once every three years, this restriction was not closely observed. And even the restriction that permitted only the three ambassadorial junks to trade without taxation could be circumvented. Additional junks sometimes called at Guangzhou to enquire officially about the ambassadors and when they might return from Beijing. Just in case the original tribute goods had been lost or damaged, these junks brought replacements and other cargo, and they, too, were allowed to dispose of their cargoes freely and untaxed (Viraphol 1977: 32–3).

Given the large profits that accrued to the treasury from this crown trade, which was an integral feature of these missions, Thai kings carefully
cultivated their official relations with China throughout the Ayutthaya period. A public and ceremonial display of loyalty was made in Beijing, in the form of the embassy itself, while the trading arm of the Thai government quietly went about its business in Guangzhou. Among all the foreign vessels that called in southern Chinese ports, it is therefore not surprising that the traders from Ayutthaya enjoyed the greatest freedom and privileges.

Monopoly Products

According to the belief of conventional Thai historiography, the idea of "free trade" existed prior to the Ayutthaya period and is reflected in the 1293 stone inscription of King Ramkhamhaeng (r. 1279–98), which claims that the land of Sukhothai is thriving. There is fish in the water and rice in the fields. The lord of the realm does not levy toll on his subjects for travelling the roads; they lead their cattle to trade or ride their horses to sell; whoever wants to trade in elephants, does so; whoever wants to trade in horses, does so; whoever wants to trade in silver and gold, does so (Wyatt 1982: 54).

Ayutthaya’s first five kings likewise may have followed a policy of free trade. Chinese junkos from the island kingdom of Ryukyu began calling at the new Thai capital by the 1390s, or perhaps slightly earlier, and may have traded freely on behalf of the Ryukyu king for about two decades. But, if free trade existed in thirteenth-century Sukhothai and fourteenth-century Ayutthaya, it did not last long.

The traders from Ryukyu who visited Ayutthaya in 1419 found—much to their consternation—that a new trading regime had been instituted. They were no longer free to sell their cargo of Chinese goods or to buy the Thai products that they sought for shipment to Ryukyu and China. All trading in these goods had to be carried out with government officials, at prices set by the government, and no private dealing in such goods was
permitted (Kobata and Matsuda 1969: 55).

The Ryukyuan documents show that the Thai government monopoly initially included various goods of high value: imports of Chinese porcelains and probably silks and satins, as well as exports of Thai sapan wood and probably pepper. These records mention only a few of the commodities traded by Chinese agents on behalf of the the king of Ryukyu, and other goods may have been subject to the monopoly regime at that time. The earliest-known Thai law with provisions for monopoly goods is dated 1433 and lists three valuable export products: aloes wood, sapan wood and tin.¹ A French list from the mid-Ayutthaya period includes tin, ivory, lead, sapan wood, weapons, animal skins and arrack (an alcoholic drink made from palm fruit or sap). It also includes gunpowder and the two trade goods needed for its manufacture: saltpeter and sulfur (La Loubère 1969: 94–5). For the late-Ayutthaya period, a Thai list compiled after 1767 specifies nine items under royal monopoly: ivory, sapan wood, aloes wood, an unspecified type of black wood,² raw lacquer, tin, civet (a musk-like substance used in perfumes), insect lac (used to make shellac, dyes and sealing wax) and dammar (used to make pitch for caulking and covering the bottoms of boats and ships). Obviously the number and types of Thai products subject to the official trading regime changed extensively as time passed, probably in response to market demand. The government gained much profit and economic benefit from its exports of these and other forest products to China and elsewhere. Once these items were placed on the list of monopoly goods, the most lucrative tier of foreign-trade operations in Ayutthaya was brought firmly under the control of the state.

The state’s ability to manage the collection of such products within its territory gave the trading regime greater control over the supply of exportable goods. Forest products were widely available in the interior of the kingdom and could be obtained by the state in two main ways. First, some monopoly goods (such as ivory) belonged solely to the government and automatically had to be turned over to the royal warehouses, regardless of who produced them. Second, exportable goods of every kind could be acquired through taxation in kind (known as suai). In-kind goods included both monopoly goods and other items such as black pepper, other spices
and other food products. Local products of all kinds were stored in the royal trade-goods warehouses (*phra khlang sin kha*) in Ayutthaya. In this way the court not only maintained an adequate supply of products for export but also made effective use of its economic powers at the provincial level of administration where the products originated. Such goods could be sold directly from the warehouses to private traders, shipped east or west on crown vessels or sent on consignment aboard private vessels, to be sold at ports throughout Asia.

In areas of the kingdom where exportable products were abundant in the forests, local groups of bondsmen were assigned to fulfill their obligations to the state by collecting the products, packing and carrying them to Ayutthaya and delivering them to the royal warehouses. These activities were carried out under the supervision of the governors and other local officials to whom the bondsmen were assigned. With this type of taxation—labor provided to the state in lieu of taxes paid in cash, which was not widely available—the state trading authorities were able to fill the royal warehouses with large volumes of exportable goods, at no direct cost to the treasury.

Monopoly was a common practice in Asia, and private traders had to accommodate themselves to such regimes. In Ayutthaya, private traders could export monopoly goods but could purchase them only from the royal warehouses. Other goods (such as rice and sugar) were traded freely in Thai marketplaces, but the profits from exporting them were not as great in terms of value per ton. Imported monopoly goods had to be sold only to the royal warehouses. For the remainder of an incoming cargo, which was sold in the marketplaces of Ayutthaya or reexported, an early Thai law imposed import duties of 10 percent on the value of the goods. This rate compared favorably with Guangzhou’s rates, which were much higher at 20 to 30 percent, and not badly with Melaka’s, which were only 3 to 6 percent (Curtin 1984: 130).

Since the government worked with Chinese residents, who shipped monopoly goods to China and elsewhere, and sold them either privately or on behalf of the government, the monopolies facilitated the overseas trade of Ayutthaya from their inception. Thai records give the impression that
kings were not concerned with such worldly business, but in actual practice, the state became active in international trade by the early fifteenth century and drew great profits from it. Not surprisingly, a trading bureaucracy was created during this period, to manage the state's international trading interests.

Structure and Functions of the Trading Bureaucracy

The main duties of the minister known as the Phra Khlang were to manage the kingdom's external affairs, both commercial and diplomatic. At the highest level, the minister was responsible for official communications with foreign governments and exchanges of ambassadors. At the mundane level of everyday business, he was in charge of all traders and other foreigners who came to the kingdom, and he collected the port taxes on their operations. But by far his most important economic functions were the management of the royal warehouses and the imports and exports of monopoly goods.

These storage, shipping and marketing operations were carried out by the elaborate bureaucracy outlined in the Law of Civil Hierarchy promulgated by King Trailok (r. 1448–88). This law reorganized royal trading activities, to guarantee the court's control of the most valuable tier of the market through the Phra Khlang Ministry. The reorganization gave official ranks and titles in the bureaucracy to some foreign traders, thus bringing them into government service and tapping their experience and skills to help develop the trading arm of the state. In fact, this is a very common practice throughout Southeast Asia. As O.W. Wolters (1999:43), an eminent historian, has pointed out,

Maritime trade does not seem to have stimulated the growth of an influential indigenous commercial class, with social status at home and regional-scale trading interests abroad. The tendency was otherwise. Rich merchants, often foreigners, aspired to rise in the local court hierarchies or were used by the rulers as an additional and reliable source of manpower for administrative functions.
The Thai law provided for a ministry (Krom Khlang) under the supervision of a minister (the Phra Khlang), who was responsible for maritime affairs, the operations of the royal warehouses, the monopoly-system transactions and general relations with foreigners from overseas. Trading affairs were divided along geographical lines between two of his deputy ministers. One deputy (the Chodúik Ratcha Seththi, who was Chinese) and his subordinate (the Thep Phakdi) were in charge of the department for trade to the east (the Krom Tha Sai, literally “Department of the Left”). They were responsible for all trade with China and beyond.

The second deputy minister (the Chula Ratcha Montri) headed the department that was in charge of western trade: the ports of the Malay peninsula, the islands of the archipelago and all of South Asia. (The department name, Krom Tha Khwa, literally means “Department of the Right.”) This deputy was usually an Indian (at least during the later Ayutthaya period) and he, in turn, had two principal subordinates or port masters (chaọ tha). The first port master (the Ratcha Montri) was in charge of traders of khaek origin (i.e., the Muslim peoples of the Malay peninsula and Indonesian archipelago), whereas the second port master (the Nontha Ket) was responsible for traders from “Brahman” lands (i.e., South Asia).

In the mid-Ayutthaya period, when Europeans began to arrive, they were randomly assigned to either of these departments. (Much later, in the Bangkok period, a new department—the Krom Tha Klang or “Central Department”—was created, and all Europeans were placed under it.) The provisions of the law have obviously changed over time, to add new foreign groups, although the original date of the law has been retained in the extant text. For example, the law places the Dutch under the department for trade to the east, although the first Dutchmen did not arrive in Siam until more than a century after Trailok’s reign ended.

In theory, the kings of Ayutthaya were avatāras (reincarnations of Hindu gods), bodhisattvas (Buddhas-to-be) and cakkravartins (world-conquering Buddhist monarchs), who could not possibly participate in lowly trade. In practice, the trade was managed by the king’s officials, as shown in the Civil Hierarchy Law. Indeed, a French diplomat who visited Siam in the late seventeenth century characterized the king of Siam as a
great merchant (La Loubère 1969: 94–5). Other provisions in the oldest Thai laws (the Three-Seals Law Code) likewise provide evidence of the state’s concern with trade—and not only the clauses dealing directly with sea-going vessels and taxation. A clause in the Marriage Law, for example, specifies that if the husband went “to China, to sea, to Chiang Mai, Phang-nga or Red-Sky Java” (in other words, on a journey to a distant place), the wife would have to wait for his return. If news were received that the husband had been captured by pirates (and thus probably sold into slavery), and if he did not come back within three years, the wife would be free to take a new husband. If the husband was reported to be shipwrecked, she would have to wait for seven years before remarrying (Khun 1973: 92). Such laws show that the *avatar* kings of Ayutthaya had to deal with many specific and practical details of worldly business activities. They also emphasize the importance of maritime trade to the kingdom—especially with China, which is given first place in the list.

**Conclusions**

Ayutthaya had more economic advantages than other sites in the central plain and along the shores of the Gulf. The vast expanse of flat plain, with its good soils and bountiful water supply, provided a perfect setting for an agricultural society to produce food in abundance. The core economy was self-sufficient, based on wet-rice cultivation and state control of manpower. Strictly speaking, therefore, Ayutthaya might be termed a hinterland kingdom. The events of the fourteenth and fifteenth century described above, however, turned it also into an important center for maritime trade. Records of maritime relations with China, Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, the Malay-Indonesian world, India, Persia, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, England, Denmark and France convey an impression of Ayutthaya—from the fifteenth century onward—as a prosperous capital and an international entrepôt. Although the capital was some distance inland, the river could accommodate seagoing vessels of all sorts. The northern part of the Gulf has few other good anchorages—notably at Chanthaburi and Tha Chin—and only the lower Chao Phraya anchorages
(at the river mouth, at Ayutthaya and everywhere in between) could easily accommodate and provide shelter for numerous, large, ocean-going vessels.

Overseas trade accounted for a relatively small share of overall economic activities in the kingdom and comprised mostly an exchange of local raw natural products for luxury manufactured goods from China, Japan, South Asia and eventually Europe (Ingram 1971: 21–9). Nevertheless, according to an estimate for the late-Ayutthaya period, royal overseas trade accounted for 36 percent of the state’s total cash income (Khamhaikan chao krung kao 1967: 277–8). One modern study has estimated that “even if the total foreign trade was a relatively small proportion of the annual produce...it still may have been a significant part of the total money transactions in the nation” (Ingram 1971: 29). This revenue enabled the court to maintain a lavish life-style and, above all, made it possible to project the concept of Ayutthaya kings as avatars, bodhisattvas and cakkravartins (Pombejra 1990: 127–42).

How did such a dual function evolve and develop so rapidly after the founding of the new capital? The geographical location, court policies that favored external relations and internal state mechanisms are the primary factors that contributed to the rise and growth of Ayutthaya. As shown earlier, events in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, in particular, help to give us a better understanding of how Ayutthaya developed as both a capital and a port, reaching its height during the period of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.

The elaborate structure of the Phra Khlang Ministry and the specialization of each of its trading officials, even in the lower tiers of the bureaucracy, imply that by the second half of the fifteenth century, when this hierarchy was instituted by law, Ayutthaya was already heavily involved in overseas trade. The reorganization took place after the Ming naval activities of 1405–33 and the emergence of a rival trading center at Melaka. Domestically, the reorganization came at a time when Ayutthaya had achieved greater internal unity, had incorporated the Sukhothai kingdom and had subjugated Angkor. At about the same time, it was also expanding its control down the east coast of the Malay peninsula and across to part of
the west coast.

Regardless of the immediate reasons for King Trailok’s administrative reorganization, Ayutthaya’s overseas trade was already well established before his reign. The Civil Hierarchy Law may have codified a system that had already been tried and tested, insofar as the trading functions of the government were concerned. By the second half of the fifteenth century, Ayutthaya had become the most powerful political center in the Gulf region as well as a trading post, exercising the dual functions of both a hinterland and a maritime kingdom—which is, indeed, a unique characteristic.

Among the numerous capitals of independent states founded by the Thai during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, none is comparable to Ayutthaya in terms of size or administrative and commercial strengths. Although the last to be founded, Ayutthaya became the first major capital of the Thai. Favorable natural conditions and government policies, along with state and private trading activities, made the city powerful, enabled the kingdom to grow rapidly and ensured that it would endure for a long time—ultimately, more than four centuries.

Notes

1. Criminal Law (Phra aiyakan acha luang), section 37 (Kotmai tra sam duang 1986 ii: 396). The date in the text of this law is 1433/4. It should be noted, however, that the law was revised much later, perhaps several times. The laws that are recorded in the Kotmai tra samduang (the Three-Seals Law Code), regardless of the dates that appear in the individual texts, were recompiled according to instructions given in 1804 by King Rama I for their revision.

2. The term black wood (mai dam) in the text may refer to a medium-size tree known in Thai as ma-kliua and to botanists as Dispyros mollis (Evenacea). It is sometimes cultivated and produces a black dye. Note that sapan wood (which produced a red dye) is also known by the colloquial name red wood (mai daeng) in Thai.

3. It would be interesting to make a detailed study of the state trading arm
in Ayutthaya, comparing its legal structure and actual operations with the comparable institution (the shahbandar or port master) of the Malay-Indonesian trading world.
Ayutthaya, 1409–24: Internal Politics and International Relations

David K. Wyatt

At the Thai Studies Conference in London in 1993, Ishii Yoneo presented a fascinating lecture building on the records of Ryukyuan trade with Siam. In the course of his argument, he mentioned an episode in 1419 when the court of Ayutthaya abruptly increased its official intervention into the overseas trade (Ishii 1994: 53–63). Why should they have done so? Who was responsible for this new tax policy? Thus began some investigations of the period at the beginning of the fifteenth century that, however, can only be limited, because the source materials concerning the period are scarce.

As Ishii explains it, Ryukyuan traders visiting Ayutthaya in 1419 were informed that they were now required to sell the Chinese porcelain they had brought only to Siamese officials, and they would be allowed to purchase Siamese products, such as sapan wood, only from a specified official, at inflated prices. Subsequently these restrictive measures were made even more harsh (Ishii 1994: 61).

My first reaction on hearing of this new evidence was to ask myself what I could remember of the period in question; particularly, what do we know about who was on the throne and who was around him as his ministers, advisers and partners? At issue here is the period from the last months of the reign of King Ramaracha (r. 1395–1409) and the whole reign of his successor, King Intharacha (r. 1409–24).

The royal chronicles’ (ratchaphongsawadan) coverage of this period is very brief; brief enough, in fact, that they can be quoted in full. In the passage that follows, the capital letters (A–F) followed by colons refer to the various versions of the chronicles: Luang Prasoet (A), Phan Chanthumanat (B), British Museum (C), Phra Phonnarat (D), Phra Chakkraphatdiphong (E) and the Royal Autograph edition (F). The years CS 771 to 781 in the Siamese calendar correspond to AD 1409 to 1419 in
the western calendar.

ABCDEF: [A: In 757, a year of the ox.] [BCDEF: In 749, a year of the hare, ninth of the decade, the Phukhao Thong Monastery was founded. One evening the king walked to Mangkhalaphisek Hall; and Thao Mon, who had died earlier, came and sat blocking the path where the king was walking and then vanished.] King Ramesuan [F: became ill and] passed away, [BCDEF: having been on the throne for six years.] so [ADF: Prince Ram,] [A: his young son,] [BCE: his young son] [D: who was] [DF: his son,] ascended the royal throne and ruled [BCE: for fourteen years] [D: for five years] [F: for fifteen years].

King Ramaracha, 1395–1409

A: In 771, a year of the ox, King Ram was enraged at Chao Senabodi and ordered that he be arrested. Chao Senabodi fled to safety and went across to stay on the other side of the river at Pathakhucham. Chao Senabodi then sent messengers to invite Prince Intharacha to come from Suphanburi and to tell him that he would bring troops in and seize Ayutthaya for him. When Prince Intharacha arrived, he then ordered Chao Senabodi to lead his men in and they attacked and captured Ayutthaya.

BCDEF: [BCE: In 763, a year of the serpent, third of the decade.] King Ram was enraged at Chao Phraya Maha Senabodi and ordered that he be arrested [F: and executed]. Chao Phraya Maha Senabodi fled [BCDE: to safety] and went [BCEF: across] to stay on the other side of the river at Pathakhucham. He then sent messengers to invite Prince Intharacha [F: , the grandson of King Borommaracha I and who was on the throne at Suphanburi,] [CDEF: at Suphanburi] to come in, and then Chao Phraya Maha Senabodi led his men in and they attacked and captured Ayutthaya.

King Intharacha, 1409–1424

A: So Prince Intharacha was invited to ascend the royal throne

BCDEF: So Prince Intharacha was invited to ascend the royal throne
and he sent King Ram to live off Pathakhucham. [D: in 763, a year of the serpent, third of the decade,] and he sent King Ram to live off Pathakhucham. Then the King presented Chao Phraya Maha Senabodi with [DF: the rewards of] a daughter of a royal concubine, a pair of gold trays of rank, a pair of pedestalled gold salvers, a gold lotus water-goblet, a two-edged sword, [C: and] an ivory palanquin [C: chased with lotus petals] [BDEF: and a lotus petal palanquin].

ABCDEF: [A: In 781, a year of the boar] [BCDEF: In 765, a year of the goat, fifth of the decade], a message arrived saying that Phra Maha Thammaracha [BCDEF: of Phitsanulok] had passed away and that all the northern cities were in confusion; so the King went up to Phrabang. [A: On that occasion,] Phraya Ban Miiang and Phraya Ram came out and paid homage to the King.

BCDEF: The King returned to the capital and then appointed Prince Ai Phraya to live off Suphanburi, Prince Yi Phraya to live off Phraek Siracha, [F: that is to say, San,] and Prince Sam Phraya to live off Chainat.

Such is the total extent of the evidence of the royal chronicles. This is not a lot, but it is something, and provides us with a starting point. It tells us that King Ramaracha (the King Ram of the chronicles) had been reigning for a number of years when his reign abruptly ended in 1409. Its ending is all we are told about his reign: that in 1409 he had some sort of conflict with "Chao Senabodi" or "Chao Phraya Maha Senabodi," who may either be the chief among his ministers and a general, or might refer to the ensemble of his ministers. (We remind ourselves that the final
fourfold division of ministries was not to come until later.) The minister (or ministers) fled “across the river” to Pathakhucham. The toponym apparently refers to the banks of the Cham Moat or Canal, where a community of Cham people had settled south of the city.

And then the minister did something unusual: he invited the prince who was controlling Suphanburi to bring troops in to seize Ayutthaya. Who was this man of Suphanburi? The chronicle does not tell us, but we might suppose that he was a descendent of King Borommaracha I (r. 1370–88), who had come to the throne from Suphanburi. The texts tell us he was “Prince Intaracha,” so he had some royal antecedents. The Van Vliet chronicle of 1640 tells us that he was “the son of Chao Khun Luang Pha-ngua [Borommaracha I] and brother of [King] Phra Thong Chan [r. 1388]” (Van Vliet 1975: 62). It also tells us that he came to the throne at the age of seventy, which would indicate that he was born in 1338 and was very venerable indeed in 1409! If so, he must have administered Suphanburi during his father’s long reign.

Notice that only the Royal Autograph edition (F) of the chronicles, which was edited and amended by King Mongkut, calls Intaracha a “grandson of King Borommaracha I and who was on the throne at Suphanburi,” which presumably indicates that he was at least a generation younger than the Van Vliet chronicle indicates.

This man, who is also referred to as Phra Nakhon In, must be the man who was responsible for the semi-independence of Suphanburi during Ramaracha’s reign. The Chinese records indicate that Suphanburi was sending independent missions to, and trading with, the Chinese court during this period, not least in 1397 and 1403 (Kasetsiri 1976: 111–3). The culmination of this series of contacts with the Chinese was the visit to Ayutthaya of the eunuch admiral Cheng Ho in 1408. Concerning this visit, Charnvit Kasetsiri (1976: 113) argues that

It is possible that the meeting had some indirect effect on the internal politics of Ayutthaya where the struggle for power grew increasingly intense. It is likely that the...quarrel between King Ramracha and Chao Senabodi, which broke out in 1409, the year following Cheng
Ho's visit, was stimulated by Ramracha's fear that the Suphanburi [people] were plotting with the Chinese against him.

The continuing special relationship between Suphanburi and China is interesting, not just because it suggests a vigorous set of political interests, but also because it might be identified with a particular set of economic interests. In other words, maybe more than political paranoia was involved in 1409.

What trade might have been involved? Both main north-south rivers of central Siam (the eastern and western branches of the Chao Phraya system) might have produced and marketed abroad the same agricultural and forest produce. However, I suspect that the western river system, flowing down through Suphanburi toward Ratburi, was especially distinguished for its export of fine ceramics from the Sukhothai-Satchanalai area, where hundreds of kiln remains from this period attest to the vitality of this industry in the early Ayutthaya period. Their distinctive bowls and ewers are still to be found widely through Southeast and East Asia.

So King Intharacha came to the throne of Ayutthaya in 1409 from Suphanburi, as an experienced ruler already approaching old age (if Van Vliet's figures are correct). He may, according to Kasetsiri, already have been "plotting with the Chinese." He presumably had experience of foreign trade, especially with China and especially involving ceramics. But he also began his reign beholden to those who had brought him to the throne—the ministers who had caused Ramaracha's downfall. The chief among them was handsomely rewarded with, among other things, "a daughter of a royal concubine," as well as various utensils emblematic of royal favor. Meanwhile, the chronicles tell us, the former king, Ramaracha, was sent to retirement exile in Pathakhucham, the Cham village to the south of Ayutthaya.

We might imagine that the new king, Intharacha, being already senior, might have delegated much of the work of running Ayutthaya to his ministers, and we might suppose that it was these men who were responsible for the changes in the terms of trade that the Ryukyuans (and presumably others) encountered in 1419. Little is known about this king beyond what
Van Vliet recorded: Intharacha (also known as Phra Nakhon In)

was a wise, prudent and merciful king; he was liberal and took great
care of his soldiers, subjects and the welfare of the country. He was a
worldly prince, liking clerics little. He loved weapons so much that he
sent various missions with junks to other countries to buy weapons.
During this king’s reign the land was burdened with internal wars, but
he conciliated the two parties. After he had reigned twenty years he
ended his days in peace. It was a fruitful and not a difficult time under
his government. (Van Vliet 1975: 62–3)

There are two particularly interesting sentences in that brief
history of the reign. First, the mention of “internal wars” and that the king
“conciliated the two parties.” The chronicle is silent on these; but we might
imagine that the reference is to the long-term competition between the
Lopburi and the Suphanburi lines—between the Khmer-oriented and the
Thai-oriented, or between the east-oriented and the north-oriented—that
has long been discussed by Wolters, Griswold, Kasetsiri and others (see
Kasetsiri 1976: 106–14 and Vickery 1977: 61–3). It is possible that Van
Vliet’s unknown source was just as baffled by it.

The other sentence is even more interesting, and mysterious: “He
loved weapons so much that he sent various missions with junks to other
countries to buy weapons.” We already have encountered Intharacha as
a ruler interested in relations with China when he still was in Suphanburi.
Van Vliet, writing at a much later date in 1640, used an anachronistic term
for “firearms” (Dutch geweer), which I have had to translate as “weapons.”
It is interesting that the account just says “other countries,” and not just
China. It might also be interesting that, instead of just “obtaining”
weapons, he sent to “buy” them. We might then imagine that the court of
Ayutthaya was gaining an appreciation of the uses of money.

And it is in this context that the 1419 incident occurred, when the
Siamese abruptly made the terms of trade much more advantageous to
themselves. One might imagine that the king and ministers were
establishing close working relations with a local mercantile community
that was probably Chinese, at least in its ethnic origins.

There is a faint echo of that community that comes out of the events following Intharacha's death (at the age of 85 years?) in 1424. After the first and second of his sons killed each other in a duel on elephant back to gain the throne, the third son became king as Borommaracha II (r. 1424–48). He almost immediately constructed Wat Ratchaburana near the site of the duel, to memorialize his brothers. In the sub-basement of the central tower of that imposing monument was a crypt filled with various valuables, which miraculously survived centuries of pillage to be opened only in 1958. In the crypt, a large number of valuable objects were entombed. Somewhat surprisingly, on the walls of that crypt, and on some of the objects found within it (dated with certainty not later than about AD 1430), were inscriptions written in a variety of languages and scripts, including Chinese, Arabic, Sanskrit/Pali, and Thai (FAD 1958: 60–3, FAD 1959a: 39–42 and FAD 1959b: 38–40). In other words, both in the objects and in the inscriptions was the message that the court appreciated foreign traders, including Chinese.

To this point, then, we have seen how competition between two factions led to the enthronement of King Intharacha in 1409; how the new king, with his ministers, was active in trade and diplomacy; how they changed the terms of trade with East Asia by 1419; and how the Chinese community and merchants in general seem to have been prominent in Ayutthaya by 1424. Taken together, these four things would seem to fit together to encourage us to imagine an Ayutthaya which, early in the fifteenth century, was becoming more active in world trade, oriented especially toward China.

One way of thinking about the 1419 episode, then, might be to imagine that pro-Chinese elements at court had taken steps by that year to reduce the Ryukyuan role in the trade with China, and thereby to increase the direct Chinese role.

However, there is more to the story than this, even though the evidence might be thinner and less definite. China and Ayutthaya, after all, were not the only countries in the world in 1409 or 1424. Angkor, remember, was still functioning, if perhaps at a slower pace than
previously. Vietnam was under Chinese occupation during this period, though that occupation would be ended in the 1420s. Java was in a state of some confusion that would be resolved only with the accession of Gajah Madah and King Hayam Wuruk by the 1430s. But it was to the south of Siam that the most relevant economic and political activities were transpiring.

O. W. Wolters (1970) has ingeniously and convincingly explained how Melaka was founded in or about the year 1400. We know very little of its history beyond the often-fanciful tales of the *Hikayat Melayu*. Such Chinese records concerning Melaka as have come down to us point to a substantial Ayutthaya involvement in both its trade and its politics. We know that Ayutthaya somehow was involved in the politics of the southern tip of the Malay peninsula, for Ayutthaya is reported as having taken steps in 1392 or 1393 to avenge the murder on Singapore Island of a Thai vassal by the future founder of Melaka. Later, the Thai records include two major references to Melaka: in 1455 the Luang Prasoe chronicle says that an army was sent against Melaka; and in 1468 Melaka is included among the chief cities of the kingdom of Ayutthaya (Wyatt 1967: 279–86). Similarly, the Malay chronicles make numerous references to Siam during the Melaka period; and the Portuguese accounts from the second decade of the sixteenth century reinforce them.

Clearly, something was going on between Ayutthaya and the southern Malay peninsula in the course of the fifteenth century; something that dates back at least to the 1390s and continues at least until the Portuguese succeed to Melaka’s power in 1511. But what was this “something”? The answer has to be that we do not know. I think it is at least plausible that a reorientation of Ayutthaya’s economic (and thus political) policies took place during the reign of King Intharacha. It may have involved something as simple as a new increment of sophistication that resulted in a determination to earn larger profits on the trade that Ishii has discussed. It may have involved a redefinition of external trade so that it was less centered on East Asia and more oriented now toward the Strait of Melaka and the entire trade of the South China Sea. Whatever it was, it would have resulted in an increase in the strength of Ayutthaya,
which in the two decades to come was to have been able finally to end its long-term rivalries with both Angkor and Sukhothai by defeating both of them.

Notes

1. This excerpt comes from the late Richard Cushman's synoptic translation of the royal chronicles of Ayutthaya, which is to be published by the Siam Society.
2. Prince Paramanuchit says he was Borommaracha I's grandson (Wyatt 1973: 34-5).
3. Kasetsirit (1976: 112-3) has much to say about him, noting that Intharacha had sent a mission to China as early as 1374, and had personally headed missions to China in 1375, 1377 and 1384. He sent additional missions there in 1397 and 1403.
4. Vickery (1977: 57-60) persuasively argues that Ramaracha was sent, not to Pathakhucham, but to Cambodia.
5. On the elephant-back duel and the foundation of Wat Ratchaburana, see the Luang Prasoet version of the chronicles of Ayutthaya, s.v. cs 786.
6. Vickery, in the conclusions to his 1977 article, suggests that economic motives were at work in the struggle between Ayutthaya and Angkor in the previous century.
7. Indeed, it was the belief that Siam was the overlord of their newly captured Melaka, or had at least been recently at war with Melaka, that brought the Portuguese to open relations with Ayutthaya shortly after 1511 (see Gulbenkian Foundation 1982). On the Malay sources, see for example Brown (1970).
Ayutthaya and Japan: Embassies and Trade in the Seventeenth Century

Nagazumi Yoko

Prior to the seventeenth century, Japan did not have official relations with the Thai kingdom. Commercial relations between the two countries had already begun to develop, however, by the time of the Japanese diplomatic overture in 1606. This chapter describes the short period of diplomatic exchanges, from 1606 to 1629, and the private and governmental trade that complemented these missions. During the 1630s, the Japanese government banned much of its foreign trade. Chinese junks and Dutch ships—but no others—were allowed to call at the port of Nagasaki. The only other ports that remained open were Tsushima (for Korea) and Satsuma (for Ryukyu). Junks from Ayutthaya, too, might have enjoyed similar privileges, if Thai relations with Japan had remained unchanged. But a separate decision, unrelated to the trade ban, was taken by the Japanese government, which terminated official relations with Ayutthaya. This chapter examines the changing pattern of commerce between Ayutthaya and Nagasaki when the trade restrictions were first imposed. It ends with a discussion of the system that emerged in the 1660s and established a new basis for trade between the two countries, which continued until Japan opened its ports to the world in the 1850s.

Thai Embassies to the Court of the Shoguns

When Tokugawa Ieyasu came to power as shogun of Japan in 1603, he seized every available opportunity to promote diplomatic relations and

Editor's note: Readers should be aware that in Prof. Nagazumi’s chapter, Japanese family names are placed first, followed by the given names. In other chapters, the authors place the Japanese given name first, followed by the family name.
to restore Japan’s trading relations, which were severed from 1592 to 1598 in the course of Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s war with Korea. In his first letter to the Thai king in July 1606, Ieyasu included the usual diplomatic greetings and requested some of Siam’s finest-quality aloes wood\(^1\) and some guns. Subsequently, letters and gifts were exchanged by Ieyasu and the Thai king, as well as by Honda Masazumi (the chief counselor or toshiyori) and his ministerial counterpart in Siam (Hayashi, 1913 vi: 529–31). There is no record, however, of a formal visit by a Japanese embassy to the Thai court, or of any visit at a later time by a Japanese ambassador. For a decade, these exchanges were by letter only, and the first Thai embassy did not reach Japan until 1616.\(^2\)

During the early years of the Tokugawa shogunate, Ishin Suden was an important counselor on domestic and foreign policy, and had responsibility for diplomatic correspondence. He was a prominent Zen-Buddhist monk of Nanzenji, was also known as Konchiin and resided in Kyoto. When the second Thai embassy arrived at Nagasaki in 1621, Suden was asked by the chief counselors to come to Edo (Hayashi 1913 vi: 531–2). Before his departure from Kyoto, Suden received further information about Thai affairs through a commercial channel: the Chaya family of Kyoto and the Hasegawa family of Nagasaki. Both families belonged to the entourage of the shogun and both engaged in the junk trade between Japan and other ports in Asia, under Japan’s system of official licenses (the “vermillion-seal” licenses, or shuin trading system). Chaya Shirojiro disclosed to Suden a letter from an official of the Thai court (Okpha Chula) to Hasegawa Gonroku. The circumstances surrounding this letter indicate that the Thai embassy used the licensed merchants as intermediaries to approach the shogunate. In particular, Hasegawa Gonroku was the magistrate of Nagasaki and therefore had jurisdiction over the ships that entered the port.

The embassy comprised two envoys, twenty subordinates, a Japanese interpreter (Ito Kyudaiu), Hasegawa Gonroku, and others, for a total of seventy people. They were provided with lodgings in Seiganji Temple in Edo. When the interpreter was summoned to the castle, he was accompanied by Kiya Jazaemon, a prominent merchant from Sakai, who
likewise held foreign trading licenses. Suden asked the purpose of the embassy, and the interpreter showed him all the correspondence: one letter from King Song Tham to the shogun, two identical letters from a Thai minister (addressed respectively to Honda Masazumi and Ito Toshikatsu), and a letter from Yamada Nagamasa (the head of the Japanese trading community in Ayutthaya) to Hasegawa Gonroku. On the following day, the interpreter delivered all these letters to the chief counselors. On 1 September 1621 the embassy was given an audience with the shogun, and the royal letter and gifts were presented to the shogun, in accordance with diplomatic precedent (Suden and Kanshitsu 1989: 41–2, Hayashi 1913 vi: 531–7).

Song Tham's letter was more than a written message—it was an elaborate ceremonial object. The text was inscribed on a thin sheet of gold, which was rolled up like a scroll and inserted in a hollow elephant tusk. This ivory container, which must have been elegantly carved, was placed in a decorative box covered with damask cloth. The text was entirely in Chinese and, curiously, ended with a date that included the era name "Tenun." Chinese and Japanese dates, of course, included their respective era names: that is, the name of the reigning emperor and a number indicating the year of his reign. But Buddhist Southeast Asians, influenced by Sanskritic and Pali traditions of India, employed a different dating system. Why did this letter use a model like Japan's rather than the Thai date?

This question puzzled a compiler of foreign correspondence in the late Tokugawa period, Hayashi Akira (1800–59), who made the following observations about the Thai use of this unknown era name in the 1621 letter:

The dates in all previous letters from the king of Siam did not specify an era name. Since Siam is a Bonji, or Sanskritic, country, it is unlikely that Siam has its own era name. There is a suspicion that the Chinese translator might have invented the era name, because a 1727 letter to the Nagasaki magistrate from Cambodia, a state subordinate to Siam, used the same era name, "Tenun." (Hayashi 1913: vi: 532)
Hayashi had a good reason for pointing out the problem of the era name, because his family had succeeded Suden as supervisors of foreign correspondence, during a period when the use of era names was a diplomatic issue.

The era name was the main point of dispute when the shogunate endeavored to restore diplomatic relations with Korea during the first three decades of the seventeenth century. Korea, as a tributary state of China, was obliged to use the era names of the successive Chinese emperors. The Koreans knew that the Japanese did not accept the Ming calendar, and they were aware of Japan's independent system. Still, Korea tried at various times to get Japan to use the Ming era name (Toby 1984: 91–2).

In the case of Siam, however, the earliest letter from the shogun in 1606 used the Japanese era name, whereas the next one in 1610 was dated by the symbols of the sexagenary cycle (Kondo 1906 i: 101–2). This inconsistent use of dates indicates that the government did not pay much attention to the era name during the shogunate of Tokugawa Ieyasu. In 1617 a Korean embassy remonstrated against the shogunal letter, and Suden responded with a discourse on the Chinese perception of world order. Among those present were Hidetada (the second shogun), the chief counselors, and provincial lords (daimyo). The shogunate recognized at this juncture the importance of era names, in relation to the framework of the Chinese world order, because the Japanese era name was a symbol of Japan's sovereignty (Nagazumi 1990: 115–6). The Thai use of an invented era name, together with their use of elaborate and costly materials to enclose the letter, fitted perfectly with the burgeoning views in Japan about world order.

It seems likely that the Thai court was prepared to accommodate the Japanese viewpoint with respect to the calendar and that it did so with advice and guidance from Japanese merchants, who were involved in the trade officially licensed by their government. Thus a diplomatic precedent was established, and all subsequent Thai embassies (in 1623, 1625, 1626, and 1629) were received in essentially the same way as the one in 1621 (Hayashi 1913 vii: 1–10).
After the death of King Song Tham in December 1628, two of his sons reigned in rapid succession, for a total of only nine months. In September 1629 three Thai envoys and their Japanese interpreter (named Nigoemon) arrived in Edo and were received by the third shogun, Iemitsu. The new king’s letter reported his father’s death and his accession to the throne, and the shogun replied with assurances of continued friendship between the two countries (Hayashi 1913 vii: 10–5).

In Ayutthaya, meanwhile, a powerful minister had deposed King Chettha and replaced him with a younger brother (Athitwong). In mid-1629, the minister out-maneuvered one of his chief opponents, Yamada Nagamasa, who at that time was the commander of the Japanese guard in the king’s palace. Yamada was commissioned by the young king to put down a rebellion in Nakhon Sithammarat and to serve as governor of that town. He was therefore obliged to sail south, taking the Japanese guard with him. Then the minister deposed and executed the young king and mounted the throne himself. The new king, known subsequently as Prasat Thong, slaughtered many of the Japanese residents in Ayutthaya during 1629–30 and drove away the survivors. The Japanese contingent in the south likewise left the kingdom. Yamada died of wounds sustained in battle, although it was widely rumored that he had been poisoned. His followers sailed away not long afterward and went to Cambodia (Iwao 1966: 167–75, Pombejra 1984: 146–7, 165, Smith 1977: 21–2).

The same year, Sakai Tadayo (the head of the chief counselors in Japan) was informed of the death of Yamada in a letter received from Siam. By that time, Hayashi Razan and Hayashi Eiki were in charge of Japan’s diplomatic correspondence, and Suden had difficulty gaining access to the letter. He wrote in his diary, “It appears as though Yamada Nagamasa died of illness. But they translated the statement so obscurely that I can hardly guess the meaning” (Suden 1971 vii: 181). The true story of the political revolution nonetheless reached the shogun almost immediately. A Japanese captain (Foquia Kizaee) returned home from Siam and reported to the magistrate of Nagasaki that the new king was a usurper (Blussé et al. 1986 i: 280).

Prasat Thong made at least six attempts, at intervals throughout his
reign, to continue the diplomatic exchanges, combined with trade, that had been successfully pursued by his predecessor. The first such mission (in 1634) failed. In 1636, the next Thai ambassador arrived in Nagasaki aboard a crown junk, with a gift to the shogun and a cargo of commercial goods that he expected to sell on behalf of his government. The local officials (bonjoys) under the Nagasaki magistrate repeatedly questioned him about the political changes in Siam. The inconsistency of his explanations cast a long shadow of doubt over his honesty, and the local officials would not allow him to see the shogun or to sell the cargo.

On his departure from Nagasaki, he was given a letter from the captain and the interpreter of the Chinese community in Nagasaki, to take to officials in Siam. This letter mentioned the previous ambassador, who had been interrogated and likewise sent away without achieving anything. The Nagasaki officials wrote bluntly:

The bearer of this letter was worse than, and knew less about the incident than, the previous ambassador. Therefore, he was not received and was likewise sent away. If you want to send junks here, choose an accomplished, discreet and competent person, who is able to bring a reply to all previous letters and who is provided with instructions from the king. He will then be received with favor by the magistrate and, through his intermediation, will be given an audience with the shogun. (Blussé 1986: 279–80)

In Siam, meanwhile, Prasat Thong had reversed his expulsion policy and had tried to entice Japanese traders to settle once again in Ayutthaya. Some of them must have been employed by the government, because a Japanese official, with the fairly high rank and title of Okphra Chula, sent another letter in 1638 to Japan, addressing it in the king’s name to the Nagasaki magistrate. The text of this letter has not been preserved, but the Dutch obtained a copy of the Japanese response, which they recorded in the journal of the Dutch factory in Hirado. The response was unyielding on the issue of the king’s legitimacy:
As I have written already, we were told that a subordinate killed the king to usurp the throne. Therefore, our authorities were ordered not to correspond with a king without legitimacy. . . .If the facts are different and if what we understand is untrue, a highly qualified person can give assurances in front of our counselors in order to discharge his duties. Only after Japan lawfully recognizes the legitimacy of the king will the route to Japan be open.3

The contention of the shogunate is clear. Doubt about the legitimacy of the king was the sole reason for rebuffing the embassies and letters.

A Dutch ship carried the reply to the foreign minister (Phra Khlang) in Ayutthaya. It was written in Chinese, and some Japanese residents in Ayutthaya were asked to translate it into Thai. Since the expression was so direct, to the great dishonor of the king and his ministers, the Japanese translators dared not reveal the true meaning. Instead, their translation in Thai said simply that “the shogun asked for an upright envoy to calm the unrest on both sides and for each side to placate the other.” Consequently, in 1640 the king commissioned a junk and sent a special envoy with yet another letter engraved on gold foil, together with rich gifts.4 But because of storms at sea, both this envoy and another who was sent in 1644 were prevented from completing their voyages to Japan (Iwao 1966: 96–100).

Prasat Thong made his final attempt in the last year of his life. His embassy arrived in Nagasaki in 1656, with a letter from his minister requesting permission to trade. But the letter was not received, and the envoy was obliged to leave, after obtaining permission to sell only the minimum amount of cargo necessary to buy provisions for the return voyage (Hayashi 1913 vii: 15–7).

This year marked the end of Thai attempts to send embassies to Japan, although it was by no means the end of trading relations. Commerce between the two countries continued to thrive during the reigns of Prasat Thong and his successors, but they were conducted under the guise of “Chinese” junk trade. The Thai lost the privilege of being received by the shogun and maintaining correspondence with Japanese authorities. But their ships and trading representatives were allowed to call at the port of
Nagasaki and to trade—albeit with the status of ordinary merchants and on the same footing as private Chinese traders.

**Japan-Thai Trade**

Ayutthaya was the principal destination in the early Tokugawa era for junks known as *shuinsen*. Each of these junks was issued by the Japanese government with a license bearing the official vermilion seal, which was valid for one voyage from Japan and back. During the period that this system was in operation, from 1604 to 1635, the shogunate issued 56 licenses for voyages to Siam. A considerable number of unlicensed Japanese ships must have plied the same sea lanes, although they are not documented. The unlicensed merchants, along with unemployed Japanese warriors (*samurai*) and even pirates, gradually settled in Ayutthaya and created the Japanese quarter in the city, which had a population of more than 1,000 and perhaps nearly 1,500 in its heyday in the 1620s.

The rapid expansion of the Japanese community and their acquisition of a large share of the Thai-Japan trade became a matter of concern to their Dutch rivals, who had received permission to establish a trading house in Ayutthaya in 1608. Joost Schouten, the head of the Dutch company’s trading house at Ayutthaya, expressed his alarm in a 1629 letter to the Dutch governor general in Batavia:

Almost every year one or two Japanese junks come to Ayutthaya, together with the junk of the *opra* [*okphra*]—the head of the Japanese residents—in order to defend themselves against pirates. Owing to the succession of the present king, the *opra* has increased his wealth and power considerably, to the extent that he will send a junk with 1,000 piculs [about 56.8 tonnes] of sapan wood and 500,000 deer skins to Japan this year, provided either by his own capital or that of his colleagues. If he is successful with this voyage, not only will the Japanese residents take over the trade, but also any efforts by the [Dutch] Company to restore its trade with Siam would be made in vain.
The official mentioned in this letter was Yamada Nagamasa, at the zenith of his career. He held the relatively high official rank of okphra at this time, and subsequently the king bestowed on him the higher rank and title of Okya Sena Phimuk. As mentioned earlier, he sent a letter to Hasegawa Gonroku with the second embassy in 1621. Moreover, he wrote to Honda Masazumi and Doi Toshikatsu, who were the most influential chief counselors in Japan at that time, and he received a reply drafted by Suden himself. According to diplomatic practice at that time, the chief counselors exchanged letters only with their counterparts. This exchange of correspondence indicates that Yamada was recognized by the Japanese authorities as one of King Song Tham’s ministers. By extension, he must have sent one or more letters to the chief counselors in Japan prior to this one. Judging from Schouten’s description, it seems highly probable that Yamada sent those letters aboard his own trading junk and that his junk conveyed the first embassy to Japan.

This hypothesis is consistent with the general seventeenth-century pattern of Siam’s royal trade and diplomacy. Ambassadors arrived at their destinations aboard junks owned or commissioned by the king and filled with goods from the royal warehouses. The cargoes from Siam were sold or bartered, and cargoes of local goods were procured for the return voyage, while the diplomats performed the ceremonial aspects of their missions. Indeed, in Siam as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, trade and diplomacy were often one and the same thing (Pombejra 1990: 128).

Schouten’s 1629 letter observes further that the Japanese had already carved out a niche for themselves in Ayutthaya, making the Dutch dependent on them:

The Japan trade, of which the principal goods are deer skins, can bring more profit to the Japanese than to the [Dutch] Company, because without the Japanese, especially the above-mentioned oprae, we cannot make a contract for the annual purchase of deer skins. We are fully under threat to contract with them. Besides their usual fraudulent practices, the price will certainly be raised. They will take the “prime cuts”—leaving the Company the “offal” —and will sell these goods for an inordinately high price in Japan for a notoriously great profit.
Given the Japanese predominance in the deer-skin trade, he proposed to make contracts for deliveries from a Chinese merchant named Sijthongh and a Portuguese named Diego da Costa, and also to allow the Company’s agents to make direct purchases from local producers. Even after taking such measures, Schouten lamented, the Company would still have to obtain two-thirds of its deer skins from the Japanese. Shortly after, however, political changes in Japan enabled other trade rivals to compete effectively: the Chinese junk operators.

In a series of decrees from 1633 to 1639, the Japanese government prohibited Japanese people from leaving Japan on overseas voyages and also prohibited Japanese expatriates from returning to Japan. Thereafter, the only foreign vessels allowed to call at Nagasaki were those of the Chinese and Dutch. Chinese junks based in Ayutthaya then came to the fore along the route to Nagasaki. According to Dutch records, 103 Chinese junks made trips to Japan between 1651 and 1686 (Iwao 1953: 1–40). The Thai goods imported into Japan are fairly well known and include the skins of various kinds of animals (deer, cattle, sharks, rays), aloes wood, sapan wood, sugar, pepper, incense and coral. Goods from India and farther west could be procured also in Ayutthaya’s marketplaces. Very little is known, however, about the volumes of these cargoes. A rare example in Dutch records shows that Chinese junks brought 6,322 deer skins to Japan in 1653 and 17,800 in 1654.8

A close study of Japanese records—such as the Totsuji kaisho nichiroku (Diary of the Office of the Chinese Interpreters, 1655–1715) and the Kai-Hentai (Report from China: From Civilization to Barbarian, 1644–1728, edited by Hayashi and Hayashi)—reveals the complexity of the Chinese junk trade in some detail. First, the records specify the country or province of origin for every incoming junk, based on the declaration of the captain. The interpreters verified this declaration by examining the news that the captain reported, the type of vessel, and the types of products included in the cargo. Between 1687 and 1728, the Kai-Hentai lists a total of 1,759 junks, 236 of which arrived from Southeast Asia. The largest number came from Quinam (the southern half of Vietnam, ruled by the Nguyen lords at Hué), and the 48 that came from Siam represent the second-largest number
of arrivals recorded in this source. Another source, the *Tosen Fusetsugaki*, preserves the captain’s declarations for at least 64 junks that arrived from Siam during 1674–1723 (Ishii 1998: 18), although these statements rarely mention the goods included in their cargoes.

Second, the name of the captain is recorded in some cases. In most of these records, a particular captain traveled between a single port of origin and Nagasaki on each successive voyage, but not necessarily aboard the same vessel. This pattern indicates that the captains were hired by the junk owners, rather than sailing their own vessels on their own accounts.

Third, the majority of the crew, merchants and other passengers were Chinese, whereas local inhabitants from the ports of origin represented fewer than 1 percent of the people on board.

Fourth, crown vessels from Ayutthaya were, without exception, much larger than the other junks that visited Nagasaki. They carried more than 100 crew members, plus a few Thai officials. During the period 1687–1728, crown vessels account for 29 of the 48 junks from Siam recorded in the *Kai-Hentai* and thus more than 60 percent of the total (*Totsuji kaisho nichiri rokyu* 1955–68 i–vii: passim, Hayashi and Hayashi 1958–9 i–iii: passim, Nakamura 1995: 40–2, Kurihara 1994: 2–9). Since the Japanese records specify crown vessels in some years, although not invariably, there can be no doubt that the magistrates of Nagasaki were well aware of the Thai court’s active participation in trade with Japan.

Overseas Japanese themselves still seem to have been playing at least a small role in the Japan trade in the 1660s. Their involvement is illustrated, at least indirectly, by an incident that arose in 1668, when two junks from Siam arrived in Nagasaki. Some people on board claimed to be carrying incense, coral, and silver coins from three of the Japanese residents in Siam to their relations in Nagasaki. Since all gifts from abroad had to be declared to the magistrate, the port interpreters questioned the captain. They discovered that several of the Chinese on board were trying to bring these goods illegally into Japan, by means of a forged letter purporting to prove that the goods were gifts (*Totsuji kaisho nichiri roku* 1955 i: 6–9). A subsequent record in the registers of the magistrate’s office suggests, however, that the Japanese residents in Siam could not have
played a big role, because there were only twelve of them in the 1670s, and they had only sixteen relations living in Nagasaki (Nakamura 1995: 48–9).

Other Japanese traders in Siam carried on their trade in Southeast Asian waters. An example is recorded by Engelbert Kaempfer, who was on board a ship en route from Batavia to Ayutthaya in 1690. One of his fellow passengers was a Japanese named Hanjemon, whom he describes as an honest and industrious man, with a good command of Chinese, Malay, Vietnamese (both the northern and the southern dialects), and Thai, in addition to Japanese, his mother tongue. These languages and details in the account suggest that he may have traded at ports in southern China, the northern and southern Vietnamese ports, the Philippines, Java and the Malay peninsula.

Kaempfer was much impressed by Hanjemon’s recent voyages, which were an adventure that had lasted for eight years, and he recorded them in his journal (Kaempfer 1906 i: 15–7). These notes show that Hanjemon set out from Siam in 1682 on a junk bound for Manila, and that there were 64 other people on board, including a Portuguese pilot. The junk ran aground on a rock and foundered near a small island in Manila Bay, where Hanjemon and thirteen others were stranded for several years. Finally, they built a small vessel that enabled them to sail to Hainan Island, off the southern coast of China. The Chinese governor of the island kindly sent them to Macau, where Hanjemon was able to board a Portuguese ship bound for Batavia, before embarking on the final segment of his journey back to Siam.

Another man with the same given name, Kimura Hanjemon, lived in Ayutthaya a generation earlier and supplied deer skins to the Dutch trading house. (A 1633 contract records his agreement to supply 3,000 skins that year.) Subsequently, in 1642 he became the head of the Japanese community in Ayutthaya. Hanjemon the polyglot and fellow passenger of Kaempfer obviously belonged to a later generation. He must have been born in Ayutthaya and been named after his father. The records of the Nagasaki magistrate’s office concerning the Japanese residents in Siam during the 1670s indicate that the elder Kimura Hanjemon had three relations and two acquaintances in Nagasaki (Iwao 1966: 179–84, Nakamura
1995: 46–8). He must have taken advantage of his family ties to enable him to engage in trade with Japan. In addition, his position as head of the Japanese residents must have enabled him to send cargoes and perhaps his own junk from Ayutthaya to any of the neighboring countries. The elder Kimura Hanjemon and his son thus provide a good example of how the overseas Japanese accommodated themselves to changing conditions, after they were cut off from their homeland.

Beginning in 1640, the Dutch were the only Europeans allowed to trade with Japan, and Chinese junks were the only other vessels permitted to visit the port of Nagasaki. The Dutch Company therefore must have managed to acquire a share of the Siam-Japan cargoes that were formerly carried on Japanese ships. Between 1641 and 1645, the Company sent 6 to 11 ships each year from Batavia to Nagasaki. But only one ship on the voyage to Nagasaki was assigned to stop also at Ayutthaya. By comparison, the port city of Taijouan on the island of Taiwan was a far more important port of call for the Japan trade than Ayutthaya was at that time.

In 1647 the Dutch concluded an agreement with King Prasat Thong, which gave them the sole and exclusive right to export cattle hides and deer skins (Smith 1977: 78, 138–41). As a result, two or three of the Dutch ships from Batavia began to stop in Ayutthaya each year, before continuing to Nagasaki, in spite of the gradual decrease of Dutch trade in Nagasaki. Prasat Thong revoked these monopoly rights in 1652, and thereafter only one Dutch ship called at Ayutthaya each year on the way to Japan. In terms of cargoes from Siam, the Company could not compete easily in the Japanese market against its combined rivals: the private Chinese traders and junk operators, who handled not only goods on their own accounts but also cargoes on consignment from the royal warehouses and probably from senior government ministers and Japanese residents in Ayutthaya. In the next decade, moreover, the Thai crown ships themselves reappeared in Japanese waters.
Return of the Crown Ships to Japan

Throughout the seventeenth century, royal embassies and trade were inseparably connected. Before the fall of Nagamasa Yamada, Japanese merchants, licensed under Japan’s vermilion-seal system, dominated the Japan-Siam trade, both as intermediaries to the shogunate and as suppliers of deer skins to the Dutch in Ayutthaya. They played a crucial role that enabled the Thai king to establish diplomatic relations with the shogun. Their trade was far more profitable than the trade of the Dutch, because the animal skins were collected, cured, and processed specifically for the Japanese market by the Japanese themselves and shipped in their junks to their own country.

After the tragic death of Yamada, the shogun did not accept any further royal embassies from Ayutthaya, demanding that a qualified person be sent from the Thai court to explain the circumstances of Yamada’s death and to justify the legitimacy of Prasat Thong. Despite the official Japanese stance, however, the Japanese residents in Ayutthaya were successful in mitigating the obstinate demands made by the shogunate to the Siamese court and finding alternative means of perpetuating the profitable trade between the two countries. Cut off from their homeland, the Japanese community had no choice other than to cooperate in the export of goods from the king’s warehouses to Japan.

According to Dutch records, junks trading specifically for the Thai king began to reappear in Japan after more than thirty years of interruption. The first two of these junks (which incidentally had Muslim crews) were given permission to sell their cargoes in Nagasaki in 1661 (Iwao 1941: 109). As mentioned earlier, however, the crown vessels were conspicuous by their size and were larger than any other junks involved in this trade. The magistrates of Nagasaki apparently gave tacit approval for crown ships to trade, as long as they were called “Chinese” junks. By this time, the magistrates did not have to fear the shogunate’s disapproval of such a relaxation in the foreign trade policy, probably because foreign countries (particularly Portugal and Spain) were no longer perceived as threats to Japan. Since nearly all the inhabitants of Nagasaki, including the
magistrates, depended on trade to a greater or lesser extent, they were eager
to increase the volumes of imports and exports, regardless of the country
of origin or destination.

Notes

1. Aloes wood (*Aquilaria agallocha*) is known also as eagle wood and is
often called calambac in early European accounts. The Thai names are
*kritsana* and *trakhan*. An oil extracted from the wood is used for
making perfumes and incense.

2. The only extant document concerning the 1616 embassy is a record of
the Thai minister's letter carried by the envoys (Ishii 1971: 163). Since
there are no records to show how this embassy was received in Japan,
it is not included in the subsequent discussion.

3. Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA, General State Archive), The Hague:
NFJ 53. Dagregister van de factorij te Hirado [Journal of the Dutch
Company Trading House at Hirado], entries for 6 and 7 November
1638.

4. ARA: NFJ 278. Letter, Jeremias van Vliet to François Caron, 4 July
1640.

5. Sapan wood (*Caesalpinia sappan*, called *fang* in Thai) takes a high
polish and is used for cabinet work and inlays. It also yields a red dye
and has some medicinal uses.

6. Utrecht Rijksarchief (Utrecht State Archive): R. 64. Familic Hijdecoper
621. Letter, Joost Schouten to Governor General and Batavia Council,
1 April 1629.

7. The rank of *okya* (*phraya* in modern Thai) was held by the senior
ministers of the Thai court. The rank of *okphra* (*phra* in modern Thai)
was one level lower.

Mergui and Tenasserim as Leading Port Cities in the Context of Autonomous History

Sunait Chutintaranond

Centralist Historical Ideology

The city of Tenasserim and the nearby deep-water anchorage at Mergui were once important ports that controlled a strategic coastline on the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea. Their history was brought to light and reconstructed in modern times, with the preconception that they were originally part of the Burmese kingdom of Pagan, that they were subsequently ruled for three centuries by the kings of Siam and then for more than half a century by the kings of Burma, and that they came under imperial Britain in the 1820s. To be more precise, historical studies about Tenasserim and Mergui are mainly written in the context of “centralist historical ideology” (Saraya 1982: 85). The centers of attention in this approach are the Thai capital (Ayutthaya) and the successive Burmese capitals (Pagan, Pegu and Ava)—that is, the seats of power of the Thai and Burmese monarchs. With or without historical consciousness on the part of the authors, the study of Mergui and Tenasserim has always relied heavily on Siamese and Burmese court chronicles, which are sources mainly concerned with monarchical affairs and chronologies of kings. As a result, mainstream historical writing places emphasis solely on the sovereign and his capital, whereas little light has been shed on the “autonomous history” of other cities such as Tenasserim and Mergui.

The preconception that Tenasserim and Mergui were in every way controlled by the reigning king, whether at Ayutthaya or elsewhere, is an outcome of a continuous and perhaps unconscious attempt by historians to marginalize the local autonomy of big and small cities in the Thai and Burmese kingdoms. This line of analysis has developed alongside the preconceived notion that Siam and Burma were strong centralized kingdoms, in the sense of being major military states that successfully
controlled a large area each, by exercising power from a single dominant center. Charnvit Kasetsiri, in his *Rise of Ayutthaya* (1976: 16–7, 93–106 and 119–31) for example, observes that the founding of the new Thai capital in 1351 gave the lower Chao Phraya basin a powerful center for the first time and simultaneously ended the era of fragmentary states that had existed since the Dvaravati period. This change, however, does not necessarily mean a consolidation of control over the states that were at the periphery.

Historical analysis in the framework of centralist ideology is not supported by some of the evidence from the precolonial period. Tomé Pires, a Portuguese pharmacist who lived briefly in Melaka and compiled a description of Siam between 1512 and 1515, made a list of twelve towns on the east coast of the Malay peninsula, from Pahang, Trengganu, Kelantan and Patani in the south, to Nakhon Sithammarat and Phetburi in the center and north of the Gulf. He observed that all these little towns belonged to Siam, but that "every one of these ports is a chief port, and they have a great deal of trade, and many of them rebel against Siam" (Pires 1944: 110). He also observed that the local rulers all had their own junks, which they operated independently of the royal trading junks. Clearly, King Ramathibodi II (r. 1491–1529) maintained only loose control over these tiny seats of maritime power, and the local rulers enjoyed a large measure of autonomy in both trade and administration.

In comparison with Ayutthaya, Victor Lieberman, in his *Burmese Administrative Cycles : Anarchy and Conquest c. 1580–1760* (1984: 7), suggests that the power of the Burmese king in the core area around his capital was insufficiently stable to control the administrative elite, either at the center or in the peripheral parts of the state—at least not during the 180 years of Burmese history encompassed by his research. After the deaths of some exceptionally strong kings, such as Tabin-shwe-hti and Bayinnaung, the Burmese kingdom broke apart. In sum, a number of practically independent states extended all across mainland Southeast Asia: Arakan, Pagan, Pegu, Martaban, Angkor, Ava, Manipur, Assam, Sukhothai, Ayutthaya, Chiang Mai, Vientiane and Champasak. This general pattern continued until the arrival of the colonial powers.
Trade and Thai Acquisition of Tenasserim

The northwestern coastline of the Malay peninsula faces westward across the Andaman Sea and directly toward the shipping channels that open into the Bay of Bengal. These sea lanes were the main routes between the peninsula and India. There are two major reasons for Ayutthaya’s extension of its political control over this area. First, as observed by David Wyatt (1982: 86), “Ayutthaya’s seizure of control of Tenasserim (by the 1460s) and Tavoy (1488) seems to have been intended primarily to secure direct access, rather than indirect access through Malacca [Melaka], to the international trade of the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.” To some degree, this policy derived from the failure of the Ayutthayan kings to extend their power over the sultans of Melaka and the rulers of other important ports in the southern part of the Malay peninsula. Pires described the uneasy relationship between Ayutthaya and Melaka in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries as follows:

The Siamese have not traded in Malacca [Melaka] for twenty-two years [i.e., not since the early 1490s]. They had a difference because the kings of Malacca owed allegiance to the kings of Siam. They say that it is theirs and that twenty-two years ago this king [Ramathibodi II (r. 1491–1529)] lost Malacca, which rose up against this subjection. They also say that Pahang rose against Siam in the same way, and that, on account of the relationship between them, the kings of Malacca favoured the people of Pahang against the Siamese, and that this was also a reason for their disagreement. (Pires 1944: 108)

Furthermore, the triumph of the Portuguese at Melaka in 1511 inevitably prevented Ayutthaya from regaining the sovereignty that it claimed over this great entrepôt of east-west trade. Instead, the Thai kings turned their attention increasingly to Tenasserim, in the upper part of the peninsula, where they still had an opportunity to establish a network of compliant vassals.

Ayutthaya’s second reason for dominating the Tenasserim coast is
attributable to the commercial link that it provided between the Indian Ocean to the west and the Gulf and the South China Sea to the east. The early history of the transpeninsular route through Tenasserim is sparsely recorded, and its reconstruction must await future archeological research. The route was known to Arab traders and is mentioned in a 1511 text by an Arab geographer, who noted that Arab merchants themselves were using this route to reach Ayutthaya (Tibbetts 1979: 229).

One of the earliest European descriptions of the commodities traded on the Tenasserim coast is based on information gathered by Jan Huygen van Linschoten (1970 i: 103), an assistant of the Portuguese archbishop in Goa during the 1580s. He mentions the bay that cuts deeply into the upper Malay peninsula and leads to the mouth of the Tenasserim River. The city of Tenasserim itself is a short distance upriver, and Van Linschoten’s informants thought that it was a mere 10 miles from the east coast of the peninsula—a remarkably short distance for the overland transit of goods. He reported that a large volume of the trade at Tenasserim was in Portuguese hands and that large quantities of the goods available there came from both the Burmese kingdom and overland from the Gulf coast.¹

Tenasserim was renown for its fine nipa-palm wine, which was shipped in large ceramic containers (generically known as Martaban jars) and distributed widely in India.

Another account, compiled a century later by Nicolas Gervaise, a Frenchman who resided in Siam during the early 1680s, called Tenasserim “a city famous for its antiquity and well known to all sailors” (Gervaise 1989: 50). He likewise notes the important commercial function of the ports on the west coast of the peninsula:

The most important ports in the kingdom are Myrguim or Mygri [Mergui] and Jonsalam [Ujung Salang, modern Phuket]. The first takes its name from a small island nearby, called Mygri by the Siamese and by us Myrguy [Mergui], which protects it from the winds. It is called by some Tenasserim, but without good reason, for Tenasserim is more than thirty leagues away.
This port [Mergui] is one of the most beautiful and the safest anywhere in the Indies. The harbour mouth is always free, and good anchorage is to be found everywhere in it. It is especially well provided for refitting vessels, and masts and all other timber needed for the construction of even the largest ships are available there so cheaply, that often they cost no more than the trouble of going to cut them. (Gervaise 1989: 17)

A large variety of goods passed overland through Tenasserim to Ayutthaya, and the cloth trade was particularly brisk. Brightly colored cottons, printed with designs to suit the tastes of Thai and other consumers, were shipped regularly from the factories on India’s east coast to Mergui.

In addition to textiles, imports to Ayutthaya across the isthmus included opium, iron and dyestuffs. Exports entering the Bay of Bengal from Mergui included aromatic woods and gums, mostly destined for the Yemen and Hidjaz, tin, ivory, elephants, spices—particularly cardamom. The latter came mostly from the Mergui-Tenasserim area itself, while Chinese porcelain and Thai Sawankhalok ceramics were trans-shipped out. (Mills 1997: 44)

These imported, exported and transshipped goods were mostly high in value and relatively low in bulk, and the taxes collected by the harbor master provided considerable revenue for the rulers, both before and after Tenasserim was brought under Thai control.

Central Administration with Local Autonomy

Most of the early Portuguese and Italian writers reported that Tenasserim was already under Ayutthaya’s jurisdiction well before the Portuguese captured Melaka (Pires 1944 i: 100, Barbosa 1921 ii: 163–4, Federici 1905: 15, Galvano 1601: 112–3; see also Campos 1940: 9). But when did the cities of Mergui and Tenasserim first acknowledge the sovereignty of the kings of Ayutthaya, and what was their status before and
after this change took place? The exact date has never been determined.

Maung Kyi O, citing Burmese manuscripts in his “Notes of the History of Mergui” (Andrews 1962: 5), attempts to trace the origins of the kingdom of Tenasserim as far back as a king called Bahika Raja, who sought military support from an Arakanese king, when a Thai king attempted to seize control of Tenasserim. After successfully repelling the attack, Bahika Raja took steps to fortify his city. Historians have to be very cautious when attempting to interpret such sources and using them to reconstruct the early history of Tenasserim. For example, the Burmese manuscripts place these events in the year A.D. 192, which is obviously not believable. But at least they provide evidence that Tenasserim was at one time ruled independently by its own king. The same is true of many cities in mainland Southeast Asia, prior to the emergence of strong political centers such as Pegu, Martaban, Ava and Ayutthaya. The notion that Tenasserim appeared to be a kingdom in its own right, even as late as the 1580s, was recorded by Van Linschoteren, whose information may reflect memories passed down by generations of his informants—Indian and Southeast Asian traders who frequented the ports on the western, northern and eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal.

The opening statement of the Thai royal chronicles lists sixteen vassal states of the new Thai capital. Among them are Melaka, Tenasserim, Nakhon Sithammarat and Tavoy (Damrong 1973 i: 111–2). The date at which Tenasserim entered the list can never be known, because no contemporary records have survived. Even if the early kings of Ayutthaya exercised some influence over Tenasserim, perhaps in the form of a token acknowledgement of vassalage, it seems unlikely that they were able to begin incorporating Tenasserim into the administrative hierarchy at any time prior to the fifteenth century. Tenasserim was far away, across the mountains to the west, and for more than half a century after the founding, Ayutthaya’s leaders were preoccupied with struggles for power between the house of Uthong, whose political base was at Lopburi, and the house of Suphanburi. Not surprisingly, this struggle usually resumed after the death of a strong king, such as Ramathibodi I (r. 1351–69) and Borommaracha I (r. 1370–88). It was not until the early fifteen century that
the tendency toward fragmentation in the early Ayutthaya polity slowly diminished, when Uthong political domination in the lower Chao Phraya basin declined and total victory was achieved by the rival house of Suphanburi. Nevertheless, the extinction of the Uthong house did not suddenly result in the political unity of Ayutthaya. Leading members of the Suphanburi family still competed among themselves to obtain absolute control over the city.

No firm evidence has been found to show that Tenasserim was brought under the jurisdiction of Ayutthaya before the middle of the fifteenth century. Judging from the Luang Prasoet (1963: 139) version of the Thai chronicles, Tavoy, a coastal city to the north of Tenasserim, remained independent until the last year of King Trailok’’s reign, when the king’s son, Barommaracha, undertook the conquest in 1488/9. For geographical and logistical reasons, he could wage war against Tavoy only by using Tenasserim as a base for military support and supplies. Clearly, therefore, Tenasserim was already under Thai control by the time the campaign began. It is also possible that Tenasserim was incorporated into the domain of Ayutthaya’s kings even earlier. Four inscriptions dated from 1462 to 1466 have been found at Tenasserim and appear to show that Ayutthaya had control of this area by that time (Wolters 1966 and Vickery 1971). Moreover, the Thai Palatine Law (Kot Monthianban) of 1458/9 classifies Tenasserim as a mūang phraya maha nakhon (in Sanskrit form, a mahā negara or “great city”), signifying that it was governed internally as an independent state but owed allegiance to the king of Ayutthaya (Pramuan kotma 1938: 59). Although we cannot be absolutely sure that Tenasserim was in the list when the law was first compiled, it seems likely that the ruler of Tenasserim had accepted the extension of Ayutthaya’s power over the Tenasserim River valley and the port of Mergui by the decade of the 1460s.

Central Power with Local Autonomy

To what degree could a local ruler retain his powers of self-government, after being militarily defeated or persuaded to accept a
suzerain? In actual practice, large, populous and distant territorial units were never successfully incorporated into the administrative system that applied to the core area around the capital. At the rim of the mandala or “circle of power” of Ayutthayan kings, a number of semi-independent local rulers existed, each with a considerable degree of autonomy. On the one hand, they built up their own networks of alliances with nearby strong rulers, in order to stabilize their authority and protect themselves from Ayutthaya. On the other hand, they acknowledged the sovereignty of the Ayutthayan king. The rulers of Phitsanulok in the north, Tenasserim in the west, and Nakhon Sithammarat, Pahang and Kedah in the south were in this category. It is evident that the city of Tenasserim still retained a degree of fame in its own right in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, because it was known to Vasco da Gama (who sailed with the first Portuguese fleet to India in 1498) and to Amerigo Vespucci (a cousin of Ferdinand Magellan) as a “colony of Moors and Gentiles [i.e., Muslims and other non-Christians], its trade with Malacca [Melaka] and Bengal, its traffic in copper, quick silver, vermilion and silk, in rose-water brought from Mekkah in little bottles of tinned copper; in opium, musk, benzoin and benjuy [gum benjamin]” (Orr 1951: 29).

An assessment of the degree of “local autonomy” enjoyed subsequently by the Tenasserim rulers should look beyond the superficial evidence of military conquest and submission. In reality, the relationship between the king at the center and the provincial rulers was not always as unstable as the observations cited above might imply. Almost all the time, both sides found their interests well served by compromising. When the king appointed governors of provincial towns, he usually chose them from the chief family or families of the respective towns, and he was able to exercise at least indirect control over the manpower and other resources in those areas, even if the towns were distant from the capital. A governor who came from a local ruling family already had a wide network of local patronage and manpower in his town, which enabled him to mobilize men at the king’s request in time of war. As a reward, the king at the center provided the governor with political protection, regalia of office and other symbols of status and authority. More important, the king did not always
intend to centralize local administration. He gave these provincial rulers enough independence to manage their internal affairs without reference to the court, as long as they remained loyal and demonstrated their obligations to the crown. For practical purposes, moreover, it was not the king himself but his senior officials such as the Phra Khlang—the minister in charge of foreign affairs, trade monopolies and revenues from maritime trade—who were responsible for the performance of the provincial rulers and for ensuring their loyalty.

The court had its limitations in developing direct control over Tenasserim, perhaps as a result of the Thai administrative system, which was by nature decentralized. The looseness of control at the periphery allowed local rulers, who were appointed by the king, to exercise a high degree of local autonomy. It also prevented the court from imposing political control over the city, either continuously or effectively. Two examples can be cited to show that this autonomy extended even to limited warfare—at least insofar as defending the governor’s trading interests was concerned.

The first example shows that the Tenasserim governor engaged in war against other major trading centers. Ludovico di Varthema, an Italian traveller from Bologna, whose 1502–8 voyage from Europe and back carried him past Tenasserim, described this warfare as follows:

The king of the city [Tenasserim] is a Pagan, and is a very powerful lord. He is constantly fighting with the king of Narsinga [in South India] and the king of Banghella [Bengal]. He has a hundred armed elephants, which are larger than any I ever saw. He always maintains 100,000 men for war, part infantry and part cavalry. Their arms consist of small swords and some sort of shields, some of which are made of tortoise-shell, and some like those of Calicut; and they have a great quantity of bows, and lances of cane, and some also of wood. When they go to war they wear a dress stuffed very full of cotton [i.e., a kind of padded armor]. (Varthema 1863: 197–8)
Obviously the size of the forces is exaggerated in this account. Tenasserim never had enough arable land and trade to support the population necessary to supply such an army, and much of the narrow coastal region south of Mergui was thinly populated (Mills 1997: 38–9). There are, moreover, no indications in the Thai chronicles that Ayutthaya was directly involved in such conflicts. Varthema’s account seems reliable in essence, however, because he reached the southeast coast of India when an armed conflict with Tenasserim was in progress and changed his itinerary accordingly. It is possible that the governor engaged in limited warfare with trading rivals, perhaps even without the court’s knowledge. In another case, which is well documented (Wyatt 1982: 115), a powerful court official secured the posts of governor and harbor master of Mergui for two of his friends in the 1680s. These men not only amassed a fortune from their private trading at Mergui but also misused their authority to plunder the ships of trading rivals and to engage in a trade war.

Given this degree of autonomy, it is easy to imagine why early European writers thought that many of the governors of these little port enclaves were kings in their own right. João de Barros, for example, never visited Asia but gathered reports from ships returning to Portugal and published an official study of Asia in the 1550s and 1560s. His informants thought that Tagala (near Martaban), Tavoy, Mergui and Tenasserim were subject to Siam but that the rulers of these places called themselves “kings” (Campos 1940: 9). This practice was indeed a rule rather than an exception, as illustrated by another Portuguese work compiled four decades earlier, which lists twelve Gulf-coast towns south of Ayutthaya and observed that they “all have lords like kings” (Pires 1944: 110).

By contrast, the same earlier source indicates that Siam’s west coast territory had far fewer towns: Tenasserim, Mergui, Trang and the Malay sultanate of Kedah. For this coast, Pires depicts a hierarchy, headed by the Tenasserim viceroy: “He is the chief person. He has jurisdiction over them all. He is the perpetual captain of Tenasserim. He is the lord of many people and of a land plenteous in foodstuffs” (1944: 110).

In sum, the political status of the ruler of Tenasserim, after he became subordinate to the king of Ayutthaya, was not significantly
different from his status prior to incorporation. That is, he still exercised a high degree of autonomy. In appearance as well as actual practice, he was always a “little king” in his distant corner of the vast but loosely integrated territories of the Thai kings.

Burmese Expansion and Conflict with the Thai

Fifteenth-century Melaka, under its independent Muslim sultan, was an entrepôt open to traders of all nations. The restrictive trade regime imposed by the Portuguese, after they seized the city in 1511, combined with official Portuguese hostility toward Muslims in general, made Melaka an unattractive port of call—even to some extent for private Portuguese merchants, who could trade more freely elsewhere. Its decline was an important factor behind the rapid growth of seaborn trade at other ports in mainland Southeast Asia (Syriam, Pegu, Patani, and Ayutthaya) and in the Indonesian archipelago (Aceh, Johor and Banten). Most of these centers adapted themselves as competitors of Portuguese Melaka, with the result that the capture of Melaka diverted Muslim traffic to more peripheral ports where eastern goods could be acquired free of Portuguese interference. Along with the Siamese dependency of Mergui on the west coast of the peninsula, it is likely that Martaban, Ye and Tavoy increased their transpeninsular trade with the Gulf of Siam. (Lieberman 1984: 28; see also Wyatt 1982: 88)

These international trade centers exported local luxuries and foodstuffs in exchange for Chinese, Southeast Asian and Indian products. The growing wealth of the coastal region, together with the development of the economic resources and wealth of both the lower Irrawaddy basin and the Tenasserim coast, soon attracted the attention of the Burmese rulers. On inheriting the throne of Taung-ngu in 1531, Tabin-shwei-hti chose to attack Pegu—the capital of the Mon kingdom, which extended across the coastal region north of the towns under Thai domination and as far west as the Irrawaddy
delta. After successfully seizing the city in the late 1530s, he abandoned the interior capital of his predecessor, to dwell close to the sea (Lieberman 1984: 29–30).

The transfer of the Burmese capital from Taung-ngu to Pegu, after the coastal kingdom of the Mon was defeated, brought the king of Burma into the commercial zone where Ayutthaya claimed paramountcy and soon led to conflict. The kings on both sides understood the great value of the ports to the east of the Bay of Bengal—especially Tenasserim, Mergui and Tavoy—and the sixteenth century is a period marked by numerous Burmese and Thai military operations to gain or regain control of this coast. To protect its western frontier and to exert greater control over Tenasserim and other important ports, an Ayutthayan king took advantage of Tabin-shwei-hti’s temporary absence from Pegu (during a campaign against Arakan) and sent an expedition against Tavoy in 1547. The ruler of Tavoy fled north, sought Burmese aid and became the immediate cause for the first Burmese invasion of Thai territory, which took place the following year.

Unlike Ayutthaya’s rulers, the kings of Burma did not intend to incorporate Tenasserim and Mergui into their political domain at that time. Instead, as recorded in the Burmese chronicle compiled by U Kala (and translated by Aung Thein 1959: 11), they sought the customs revenues of Tenasserim. Although the 1548 siege of Ayutthaya was unsuccessful, the Burmese did capture one of the Thai king’s sons and his future son-in-law (who was viceroy of Phitsanulok). In the negotiations that followed, the price paid by the Thai king for the lives of these royal prisoners was the revenues of Tenasserim, his most valuable port outside the capital region itself. Subsequently, the Burmese lost this concession but regained it in 1564 after King Bayin-naung’s siege of Ayutthaya, which ended in another negotiated settlement. Once again, the Thai king was obliged to send the port revenues of Tenasserim to the Burmese court (Aung Thein 1969: 28). During the long series of unsuccessful invasions launched from Pegu against Ayutthaya, which began in 1585, the Burmese had direct control of Tenasserim and thus dominated the trade in these waters. After the retreat of Burmese forces from the Ayutthaya region in early 1593, however, the
first Thai objective was to recapture Tenasserim and Tavoy. Within a few months, the Thai once again controlled these ports and the sea lanes. The Thai held Tenasserim continuously thereafter until 1760, when the next invasion began. The Burmese captured it, lost it the same year and retook it in 1765. Thereafter, the Thai never managed to regain control, and this coastline passed into British hands in the 1820s.

Toward a New Historical Ideology

The role and significance of Tenasserim are relegated to the margins in the histories of both Siam and Burma. The *Burma Gazetteer* (Andrews 1962: 4–5), for example, describes Tenasserim and Mergui merely as a “battle-ground of the rival kingdoms of Burma and Siam” before the British conquest. The brief introduction presented above shows, to the contrary that economic and political factors placed Tenasserim not at the periphery but at the center of rivalries and conflicts, which extended across more than three centuries.

Up to the present time, much of Thai and Burmese history has been written in the context of “centralist historical ideology,” in which the significance of local autonomy has been either ignored or evaluated superficially. To foster the study of “history from below,” scholars will have to transfer their focus from the actions of kings at the center to local rulers at the periphery. This task is very difficult, because most of the extant indigenous materials are not well suited to this type of enquiry. Nonetheless, careful study of the known sources could yield valuable results. These sources include the official works produced by court officials, such as the royal chronicles—the *phongsawadan* of the Thai, the *yazawin* of the Burmese, the *slapat rajawan* of the Mon—and historical works produced by local intellectuals, local folk literature, stories and legends associated with local events, and even the collective memories of people who live (or whose forebears once lived) in the area under investigation.

Unlike many large provincial towns and even some small ones, Tenasserim’s history has not been preserved in the written words of contemporary local historians. To be more precise, if such a text once
existed, no copy has come to light in modern times. In the case of Tenasserim and Mergui, where indigenous sources are scanty, historians must rely in large part on the court chronicles. In addition, however, there is a large volume of foreign records concerning this coast from the sixteenth century onward, in Danish, Dutch, English, French, Latin, Persian, Portuguese and other languages, and there are earlier records in Arabic and Chinese. Such sources, written from perspectives that are entirely independent of the official court texts, can be used to construct a new version of history that will surely not correspond to the mainstream approach.

Notes

1. *Editor’s note:* Portugal was the only European power involved in this trade until the end of the sixteenth century. The activities of private Portuguese traders and adventurers in Siam during this period have been well documented by Flores (1995). For Portuguese activities on Burma’s side of the peninsula, see Guedes (1994).

2. The year specified in the chronicle is C.S. (Lesser Era) 850, which began on 29 March 1488 and ended on 28 March 1489. The month is not specified. Tavoy could have been captured in April or May 1488 (prior to the rainy season) or in the early months of 1489. The Luang Prasoet version is the only source that gives the year 1488/9. Another Thai chronicle (Phra Chakkraphatphong 1961: 18, which has less-reliable dates) and a Mon chronicle (Phongsawadan mon phama 1963: 3) both place the campaign in 1470/1, the year that King Dhammacedi came to the throne of Pegu in the neighboring Mon kingdom. The Royal Autograph version of the chronicles, edited by King Mongkut in the 1850s and 1860s, makes no mention at all of the Tavoy campaign (Damrong 1973 i: 122).

3. A rare example of a local Tenasserim record is in the *Burma Gazetteer*, which refers to historical evidence concerning Tenasserim before the arrival of the Portuguese. An inscription was found near the Shinkodaw pagoda, about ten miles from Mergui. The inscription is dated B.E. 631
(A.D. 1269/70), and records a gift to the pagoda by Nga Pon, the royal usurer of Tayok-pye-min ("the king who fled from the Chinese"), who reigned at Pagan from 1248 to 1285 (Andrews 1962: 5). This evidence might shed new light on the obscure history of early Tenasserim and local autonomy, before great kingdoms with centers such as Ayutthaya, Pegu and Ava were established. Unfortunately, nothing is known about this inscription, except the information recorded in the gazetteer.
Ayutthaya and the Persian and Indian Muslim Connection

Leonard Y. Andaya

In the histories of the mainland polities of Southeast Asia, a principally wet-rice (sawah) growing lowland culture has usually been regarded as the foundation of society. The precise care required at various stages of rice cultivation demanded access to a readily available pool of human resources. Therefore in the development of these polities, the authorities were eager to encourage a sedentary existence among their people. This not only fulfilled the labor requirements for sawah cultivation, but enabled the authorities to organize labor and taxes to support larger and more ambitious projects. In his study of the early Bangkok period, the Thai anthropologist, Akin Rabibhadana (1969), draws attention to the systematic steps taken by Siamese authorities to attract and maintain manpower. In neighboring Burma, Michael Aung-Thwin (1985: 199–204) even argues that during the Pagan period the dynamics of the struggle for human and material resources in the agricultural interior of Pagan between Theravada Buddhism and kingship in the kingdom of Pagan were paradigmatic for the whole of precolonial Burma.

Yet while lowland sawah agriculture with its attendant political and social institutions is a significant factor in the evolution of mainland states, there is no denying the important role also played by international trade. Charnvit Kasetsiri (1976) has indeed argued that it was a combination of control over the rich agricultural hinterlands in the Chao Phraya basin, as well as access to international trade, that ensured Ayutthaya’s dominance over the other Tai-speaking polities in the area. Victor Lieberman, too, draws the same conclusion with regard to the two Taung-ngu dynasties that followed the fall of Pagan. Lieberman (1987: 172) questions Aung-Thwin’s emphasis on Pagan, an interior agricultural state, as representing the Burmese pre-colonial state par excellence. He argues instead that changing international trade patterns made the coastal regions increasingly
important and shifted the center of political gravity toward a greater balance between interior and the coast. Neither Ayutthaya nor the Taung- ngu dynasties arose in a vacuum; they had instead built upon a well-established tradition of coastal kingdoms. For the Burmese, it was the impressive international trade that had centered on the Mon kingdom of Thaton in Lower Burma, and for Ayutthaya it was the earlier agglomeration of city-states that together had formed the Dvaravati cultural complex.

Charnvit Kasetsiri suggests that the founder of Ayutthaya, Uthong, may have been a resident Chinese merchant actively engaged in trade in the Malay peninsula and southern Siam. Uthong’s wealth, influence among the Chinese population and judicious marriages with daughters of the ruling houses of Suphanburi and Lopburi, the two most prominent Dvaravati city-states in the Chao Phraya basin, guaranteed his success (Kasetsiri 1976: 67–70). Ayutthaya’s ability to attract Chinese traders ensured its status as a leading regional entrepôt in Southeast Asia. Only in the last few years of his life did the first Ming emperor Hung-wu (1368–98) encourage closer relations with any nation beyond Siam (Wang 1964: 89).

Before the fifteenth century, the growth of Ayutthaya appears to have been stimulated by its trade relations with China. But it was to lose its preeminence as the region’s foremost entrepôt as a result of the rise of Melaka. A group of Muslim traders, tentatively identified as being from the Malabar coast, was in Siam when the Chinese envoys arrived at court. They succeeded in persuading the Chinese to allow them to accompany them back to China, where they may have reported the founding of Melaka. Wang Gungwu argues that these Muslims may have been responsible for the decision by the Chinese court to send a mission to Melaka in 1403 in order to promote their own interests. It appears that they had difficulties in obtaining Chinese goods in Siam, and they understood that there was a strong market for pepper in China. Moreover, Melaka’s convenient location on the Straits and congenial atmosphere for trade were compelling reasons for convincing the Chinese to favor Melaka as an entrepôt (Wang 1964: 94–6). Until Yung-lo’s mission in October 1403, the Chinese had no knowledge of Melaka. Once they were informed of Melaka’s existence, they realized that it would satisfy China’s desire for a convenient trade
center and a safe route to India. Thus it was that Melaka was granted the special honor of being the first foreign state to receive the emperor’s inscription (Wang 1964: 101–4). This sign of extraordinary favor enabled Melaka to eclipse Siam as the region’s major entrepôt.

Melaka’s rise, however, did not mean that Ayutthaya had become a backwater. Chinese traders continued to visit its ports, and Muslim traders were beginning to arrive in increasing numbers to the region because of the great amount of trade generated at Melaka. When the Portuguese first visited Melaka in 1509 they claimed that there were a thousand Gujarati merchants in the city (Pires 1944 i: 254), most of whom would have been Muslim. After Melaka’s ruler became Muslim in the middle of the fifteenth century, it became a port even more favored by Muslim traders from India, the Middle East and other Muslim areas in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago. Events in the Islamic world during the sixteenth and early seventeenth century were to contribute further to the flow of Muslim traders to Southeast Asia.

The Islamic “Long” Sixteenth Century

The role of the Chinese in Ayutthaya’s international trade is adequately documented (see especially Viraphol 1977 and Cushman 1993), and a study of the Amoy trade network underlines the differences between state and private trade, and the complexity of the latter in the southern Chinese provinces (Ng 1983). Less well-known is the second “pillar” of Ayutthaya’s international trade: the Muslims. Muslim trade to Ayutthaya is equally complicated but with a few exceptions has not received the attention it deserves.¹ One of the earliest references of Muslim links to Ayutthaya is from a Persian historian of the fifteenth century who lists Shahr-i Naw (Arabic for the “New City,” meaning Ayutthaya) as a port visited by sailors from Hormuz (Tibbetts 1979: 99).² Early in the sixteenth century, Tomé Pires (1944 i: 104) remarked that there were “few Moors in Siam,” using an Iberian label for Muslims. But he was referring solely to Malay Muslims, for he continues: “There are, however, Arabs, Persians, Bengalee, many Klings...” It was in the seventeenth century that the
Muslim traders made the greatest impact on Ayutthaya, particularly during the reign of King Narai (1656–88). To be able to place in perspective the significance of the Muslim trade in Ayutthaya, it is necessary to understand the prestige that was attached to Islam in this period.

Although Pires perceived a distinction among the Muslims from the archipelago and elsewhere, for the Muslims themselves differences in language and customs were less important than the fact that they belonged to a single religious unity, the Dār al-Islām (The Abode of Islam). In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there were three major Muslim empires in the world: the Safavī dynasty centered in Persia, the Ottoman dynasty in Anatolia, and the Mughal dynasty in India. This period marked the peak of Muslim political power, and if there were one single international language of diplomacy, it was Persian (Hodgson 1974: 47). Ismail had come to the throne of the Safavī dynasty in 1500, and by his death in 1524 he had created the Persian Empire and made the Shī‘ī form of Islam the basis of the state. Under ʿAbbās I (1587–1629) the empire reached its peak and included Iraq, western Iran, and Khorāsān—areas which were the cultural centers of classical Islamdom. The Safavī empire was not simply a Persian entity but, like the Ottoman empire, included Persians, Turks, and Arabs equally. It was Persia that became the heart of Islamic culture, setting the standards for the rest of the Islamic world (Hodgson 1974: 28, 39, 49–50).

The Ottomans favored the Sunni form of Islam. Under their tutelage, but particularly under Sūleymān the Magnificent (1520–66), the Sharī‘ah (Canon or Sacred Law), which is the body of laws governing the life of a Muslim, and the ‘ulamā’, one learned in Islamic legal and religious studies, became established in the Sunni world. Since the Ottomans were also at the forefront of the forceful proselytization of Christian Europe, they developed a strong military organization that relied on advanced gunnery and a highly trained infantry corps and a naval force. At the heart of the army were the Janissaries, originally sons of Christian families from the Balkans converted to Islam, who gave their allegiance directly to the ruler. The Ottoman imperial style was developed in the sixteenth century, and continued to be vigorous in the military and Islamic intellectual fields.
throughout the seventeenth century. The Ottoman empire, like that of the Safavî, was multiethnic and included many Arabs, Turks, and Persians. As a Sunni empire, it set the standards for many areas of Southeast Asia which also followed the Sunni form of Islam (Hodgson 1974: 97, 102, 105, 107, 116, 133).

The third major Islamic empire in the sixteenth century was that of the Mughals, whose ruling elite came from the Chaghhatay Turks in Timur’s line and were therefore Timurî or Indo-Timurî (Hodgson 1974: 62, n. 2). Their establishment in India was facilitated by the long presence of Islam in India dating from the beginning of the eighth century. Then in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries there was a second expansion of Islam southward from the Indo-Gangetic plains, bringing in its wake merchants from the Arab urban centers of Aleppo, Damascus, Cairo, and Mekka; and from the Iranian regional capitals of Herat, Shiraz, and Tabriz (Aubin 1988: 88–9). The Muslim Bahmanî dynasty of central India entered into a long struggle against the southern Indian Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar for control of the Deccan. Toward the end of the Bahmanî dynasty an internal struggle for power between local Muslims and the resident Arabs, Persians, and Turks contributed to the demise of the sultanate. The governors of the four major provinces then declared their independence, and eventually only Bijapur (1489), which absorbed two of the newly independent sultanates, and Golkonda (1512) survived (Kulke and Rothermund 1986: 181–3). Under Ibrâhîm Qutb Shah (1550–80) Golkonda encouraged the immigration of Persians, especially those of Sayyid clans residing in the vicinity of Isfahan. These Persians, who arrived in substantial numbers in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, settled in both Bijapur and Golkonda. The courts and administration of both kingdoms became dominated by three major Muslim factions: the Persians, the Dakhnis (local converts), and the Habshis (Abyssinian Muslims) (Subrahmanyan 1988: 504–5).

The Mughals, meanwhile, also began expanding under their greatest ruler, Akbar (1556–1605), and gained control over much of northern India by 1567. Akbar encouraged well-placed immigrants (who may have been Turks) from Iran to settle in India and to serve in his army. They retained
rights to land revenues in Iran despite their having entered the employ of the Mughals (Hodgson 1974: 63, 83). It appears that there were no real difficulties regarding movements of people among the three major Islamic empires, notwithstanding the persecution of Shi‘îs in Ottoman lands and of Sunnis in Safavî lands. The Mughal empire, on the other hand, was noted for its tolerance of both and of other religious ideas. Akbar incorporated the powerful Muslim kingdom of Gujarat and the Rajput states in 1573, the Afghan strongholds in Bihar and Bengal in 1576, and a number of other important areas. This expansion continued under his successors, particularly Awrangzeb (1658–1707), who added the Shi‘î sultanantes of Bijapur and Golkonda in the Deccan in 1686–8 (Hodgson 1974: 63, 97). Thus by the end of the seventeenth century, the Mughals were the preeminent power in India. This military and spiritual conquest was essentially due to Persian Islam, and was the beginning of the creation of a unique Islamic Indo-Muslim civilization based on Persian culture (Aubin 1988: 84).

The sixteenth century and much of the seventeenth witnessed a period of Islamic expansion in all fields led by the brilliance of the Safavî, Ottoman, and the Indo-Timurî courts. The three major Islamic empires provided models of behavior and statecraft, the occasional armed expedition, religious scholars and administrators, and traders to the other Islamic lands. Islamic powers thus became dominant in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the various seas in the Malaysian-Indonesian archipelago, and parts of the South China Sea. Extensive seaborne trading networks of Muslim merchants were created, ensuring a steady flow of secular and spiritual goods and people along these routes. In Southeast Asia there was a noticeable increase in Muslim traders, especially Indian Muslims and Persians. As bearers of much desired goods from the west, and as representatives of prestigious Islamic centers, these traders were welcomed by rulers in Southeast Asia. (See for example Reid 1993: 144, 146–7 and Andaya 1993: 135–7.) The presence of foreign Muslim communities in the port cities became commonplace, and it was not unusual to find Muslim officials occupying influential positions in the courts. This then is the context for understanding the Persian and the Indian Muslim connection with Ayutthaya.
Ayutthaya and the Muslim Connection

Foreign trade had always played a major part in Ayutthaya's success as a polity. Before it was overshadowed by Melaka in the beginning of the fifteenth century, it had entertained ambitions of becoming the foremost regional entrepôt in Southeast Asia. It nevertheless continued to maintain practices of a state dependent on international commerce. Each nation was given special quarters (ban) in the city where it could worship and practice its own customs under the jurisdiction of a chosen leader in consultation with the Siamese Phra Khlang. Because the Muslims were especially prominent in this trade, the office of Phra Khlang and other principal offices in the court were sometimes held by Muslims. King Narai was so keen to maintain their presence that he even exempted them from the required six months corvée labor required of most Siamese men (Lach and Van Kley 1993: 1,222).

Under Song Tham (1611-28) two rich brothers from south India, identified in a Thai text as being originally from the “Arab” country, helped to reorganize the Phra Khlang Ministry into the Department of the Left (Krom Tha Sai) and the Department of the Right (Krom Tha Khwa). The brothers were associated with the latter which had responsibility for trade to the south and west, including Java, Sumatra, Tenasserim, Bengal, Golconda, etc. They brought merchants from south India, who established retail shops in Ayutthaya in the 1610s and 1620s. Eventually one of the brothers returned to India, while the other remained and became the head of the Department of the Right. The king granted him and his followers a village site to build their homes, a mosque, and a graveyard, which is still known today as Ban Khaek Kuti Chao Sen (Thiphakorawong 1939: 3).³

Muslims traditionally preferred to trade and settle within a Muslim kingdom, but Thai rulers, particularly King Narai, made Ayutthaya attractive to them. He built mosques and gave Muslims the freedom to worship in their own way (Lach and Van Kley 1993: 1,180, 1,222). Even prior to this time, however, Persians had settled in Ayutthaya because of its hospitable environment. They would have been part of a steady stream of Persian merchants benefitting from the prosperity of the Safavī empire under
‘Abbâs I (1587–1629). In the sixteenth century both Varthema and Pires mention Persian merchants in Pegu, and Persians and Armenians in Melaka (Ferrier 1986: 423). The Armenian presence in Southeast Asia was to increase as a result of ‘Abbâs I’s transferral of his capital to Isfahan in 1599 and the forceable removal of the Armenians to the new capital from the city of Julfa, where they had controlled the international silk trade (Bausani 1971: 144–6). The silk trade was thus redirected away from its traditional route through the Ottoman empire to Astrakhan under Safavî control. Under ‘Abbâs I the Armenians became a professional class of international traders and helped the empire to corner the market in silk. In addition ‘Abbâs also monopolized the Chinese porcelain market and created a porcelain industry with the aid of the Chinese. Isfahan was transformed during ‘Abbâs’ time into the central marketplace for the various regional markets in Iran. With a unified economy the Safavî empire became a dominant factor in international trade (Calmard 1988: 94–5, 98–9).

Though there was a hiatus of weak rulers after ‘Abbâs I, the ascent to the throne of his namesake, ‘Abbâs II (1642–66), restored the empire to its greatness and again made Persians a respected economic and political power (Bausani 1971: 143–6). Under this ruler Persian maritime trade to India and farther east reached a level of activity not seen since the last decade of the fifteenth century (Ferrier 1986: 423). Persian traders were found dispersed throughout the Islamic world. These merchants were welcomed by the Muslim sultanates in India—especially the Mughals who benefitted from what Hodgson has called the sixteenth century “Persianate flowering” of an “Islamicate culture the equivalent of Europe’s Renaissance” (Hodgson 1974: 49–50). In the wars between Muslim Gujarat and Hindu Vijayanagar in the Deccan in the fifteenth century, some Persian merchants played a military as well as an economic role in the Muslim victory. These so-called “merchant-condotieri” recruited men and supplies for their patrons, and served as viceroys and military leaders. Mahmud Gâvân, the distinguished merchant and viceroy under the Bahmanîs in 1460–70, was an example of a Muslim merchant-condotieri. He was originally from Gilân, a region bordering the Caspian sea, and had first settled in Egypt
before immigrating to India (Aubin 1988: 86). This was a pattern not only in India but also in Ayutthaya, where Persians held positions of authority in the government and fulfilled roles similar to the merchant-condotierri described in India. One of the leaders of the Persian community during King Narai’s time, Aqâ Muhammad Astarâbâdî, was a minister and counsellor to the king, and others were officials with military duties and given titles of raja, which a Persian envoy understood to mean “commander” (O’Kane 1972: 58, 64).

Another office in Ayutthaya to which the Persians may have given greater weight is the king’s merchant (the Phra Khlang), since this was an institution of great prestige among Muslim nations. From the time of ‘Abbâs I, the ruler became the greatest investor of capital in the Safavî realm (Hodgson 1974: 55). There arose a distinction between the great merchant and the petty artisan. The former was referred to either by the Arabic tâjer (plural tojjâr) or by the Persian sudâga/sawdâgâr (plural sudâgarân); and the latter by the Arabic kâseb (plural kasaba) and the Persian pisevar (plural pisevarân). To maintain supervision over economic matters, a “king of merchants” (Arabic malek-ot-tojjâr) was appointed at Isfahan and the provincial capitals to deal with differences between merchants and to promote the interests of the state. He was influential in the economic affairs of the state and was the financial agent of the ruler (Ferrier 1986: 423). This Persian model of a “king of merchants” appeared in the Malay courts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, where they were called saudagar raja. The term combines the Persian (and not the Arabic as in the Safavî empire) saudagar and the Malay or Sanskrit, raja, meaning king. The function of the saudagar raja was similar to that of the Persian office of malek-ot-tojjâr, but in the Malay courts he was expected to have knowledge of the language and customs of Europeans and Asians. This was a rare combination of skills, and often these posts were held by “Klings,” who were Muslim Indians from Kalinga in the Godavari delta in southern India. The title was in frequent use in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries but apparently not during the heyday of the Melaka kingdom in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries (Andaya 1978: 14, 19-21). The prominence of the saudagar raja title in the Malay world
coincides with the growing Perso-Arabic influence in the trading world of Southeast Asia at this time. In Ayutthaya the Persian merchant, Aqâ Muhammad Astarâbâdî, became one of the principal ministers of state in the seventeenth century (O’Kane 1972: 58). In the 1680s another foreigner, this time the Greek adventurer Constantine Phaulkon, rose to great prominence in Ayutthaya and became in all but title the Phra Khlang (Pombejra 1990: 136).

In the 1640s Ayutthaya was influenced further by the major Islamic empires. In that decade there was an increase in trade between Persia, India, and the Levant, much of which was carried on ships belonging to the Dutch and the English East India Companies. The cooperation between the European and Muslim merchants made such arrangements desirable and even necessary for rulers wishing to participate in these profitable ventures. Many Armenians came to establish themselves at the port of Bandar Abbas, from which place they controlled an extensive network that extended throughout India and the maritime areas of Southeast Asia. The trade from India to Southeast Asia was centered at Surat, the port of the Mughal empire, but Masulipatnam in northern Coromandel under Golkonda was another major participant in this trade. Ayutthaya was not unaware of these developments. At the same time that rulers elsewhere were employing both Muslim merchants and European vessels to conduct their trade, Ayutthaya’s rulers in the seventeenth century were doing the same to encourage crown trade. Events in India were also noted, and King Narai established trade links with Surat in the 1660s and sent an embassy to the Qutb Shah ruler of Golkonda in 1665 (Ferrier 1986: 450, 456, 469–71, 491, 516). Ayutthaya, along with other important Southeast Asian maritime kingdoms, had a consular agent in Golkonda to oversee trade, and the Golkonda ruler reciprocated by placing a consular agent in each of their port cities (Arasaratnam and Ray 1994: 11, 26–9). When a French missionary was in Masulipatnam in 1674, he noted that the agent or factor for the king of Siam was a leading local Muslim by the name of Pelar (Launay 1920 i: 70).

From India the move of Persians to Southeast Asia would have been relatively smooth because of the longstanding commercial relations
between the two areas. A Persian envoy to Narai’s court estimated that there were some 100 Persians residing in the country at the time that King Narai came to the throne in 1656 (O’Kane 1972: 95). Merchants from India, who would have included resident Persians, brought Indian textiles in exchange for tin, elephants and the Chinese and Japanese goods available in Ayutthaya. In the seventeenth century, and perhaps in the late sixteenth century under ‘Abbâs I, Persian merchants may have been encouraged to settle in Ayutthaya through such incentives as offers of houses and positions in the government. The success of this policy is evident during a visit of Persian envoys in 1686. At various places along their route through the country, the envoys were hosted by compatriots who occupied high positions in the administration. In one case the Muslim official was from Rûm in the Sunnî Ottoman empire but had since converted to Shi‘ism, the dominant school of Islam in the Persian Safavî empire (O’Kane 1972: 46, 50–1). King Narai was ever receptive to Persian sensitivities and arranged to pay for the annual Shi‘î festival “in Ali’s memory” (Lach and Van Kley 1993: 1,222).5

In addition to the Persians, Muslims from the southern Indian sultanates of Golkonda and Bijapur also played a role in Ayutthaya’s history. Both kingdoms had prospered since coming into existence at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries. Both rulers invested in shipping and cargoes in the prosperous Coromandel ports (Arasaratnam 1984a: 114–7). Golkonda showed special interest in the development of the northern Coromandel port of Masulipatnam. Political patronage led to an inflow of capital investment in shipping and trade from the interior court and even from the Persian Gulf region. A major highway was built linking the royal capital and the port to facilitate the movement of goods. To a large degree Masulipatnam’s success can be attributed to the presence of a substantial resident Persian merchant community, who were merchants, ship owners and important administrators with extensive connections in Southeast Asia, India, the Persian Gulf region and beyond. It was in the 1620s that Masulipatnam’s overseas trade, mainly in the hands of Persians, greatly expanded to lands bordering the Bay of Bengal, such as Mrauk-u in Arakan, Aceh, Pegu, and Tenasserim’s port of Mergui
Ayutthaya was one of the beneficiaries of this extensive Islamic trading network because it had taken possession of Tenasserim by the 1460s and Tavoy by 1488 (Wyatt 1982: 86). The trade to this area of peninsular Burma and Siam was particularly impressive, with its value in 1627 estimated to be about 300,000 pagodas or 1,350,000 Dutch florins. This sum far exceeded the entire Dutch export bill from Coromandel for that year. But the prosperous 1620s were followed in the 1630s by a weakened agricultural economy which diminished when bad weather patterns undermined a major source of revenue for the Persian tax collectors. Liquidity problems among the Persians resulted in a decline of capital investment in shipping and trade at Masulipatnam, and they lost their dominance to other Asian traders. There appears to have been a practice at this time of Persian administrator-merchants sending their ships to trade at Bandar Abbas. The major shift to the Persian Gulf area would have been encouraged by the end of hostilities between the Portuguese and the Safavī empire in 1630. This trade to the west was dominated by one trader: Mir Muhammad Sayyid Ardestani. But he was among the very last of the brilliant Persian traders operating from Golkonda. His death in 1655 marked the demise of Persian influence in the kingdom and had direct repercussions on other Persian communities linked to this southern Indian trade, including Ayutthaya. The displacement in Golkonda of Persian shippers by Europeans, and Persian administrators by indigenous officers between 1655 and 1687 (Subrahmanyam 1988: 511, 513–6, 524–5) was repeated in Ayutthaya.

The involvement of Europeans in the trade of the region became especially marked in the second half of the seventeenth century. Because of the volume of trade conducted between the south Indian ports and Southeast Asia, the growing prominence of Europeans at the expense of Persians was becoming evident. This was a tendency also noted in Ayutthaya. By the early 1680s little remained of the ship-owning Persian community in Masulipatnam. With the disappearance of the Persian merchants, no one could fill the role of negotiating with the increasing numbers of European Company and private vessels that harassed Asian
shipping in the area. It therefore became a matter of course for Asian merchants to use European ships to freight their goods (Subrahmanyan 1988: 529). Golkonda had never been a major shipping power and had, instead, relied on charters or freight space on English and Dutch bottoms. One of the rulers in 1676 even visited a Dutch factory and went aboard a Dutch ship as a sign of interest and favor (Arasaratnam 1984b: 24). Despite the tendency of scholars to focus on the rivalry between Muslims and Christians, in matters of trade, there was a fair degree of cooperation. The Europeans were never able to fill their ships with their own Indian goods, and therefore excess space was readily allocated to Indian merchants. With European sailors on board these ships, the Muslim merchants were assured freedom from harassment from other European ships (Arasaratnam 1986: 135).

After the French East India Company established posts in Surat in 1668 and Masulipatnam in 1669, Muslim merchants either chartered French ships or shared shipping space on French ships. Some conflict arose in Golkonda involving the French and the local governor of Masulipatnam, which ended this useful arrangement. A French missionary arrived in the port of Masulipatnam on 15 April 1674, just after an open conflict and attack on the French in the city. He was able to escape injury only by announcing that he was on a mission for the king of Siam (Launay 1920b: 70).

Bijapur backed the French in a dispute with Golkonda over the port of San Thomé and enabled them to acquire Pondicherry. The French eventually relinquished San Thomé to Golkonda in 1674 and settled permanently in Pondicherry. With Pondicherry as their base, the French came to be regarded as a regional power in South India. From 1680 onward the French entered into profitable share capital partnerships with Hindu and Chulia merchants based at Porto Novo and Cuddalore on the Coromandel coast. Indian merchants were happy to cooperate with the French to counter Dutch aggressive monopolistic practices, especially since these ships bore French passes and thus avoided Dutch restrictions. The manner in which this occurred can be seen in the activities of a major Chulia ship-owning merchant of Cuddalore, Nallabuka Marrikar. He had close trading
arrangements with the French, and his ships carried French passes. In 1681 one of his ships under the command of nine Frenchmen visited the west Java port of Banten to trade in Indian textiles, tin and elephants. The home port of the ship was Porto Novo, but it had called at Pondichery to freight French cargo before leaving for Southeast Asia. This mutually beneficial arrangement clearly alarmed the Dutch, who feared that the French would eventually become dominant in the shipping of Porto Novo. The French quickly became a major player in a substantial Indian trade to the Southeast Asian ports of Syriam, Mergui, Ujung Salang, Kedah, Aceh, Johor and Banten (Arasaratnam 1986: 138–9).

King Narai’s decision to rely on the French rather than the Dutch would have been based on considerations similar to those of the Indian traders in the Coromandel. Dutch restrictive practices were damaging to royal trade, and the French offered an ideal alternative. Even though the French were relatively new on the scene, they had already established workable relationships with Indian merchants and enabled Ayutthaya’s long-standing trade with India in textiles, elephants and tin to continue unhindered. By the mid-1670s the French were already regarded as a regional power in South India, and by the beginning of the 1680s they were active participants with Indian merchants in the trade to Southeast Asia. King Narai’s decision to rely on the French was therefore a sensible move based on an understanding of French activities in India. At the time there was little to indicate that the French would not continue to be a major economic and even military force in the region.

Golkonda’s and Bijapur’s cooperation in the promotion of trade on the Coromandel coast came to an abrupt end with the Mughal conquest of Bijapur and Golkonda in 1686–8. Mughal administrative practices, especially regarding the collection of taxes, led to the abandonment of Masulipatnam by merchants and the flight by wealthy Persians to places such as Bengal or San Thomé (Arasaratnam 1984b: 23–4, 27). But the exodus of the Persian mercantile community had already begun earlier during the 1630s. A growing Persian interest in Ayutthaya in this period may have been a direct consequence of the demise of the Persian community in Golkonda (Subrahmanyam 1988: 527–8). The reputation of Golkonda,
nevertheless, may have still been high in Ayutthaya. Persian envoys who visited Narai’s court claimed that Narai had sent gifts to various rulers in India, including the Muslim ruler of Golkonda at Hyderabad, to counter Phaulkon’s efforts to increase Ayutthaya’s contacts with Christian kings (O’Kane 1972: 99–100).

Less visible than the Persians, yet perhaps ultimately a more significant Muslim link with Ayutthaya, were the Chulia traders. In the seventeenth century the term “Chulia” was used for Tamil Muslim merchants of south Coromandel who were acknowledged as one of the most dynamic trading groups in the Bay of Bengal. It is believed that this Tamil Muslim group originated from early Arab merchants who had settled at Kayalpatnam and had gradually integrated into the Tamil community (Arasaratnam 1987: 125). The Chulias responded to the growing desire for Indian textiles in Southeast Asia, and the continuing demand in India for elephants from Southeast Asia. These were the principal items carried by the Chulias who visited every major port in Southeast Asia but focused on the trade to Ceylon, northeast Sumatra (especially Aceh), the western coast of the Malay peninsula and the ports in lower Burma and Siam. In the second half of the seventeenth century there was an increase in Chulia trade to the Burmese coast, the kingdoms of Arakan and Pegu, the province of Tenasserim, Ayutthaya and the Gulf ports using the trans-peninsular route (Arasaratnam 1987: 128–9). This route was favored over the Straits because of pirates, the Dutch post at Melaka and contrary winds at certain times of the year, which could make a trip via the Straits six times longer than normal. High value goods such as silk, porcelain, and Indian textiles were usually sent across the isthmus route. This trade in the seventeenth century was in the hands of Chulias and Persians based in Ayutthaya (Collis 1936: 39, 294). Along with the Golkonda Muslims from Masulipatnam, the Chulias were the principal merchants involved in the portage of goods across the isthmus and in the trade in tin. They both established settlements of their people in Syria, Mergui, along the Tenasserim River, and in the tin-bearing islands off the southwest coast of Siam. So important were the Chulias that one of them was was appointed district governor of Ujung Salang (present-day Phuket Island) in the 1670s

Dutch sources in the 1670s speak of the growing presence in Ayutthaya of the Golkonda Muslims from Masulipatnam in north Coromandel and the Chulias from Porto Novo in south Coromandel. This trade was stimulated by Coromandel weaving centers making textiles especially for the Siamese and Burmese markets. Trade items sought by the Indian traders were sapan wood, hides, elephants, tin, ivory and gold. Furthermore, Ayutthaya was a major entrepôt for Japanese and Chinese goods, and so Coromandel merchants could go there directly to obtain goods such as copper, zinc, lead, alum and radix china. Bilateral trade was also conducted between Siam and the Indian ports centered on the western ports of peninsular Siam and Burma. In addition to using their own ships for this trade, Chulias, like other South Indian merchants, rented excess space on European ships to freight their goods. The Chulias were especially effective in Southeast Asia because they established interlinking networks within the region, with Banten the center of their commercial enterprise. For the trade in the Malay peninsula and the Siamese-Burmese peninsular ports, the Chulias relied on their fleets and armed settlements along the coast and at the mouth of the Kedah River. They became, therefore, the ideal intermediaries for trade between Southeast Asia and the international markets and served as trading agents for the ruler of Ayutthaya. At Porto Novo the Chulia merchants handled the sale of the imported goods and the cargoes for the homeward journey, thus gaining them favor in the court of Ayutthaya (Arasaratnam 1987: 131–2, 137).

Ayutthaya had created a hospitable environment for Muslim merchants, and their participation in the commercial activities of the kingdom attracted other international traders. A visiting priest in 1662 commented that there were so many foreign merchants in Ayutthaya that twenty different languages could be heard in the streets (Lach and Van Kley 1993: 1,187). Since its founding, Ayutthaya had relied upon international trade and wet-rice agriculture as the economic bases of the economy. The khumnang, or nobility, whose power and authority rested on control of human resources, apparently had a dislike for active involvement in international trade (Gervaise 1989: 114). Much of this second major aspect
of the economy was thus relegated to Chinese and Muslim merchants, and among the latter the Persians and the Chulias were particularly prominent. In the seventeenth century, the rulers and members of the royal family, plus some of the khunnang, prospered by relying on foreign merchants to conduct this trade on their behalf (Pombejra 1990: 129–30, 139). As one of the two principal trading communities, the Muslim merchants, especially those from Persia and India, made a significant impact on the history of Ayutthaya.

Conclusion

This chapter attempts to provide a context for understanding the Persian and Indian, or principally the southern Indian, connection with Ayutthaya. It argues that the Persian presence in Ayutthaya was not an aberration but the result of a large-scale expansion of Persian trade under the Safavî rulers ‘Abbâs I (1587–1628) and ‘Abbâs II (1642-66). The explosion of Persian Safavî international trade coincided with what Jean Aubin has called the second wave of Islamic expansion in India in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries from the Indo-Gangetic plains to the Deccan in the south (Aubin 1988: 89). It resulted in the establishment of the southern Muslim sultanates of Bijapur and Golkonda, which then served as a magnet for merchants from the prosperous Safavî empire. Persian merchants and officials settled in these kingdoms and formed a second base for Persian expansion into Southeast Asia. The large numbers of Persians resident in Ayutthaya in the seventeenth century would have been part of a large-scale movement of Persians that had begun in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century. They were especially valued and revered because they were the links to the profitable Persian trade network, and because they were representatives of the prestigious Safavî empire.

The Chulia Muslims were preeminent among Muslim Indian merchants to Southeast Asia in the seventeenth century and were the principal traders of Indian textiles for Ayutthaya’s tin and elephants. They were resourceful, and their extensive and successful Southeast Asian network assured Ayutthaya of continuing access to the riches of international trade.
The Persian and Indian Muslim merchants may not have had the high visibility of the Chinese, but they were equally valued by Ayutthaya because of their prestigious and lucrative links to the larger Islamic world.

Notes

1. One of the better studies of the Muslim connection is part of a general analysis of the trade during King Narai’s time done by Pombejra (1990: 127–42).

2. Tibbetts identifies Shahr-i Naw as Lopburi and does not mention Ayutthaya. The records of the 1686 Persian embassy, however, show clearly that Shahr-i Naw (Shahr Nav in Persian) referred to Ayutthaya and that Lopburi was known in Persian as Lubu (O’Kane 1972: 54).

3. I would like to thank Tej Bunnag for providing a copy of this work from his personal library, and Ken Breazeale for translating the relevant passages.

4. Shi‘i Islam became the dominant creed in the Safavī empire under ‘Abbās I, and all Sunni followers were forced to convert. The Sunni empire of the Ottomans retaliated and conducted their own campaign against the Shi‘is in their midst. See Hodgson (1974: 23–4). This attitude was exported overseas, and since the Persians were the dominant traders in Siam, the Sunni merchant was most likely forced to change his belief to maintain his position of influence among the Persian Muslims.

5. It is not certain whether this refers to the Ghadir khumm, which celebrates ‘Ali’s appointment as Caliph, or to the fast during Muharram, especially the tenth day, known as 'Ashūra, which is the highpoint of the Shi‘i religious year and commemorates the mourning (ta‘ziyah) for Husayn, ‘Ali’s son killed at Karbala’. From the description of the festival in O’Kane’s Ship of Sulaiman, it appears that the latter is meant.
Power Politics in Southeast Asian Waters

Adrian B. Lapian

When China Ruled the Seas is the title of a book that takes the reader on the expeditions of the Chinese navy under the command, mostly, of admiral Zheng He during the first part of the fifteenth century. Half the world was within China's reach at that time, and the rest could easily have been, had the emperor so wished. But instead, China turned inward, resulting in the rapid demise of its navy and the loss of its technological and scientific edge over Europe. As had happened many times before in the country's history—and has happened many times subsequently—the gates swung wide open, and then clanged shut. China's greatest period of expansion was thus followed by its greatest period of isolation (Levathes 1994).

Even during the heyday of the Chinese fleet, it is still doubtful whether it exercised effective control over the vast South China Sea. And in the eighteenth century, certainly no single power could claim dominance over the whole area. Chinese shipping and trade were still lively in Southeast Asia, but China's navy was no longer significant. Local Chinese forces were more or less confined to specific areas, because China could not muster sufficient maritime strength for involvement with the entire region.

Although it is still a matter of dispute as to how far-reaching and profound China's rule of the sea was, there can be no doubt that the show of force by the Chinese fleet left a deep impression on many Southeast Asian states. For weaker states, China became a convenient recourse when threatened by a stronger neighbor, as a kind of recognition that weak states had achieved "equal" status among the family of nations in the region.

Strictly speaking, however, there was no equality in diplomatic relations in the Southeast Asian context (Suwannathat-Pian 1988: ch. 2). There was, and always had been, a hierarchical order, whether between father and son, between grandfather and grandson or even between master
and slave. A kind of equality did exist between “brother” states, but an elder brother (kakak in Indonesian) was always distinguished from a younger one (adik). This distinction was often resented by the junior partner in “brother” states, who would sooner or later seek ways and means to alter the situation. But others would be content with their subordinate position and would bask in the safe protection of a suzerain, who seldom interfered in internal affairs, as long as the rules of conduct were properly observed. When necessary, if a weak state was situated between two strong powers, its ruler would not hesitate to pay homage to both.

This chapter provides a brief introduction to the maritime powers in two areas of immediate concern to the rulers of Ayutthaya—the Gulf of Thailand and the Straits of Melaka and Singapore—and the changing patterns of maritime power during the last decades of the Ayutthaya period.

The Straits of Melaka and Singapore

The island of Riau is at the juncture of busy sea lanes just off the southern tip of the Malay peninsula. It is much closer to Melaka than to Batavia: two centers where the Dutch East India Company enforced its monopolies. Eighteenth-century private traders preferred to call at the port of Riau, where the local authorities permitted relatively free transactions. An English merchant engaged in local trade, writing from Madras to Calcutta in 1769 about commerce in the Strait of Melaka, reported that the Dutch company regarded Riau as their rival (Vos 1993: 125). The same report said that it was a destination for ships from Borneo, Bali, Java, all the eastern islands of the archipelago, Siam, Cambodia and southern Vietnam. The author of a Riau chronicle extolled the port’s prosperity in a vivid description of the array of ships and junks of every size and design that called at Riau:

there were Chinese and Bugis merchants in kepal, keci and wangkan with red or green bows, scores of them anchored in Riau and plying their trade there. There were hundreds of Bugis and Javanese perahu and tob from Siam berthed at Riau, let alone the perahu from the outer territories. (Ali al-Haji 1982: 160-1)
Riau, the seat of the sultanate of Johor, was generally regarded as the heir to the old sultanate of Melaka. After the city of Melaka was conquered by the Portuguese in 1511, the royal family moved to the south and established a new seat of government in the Riau-Johor area. Some former vassals, however, regarded the defeat of Melaka as a signal that their old relationship with the sultanate had been terminated, and they began to act as sovereigns in their own right. Perak and Brunei belonged to this category. Kedah, together with other Malay states in the northern part of the peninsula, began sending tribute to the court of Ayutthaya. A multipolar system thus replaced the old hegemony of Melaka. New centers of trade emerged in Aceh and Banten, whereas Palembang and Jambi maintained close ties with Java. (All four of these centers had trading relations with Ayutthaya at various times, but unfortunately this subject is sparsely documented.) Aceh in particular became a serious challenger of Johor’s position during the course of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In 1641 the Dutch company, with the help of Johor, occupied Melaka, marking the beginning of Dutch territorial acquisitions in the area.

The process of multipolarization continued after 1699, when Sultan Mahmud of Johor, the last scion of the old Melaka dynasty, was assassinated, and the highest-ranking court official (the bendahara) took the throne as Sultan Abdul Jalil. One result of his accession was the defection of the sea people (Orang Laut), who had formerly served as the sultan’s personal retainers and fighting men, but who now regarded their age-old ties of allegiance as no longer tenable. Later they would disperse and form small autonomous groups, recognizing no higher authority than their commander (punggawa), who was more a first-among-equals than a real chief.

Raja Kecil claimed to be the rightful heir to the throne of Johor. With his Minangkabau followers, he succeeded in rallying many groups of sea people behind him, ousted the new king and took command of Johor in 1718. He, in turn, was removed from the throne in 1721 by the Bugis, who reinstalled the Malay sultan in Riau. Raja Kecil then settled in Siak (opposite Melaka, on the island of Sumatra), where he continued to be a threat to the Riau sultan for a long time to come.
In the course of the seventeenth century, the Bugis, who were originally from South Sulawesi, began to build settlements around strategic river estuaries on the west coast of the Malay peninsula, from which they could control the traffic from the tin-producing hinterland. They became a political force in the region and established kingdoms of their own, such as Selangor in the peninsula and Mempawa on the island of Borneo. In Riau they became indispensable, owing to their maritime capabilities, and their leader became the viceroy (rajamuda), who had virtual control of the economy of the realm.

During this Malay-Bugis alliance, the port of Riau experienced an economic boom, but the dependency on the Bugis became a source of resentment to the sultan, who then sought closer ties with the Dutch, ostensibly to crush the power of Siam. The Bugis under Daeng Kamboja, however, were opposed to such an alliance with the Dutch company and instead supported Siak. Eventually, Sultan Sulaiman of Riau, realizing that no real support from the Dutch was forthcoming, became reconciled with the Bugis. Under the leadership of Raja Haji, nephew and successor of Daeng Kamboja, the port flourished again in the 1760s.

This new prosperity became the source of Dutch envy and frustration, resulting in the war of 1783–85. Riau was destroyed, and the sultan was obliged to recognize Dutch overlordship. It was, however, a barren victory for the Dutch, because neither Melaka nor Batavia was able to develop the same lively combination of trade that had made Riau so prosperous. Instead, traders became more attracted to the new center at Pinang Island, founded in 1786 by the English East India Company after successful negotiations with the Sultan of Kedah to lease the island. In 1795, Melaka, too, became a British possession.

The Gulf

From the middle of the fourteenth century, the kingdom of Ayutthaya became the most important power in the Gulf. Thai leaders recognized the importance of Nakhon Sithammarat, as a strategic and economic center in the southern region, and placed loyal vassals there, most of them closely
related to the court. Through the intermediary of Nakhon Sithammarat, Ayutthaya exacted tribute from the Malay vassals in the south. But it was by way of Patani, another Malay vassal, that the Dutch began their long history of trade and diplomatic relations with Siam.

In 1601, one year before the establishment of the Dutch company, a Dutch admiral concluded an agreement with the Queen of Patani for supplies of pepper and the right to build a trading house there. Dutch commerce with Patani soon began to flourish, and in 1604 the Dutch sent a mission to Ayutthaya. Besides establishing relations with the Thai court, the main purpose of the mission was to seek the good offices of the king to facilitate the company’s trade with China. This proposal led nowhere, and in later years, Dutch commercial transactions in Ayutthaya became increasingly tied to the company’s trade with Japan. This Japan connection is investigated in detail in the chapter by Nagazumi.

The Dutch went to Ayutthaya in search of profitable trade, but they were not always on the receiving side of the bargain. They also performed useful services for the Thai—for instance in transporting the king’s messengers on Dutch ships and bringing Buddhist monks from Sri Lanka to Siam. Another factor that has been inadequately explored is the transfer of technology, in particular the techniques of shipbuilding. The first Thai envoys to Europe might be compared with Russia’s Peter the Great, who visited the Netherlands and England in the seventeenth century to observe the skills of western European shipwrights and to learn the latest shipbuilding techniques. The Thai envoys, who stayed in the Netherlands for more than sixteen months during 1608–10, similarly examined Dutch shipyards and must have been impressed by the superior quality of Dutch technology. The Thai king asked for Dutch craftsmen—specialists in shipbuilding, navigation, and weaponry—to work for him, and craftsmen were readily supplied. But Jeremias van Vliet, who arrived in Siam in 1633 and was director of the Dutch trading house during 1636–41, made it clear to Thai officials that there was a big difference between Dutch craftsmen and Thai laborers who received no wages for their services. It was to King Narai that Dutch craftsmen were sent regularly. Also, Thai carpenters went to Batavia to learn various crafts from the Dutch. In short, further study needs
to be done to know the extent of Dutch influence in the Thai art of shipbuilding and other craftsmanship of this period. We know that in the eighteenth century, when the Dutch had lost their superiority in this field, the Thai were employing Chinese for their shipbuilding, as well as for navigating the Thai-owned ships that sailed to China and Japan.

In the eighteenth century, Dutch company establishments in Siam were confined to Ayutthaya, Nakhon Sithammarat and Phuket Island (the port known as Ujung Salang in Malay and Thalang in Thai). Dutch records show, however, that the company sustained many losses as Table 1 illustrates. After 1730, annual losses rose to around 35,000 guilders. Many causes can be attributed to the deplorable state of commercial relations between Siam and the Dutch. There was competition with other European traders, initially the Portuguese and Spanish and later also the English and French. The Dutch merchants found their trade frustrated at

**Table 1.** Annual Dutch-company losses in Siam, 1709/10–1729/30 (guilders)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Years</th>
<th>Losses</th>
<th>Profits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1709/10</td>
<td>8,484</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1710/11</td>
<td>44,021</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1711/12</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>25,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1712/13</td>
<td>5,796</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1720/21</td>
<td>20,158</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1725/26</td>
<td>15,432</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1729/30</td>
<td>20,394</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Oversigt der betrekkingen door de Oost-Indische Companie met het Rijk van Siam onderhouden [A Survey of the Relations between the East India Company and the Kingdom of Siam]. Document in the Arsip National Republic Indonesia (National Archives of Indonesia), Buitenland (Foreign Affairs) records, Siam series, no. 5.

*Note:* The data are for the trading houses at Ayutthaya, Nakhon Sithammarat (Ligor) and Phuket (Ujung Salang).
every turn in Siam. The prices they paid for sapan wood and other goods from the royal warehouses were higher than the prices received by the suppliers, who were required by law to sell exclusively to the king’s trading officers. One Thai minister was in charge of all goods traded under the royal monopolies, and his officials also collected the customs duties on imports. In addition, he had general responsibility for all affairs relating to foreigners. The Dutch regarded the actions of this minister, the Phra Khlang, as whimsical, but were obliged to deal with him. First and foremost, the Dutch company policy of demanding monopoly rights of their own brought them into conflict with the Thai monopoly system.

Middlemen, who acted as interpreters and translators for transactions with Thai officials, also played an important role in these trading relations, although not always an effective one. For example, in 1688 the Dutch renewed a contract for tin in the peninsular towns and were led to believe

that by the Siamese king it was granted to the Honorable Company the exclusive trade in tin at Ligor [Nakhon Sithammarat] and that His Majesty will take only what he needs of that mineral for his daily use, such as the construction of temples and buildings.¹

The Dutch thus appeared to have won direct control of the tin trade, except for a share needed for official use. The Thai text, however, differed in a significant way from the translation. It stated explicitly that

all the tin is the king’s property and can be negotiated only by His Majesty’s servants; but all the tin that His Majesty does not need, and thus will be left over, can be bought only by the Dutch, to the exclusion of others.²

The Dutch felt deceived when they became aware of the true meaning of the agreement that they had concluded. All tin transactions remained within the royal monopoly, and the Dutch were thus allowed to buy only the amounts determined by the officials in charge of the royal warehouses.
The only concession obtained, therefore, was that no other foreigners would be allowed to buy tin. In this case and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, thorough investigations of agreements between the Dutch company and indigenous rulers are indeed necessary to understand the nature of trading relationships.

In spite of such difficulties and losses, the governor-general and council in Batavia were able to convince the company’s directors in the Netherlands that it was a useful policy to maintain friendly commercial relations with Siam. The trading house in Ayutthaya was abandoned, however, when the Burmese invasion of 1765 got under way. After the dramatic fall and destruction of the Thai capital, the Dutch did not rebuild. Instead, they relinquished the position they had maintained for so long in Siam and did not return until the next century.

The Sulu Sea

The sultanate of Sulu was part of the Malay-Muslim world of Southeast Asia, which included the Malay states in the peninsular areas dominated by the kingdom of Ayutthaya. No study has been published about relations between the peninsula and Sulu, but it seems probable that Sulu belonged to the same network of island ports that have some documented connections with the Thai kingdom, including Jambi, Riau, Banten, South Sulawesi and Timor. Sulu was certainly visited by Bugis traders and by traders from Tuban (East Java) in the late Majapahit era.

During the eighteenth century, especially after 1768, Sulu began to expand its activities and carried out maritime expeditions that extended as far west as the Gulf of Siam. Western observers branded these activities as piratical raids. In the Western Malay world, they were called lanun, while in the eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago they were known as mangindano. These names refer to places where the people came from, but later the names became synonymous with “pirates.” In the nineteenth century, the name balangingi was used. The Sulu mariners continued to threaten shipping in the region until about 1850. Given the geographical range of these expeditions, Sulu should not be overlooked when examining
the maritime powers in the South China Sea and the Gulf.

The following observations were made about Sulu mariners by Thomas Forrest, an English country trader in the mid-1770s:

The Sooloos [Sulu people] have in their families many Bisayan [Philippine], some Spanish slaves, whom they purchase from the Illanon and Mangindanao cruisers. Sometimes they purchase whole cargoes, which they carry to Passir, on Borneo; where, if the females are handsome, they are bought up for the Batavia market. (Forrest 1969: 330)

This description is a good illustration of the extent and nature of Sulu activities in this period. The sultanate occupied a strategic position, with China, the Spanish Philippines and Mindanao to its north, Sulawesi and Maluku to its east, and Brunei together with the rest of the island of Kalimantan to its southwest. Taking advantage of its geographical position and maritime expertise, it developed into a significant power in the area, while at the same time benefiting from Brunei's decline due to internal conflicts.

Sulu's maritime expeditions—usually termed "piratical" exploits in Dutch records—at one time extended across almost the whole of island Southeast Asia. Constantly harassed by Spanish attacks from the end of the sixteenth century, the people of Sulu developed a great resilience, and by the middle of the eighteenth century they were able to profit from the increased commercial opportunities extended by the country traders.

Attention was drawn to this part of the world through the efforts of Alexander Dalrymple, who realized that this area had potential for British ventures. An opportunity arose when British forces seized Manila (1762–4), after declaring war on Spain near the end of the Seven Year's War in Europe. The occupying forces found and released the captive Sultan of Sulu. Dalrymple not only helped to return the sultan to his capital, Jolo, but also negotiated with him for the cession of the island of Balambangan, together with a part of the Borneo coast, in 1762 and 1763.

The British East India Company did not take possession of the island
until 1773, and John Herbert was appointed agent at Balambangan. The attraction of this site, at the western end of the chain of islands that extend from Mindanao to Borneo, was that it was outside both the Dutch and the Spanish spheres and yet was still within the zone where—as observed by Herbert—their arch-rivals the Dutch had “in great measure absorb’d the profits...for two hundred years” (quoted in Warren 1981: 19). By that time, however, both Dalrymple and Sultan Azimuddin I had disappeared from the political arena. A different policy was pursued by Herbert, and relations between the two partners deteriorated, not least because of the closer connections cultivated by the English company with the Sultanate of Magindanao. In 1774, the settlement at Balambangan was destroyed by a local chief (datu) and his followers.

Although short-lived, the British settlement showed remarkable potential and attracted traders of the region. The Spanish government in Manila followed developments in this area with great concern. Not only was the settlement becoming a commercial threat, but also the trade in firearms and ammunition was perceived as a real danger. The Spanish authorities were therefore greatly relieved when reports of its destruction reached Manila. Nonetheless, they faced a new problem when country traders then shifted their activities to Jolo.

Like the port of Riau in the Straits area, Jolo served as an entrepôt for the Sulu region. The country traders brought textiles from India, which were in great demand Sulu, and exchanged them for goods that were in demand in China. These included gold, spices from Maluku, pepper from South Kalimantan, pearl shells from the Sulu archipelago, birds’ nests from Sabah and other commodities such as diamonds, which came from Mindanao, North Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan. For the remainder of the eighteenth century, Sulu experienced remarkable economic growth, which enhanced her political status among the local powers in the area.

Previously, European manufactures had not found a ready market in the Sulu region. But a strong demand arose for weapons and ammunition, once the chiefs (datu) realized that Western artillery pieces were far superior to the long, heavy, brass cannons (known as rentaka, rantaka or lantaka) that were manufacture locally. Also, as the wealth increased, the need for
manpower rose accordingly. Slave-raiders, mostly Iranun and Magindanao marauders, thus found a favorable market at Jolo. This port continued to be a thriving emporium until the middle of the nineteenth century (Warren 1981).

It might be worthwhile to reexamine Thai sources for references to piratical raids in the Gulf area. The successive viceregal governors of Nakhon Sithammarat in particular, who were responsible for the defenses of the long eastern coastline of the Malay peninsula, would have been affected by raids on this territory and by attacks on ships that frequented the peninsular ports. Khmer, Vietnamese and Chinese materials likewise may provide information for further research on maritime interactions between the ports of mainland Southeast Asia and island ports to the east during the late Ayutthaya period and subsequent decades.

The Eighteenth Century

In the context of this book, this chapter serves only as an exercise to collect data about the evolving maritime powers in the area during the centuries leading to Ayutthaya’s downfall. Ayutthaya’s leaders sought and cultivated commercial and political relations with sultanates in the western part of the archipelago (Aceh, Jambi, Riau, Johor, Banten), while also welcoming a succession of European trading companies and private traders at the Thai court (Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, English, Danish, French). The kings of Ayutthaya and their successors were keenly aware of maritime leadership and its potential. During the final decades, the Thai elite were also doubtless well informed about the naval dramas that were played out from the 1740s to the 1760s, which would contribute to the eventual realignment of power in the region: the Anglo-French naval battles in the Bay of Bengal, the British occupation of Spanish Manila during the Seven Years War with France (in which Spain was allied with the French) and the British attempt to create a base in the Sulu Sea.

From another viewpoint, the eighteenth century could also be called a “Bugis century,” for it was the time when the Bugis exercised real political power in many coastal states, not only in the Straits area but also
on the island of Borneo and the seas farther to the east. Their involvement in Malay political intrigues and economic activities, and their participation in Malay social life were so intensive that they blended into the cultural fabric and Malay ethnicity, which assumed broader dimensions. The birth of this new concept of “Malay,” which also includes many other ethnic groups such as the Minangkabau and Banjarese, makes us look at this century in a more positive way than the “traditional” perspectives of Malay history (Andaya and Andaya 1986: 112–3).

The destruction of Ayutthaya in 1767 upset the balance of power around the Gulf for a while, but Siam recovered under the leadership of King Taksin. Vassal states such as Nakhon Sithammarat, which managed to assert their independence during this period of turmoil, were soon brought back into the fold. The overland trade route in the northern part of the peninsula could no longer be used, after the Burmese seized Tenasserim in 1765, but this loss was compensated in part by making greater use of the routes farther south. The development of Songkhla as an important port town on the Gulf coast, and the overland route from there to Pinang (which had been leased to the British) and to Kedah concentrated more commercial activity in this area and brought new political factors into play.

This discussion of the new alignment of powers in this region would not be complete without mentioning the southward expansion of the Vietnamese, who reached the Gulf coast in the eighteenth century. This subject, together with related events along the Cambodian coast before and after the fall of Ayutthaya, is discussed at length in the chapter by Sakurai and Kitagawa.

The destruction of the Riau entrepôt in the 1780s by the Dutch company was a fatal blow to the sultanate. Dynastic quarrels facilitated the disintegration of the kingdom and made possible the creation of “a second Riau” some twenty miles to the north, with the founding of Singapore by the British (Vos 1993: 205). In the next century, this strategic site would gain a dominant position in much of the trade that passed along the sea lanes of this region. It would also become a major trading partner with the Thai kingdom, superseding the network of direct trading relationships that had existed between the Thai capital and the smaller port-powers during
Ayutthayan times.

Notes

1. The Dutch text is as follows: dat door den Siamschen vorst aan de Edele Compagnie vergund was de exclusive handel in tin te Ligor en dat Zijne Majesteit van dat mineraal alleenlijk dat zou mogen genieten, wat hij tot zijn dagelijks gebruik, als bijv. Voor het maken van tempels en gebouwen zou noodig hebben. This extract and the following one are from the document in the Arsip National Republic Indonesia, Buitenland, Siam, no. 5, cited in Table 1.

2. The Dutch text is as follows: al de tin is des Konings en mag alleen door Zijnen Majesteits bedienden worden genegotieert, doch al de tin welke Zijne Majesteit niet van noode heeft en al zoo kwam overteblijven, zal alleen door de Hollanders by uitsluiting van anderen mogen worden gekocht.
Ha Tien or Banteay Meas in the Time of the Fall of Ayutthaya

Yumio Sakurai and Takako Kitagawa

Preface

The Fourteenth Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia (IAHA 1994), held at Sophia University in Tokyo, included a long panel discussion titled “The Eighteenth Century in Southeast Asia.” Throughout the four days of discussion, the eighteenth century appeared to be the most splendid century for overseas Chinese political activity in Southeast Asia and for state consolidation in Burma, Siam, and Vietnam, while Dutch colonial expansion in the archipelago had started also.

Since the end of the seventeenth century, as the result of the Japanese and Dutch retreat from the South China Sea, the northern Vietnamese kingdom or Trinh government had made efforts to establish an agronomic state. Meanwhile, the central Vietnamese kingdom (Quang Nam), ruled by the Nguyen family, had begun its march toward the south (Nam Tien) and had established two centers for agronomic migration at Bien Hoa and Saigon by the end of the seventeenth century. But it had not yet reached the coast of the Gulf, including the west coast of the Camau peninsula, and it showed little interest in the trade of the Gulf or the South China Sea.¹

The history of Cambodia in the eighteenth century, after the “Age of Commerce,” has hitherto been little studied because of the shortage of historical materials. For the period spanning the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the Cambodian chronicles are filled with descriptions of several civil wars between the “Water Kings” (the Mekong power) and the “Land Kings” (the Tonlesap power).² These kings could not afford to pay attention to the Gulf trade. The Kram Srok (a Cambodian constitutional law dated 1693) stipulates that a foreigner could not be appointed as a governor (cauvay srok),³ because all foreigners were merchants and sought only their own profit (KS p. 9, art. 44–5). This text shows that Cambodian governors in the seventeenth century were not concerned with commercial affairs—as
illustrated by the official status of the governor of Banteay Meas, which was only 7 hupoan, even though this city was the most important port leading from the Golf to the area of Udong and Longvek, as shown in the marching route of the Siamese army in 1621. In the nineteenth century, the governor of Kampot—the port town that provided the only outlet to the sea from the Udong area during the reign of King Ang Duong (Kitagawa 1992)—was Okña Senanucit, a high official of 9 hupoan status (KnG, p. 6).

The political vacuum along the eastern shores of the Golf and the development of the Chinese market from the end of the century in China encouraged overseas Chinese activities. These Chinese established several semi-independent port polities such as Ha Tien and Chanthaburi, whose history will be mentioned in this chapter.

The Ha Tien port polity was established by a Cantonese adventurer, Mac Cuu, in the early eighteenth century at Banteay Meas in South Cambodia. It is said that he was allied with Cambodia and the Quang Nam kingdom and that Ha Tien confronted the kingdom of Siam in order to monopolize trade in the Golf, especially during the rule of his son, Mac Thien Tu. After the conquest of King Taksin and the spread of the Tay Son insurrection in south Vietnam in the fourth quarter of the eighteenth century, however, this port polity disappeared from history. Its fate may be typical of the histories of the Chinese port polities of that century. This chapter seeks to understand the historical meaning of a Chinese port polity in the eighteenth century by analyzing the political evolution of the Ha Tien Chinese kingdom, from its rise to its fall, based on the Vietnamese and Cambodian chronicles.

Materials and Abbreviations

In this study, Sakurai uses the following Vietnamese materials:

Gia Dinh Thong Chi (Gia Dinh Gazetteer, cited as GDTC). The GDTC is a geography of the Mekong delta edited in the reign of Minh Mang (r. 1820–40) by Trinh Hoai Duc and written in Sino-Vietnamese characters. The fifth volume describes the history of Ha Tien, from the end of the seventeenth century to the early nineteenth century, and includes much information about the relations between Siam and Vietnam. There are many handwritten copies of this work. A manuscript preserved in the Toyo Bunko
(Oriental Library) in Tokyo was used for the present study. The Sino-Vietnamese text was published in 1956. A French translation by Gabriel Aubaret was published in 1863 and reprinted in 1969.

_Dai Nam Thuc Luc_ (the Official Chronicle of the Nguyen Dynasty, cited as DNTL). The DNTL was published by the Quoc Su Quan (Royal Institute for National History) from 1844 to 1909. Copies have been preserved in several archives such as the Toyo Bunko, Toyo Bunka Kenkyujo (Institute of Oriental Culture) of the University of Tokyo, and elsewhere, based on royal documents such as the Nguyen Trieu Chau Bon (Vermilion Books of the Nguyen Dynasty), preserved in National Archive No. 1 in Hanoi. The DNTL was reedited by the Gengo Bunka Kenkyujo (Institute for Language and Culture) of Keio University and has been published by Yurindo Shuppan in Yokohama since 1961 under the series title _Dainanjitsuroku_ (cited as the KODT). The following volumes include a great deal of information about Ha Tien and Siam (Xiem in Vietnamese).

(1) _Dai Nam Thuc Luc Tien Bien_ (the Official Chronicle of the Pre-Gia-Long Nguyen Dynasty, cited as DTTB) comprises twelve volumes edited in 1844. It was reprinted in volume 1 of the KODT published in 1961.

(2) _Dai Nam Chinh Bien De Nhat Ky_ (the Official Chronicle of the Reign of Gia Long, 1802–20, cited as DNBC) comprises sixty volumes edited in 1848. This work includes also the period 1778–1801, before Gia Long ascended the throne. Volume 1 provides some descriptions of the Ha Tien kingdom, which were reprinted in volume 2 of KODT published in 1963.

(3) _Dai Nam Liet Truyen Tien Bien_ (Biographies of the Quang Nam Kingdom, cited as DLTB) was edited in 1852. Volume 6 includes a short history of Mac Cuu and Mac Thien Tu, which was reprinted in volume 1 of the KODT published in 1961.

(4) _Dai Nam Liet Truyen So Tap_ (Biographies in the Reign of Gia Long, cited as DLTS) comprises thirty-three volumes and was edited in 1889. Volumes 32 and 33 record information about neighboring states such as Cambodia, Siam, Burma, Vientiane and Luang Prabang during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. They were reprinted in volume 4 of the KODT published in 1962.

_Ha Tien Tran Hiep Tran Mac Thi Gia Pha_ (History of the Mac Family,
Governors-General of Ha Tien Division, cited as MTGP) was written in 1818 by Vu The Thuong. Chen Chingho (1956) edited and commented on it in his *He Hsien Chen Hsieh Chen Mo Shih Chia P’u Chu Ch’ih* (Note on the Ha Tien Tran Hiep Tran Mac Thi Gia Pha).

Chen Chingho collected the epitaphs from the Mac family cemetery in Ha Tien and published them with comments in his *He Hsien Mo Shih Shih His K’ao* (A Genealogical Study of the Macs of Ha Tien, cited as HMTK) in *Hua-Kang Hsieh Pao* (Hua-Kang Scholarly Journal, Taipei), no. 5, in 1969.

In this study, Kitagawa uses the following Cambodian materials:

The *Preah Reac Pongsavada* (cited as BK) is a Cambodian chronicle that was found in the National Library of Thailand. It was edited by Yasuyuki Sakamoto and published by the Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, in 1995. Probably it is a version of the Prince Nupparat chronicle edited in 1878, the text of which was translated into Thai and given the title *Ratcha phongsawadan krung kamphuchia* (A Royal Chronicle of Cambodia). A copy of the National Library’s manuscript was used for this study.

The *Preah Reac Pongsavada Mahakhsat Khmae* (cited as VJ) is a Cambodian chronicle that was edited by a commission organized by King Monivong, completed in 1929 and published in 1934. The text up to the year 1677 was translated into French by Khin Sok (1988) and Mak Phoen (1981). Materials for the present study are drawn from the manuscript (g. 53) in the Buddhist Institute (Institut Buddhique) of Phnom Penh, using a microfilm copy that is preserved in the Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies for Unesco in Tokyo.

The *Kram Srok* (cited as KS) is a Cambodian constitutional law dated 1693. Adhémard Leclère translated it into French and published it as a chapter of his *Les codes cambogiens* (Leclère 1898: 89–122). The manuscript copy (P115) in the Ecole française d’Extrême-orient in Paris was used for the present study.

The *Korom Ngea Nung Tomrong Sak Sdec, Montrei Nung Sanama Sak* is a list of Cambodian mandarins during the reign of King Norodom (r. 1860–1904), compiled in 1943. The original manuscript was kept in the Buddhist Institute in Phnom Penh until 1975 but has now disappeared. Photographs of the manuscript were used for the present study.
The Rise of the Ha Tien Kingdom

*Chinese Expansion in the South China Sea from the End of the Seventeenth Century*

Shortly before the fall of the Cheng kingdom in Taiwan in 1683, a ship of the Dutch East India Company arrived at Nagasaki and reported to the Bakufu that the last Cheng king, Cheng Ke Sang, and his followers were planning to seek refuge in Cambodia (Chen 1977: 1). This report suggests that there was a tight network linking Taiwan with Cambodia at the end of the seventeenth century. Although that plan was not carried out, a great many anti-Manchu Chinese nonetheless went into exile in Cambodia after the fall of Taiwan. For example, two admirals of the Cheng navy—one known as Duong Ngan Dich in Vietnamese (Yang Yen Ti in Chinese) and another known as Tran Thuong Xuyen in Vietnamese (Chen Shang Chuan in Chinese)—arrived at Tourane (Da Nang) with about seventy war junks and 3,000 soldiers and submitted to the Quang Nam king in 1682 or 1683. Hien Vuong, the Quang Nam king, settled them in two colonies (*dong pho*), newly opened by the Nguyen government, in the eastern part of the Mekong delta. Dich went to My Tho and controlled transportation on the Mekong. Xuyen went to Bien Hoa and monopolized the Dong Nai River network. Later Xuyen’s influence became prominent in the eastern part of the Mekong delta.

Unlike the overseas Chinese in earlier times, who worked as foreign merchants under the strictly administered control of local port polities, the Chinese who arrived from the end of the seventeenth century onward took great initiatives in international trade and also exercised military and political power. These characteristics are common to the cases of Wu Jang, who became powerful in Songkhla, and Lo Fang Pai in Pontianak on Borneo (Chen 1977: 3–5).

*Mac Cuu Settles at Ha Tien*

According to Fujiwara (1986: 219–20), the founder of the Ha Tien kingdom was Mac Cuu. He was born in 1655 in Lei Zhou, Guangdong Province, and migrated in 1671 to Phnom Penh (Fujiwara 1986: 222), where
the king of Cambodia entrusted him with commercial affairs. Then he was
given an appointment with the official rank of an okña, and he moved to Vong
Kham (Mong Hom in Cantonese) between 1687 and 1695 (MTGP, p. 84;
Fujiwara 1986: 225). According to the GDTC (vol. 3) and the MTGP, Ha
Tien was in the territory of Chan Lap (Chenla, the Chinese name for
Cambodia) and was originally called Vong Kham or Mong Hom. Mong Hom
in the GDTC can be identified as Muang Peam. The word peam in Khmer
means a river mouth, and there are many examples of peam or khael² peam
specifying a port of Banteay Meas in the Cambodian chronicles. Mac Cuu
observed that a great many Chinese, Vietnamese, Khmer and Malay³
merchants gathered in Say Mat phu (Say Mat city in Vietnamese), and
therefore he opened gambling dens for them. According to the DLTB (vol.
6), the place where Mac Cuu opened these establishments was called
Phuong Thanh. Say Mat phu can be identified as Banteay Meas and Phuong
Thanh (Phuong Fort in Vietnamese) as Peam in Khmer (Maybon 1919: 122,
note). Fujiwara (1986: 226) concluded that Mac Cuu was appointed
governor-general of Banteay Meas or Peam with the rank of an okña.

Two Banteay Meases

According to the KS (p. 26, art. 113), the governor (cauvay srok)⁴ of
Banteay Meas had the rank not of an okña but of a cau poñea. The title of the
governor of Banteay Meas also appears in the list of titles of officials during
King Norodom’s reign (KNg, p. 4). These records show that Banteay Meas
was under the rule of a Cambodian governor from the seventeenth to the
nineteenth centuries. On the other hand, although the toponym Peam does not
appear in the KS, both the BK and the VJ record a governor with the rank of
okña and the title Reacea Sethei in Peam in 1756. Thus Peam, too, was a
Cambodian region under the rule of Okña Reacea Sethei, although the
governorship first appears in the records only in the late eighteenth century.

Alexander Hamilton (1930: 105–11), a famous adventurer who visited
this area in 1720, reported that there were two ports—which he called
Cupangsoap and Ponteamass—along the coast of the Gulf. Probably his
Cupangsoap was Kampong Som, and Ponteamass was Banteay Meas.
According to Hamilton, Cupangsoap had supplies of ivory, insect lac and
gum gamboge, but no free trade was allowed there without a license from the court of Cambodia. By contrast, Ponteamass was a place that offered good trade. There was a fairly deep but narrow river at Ponteamass which, during the rainy seasons of the southwest monsoon provided communication with the Bansack (the present-day Bassac River or Hau Giang, the western channel of the Mekong delta) or Cambodia River (the Mekong). Because the city of Cambodia (present-day Phnom Penh) was nearly 100 leagues up the river and navigation to the city was so long and difficult, foreign traders preferred to call at Ponteamass. Furthermore, Ponteamass also had contact with Phnom Penh by a land route,\textsuperscript{11} and it was the best port in Cambodia from a European navigator’s viewpoint.

Although Hamilton visited Banteay Meas during the time that Mac Cuu was ruling there, he makes no mention of a Chinese governor there. A local official who spoke a little Portuguese provided him with warm hospitality, and his arrival was reported not to the Quang Nam king but to the Cambodian king.

There seem to have been two “Banteay Meases” in 1720: first, Say Mat phu (or Phuong Thanh) ruled by Mac Cuu under the sovereignty of Quang Nam, and second, Ponteamass, which was the port of the Cambodian kingdom described in Hamilton’s report. It is very difficult, however, to suppose the existence of a port called Ponteamass that was different from Say Mat Phu, because Vietnamese records never mention another Banteay Meas, and Hamilton does not mention the existence of a Chinese-ruled Say Mat phu. Most likely, the port city that was in the Banteay Meas region—or more precisely, Peam Banteay Meas in Cambodian—had two faces and two names, one known to the Chinese and the other known to westerners.

\textit{Banteay Meas and Ha Tien in the Colonial Period}

According to French reports, Ha Tien was definitively Vietnamese territory in the colonial period. But even at that time, the names of Banteay Meas and Peam were still found in Cambodian territory. Even now, there is a small district (\textit{srok}) called Banteay Meas in \textit{khaet} Kampot. Aymonier (1900 i: 154) states that Peam remained within Cambodian territory after the Chinese and Vietnamese were expelled from Ha Tien. The center of Peam
was the port of Kampong Trach, where a governor with the title Okña Reacea Sethei (Raja Sesthi in French) resided. Aymonier (1900 i: 156) also mentions that there was a Banteay Meas region centered at Phum Tuk Meas, along the Prek Tuk Meas River at the confluence of the Prek Peam River, and that a Cambodian governor with the title Okña Preah Yuddhadhipati resided there.

Rousseau (1918: 11–2) reported in his geography on the Residency of Kampot in 1917 that there were three important ports on the eastern shores of the Gulf—Ha Tien, Kampot and Kampong Trach—but that only junks and coastal vessels called there, because none of the three ports could accommodate large ocean-going ships. The port of Kampong Trach was opened by the Chinese during the pre-colonial period. It could be reached from the sea by way of the Kampong Trach River, which small junks could navigate. It is near the seacoast, the port of Ha Tien and the Vinh Te Canal. It developed as a center for the pepper trade, and restaurants and tailors’ shops were built there, especially after the construction of the marketplace in 1907. Rousseau (1918: 13) also mentioned that Tuk Meas, the center of the Banteay Meas region, was a big town settled by Chinese, that big junks could enter the town by way of the Prek Tuk Meas River during the rainy season and that a land route led from there to Takeo, through a Chinese town called Tani.

The name “Peam” has now disappeared, but Kampong Trach is still a district (srok) name in khaet Kampot. It is clear that Ha Tien and Banteay Meas were different regions in both the French period and even at the present time. The latter (with its center at Kampong Trach) belongs to Cambodia and the former belongs to Vietnam.

These considerations suggest the following conclusions: There was a region called Banteay Meas under a governor (cauvay srok) in the seventeenth century, which encompassed present-day Ha Tien in Vietnam and khaet Banteay Meas in Cambodia. In the early eighteenth century, there was a port that had two names: Peam Banteay Meas (Hamilton’s Ponteamass) under the control of Cambodian officials, and Say Mat phu (the Phuong Thanh of the Vietnamese) under the rule of the Cantonese residing there. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the port ceased to be Cambodian territory. The hinterland region of Ha Tien, however, did remain in Cambodia, was called Banteay Meas and was under the rule of Okña Reacea Sethei. This change must have taken place while Mac Thien Tu
(known in Khmer as Preah Sotoat) ruled Ha Tien tran, from 1735 to 1772.

**Mac Cuu as the Leader of the Say Mat Phu Chinese**

According to the GDTC, Mac Cuu managed gambling houses, opened silver mines and organized the overseas Chinese to establish seven villages (xa). These places can be identified as follows: Phu Quoc as Phu Quoc island (Koh Tral in Khmer), Can Bot as Kampot, Camau as Camau (Tuk Khmau), Lung Co maybe as Srei Ambel (in Ha Tien),

13 Rach Gia as Rach Gia (Kramuon Sa) and Phung Tham as Vung Thom

14 (Kampong Som). Ha Tien is not mentioned in the GDTC. According to Fujiwara (1986: 231), Ha Tien should be added to the six xa, making a total of seven.

Fujiwara (1986: 230–2) concluded that Mac Cuu ruled the region extending from southwest Cochinchina to south Cambodia in the early eighteenth century. But that interpretation cannot be believed for several reasons. First, according to the GDTB, the Cambodian king Ang Ton (Nac Ong Ton in Vietnamese) presented five prefectures—Chan Sam

15 (Phum Tnaot Chong Srang), Say Mat

16 (phum Banteay Meas), Linh Quynh

17 (probably Tuk Meas), Can Bot (Kampot) and Phung Tham (Kampong Som)—to Mac Thien Tu as a reward for his support of Ang Ton’s accession to the throne in 1757. Mac Thien Tu offered the five prefectures to the Quang Nam king, who then redistributed them to Ha Tien Tran. The names of two of these five prefectures appear among the seven villages that Mac Cuu is supposed to have established. Second, the Sino-Vietnamese names of these villages have their origins in Khmer names, except for Phu Quoc. This means that the Khmer had already established these administrative units. Third, the MTGP—the most reliable document—makes no mention of the seven villages or their establishment.

Thus the GDTC story, which claims that the seven villages were founded in Mac Cuu’s time, must be based on the 1757 accomplishments of Mac Thien Tu, projecting them back in time to make it appear as though Mac Cuu was the founder of Greater Ha Tien. Probably the reference to “establishing seven villages” means that he founded seven Chinese villages in seven Khmer administrative areas. According to the GDTC (vol. 5), the area of Ha Tien city in the early nineteenth century included seven
Vietnamese villages, six Chinese quarters (pho), twenty-six Khmer villages (suc or srok) and one Malay group (doi). Thus Mac Cuu was not the governor of Banteay Meas but the leader of the Chinese settlements in the Banteay Meas region.

Establishment of Ha Tien

Ha Tien as a Subordinate State of Vietnam

According to the HMGP and GDTC, Mac Cuu greatly feared that the Cambodian kingdom would collapse, and therefore he submitted the area over which he had influence to the Quang Nam kingdom.\(^\text{18}\) Then the Quang Nam king appointed him General Commander of Ha Tien\(^\text{19}\) Division (Ha Tien Tran Tong Binh) in 1711. Cambodian records, however, do not describe Banteay Meas as belonging to Quang Nam. Probably, this discrepancy means that Mac Cuu and his Chinese followers in the port city of Banteay Meas (Say Mat phu) submitted themselves to Quang Nam. As mentioned below, the BK and VJ contain many descriptions of governors (cauvay srok) of khaet Peam or khaet Banteay Meas, who had the title Okña Reacea Sethei Phuv (or Okña Mno Sethei Phuv) and who supported Mac Thien Tu during the Cambodian-Siamese war from 1770 to 1772. The area of Banteay Meas, other than Ha Tien city, remained in Cambodian territory under the control of the Cambodian governor at that time. Even in Ha Tien itself, the local Khmer were called up by the governor (cauvay srok Peam), whose title was Okña Reacea Sethei. In a sense, it is difficult to regard Mac Cuu as the governor-general of all of Banteay Meas or as being appointed by the kings of Cambodia and Quang Nam in the early seventeenth century. Probably Mac Cuu's rank as an okña was a self-appointed one.

Mac Cuu died in 1735. His son, Mac Thien Tu,\(^\text{20}\) was appointed by the Quang Nam king to succeed him as governor-general of Ha Tien Division in 1736, and Ha Tię́ was exempted from sending the customary local administration tax to the central government. Mac Cuu had been allowed to mint coins in Ha Tien for its trade. Mac Thien Tu established an autonomous government and army. He also invited Chinese literati to develop Chinese culture in Ha Tien. The entire lifestyle of his court seems to have been the
same as that of a court in China. Furthermore, he sent official missions to China and Japan to develop international trade, as a diplomatically independent state (MTGP, pp. 116–7). According to the letter he wrote in Cambodian to the Shogunate in 1742, Neak Somdec Preah Sotoat (the Cambodian name of Mac Thien Tu) called himself the Reacea Krong Kampuea Tiptei or “King of Cambodia” (Péri 1923: 131–2). Thus this polity can be called the “Ha Tien kingdom” from the 1730s, although it sent tribute to Quang Nam irregularly.22

Vietnamese Expansion in the Eastern Part of the Mekong Delta

The following passage appears in the VJ (pp. 540–5). (This and all subsequent translations are by the authors.)

In the year of the serpent [1737], Preah Bat Somdec Preah Borom Reacea [King Satha (Ang Ci)] did not trust his queen Preah Srei Soceada, Preah Utei [a son of Ang Tong], Preah Srei Cei Cet or Preah Borom Reacea [sons of the ex-king Thoamma Reacea], and tried to kill them. Their armies fought against each other at Veal Russei Duoc in srok Phnom Penh. The army of Preah Borom Reacea was defeated, and he hastened away to Krong Anam [Quang Nam]. The Cambodian ex-king Thoamma Reacea [in Ayutthaya] and a prince, Preah Ang Tong, knew that an internal disturbance had occurred in Cambodia. King Thoamma Reacea asked King Thai Sreah [King Thai Sa] of Siam to send reinforcements. King Thai Sreah had King Thoamma Reacea escorted to khaet Kampot by sea with 2,000 soldiers and sent Preah Ang Tong with 10,000 soldiers to khaet Neang Rong [Nang Rong District in] Nokor Reac Seima [Nakhon Ratchasima]. He took the route from Ayutthaya to Phnom Penh through Can Borei [Chanthaburi], Kompong Som and Kampot.23

According to the DLTS (vol. 6), in the year ky mui (1739):

In the springtime [the first, second and third months of the Vietnamese calendar], a Chan Lap [Cambodian] person named Nac Bon invaded Ha Tien, because Chan Lap had a grudge against Mac Cuu, who had taken
away their land. But Mac Thien Tu defeated them. The Quang Nam king praised Mac Thien Tu and appointed him Do Doc Dai Thuong Quan [a title signifying a general commander]. Chan Lap never invaded Ha Tien again.

Comparing these descriptions, we may draw the following conclusions: King Thoamma Reacea was called Nac Tham in Vietnamese. He and Prince Tong were able to land at the ports of Kampot and Kampong Som with the Siamese army without encountering resistance. This provides further evidence that the Ha Tien kingdom did not control the region around Kampot and Kampong Som in 1738. In this context, Nac Bon’s invasion of Ha Tien in 1739, which is not mentioned in the Cambodian chronicles, could be regarded as an armed conflict between Ha Tien and the local Khmer chief in the Banteay Meas region, who may have been encouraged by Thoamma Reacea’s victory with the support of Siam. Ha Tien took advantage of the Cambodian conflict to begin exercising its military influence and expanding its territory into the Khmer hinterland, with military support from Quang Nam.

According to the VJ (pp.555–7):

In 1748, knowing that there was an internal disturbance in Cambodia, the Vietnamese king had the Cambodian ex-king Somdec Preah Borom Reacea Ang Ci escorted to Cambodia with soldiers. The Vietnamese generals Ong Kham Say Ceay Neat and Ong Ba Hao defeated Okňa Noren Tok, the cauvay khaet Basak.

According to the DNLS (vol. 31):

En [King Thoamma Reacea] died. His son Nac Tha ascended the throne. Tham [the ex-king who took refuge in Ayutthaya] returned to his country from Siam. Tha did not allow him to be received [at court]. Tham attacked him. Tha fled to Gia Dinh. Tham took power again.

According to the DNTB (vol. 10), in the tenth year of The Ton (1748):
Before then, Nac Tha of Chan Lap ascended the throne. Nac Tham came back to Cambodia from Siam, but Nac Tha would not accept him. Then Nac Tham raised an army against him. Nac Tha fled to Gia Dinh. Nac Tham ascended the throne.

...In the first month [January/February 1748] in the spring, [the Quang Nam king] dispatched Nguyen Huu Doan to attack Chan Lap to pacify it.... After Nac Tham died, his three sons—Don, Hien and Diep—fought each other for the throne. Their subject, Suu Lien Toc, made use of this conflict and then invaded My Tho. Nguyen Huu Doan led soldiers and marched out, defeating Suu Lien Toc, setting fire to his battleships and entering Phnom Penh. Don, Hien and Diep hastened away. Based on Huu Doan’s report on his success, [the king] gave orders to send Nac Tha back to his country and to restore him to his throne. In the sixth month [June/July] during the summer, Nac Nguyen of Chan Lap, the second son of Nac Tham and Cao La Ham Dot Loc Man supported the army of Siam in attacking Nac Tha. Nac Tha fled to Gia Dinh and then died from a disease. Nac Nguyen ascended the throne of Cambodia.

According to the MTGP:

Then the Cambodian king died. His sons fought each other, [each] aiming to ascend the throne. Many hungry people took refuge in Mac Thien Tu’s territory. Mac Thien Tu helped to supply them with food.

The information in these passages can be interpreted as follows: King Thoamma Reacea died in 1747. Taking advantage of the confusion surrounding the succession, the governor of Bassac Province, Okña Noren Tok (called Suu Lien Toc in the Vietnamese sources), attacked My Tho from the sea in 1748. This action suggests that the local Khmer with power in the Basak (Bassac) area of the Mekong maintained their loyalty to the anti-Vietnamese faction in Udong, although they were under the influence of Quang Nam.

Okña Noren Tok was defeated by a commander called Ong Kham Say Ceay Neat in Khmer. He can be identified as Nguyen Huu Doan.
(the commander who marched to Phnom Penh along the Bassac). After this expedition, the Bassac area came under the influence of Quang Nam. As a result of these military operations, the semi-independent status of the Ha Tien polity must have changed to that of a subordinate state under Quang Nam.

Nguyen Huu Doan escorted King Satha (Ang Ci, also known as King Borom Reacea) to Udong to restore him to the throne. But after the departure of the Quang Nam forces, the Siamese forces expelled him, and he went to Saigon again.

The new Cambodian ruler (called Nac Nguyen in the Vietnamese sources) can be identified as King Cei Cet (Ang Snguon), who ascended the throne in 1749 with the support of the Siamese king after the Quang Nam forces had departed.

According to the GDTC (vol. 4), in the year giap tuat (1754):

In the sixth month [July/August 1754] in the summer, two divisions of Gia Dinh marched to Cambodia along two routes. Nghia Bieu Hau (Nguyen Cuu Trinh) led the co binh [second army] along the Dong Giang [the Vam Co Tay River] to Tan Li Bac [the Tonle Bac?], where he arrived at the Dai Giang [Big River, meaning the Mekong] and joined the chinh binh [first army] of the Tien Giang [another channel of the Mekong and coming from My Tho according to the DNTB (vol. 10)] led by Thien Chinh Hau at Lu En Don [Lovea Em]. The entire Cambodian army in Xoi Lap [the river mouth of the Vam Co],26 Tam Bon, Cau Nam [Kandal?] and Nam Vang [Phnom Penh] surrendered to them.

Then the Quang Nam army dispatched cai doi [commander] Tan Long Hau to Tam Phong Xiem [Kompong Xiem = Kompong Cham] to receive the Con Man27 [Cham] people who were migrating from Thuan Thanh.28 The Cambodian king, Nac Nguyen, fled to Tam Phong Thu or present-day La Biec [Longvek]. But in the autumn, a big flood occurred, so the Quang Nam army returned to their forts to rest.

According to the GDTC (vol. 4), in the year at hoi (1755):
The great division under Thien Chinh Hau returned to My Tho and ordered the Con Man [Cham] people in Thuan Thanh, who numbered around 10,000, to abandon Kha Tung and move to Binh Thanh. When they arrived at Vo Ta On [unidentified], more than 10,000 Khmer soldiers attacked them. The Con Man people were very tired and isolated. They asked Thien Chinh Hau for relief. But, it was very difficult to relieve them so quickly, because the forests were a hindrance. Nghia Bieu Hau (Nguyen Cuu Trinh) alone led five doanh [armies] to rescue them. He relieved more than 5,000 Con Man people and then returned to Ba Dinh Mountain [Mount Ba Den to the north of Tay Ninh City]....

Then the Quang Nam army led by the cai doi [commander] Du Chinh Hau [Duke of Du Chinh] Truong Phuoc Du, with Con Man people as guides, marched to Cau Nam and Nam Vang [Phnom Penh] and killed some oc nha [okña, Khmer officials]. The Cambodian king was so afraid that he fled to Ton Duc Hau [Mac Thien Tu] in Ha Tien. Mac Thien Tu offered excuses to the throne [to the king of Quang Nam] on his behalf, [stating] that he had not attacked the Con Man people but that a Khmer general, Chieu Nhuy Ech, [who was] stationed in the border area, had done so.

According to the GDTC (vol. 4), in the year binh ty (1756):

The Cambodian king, Nac Ong Nguyen, proposed to the Quang Nam king to cede two prefectures—Tan Don and Xoi Lap—as compensation for his offense, and he promised to pay unexcused tribute for three years.

These passages suggest the following pattern of political alignment and territorial change: The government of Quang Nam tried to move many Cham people from Thuan Thanh to Khmer areas such as Kampong Cham, and they passed through Tay Ninh. This migration caused a conflict between the local Khmer and the Cham.

King Cei Cet (Ang Snguon) belonged to the pro-Siam and anti-Vietnam faction at the court of Udong. When he escaped from the Quang Nam army, however, he went not to Siam but to Ha Tien. Probably he regarded Ha Tien as neutral ground in the confrontation among Cambodia,
Siam and Quang Nam. Although Ha Tien had influence along the Bassac and in the coastal area of the eastern part of the Gulf, Ha Tien’s relations with Cambodia must have been somewhat different from its relations with Quang Nam by way of the Mekong.  

King Cei Cet (Ang Snguong) ceded two prefectures—Tan Bon and Loi Lap (Xoi Lap)—in the lower reaches of the Vam Co to the Quang Nam king through the intermediary of Mac Thien Tu in 1756. But this affair is not mentioned in the Cambodian chronicles. Both prefectures are between My Tho and Saigon and, without first securing these areas, Quang Nam could not expand into other parts of the Mekong delta—such as Vinh Long, where it established a military base called Long Ho Doanh in 1732. These two prefectures must have been under the influence of Quang Nam before 1756. Furthermore, King Cei Cet died in 1755. The Cambodian king who fled to Ha Tien could not have been Cei Cet (called Nac Nguyen in the Vietnamese sources) but Moha Uphayoreac (“second king”) Ang Tong (Nac Tong in Vietnamese). It is difficult to believe the Vietnamese description of the 1756 affair. If the Vietnamese records are at least true in part, that means the Cambodian king recognized Vietnamese rule in the two prefectures.

Ha Tien under Mac Thien Tu can be regarded as an important vanguard of Vietnamese expansion in the Mekong delta from the Quang Nam viewpoint. Ha Tien was changing from a Chinese port polity into a dependency of a territorial state: Quang Nam. Furthermore, Mac Thien Tu led Ha Tien’s expansion along the right bank of the Bassac.

The change must have been triggered by a problem with pirates at that time. According to the GDTC (vol. 5), in the eighth month of the year đình mạo (September/October 1747), a pirate, who called himself Vu Vuong Duc Vung, plundered a ship belonging to Mac Thien Tu while it was sailing to Huế across the Long Xuyen Sea. Mac Thien Tu dispatched his fleet to arrest Duc Vung, but he escaped to Ba Thac (the river mouth of the Hau Giang or Bassac) and was captured by Gia Dinh (Saigon) officials. Probably, Ha Tien needed the military support of Quang Nam to protect its maritime routes across the South China Sea.

This is the second reason why Mac Thien Tu wanted Ha Tien to be a territorial state with its own hinterland, like the exporting ports of Siam. In the “Age of Commerce,” many port polities, such as Aceh and Melaka,
tried to expand their territories into the hinterlands. In the eighteenth century, Pegu, Ayutthaya, Thonburi and Quang Nam also developed from port polities into territorial states, although some attempts failed. Among the Chinese port polities, Ha Tien is the only example in which there was active expansion.

The following passages describe the troubled events surrounding the succession, after the death of the Cambodian king, Cei Cet (Ang Snguon), in 1755. According to the GDTC (vol. 4), in the year dinh suu (1757), the nineteenth year of The Ton:

The Cao Man king, Nac Ong Nguyen [Cei Cet], died. His uncle, Nac Ong Nhuan, executed all affairs in the place of the king. Mandarins in Gia Dinh asked the throne [the king of Quang Nam] to permit Nac Ong Nhuan to be the king of Cambodia. The Quang Nam king responded that after ceding two provinces—Tra Vinh and Ba Thac [present-day Cua Bat Xac, at the mouth of the Bassac River, near Soc Trang city]—to Quang Nam, he would recognize him [Nac Nhuan] as king. But Nac Nhuan’s son-in-law, Nac Hinh, killed Nac Nhuan and usurped. Nac Ton, a son of Nhuan, fled to Ha Tien. Du Chinh Hau [the Duke of Du Chinh, a general of Quang Nam] took advantage of this affair to attack Nac Hinh. Nac Hinh fled to Tan Phong Xoi [Kampong Svay?], and then his staff member, Oc Nha Uong, killed him. Mac Thien Tu petitioned the Quang Nam king to have Nac Ong Ton ascend the throne. [The Quang Nam king] ordered Mac Tien Tu to escort Nac Ong Ton to his country.

According to the MTGP:

The Cambodian king’s first son, Chieu Ong Ton, heard that Mac Thien Tu was renown for his virtue. He hoped that Mac Thien Tu would have pity for his isolated status and solve his urgent problem. He sent his followers to Mac Thien Tu to ask him to attack his enemy. Dinh Quoc Cong [Mac Thien Tu] pitied him because he was so isolated that he had lost his way. Mac Tien Tu reported to the throne about his urgent situation. The Quang Nam king, Hieu Vu Hoang De, ordered Mac Thien Tu to resolve the Cambodian problem and ordered the Governor-General of Gia Dinh to
command a Vietnamese army to help him. Mac Thien Tu had command of more than 10,000 Ha Tien soldiers to escort Chieu Ong Ton to ascend the throne.

According to the BK:

In 1757, Upareac Preah Srei Soriyopor attacked Preah Utey Reacea. Preah Utey Reacea fled to srok Peam along a land route. Preah Sotoat, living in srok Peam, was pleased to receive him into exile. Preah Utey Reacea requested Preah Sotoat, who was [his] preah thoamabeida [adoptive father], to order Okña Kosala, Okña Mno Sethei Phuv and Cau Poña Yuos to raise an army to occupy srok Treang [in Takeo], Banteay Meas, Prei Krabas [in Takeo], Nokor Borei [in Takeo], Bati [in Takeo] and Samrong Tong. They fought Preah Srei Soriyopor at Banteay Pec. Then Preah Utey Reacea left Peam with his soldiers and went to Kampong Krasang, where he took boats. After joining his troops, he marched along Tonle Moat Cruk [the Chau Doc River] to Prek Ambel, Tuk Vil and Anlong San, and then arrived at srok Phnom Penh. He pursued Preah Srei Soriyopor’s army and then entered the fortress to destroy the army.

According to the VJ (pp. 572–4):

Preah Utey Reacea was defeated by Preah Srei Soriyopor and fled to khaet Banteay Meas along a land route. Preah Sotoat, who was Preah Utey Reacea’s adoptive father, ordered Okña Kosala, Okña Reacea Sethei Phuv and Cau Poña Yuos to gather people of khaet Treang, Kampot, Banteay Meas, Prei Krabas and Bati to organize their soldiers. Those three ministers attacked Udong.

On the other side, Preah Utey Reacea took soldiers, left khaet Peam and marched from srok Kampong Krasang and srok Moat Cruk [Chau Doc] by boat. Gathering people of the [various] khaet along the Tonle [the Bassac River], he arrived at Phnom Penh and then moved to Kampong Luong [a river port near Udong].
Somdec Preah Srei Soriyopor Moha Upareac sent soldiers and fought with Preah Utey Reacea (Ang Ton) but was defeated at Phum Dombok Mean Leak in *khaet* Samrong Tong. After that, Somdec Moha Upareac hastened to *khaet* Prei Kdei. Somdec Preah Kaev Hva (Ang Duong) [a younger brother of Moha Upareac], who had conspired with Somdec Preah Srei Soriyopor Moha Upareac, was so afraid that he became a monk in Vat Sbaeng. Preah Ang Non Civ likewise became a *samaner* [Buddhist novice]. Knowing this, Preah Ang Ton sent soldiers to arrest Somdec Preah Srei Soriyopor Moha Upareac Ang Hing at Khet Prei Kdei and had him executed at *srok* Kampong Chnang. After that, Preah Utey Reacea Ang Ton had Somdec Preah Kaev Hva (Ang Duong) return to secular life and had him executed at Vat Prok Kda.

After a few months, Somdec Preah Anoevat Khsatrei, the queen of Somdec Preah Srei Soriyopor Moha Upareac, had some ministers attack Preah Utey Reacea. ...Preah Utey Reacea defeated Somdec Preah Anoevat Khsatrei’s faction. Somdec Preah Reamea Thipdei Moha Uphayoreac Ang Tong became aware this, hastened to *khaet* Posat and died there in the year of the bull [1757/8]. Somdec Preah Anoevat Khsatrei hastened to Prei Rusei Sañ in *khaet* Posat with a prince, Preah Ang At, and the ministers. Preah Ang Non Preah Ream and Preah Ang Civ hastened to *khaet* Kampong Svay.

Preah Utey Reacea’s soldiers apprehended Somdec Preah Anoevat Khsatrei, Preah Ang At and the ministers, and executed them at *srok* Kampong Chnang. Then Preah Utey Reacea ordered his soldiers to arrest Preah Ang Non Preah Ream and Preah Ang Civ. But Preah Ang Non Preah Ream managed to escape at Kampong Preah Sruv and hastened to Krong Srei Ayuthya [Ayutthaya] by land. Preah Ang Civ was executed at Udong. Preah Utey Reacea ascended the throne in 1758.

Comparisons of these passages provide several insights into the divisions within the Cambodian court, as well as political and economic characteristics of the Ha Tien polity. In 1756, the court was divided into two factions, led respectively by Utey Reacea (Ang Ton) and by Somdec Preah
Srei Soriyopor Moha Upareac (Ang Hing).

Nac Ong Ton (in the Vietnamese reports) can be identified as Utey Reacea, whose former name was Ang Ton. His father was Somdec Preah Utey Reacea Moha Upareac Ang So, who wielded great power at srok Moha Nokor Vat (Angkor) during the reign of King Cei Cet (Ang Snguon, known as Nac Nguyen in Vietnamese).

Nac Hinh (in the Vietnamese reports) must be Somdec Preah Srei Soriyopor Moha Upareac (Ang Hing). He inherited the position of upareac ("second king") from Ang So after the latter died. Nac Hinh was a son-in-law of Nac Nhuan (the name given in the Vietnamese records). Thus, Nac Nhuan appears to have been Ang So. According to the Vietnamese information, Nac Hinh killed Ang So.

Utey Reacea (Ang Ton) fled to srok Peam in khaet Banteay Meas, where his adoptive father (called Preah Sotoat in Khmer) had settled. Thus srok Peam and Preah Sotoat (the names given in the Cambodian records) must be Ha Tien City and Mac Thien Tu, respectively. The Vietnamese records likewise call Ang Ton an adopted son of Mac Thien Tu.

According to the BK, Preah Sotoat exercised strong influence over local Cambodian officials such as Okña Kosala, Okña Mno Sethei Phuv and Cau Poñea Yuos. Probably they were governors of khaet Treang (in Takeo), Kampot, Banteay Meas, Prey Krabas (in Takeo) and Bati (in Takeo). They were able to mobilize the local Cambodian people. Without the support of these Cambodian officials, Mac Thien Tu could not mobilize Khmer soldiers, not even in Ha Tien.

The Ha Tien army included Khmer people from the Chau Doc and Bassac area and Quang Nam. It marched by way of the Mekong River and defeated King Hinh’s army near Udong. Hinh fled to Kampong Chnang (Tan Phong Xoi in Vietnamese), where he was arrested and killed. Ton then launched a purge at Udong, driving out the supporters and followers of Hinh. Tong fled to Posat and died there. Cei Cet (Nguyen’s son), Preah Ang Non Preah Ream (Ang Non), fled to Ayutthaya.

These events demonstrate the hegemony that Mac Thien Tu gained over the southern provinces along the Bassac River (the Hau Giang) and over the eastern shores of the Gulf in the 1750s, through the cooperation of local Cambodian officials and with military protection from Quang Nam. Mac
Thien Tu’s polity thus had three distinctive features: first, its subordinate relationship with Quang Nam with regard to military affairs; second, the autonomy of Ha Tien Chinese residents in their trade and urban administration; and third, the influence exercised over local Khmer officials as a means of controlling the Khmer population.

**Formation of Ha Tien Territory**

Important territorial changes of concern to Ha Tien are reflected in the following extracts. According to the GDTC (vol. 4), in the year *dinh suu* (1757):

At that time, Mac Thien Tu recommended to the throne [the Quang Nam king] that Nac Ong Ton ascend the throne of Cambodia. The king [of Quang Nam] give orders for Mac Thien Tu and the generals of five [Quang Nam] armies to escort Nac Ong Ton on his return to his country. [Nac Ong Ton] presented Tam Phong Long [Kampong Long, present-day Long Xuyen City]\(^{37}\) to Quang Nam.

The Quang Nam army returned to Gia Dinh. Du Chinh Hau and Nghia Bieu Hau reported to the throne the removal of Long Ho Dinh to Tam Bao, where the present Long Ho village is, and the establishment of Dong Khau Dao in Sadec, Tan Chau Dao in Tien Giang Cau Lao [Cu Lao Gieng, an island in the Mekong River near Cao Lanh] and Chau Doc Dao in Hau Giang Chau Doc, where soldiers of Long Ho Dinh were stationed.

After settling all the affairs, Nac Ong Ton ceded five prefectures—Phung Tham, Can Bot, Chan Sam, Say Mat and Linh Quynh—to Mac Thien Tu as the reward for his service. Mac Thien Tu established Kien Giang Dao at Rach Gia and Long Xuyen Dao at Ca Mau. He established local bureaucratic institutions, settled a population and built villages there. Ha Tien expanded very widely.

According to the MTGP:
After the problem was solved, the king [of Quang Nam] ordered his imperial subjects to carry the imperial message appointing him a phien vuong [a vassal king] and ordered tham cong [the three highest dukes] to take colored mandarin costumes, mandarin hoods, gold and silver to Mac Thien Tu in order to transfer the prince [Nac Ton]. The prince was very pleased to receive favor from the Quang Nam king and sent his followers to the capital to thank him.

...After ascending the throne, he wished to be under the umbrella of Mac Thien Tu, and then he ceded five provinces to Mac Thien Tu’s domain to express his thanks: Vang Tham, Can Bot, Chan Sam, Say Mat and Ninh Quyinh. Mac Thien Tu developed Cambodian wilderness to populate [the newly settled areas of] Long Xuyen, Kien Giang, Tran Giang and Tran Di. He established administrative units and sent his officials there.

This Cambodian cession of land to Quang Nam is not mentioned in the Cambodian chronicles; nor is the Vietnamese expedition to Cambodia in 1757. According to the GDTC, however, the Vietnamese army maintained stations at Long Ho (near Tra Vinh), Sadec, Cu Lao Gieng and Chau Duc, from that time onward. Furthermore, the area from Rach Gia and Ca Mau to Long Xuyen (the area called Trans-Bassac or Mekong Occidentale during the French colonial period) belonged to the Ha Tien kingdom but was known as Long Xuyen, Kien Giang and Tran Giang. This evidence shows that the concept of a geo-body appeared for the first time in the Vietnamese part of the Mekong delta and that Quang Nam and Ha Tien shared that concept, based on the line formed by the Bassac.

Mac Thien Tu succeeded in ruling four important ports along the eastern shores of the Gulf, including Kampot, Ha Tien and Rach Gia. His rule must have been a big threat to other trading powers in the Gulf region, such as the Teochiu Chinese maritime merchants based at Chanthaburi and Trat.

Furthermore, his new domain—Say Mat (phum Banteay Meas), Linh Quyhn (Tuk Meas) and Chan Sam (Tnaot Chong Srang)—belonged to the Banteay Meas region during the period of French colonial rule. He ruled the hinterland of Ha Tien along the Giang Thanh (Banteay River) system.
Fall of Ayutthaya and Ha Tien

Threat of Invasion from Ayutthaya in 1766

The Quang Nam kingdom received its first detailed information concerning the current affairs of Siam from the Ha Tien kingdom.\(^{38}\) The following passages are from the GDTC (vol. 5) and refer to Ha Tien’s fears of invasion in 1766 by Siamese forces.

In the tenth month of the year *binh tuat* (November 1766):

A spy sent to Siam by Ha Tien returned and reported that the Phong Vuong of Xiem [Siam]—who was a leper, and hence people called him Phong Vuong [Leper King]—had prepared a *chien dap*\(^{39}\) [a battleship in Siam, a western-style large sampan on which the rowers sat toward the stern] and also soldiers to invade Ha Tien *tran*. At that time, the Phong Vuong wished to invade his neighbors. They [his subjects] had a grudge against him, because his rule was very cruel. Ton Duc Hau\(^{40}\) [Mac Thien Tu] was so fearful of a Siamese invasion that he consolidated the defenses of Ha Tien.

In the ninth month of the year *binh tuat* (October 1766):

[Mac Thien Tu] sent a letter to Gia Dinh to ask Quang Nam for military support for Ha Tien.

On the eighteenth day of the tenth month of the year *binh tuat* (19 November 1766):

The *thong xuat* [general commander] of the *dieu khien quan* [mandarins of Saigon]—Khoi Khoa Hau [Duke of Khoi Khoa], whose name was Nguyen Phuoc Khoi [the same person as Nguyen Cuu Khoi in the DTTB]—and the *tam muu* [a general staff officer] Mien Truong Hau [Duke of Mien Truong], whose name was Nguyen Huu Mien [the same person as Nguyen Huu Minh in the DTTB], dispatched three commanders—[1] Khoi Nghia Hau, a *cai doi* [regimental commender], [2] Kinh Thien Hau, the *cai doi* of Tan Chau Dau [present-day Culao Giem] and [3]
Duy Tai Bac [Earl of Duy Tai], a binh luan [a mandarinal title]—with a fleet of twenty battleships and 1,000 sailors to Ha Tien along three routes.

On the third day of the eleventh month of the year binh tuat (4 December 1766):

The Quang Nam navy arrived at Ha Tien tran and then strengthened its defenses against an invasion by Siam.

The Siamese king at that time was known as the “Phong King” in Ha Tien. Generally, phong in Vietnamese means an illness of the brain, madness or a headache. But the idiom maphong has another meaning: a leper. It is well known that the last king of Ayutthaya, Suriyamarin (Ekathat, r. 1758–67), was called the leprous king in Ayutthaya, although he suffered from a kind of eczema and not from leprosy (Rong 1973: 90). The fact that the rumor about his skin disease was commonly known, in both Ayutthaya and Ha Tien, illustrates how well informed the Gulf network was during that period.

If this information is correct, King Ekathat planned to invade Ha Tien during the summer of 1766. This would have been the second attempt by a Siamese king to use military force to control the Gulf—the first attempt having ended in the destruction of Ha Tien in the 1710s. The Quang Nam army in Vinh Long responded instantly to the threat of invasion from Siam, and an army was sent to Ha Tien by ship. Thus the navies of two armed maritime powers—Ayutthaya versus the combined forces of Ha Tien and Quang Nam—were operating in the Gulf just before the fall of Ayutthaya.

**Fall of Ayutthaya in 1767**

The Vietnamese and Cambodian sources provide numerous details about the Burmese sack of the Thai capital in 1767. According to the GDTC (vol. 5), in the third month of the year dinh hoi (April 1677):

Mien Dien [Burma] invaded Xiem [Siam], taking advantage of the anger of the Xiem people [because of their king’s cruelty]. Mien Dien was a Southwest Barbarian land. It is presumed to be the Mien that Emperor
The To of the Nguyen [Shih Tsung of the Yuan dynasty, namely Khubilai Khan] conquered, and the Mien Dien Lang where Que Vuong of the Minh [Kuei Wang of the Ming dynasty] Du Lang took refuge. They tattoo their bellies, so their state was called Hoa Tho [Hua Du in Chinese] or O Tho [Wu Du in Chinese]. The local people called it Phu Ma [Burma].

Mien Dien set fire to the royal palace and plundered the royal treasures of Xiem. Furthermore, they carried off the Siamese king and his son, Chieu Doc, to Burma, with several thousand people, and devastated the land, [leaving it] to become wilderness. But the Siamese king’s second son, Chieu Di Xoang, took refuge in Cao Man Quoc, and the third son, Chieu Chui, fled to Ha Tien.

According to the MTGP, in the ninth month of the year *dinh hoi* (October/November 1767):

Hoa Tho [Burma] raised an army to sack Xiem La [Siam]. [The king of] Xiem La, relying on his riches, had not organized his state well. No wars had taken place for sixty years. Once they were defeated, innumerable people were killed. But because Hoa Tho is a considerable distance from Siam, it could not defend [i.e., maintain occupation forces in] Ayutthaya for a long time. They plundered women and treasures, set palaces ablaze and then retreated to their country, with Prince Chieu Doc and many people.

Princes Chieu Hoa and Chieu Di Xoang alone fled to the coastal region, with more than 100 followers. Afterwards, they sought asylum under Mac Thien Tu. They asked Mac Thien Tu to restore their country and take revenge. Mac Thien Tu pitied them and permitted to stay in Ha Tien. He provided them with a house and clothing as fine as those of a king.

According to the DLTS (vol. 33):

His [the Siamese king’s] first son Trieu Doc and second son Trieu Di Xoang took refuge in Chan Lap [Cambodia]. Trieu Chui fled to Vong Sat in Ha Tien.
According to the VJ (pp. 593–4):

In 1767, the Burmese army invaded Krung Srei Ayuthya [Ayutthaya] and sacked it. Preah Borom Reacea, namely Preah Bat Suriyeamari [King Suriyamarin], managed to escape from the palace but died of anxiety. Some of the royal family fled to several provinces (khaet). Cau Si San and Cau Col [two princes] arrived in Cambodia in 1767. Preah Bat Somdech Preah Nreay Reacea (Nac Ton) had the kindness to build a house for them to stay in.

Ayutthaya was sacked on 7 April 1767, and news of this event reached Ha Tien between 9 April and 8 May. Hua Du (or Wu Du) can be identified as the wadi element in Han-tha-wadi (Pegu). Phu Ma (or Fu Ma) is the same as “Phama,” meaning Burma in Thai. According to the GDTC, the Burmese army captured the last Siamese king (called the “Leprous” or “Mad” King, namely Ekathat) and Prince Doc. But according to other reports, King Ekathat died while trying to escape (Turpin 1771: 318). Probably the GDTC compilers mistook Ex-King Uthumphon (who was taken away as a prisoner and died in Burma) for King Ekathat. Prince Doc has not been identified. Obviously, the information that reached Cambodia and Vietnam, concerning the Ayutthaya royal family, was still confused.

The Siamese princes41 who sought refuge in Ha Tien and Cambodia were also reported by Westerners.42 According to one western source, two princes passed through Ha Tien and arrived at Hon Dat (a place between Rach Gia and Ha Tien), where some French missionaries had gone in November 1767, after escaping from Ayutthaya. Within a month, one of the princes moved to Cambodia. Mac Thien Tu suspected that the missionaries helped him to escape to Cambodia and arrested three of them in January 1767, including Pigneau de Béhaine (later a bishop and Apostolic Vicar of Cochinchina). Vong Sat (mentioned in the DLTS) must be Hon Dat. Cau Si San (mentioned in the Cambodian chronicles) must be the same person as Trieu (Chieu) Di Xoang (mentioned in the DLTS). Cau Col, however, does not appear in materials other than the Cambodian chronicles.

The fall of Ayutthaya meant the temporary disappearance of Ha Tien’s rival. Furthermore, the refuge taken there by the Ayutthayan princes lent
legitimacy to Ha Tien as the heir to the Ayutthaya-China royal trading privileges.

**Expansion of Ha Tien in the Gulf**

The eclipse of Ayutthaya provided the setting in which Ha Tien began to assert its power along the eastern shores of the Gulf, as recorded by the Vietnamese. According to the GDTC (vol. 5), in the fifth month of the year *dinh hoi* (May/June 1767):

At that time [after receiving news of the fall of Ayutthaya], because the problem of the [threatened] invasion from Xiem [Siam] had been solved, Ton Duc Hau [Mac Tien Tu] thanked the Vietnamese generals for supporting Ha Tien and asked them to retreat with their soldiers. Gia Dinh recalled Xieu Nghia Hau from Ha Tien with his soldiers for a rest.

According to the DTTB, in the third month of the year *dinh hoi* (April 1767):

Mac Thien Tu reported those affairs to the dieu khien Nguyen Cuu Khoi at Gia Dinh and requested that he withdraw his troops for a rest.

Ha Tien declined military support from Quang Nam because of the disappearance of Ayutthaya’s navy, which also gave Ha Tien a chance to be fully independent of Quang Nam.

According to the GDTC (vol. 5), in the year *dinh hoi* (1767):

[Mac Thien Tu] dispatched the cai doi [commander] Duc Nghiep with troops to patrol the islands, such as Co Cong [Kong Island], Co Cot [Kut Island] and Dan Kham [Khram Island].

This passage in the GDTC follows the description of the problem in Chanthaburi, which will be mentioned below. According to Chen Chingho’s research, the Chanthaburi affair occurred not in 1767 but in 1769. Probably,
in 1767 the Ha Tien navy was sent on expeditions to several islands in the area from Kong Island to Khram Island. This Ha Tien military expedition provoked an armed response from the Teochiu Chinese in the Gulf, as shown in the following section.

**Struggle against Toechiu Power**

According to the GDTC, in the fifth month of the year định hoi (May/June 1767):

Previously, Hoac Nhkiem, a Chinese originally from a gang of Trieu Chau [Toechiu], was so skilful in the martial arts that he succeeded in gathering many pirates at Co Cong [Kong Island]. It was a quite steep, mountainous island, but had good routes to the Cambodian mountains and to Chinese ports, and also there was a deep and long inlet where ships could lie calmly at anchor.

He built a fortress in order to settle there and established their [pirate] base, from which they sailed out to sea to plunder trading ships from south and north and to capture Xiem [Siamese] people. No residents in the coastal area escaped from them. He [Hoac Nhkiem] was so skillful that he could shoot an arrow with a big iron head and split a halyard. Usually his body was clad with rattan [armor], and he wandered about on the sea in order to plunder merchant ships. Eventually, he intended to invade Ha Tien. But [news of] his plot leaked out.

Ton Duc Hau [Mac Thien Tu] sent the cai doi [commander] Khanh Thanh with a strong body of soldiers to arrest him in secret. One night, they made a surprise attack [on Hoac Nhkiem’s fortress] with a volley of fire, and they marched to the accompaniment of drums. The pirates were too surprised to put up a defence and scattered in confusion. Hoac Nhkiem along took a small dagger and boarded a small boat to escape. But they shot him, and he dropped into the water. They thrust a spear into his body to kill him. His [severed] head was exposed to the people. All of his conspirators were scattered.
According to the GDTC (vol. 5), in the year *ky suu* (1769):

Tran Thai, a Trieu Chau [Toechiu] refugee, gathered robbers at Mount Bach Ma in Ha Tien to try to attack the Ha Tien fort. He secretly contacted some of the Mac family, such as Mac Sung and Mac Khoan. They plotted to set fire to the fort on the thirteenth day of the sixth month [15 July 1769]. But [news of] this plot leaked out. Ton Duc Hau [Mac Thien Tu] ambushed and massacred them at Huong Son Tu or Chua That Huong [the Temple of Seven Perfumes]. Tran Thai took refuge in Chan Bon [Chanthaburi] in Xiem La [Siam].

According to the MTGP:

A Chinese man, Tran Nghiet, emigrated from Siam and gathered followers at Mount Bach Ma in Ha Tien. He led a big army in an attack on Ha Tien at night. Mac Thien Tu ordered the *Xa Ba* [Malay] general to defeat them. They scattered and returned to Trach Van [Chanthaburi]. After that, Taksin ordered them to guide him to Ha Tien.

The Teochiu, a Chinese group who had settled in the southeast of present-day Thailand, were confronting the armed expansion of Ha Tien in the waters of the Gulf. Hoac Nhiem at Kong Island, south of Trat, was the first Teochiu rival against Ha Tien's expansion, and the Ha Tien naval forces eliminated him and his base. Tran Thai was the second rival. Mac Thien Tu made a preemptive strike against him in 1769 but failed to kill him. Tran Thai fled to Chanthaburi. Subsequently, as discussed below, he accompanied the vanguard of the Siamese army in the attack on Ha Tien in 1771. These battles between Chinese rivals do not appear in the Thai or Cambodian chronicles.

**Confrontation with King Taksin**

*Taksin's Occupation of Chanthaburi in 1767*

Mac Thien Tu was unable to rule the eastern shores of the Gulf efficiently, because of resistance from Chinese settlers, such as Tran Thai,
who were based at Chanthaburi and Trat.

According to Jacqueline de Fels (1976 i: 109–15), after the fall of Ayutthaya, Taksin\(^4\) fled to Phatthaya and then organized the resistance against the Burmese from a base at Rayong, with the support of Teochiu Chinese. He sent a mission—with a Vietnamese guide (Nai Phuak) and a Cambodian guide (Nak Ma)—to Phraya Chanthaburi (the governor of Chanthaburi) to ask the governor to submit to him, but the governor failed to respond. Taksin gained the support of Phutthai Mat (i.e., Banteay Meas, whose governor was called Phraya Ratcha Sethti by the Siamese)\(^4\) and the support of Chonburi, and then he tried to attack Chanthaburi in 1767 with the support of Chiam, a Chinese man in Trat.\(^4\) Phraya Chanthaburi fled to Phutthai Mat. This was the first victory of Taksin after he established his base in the southeast of Thailand, and it shows that the occupation of Chanthaburi was a very important step in establishing his power. No Vietnamese document, however, mentions the fall of Chanthaburi or the exile of Phraya Chanthaburi to Phutthai Mat in 1767.

Chiam was appointed deputy governor of Trat with the title Phra Phiphit. According to de Fels (1976 i: 113), he was the Chinese leader of a fleet of junks at Trat, and he and his soldiers surrendered to Taksin after a half day’s resistance. He is also called Phokhakorn or Pońea Pipit in the Cambodian chronicles. Later he became governor of Trat with the title Phraya Aphai Phiphit. He appears to be the same person as Tran Lien in the Ha Tien report. As mentioned below, Tran Lien (a Teochiu Chinese) was a military adviser of Taksin. He attacked the Ha Tien army in Chanthaburi in 1769, sacked Ha Tien in 1770 and was appointed chief of Ha Tien in 1771.

According to the MTGP:

He [Taksin] knew that Chieu Hoa and Chieu Di Xoang [the two Siamese princes] had sought asylum in Ha Tien. Based on Tran Lien’s advice to massacre the descendants of the previous dynasty, Taksin sent a flattering letter to Mac Thien Tu referring to himself as a .nghi tu [adopted son] of Mac Thien Tu, asking the Siamese princes to return to Siam, and saying that if Mac Thien Tu agreed, he would cede part of his land and send tribute to Mac Thien Tu.
Taksin first contacted Mac Thien Tu in 1767. Taksin professed himself to be an adopted son (*nghi tu*) of Mac Thien Tu in his letter to Mac Thien Tu (Chen 1977: 8). According to the Siamese chronicles, Taksin sent a message to the governor of Banteay Meas—known as Ong Chien Chun or Phraya Ratcha Setthi—to propose cooperation and assistance in 1767. Thus, during the early period of Taksin’s rise to power, Taksin and Mac Tien Tu maintained a close relationship. By the end of 1767, however, that relationship began to break down, as shown in the following passage.

*Breakdown at the End of 1767*

According to the MTGP:

Mac Thien Tu knew about Taksin’s conspiracy, and he planned his expansion policy [accordingly]. He pretended to accept Taksin’s request and at the same time sent spies to collect information. Then he dispatched his son-in-law, Ngo Nhung To Hau, with more than 100 battleships to the outside of Bac Lam [Paknam] port in Vong Cac [Bangkok] in secret. To Hau tried to send a messenger to Taksin to invite him on board his ship for discussions. But at the same time, Taksin sent a spy named A Ma to sneak into [the household of] Mac Thien Tu’s sister as a servant. ...So, Taksin knew of Mac Thien Tu’s plan, and he did not meet To Hau. To Hau waited for him for ten days and more, but had nothing to do. Moreover, a big typhoon struck his fleet during the night, damaging more than forty ships. To Hau perceived his failure and then returned to Phuc Thuyen Son [Bang Pla Soi = Chonburi], where he died of a disease.

According to the Thai chronicles, Taksin imported rice from Banteay Meas to Thonburi in 1768. This was probably the rice that the Siamese plundered from a Ha Tien ship at the end of 1767. A French missionary, Jacques Corre, reported in 1769 that Mac Thien Tu ordered his son-in-law to pretend to export rice to Bangkok as a means of kidnapping Taksin. But Taksin became aware of this conspiracy. The Siamese plundered his rice and massacred his soldiers. The son-in-law died on the return voyage (HMTK, p. 190). According to Chen Chingho, the epitaph of To Dung (Ngo Nhung To
Hau) in Ha Tien was made in 1767 (HMTK, p. 189). Probably, To Dung was sent on this mission to Paknam after Taksin’s reconquest of Ayutthaya in November 1767.

After Taksin succeeded in unifying central Thailand, he was tempted by Tran Lien, a representative of the Teochiu Chinese in the eastern part of the Gulf, into changing his strategy and confronting Ha Tien.

**Sack of Chanthaburi by Ha Tien in 1769**

Chinese rivalry along the eastern shores of the Gulf is documented also in the events of 1769-70 relating to Chanthaburi. According to the GDTC (vol. 5), in the year *dinh hoi* (1767):

Ton Duc Hau [Mac Thien Tu] was afraid that Mien Dien [Burma] would invade Ha Tien after the victory over Xiem [Siam]. He ordered his nephew [a son of his sister]—Thang Thuy Doi, a *cai doi* [admiral of the Thang Thuy fleet] named Chou Tai Hau and Tran Van Phuong—to go with battleships and sailors to Chan Bon [Chanthaburi] to patrol the border area. At that time, after the damages of the war, an epidemic was raging in Siam. Many Ha Tien soldiers and Xiem people were dying. Chou Tai Hau himself died in the epidemic. But because of the importance of the defense of the border area, it was impossible to slacken off. [Mac Thien Tu] ordered Ngo Nhung Ky [an army officer] to take his place; he, too, became sick, was returning to Ha Tien, but died on the way.

According to Chen Chingho, Tran Van Phuong went to Ha Tien and died there not in 1767 but in 1769. Also, as mentioned above, Ngo Nhung Ky (namely To Dung) died at the end of 1767, not in Chanthaburi but in Chonburi. Comparing this evidence with other materials, it is certain that Mac Thien Tu tried to attack Chanthaburi in 1769.

According to the MTGP, in the thirtieth year of Canh Hung (1769):

[Mac Thien Tu] ordered Thang Thuy Tran Hau, the son of his elder sister, to take command of more than 50,000 soldiers and sailors for an attack on Siam. ... The army arrived at Trach Van [Chanthaburi] and built a fence
[presumably a wooden stockade] to settle in. Tan [Taksin] sent his general, Tran Lai, to take 3,000 soldiers to relieve Trach Van. Tran Hau defeated and massacred his [Siamese] army with his big [Ha Tien] army. He [Tran Lai] was defeated and evacuated. Subsequently, they defended their fortresses on land and at sea and never marched out.

...Tran Hau was stationed at Trach Van for two months. But the land and water there were not suitable. Epidemics occurred every day. Tran Hau, too, became ill. Many soldiers were suffering from disease. More than 100 soldiers died every day. ...Mac Thien Tu ordered his subjects to call Tran Hau back. More than 10,000 soldiers among the original 50,000 were able to return to Ha Tien. Tan [Taksin] heard that the Ha Tien army was evacuating and followed with a big army. They arrived at Trach Van, realized that Ha Tien was firmly defended and then returned.

According to the BK:

Preah Sotoat of srok Peam [Mac Thien Tu of Ha Tien] gathered people of khaet Banteay Meas and khaet Treang [in Takeo] to attack srok Can Bo [Chanthaburi] and srok Thung Yai [Trat?]. But they were defeated by the Siamese army and retreated to srok Peam in 1770.

According to the VJ (pp. 601–2):

In 1770, Preah Sotoat at khaet Peam, the adopted father of the Cambodian king, conspired with Okña Reacea Sethei Phuv, the cauway srok [provincial governor] of khaet Peam and other cauway srok of khaet Treang, Banteay Meas, Kampot and Kampong Som, and then mobilized 10,000 soldiers. They left khaet Peam and sacked khaet Krat [Trat] at the border between Cambodia and Siam, then they surrounded srok Can Borei [Chanthaburi] for three months. The Siamese commander, a minister of King Tak [Taksin] died in the battle. Preah Sotoat entered the fort to plunder its treasure and took 5,000 Siamese prisoners. But he could not afford to maintain a position there and thus retreated to khaet Peam Banteay Meas.
According to Chen Chingho (HMTK, p. 194), a French missionary, Jacques-Nicolas Morvan, stated that the governor (Mac Thien Tu) of Cang Khau (the Chinese name of Ha Tien) confronted Phraya Tak, the new Siamese king. Mac Thien Tu dispatched a fleet to attack Siam in September 1769. Moreover, the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi reported to Beijing on 30 August 1769 (Ch’inh Kao Tsung Shih Lu, vol. 839) that the chief of Ha Tien, Mac Si Lam (Mac Thien Tu), had dispatched an army to sack Chiem Trach (Chanthaburi) and had tried to attack Kan En Chih (Taksin) and the Siamese chiefs (HMTK, p. 194). Mac Thien Tu must therefore have attempted to send an expedition against Chanthaburi in September 1769 but postponed it until early 1770.

Tran Thai fled to Chanthaburi after he was defeated at Ha Tien. Chanthaburi was a center of Teochiu Chinese power in the Gulf, and the Teochiu Chinese opposed Ha Tien’s hegemony. Probably Mac Thien Tu tried to conquer Chanthaburi in order to crush the power of the Teochiu, including Tran Thai. Thus Ha Tien’s preemptive strike in 1769 against Tran Thai and the 1770 conquest of Chanthaburi should be regarded as two phases of the same military operations (Chen 1977: 10).

As mentioned above, a Chinese governor named Chiam (with the title Phraya Phiphit) had ruled Chanthaburi and Trat since 1767. Tran Lai must be the same person as Chiam. He would have been in the vanguard of the Siamese army that marched to Ha Tien in 1770 under the name of Tran Lien, as mentioned below. Tran Thai (Tran Nghiet in the MTGP) guided the Siamese army to Ha Tien in the same year. Probably, Tran Thai was also called Tran Lai, Tran Nghiet and Tran Lien in different source, and was the man known in Thai as Phraya Phiphit (Chiam), governor of Chanthaburi under Taksin.

**Fall of Ha Tien**

*Taksin’s Invasion of Cambodia from the Northern Route*

According to the BK:

In 1771, Poñea Tak [Taksin] ordered Poñea Yomareac [Phraya Yommarat]

According to the VJ (pp. 602–3):

When Preah Sotoat sacked Chan Borei [Chanthaburi], King Tak [Taksin] was attacking the srok lu [northern states]. In 1771, he appointed Poñea Apheirunret Duong to be Cakrei [Phraya Chakkri (Duang)] and Poñea Anucit Pon Ma [Phraya Anucht (Bun Ma)] to be Poñea So Sei [Phraya Surasi], to lead 10,000 soldiers with the Cambodian prince Preah Ang Non Preah Ream and march to Udong by way of Pascem Borei [Prachinburi].

According to the GDTC (vol. 5), in the year ky suu (1769):

At that time, the Xiem [Siamese] king, Phi Nya Tan [Phraya Taksin], dispatched a general—with the official name Phi Nha So Si [Phraya Surasi] and the personal name Bon Ma [Bun Ma]—with soldiers to subjugate the Cao Man [Cambodian] king Nac Ong Ton [Ang Ton], and sent the pretender-king of Cao Man, Nac Ong Non [Ang Non], back to his country. When his army marched to Lo Khu Vat Suc [srok Nokor Vat = Angkor Wat], they were defeated and then retreated to Xiem with many Cambodian people. Ha Tien Tran strengthened the defenses of the border area because of the confusion in the neighboring country.

According to the DNLS (vol. 32), in the year ky suu (1769):

the King of Xiem, Trinh Quoc Anh [Phraya Taksin] dispatched Bon Ma to send the pretender-king Nac Non back to his country. They marched to Lo Khu [Nokor = Angkor] and engaged in battle with Nac Ton there. They were defeated and then took many Cambodian people to Xiem.

According to the Vietnamese materials, the Cambodian king refused to send tribute to King Taksin, because Taksin was not a legitimate king of Siam. This story is well known in Thai and Cambodian historiography, as an
explanation for the Siamese invasion of Cambodia in 1771 (for example Khin Sok 1991: 37). It is very difficult to understand the reason why the exact same story was recorded in the three countries' chronicles. Mac Thien Tu may have urged King Utey (Ang Ton) to refuse Taksin's request for tribute.

According to the Thai chronicles, Taksin met the Cambodian king, Ang Non (called Ramathibodi in Thai), at Thonburi in early 1769, when Taksin was preparing to attack Nakhon Sithammarat. Non had been banished by his cousin, Utey Reacea (Ang Ton, known as Uthairacha in Thai), who ascended the throne and took the royal title Nreay Reacea (Narairacha in Thai). Learning of this change of reign, Taksin asked the new Cambodian king, as a vassal-state ruler, to send tribute to him, but the request was denied. Then he ordered Phraya Chakkri and Chakkri's brother, Phraya Surasi, to march through Prachinburi to Nakhon Ratchasima with 2,000 soldiers, intending to attack King Utey Reacea and conquer Udong (de Fels 1976 i: 171). At that time, however, Taksin was embroiled in the conquest of southern and northern Thai territories and could not afford to invade Cambodia. The operations were therefore postponed until 1771 (de Fels 1976 i: 149-50).  

In 1771, the Siamese army commanded by Phraya Chakkri and his brother Phraya Surasi invaded Cambodia by way of Angkor. The account of this invasion is confused in the Vietnamese materials, which incorrectly place it in the year 1769.

**Taksin's Expedition against Ha Tien**

In late 1771 King Taksin led his forces by sea in an attack on Ha Tien, followed by an attack on the Cambodian capital. According to the VJ (p. 603):

King Tak himself went on an expedition [to Cambodia] from Krong Thon Borei Srei Ayuthya [Thonburi] by sea with 400 battleships and 15,000 pol [soldiers]. He ordered Poñea Kosa Thipadei [Phraya Kosa Thibodi] to go to khaet Kampong Som and Kampot. He landed at Kampong Tromaeng, entered khaet Peam Banteay Meas and then fortified his position by planting a thorny fence. Preah Sotoat and Okña Reacea Sethei Phuv levied the pol to protect their fort and moved to khaet Tuk Khmau to ask for the
support of Udong. But in the absence of support from Udong, they were defeated by the Siamese army and retreated to srok Tuk Khmau.

According to the BK:

The other side—Cambodian Prince Neak Ang Non Cea Somdec Preah Ream—ininvaded srok Peam by sea. Preah Sotoat fled from srok Peam to srok Tuk Khmau.

The Vietnamese chronicles provide more detailed information about Ha Tien. The following four extracts are from the GDTC.
In the eighth month of the year tan mao (September/October 1771):

Ha Tien received information that the Xiem king Phi Nha Tan [Phraya Taksin] had strengthened his forces to invade Ha Tien. Ton Duc Hau [Mac Thien Tu] sent an urgent message to Gia Dinh to ask for reinforcements. But the dieu khien quan [Vietnamese commanders] Khoi Khoa Hau and Mien Truong Hau replied [as follows]: When they sent soldiers to the border area the previous year, based on incorrect information from Ha Tien, nothing took place and then they had to retreat. It would be better way to wait until the time the Xiem army crosses the border.

In the ninth month (October/November 1771):

Phi Nha Tan was fearful about Chieu Chuy [Ayuttthayan Prince Chui, who was] staying in Ha Tien. After defeating Luc Con [Nakhon Sithammarat], which was a dependency of Mien Dien [Burma], he took command of 2,000 soldiers for the invasion of Ha Tien, with Tran Thai of Bach Ma as a guide.

On the third day of the tenth month (9 November 1771):

The Xiem army invaded and besieged the Ha Tien fort, whose three sides were constructed of wood without stone or clay. At that time, there were few soldiers in the fort. They defended the fort and sent a message to
[the military base at] Long Ho Doanh to report the urgent situation. Unfortunately, the Xiem sailors occupied Mount To Chau and bombarded the fort from there. The situation was urgent.

On the tenth night of the tenth month (16 November 1771):

A powder magazine on Ngo Ho hill exploded. The fort was in great confusion. On the thirtieth night [sic, should be thirteenth, 19 December 1771], Xiem soldiers penetrated the fort through the back gate near the river mouth, where no wall had been built, and set fire to the buildings of the fort. The blaze illuminated the forests and valleys. The Xiem army broke into the fort, which was in turmoil. ...Although Ton Duc Hau [Mac Thien Tu] commanded the soldiers and tried to rally them, the people in the fort were forced to flee. At one o’clock during the night, the fort fell. ...the cai doi [commander] Duc Nghiep helped [Mac Thien Tu] to board a boat and go to Giang Thanh [the Banteay River]. Hiep tran Mac Tu Hoang, thang thuy Mac Tu Thuong and tham tuong Mac Tu Lac led their sailors in an escape from the siege and went down to Kien Giang [Rach Gia].

According to the MTGP:

In the year tan mao [1771], Trinh Tan [Taksin] conquered Luc Con [Nakhon Sithammarat]. His army became braver and mightier. He moved his army to Ha Tien. The information arrived at Ngo Doanh [the Quang Nam army] to ask for reinforcements to Ha Tien. But ... they could not reinforce Ha Tien. Since the war of Trach Van [Chanthaburi], many Ha Tien people had died. The number of soldiers protecting the Ha Tien fort had also decreased. But [Mac Thien Tu] prepared food and weapons in the fort and conscripted more than 1,000 soldiers. Cong [Mac Thien Tu] arranged for them to guard the fort.

The Siamese army surrounded the fort in three columns. Cong ordered Prince Dung to command the left-flank troops against the enemy. He ordered Prince Thuong to command the battleships to defend the port.
Dung fired cannons and guns at the enemy. They could not enter the fort. They confronted each other for more than ten days. Even though there were ten Siamese soldiers for each Ha Tien soldier, the [Siamese] soldiers were too few in number.

The Ha Tien soldiers were exhausted, but they did not want to evacuate the fort, and decided to die in battle. The Siamese soldiers penetrated the fort at night. The Ha Tien powder magazine exploded. The [Siamese] soldiers outside, seizing this favorable opportunity, tried to penetrate the fort. Cong himself led the soldiers to kill the enemy. They managed to stop the enemy attack a little. But the enemy fired Western-style cannons, and many Ha Tien soldiers were wounded.

At that time, Cong heard that the enemy had entered the fort through unguarded points, and then he tried to return to the fort. When it was dawn, they were surrounded by enemy gunfire. Cong called upon his followers to close the gates of the fort and die.

Huu Bo (a commander of the right wing) knew that Cong was quite courageous in upholding justice, and so he insisted on escaping. But Cong would not listen to this advice. Then Huu Bo deceived Cong into waiting on board a battleship in the basin and gathering together his followers to fight again. Cong embarked in accordance with his advice. Huu Bo then ordered the sailors to leave immediately for Chau Doc to escape from the enemy’s gunfire.

Since Ha Tien is on the seacoast, no one could escape from the attack without ships. More than ten members of the Cong family and many other people drowned. Fortunately, [Mac Thien Tu’s] sons—princes Tu Hoang, Tu Thuong and Tu Dung—managed to board a battleship, fought more than ten dap [Siamese battle ships] and escaped to the place where the Quang Nam army was stationed.

Taksin and the Cambodian prince Non landed at Kampong Som and Kampot with the Siamese army. The first objective was to arrest Prince Chui,
the Ayutthaya prince staying in Ha Tien. In the name of this prince, Mac Thien Tu had invaded Chanthaburi in 1769. The second objective was to remove the pro-Vietnamese king of Cambodia (Ang Ton), who had refused to send tribute to Taksin.

The naval forces sent to attack Ha Tien were commanded by a Teochiu Chinese: Hau Tran Lien (known to the Siamese as Phraya Phiphit and Chiam), who was called a chieu khoa by the Vietnamese. (This term might be the generic Thai term for a high-ranking official: chao khun). They were guided by Tran Thai (probably the same person as Tran Lien). These events could be regarded as a war between the Teochiu Chinese and the Ha Tien Cantonese, in a struggle for hegemony over the eastern part of the Gulf.

The Siamese army occupied To Chau hill to the south of Ha Tien city and bombed the fort. The GDTC’s explanation for the fall of Ha Tien is that its defenses were too simple, with only wooden walls and few soldiers. According to the Cambodian chronicles, whenever Mac Thien Tu attempted a military expedition, he usually called upon three Cambodian governors to conscript their soldiers (pol). But when the city fell, according to the VJ, the only soldiers defending the fort were Chinese, and the MTGP states that there were a mere 1,000 defenders. The Chinese settlers alone could not protect the fort.

The Ha Tien war in November 1771 is described in considerable detail in a daily record of the campaign kept by the Siamese (FAD 1969b). Thai sources mention two commanders who attacked Banteay Meas (Ha Tien): Phraya Chakkri and Phraya Thip Kosa. Phraya Phiphit’s name appears in this version, in the context of his bringing a daughter of Phraya Ratcha Seththi to Taksin. Taksin appointed Phraya Phiphit, the acting Kosa, to the position of Phraya Ratcha Seththi.

According to the GDTC, in the eighth month of the year tan mao (September/October 1771):

On the fifteenth day [23 September 1771], the fleet of Ton Duc Hau [Mac Thien Tu] arrived at Chau Duc Dao and encountered the army of the chieu khoa [Thai chao khun?] Lien [Tran Lien] following them. Ton Duc Hau ordered the cai doi Sa [Malay general] to intercept them, but he was defeated.
...Sa retreated to Tien Giang Tan Chau Dao [Cu Lao Gien in Tien Giang], where he met the royal [Vietnamese] army led by Kinh Chan Hau ... sailing on the sea. They entered the Chau Doc Giang [Chau Doc River] and killed the giac binh [bandit soldiers, meaning the Siamese army]. The Xiem [Siamese] soldiers had little knowledge of the route and were forced onto the river bank. The Vietnamese army chased them and killed more than 300. Trieu Khoa Lien [chao khun (?)] Lien abandoned his ship, landed on the bank and then hastened away to Ha Tien by way of the route to Chan Sam. The Vietnamese army captured five Xiem dap [Siamese battleships] and their weapons.

...Part of the Vietnamese forces were left to hold Chau Doc, and the army retreated to Tan Chau [Kulao Gieng] to comfort Ton Duc Hau [Mac Thien Tu]. They sent ships to escort Ton Duc Hau to Long Ho Doanh [Vinh Long]. He stayed there.

According to the MTGP:

At that time, the local officials of Chau Doc were not yet prepared to guard their town. When the Siamese ships invaded there, they were too agitated to resist. More than six or seven hundred families in Chau Doc were killed. The division of Dong Khau Dao [Kulao Gieng in the Mekong River] was informed and then marched to Chau Doc to attack the enemy. The enemy ships lost their way and strayed into dangerous points. Dong Khau soldiers attacked and killed them. They abandoned their ships and landed on the river bank to run away. The Quang Nam army followed and massacred them. Then they gibbeted the dead bodies. The rear [Siamese] column was informed that their vanguard had failed and thus did not march out from Ha Tien.

After the fall of Ha Tien, Mac Thien Tu fled to Chau Doc along the present Vinh Te River (the Banteay River), where he met the Quang Nam army. Tran Lien’s fleet followed him and sacked Chau Doc. But the Vietnamese Mekong Division arrived at Chau Doc and defeated the Siamese navy. Thus Mac Thien Tu lost his independence and came under the
protection of the Quang Nam army.

According to the Cambodian chronicles, Mac Thien Tu and Okña Reacea Sethei Phuv (the Cambodian governor of Peam) fled to Tuk Khmau (Ca Mau Province, on the right bank of the Bassac). But Vietnamese materials indicate that Mac Thien Tu fled to Chau Doc and met the Vietnamese army there. The Vietnamese forces defeated the Siamese army commanded by Lien. Then Mac Thien Tu moved to Kulao Gieng on the Mekong River. Subsequently, he moved to Can Tho. Tuk Khmau in that period was not the present-day Ca Mau Province but the area along the Bassac, including present-day Can Tho and Long Xuyen. Mac Thien Tu’s base of operations thus changed from the coastal region to the inland Bassac region.

Neither the Vietnamese nor the Thai records mentions Okña Reacea Sethei Phuv as a person different from Mac Thien Tu. Probably Mac Thien Tu, representing himself as the ruler of Ha Tien territory, concealed from the Quang Nam court the existence of the Khmer governor, Okña Reacea Sethei Phuv.

_Taksin’s March to Udong_

After capturing Ha Tien, Taksin deployed his occupying forces. According to the GDTC:

> Phi Nha Tan [Taksin] left the _chieu khoa_ Lien to hold Ha Tien and he returned to Cao Man [Cambodia] with his forces.

According to the MTGP:

> Trinh Tan [Taksin] left his subject, Tran Lien, to defend Ha Tien and marched to Cao Man [Cambodia] with 60,000 soldiers. [Cambodia’s king] Ton and his followers went into exile. Trinh Tan arrested Ong Non and his son but did not kill them. He was stationed at Nam Vang [Phnom Penh] with the aim of conquering Gia Dinh.

According to the VJ (p. 608):
After the victory [at Ha Tien], King Tak set up his base camp in the fort of the Khmer, appointed Poñea Pipit as Okña Reacea Sethei and stationed him at khaet Peam and khaet Banteay Meas.

Tran Lien was appointed magistrate in Ha Tien, with the Thai title Phraya Ratcha Setthi (Reacea Sethei in Khmer), which was the title of the former Khmer governor of khaet Peam before the fall of Ha Tien. At this juncture, therefore, a Teochiu-Siamese governor controlled the Chinese town of Ha Tien and the Cambodian prefecture of Banteay Meas.

The presence of Ang Non, who accompanied Taksin from Thonburi, was unknown in Ha Tien. Thus the MTGP recorded that Taksin captured him in Udong. This error means that the succession war in Cambodia between 1770 and 1772 was regarded, from the viewpoint of Ha Tien, as a struggle between Siam and Ha Tien, or more precisely as a struggle between the Teochiu Chinese on the Siam side and the Cantonese of Ha Tien on the Quang Nam side.

*The Fall of Udong*

The following passages describe events at the time of Taksin’s capture of the Cambodian capital. According to the BK:

When it [the fall of Ha Tien] became known to the [Cambodian] king, he hastened away from Kampong Luong by boat. After occupying srok Peam [Ha Tien], Poñea Tak [Taksin] and Neak Ang Non Cea Somdec Preah Ream [Ang Non] conquered srok Phnom Penh and sacked the Tonle Crap Cheam. A division of the Siamese army pursued the Cambodian royal family to Peam Bañcho, where they fought with the army of Okña Yomareac Tol.

According to the VJ (pp. 610–1):

Afterwards, King Tak marched to Koh Sla Kêt and khaet Phnom Penh, while subjugating several khaet along the Tonle [the Bassac River]. Preah Bat Somdec Preah Nreay Reacea [Ang Ton]—who knew that the Siamese
army had invaded Cambodia by sea and by land, and that Preah Sotoat [Mac Thien Tu] and Okña Reacea Sethei had been defeated [in Banteay Meas]—escaped along the waterway [from Udong] to khaet Ba Phnom and then fled through srok Trolong Khaos to srok Ba Rea Dong Nay [Baria, present-day Chau Thanh],55 where he asked for the support of the Vietnamese king. The king sent a minister to welcome him and prepared a house for him to stay in. The Siamese army provided support for Preah Ang Non Preah Ream [Ang Non] to enter the palace in Udong.

According to the GDTC:

The king of Cao Man [Cambodia], Nac Ong Ton, sought refuge in Bat Long Khuyen Long Khuat.56 Phi Nha Tan [Taksin] gave the throne to Nac Ong Non. The Xiem [Siamese] army occupied Nam Vang phu [Phnom Penh], seeking a chance to invade Gia Dinh.

After the fall of Ha Tien, Taksin and Ang Non proceeded along the Bassac River and occupied Phnom Penh. Ang Ton fled from Udong to srok Trolong Khaos and then moved to Baria, seeking Vietnamese protection. Ang Non entered the Udong palace and ascended the throne. Meanwhile, Okña Yomareac Tol (Okña Yomareac Toy in the VJ), together with the family of Ang Ton, resisted the Siamese army in the Prey Veng region, to the east of Phnom Penh.

Ang Ton asked the Quang Nam king for help. But the VJ says he asked for help from “Gia Long.” The future emperor, Gia Long (Nguyen Phuoc Anh), was born in 1762, so he was only nine years old at the time of Taksin’s invasion of Cambodia. Probably the editor of the Cambodian chronicles mistook the name of Due Ton, who was the Quang Nam king at that time, for the famous Gia Long.

Counter-offensive by the Vietnamese Army in 1772

Vietnamese and Cambodian source provide considerable detail concerning the preparations for the counter-offensive against the invading Siamese forces. According to the GDTC (vol. 5), in the twelfth month of the
year tan mau (January 1772):

[The Quang Nam king] supplied money and food to Mac Thien Tu and ordered dieu khien [mandarins] to escort him to Tran Giang Dao. Mac Thien Tu based himself there and gathered scattered people to prepare to counter-attack the enemy.

According to the MTGP:

[The Quang Nam king] ordered the mandarins of ngo doanh [five regiments] to give 3,000 people of Gia Dinh and 3,000 guns to Cong and permitted Cong to prepare to take revenge by himself. Cong moved to Tran Giang and stayed there. People who had poured out of Ha Tien [during the conflict] gathered there.

According to the GDTC (vol. 5), in the sixth month of the year nham thin (July 1772):


Unfortunately, Nhan Tinh Hau [Dong Khau Dao Cai Doi Nguyen Huu Nhan] suffered from a serious illness, so Hien Chuong Hau alone fought the Xiem [Siamese] army with 1,000 soldiers and 50 ships. He was defeated and evacuated to Kien Giang [Can Tho].

Dam On Hau appointed a Cambodian, Nhan Rach [Okña Yomareac Tol], to be in the vanguard of the attack on Nam Vang [Phnom Penh]. They defeated the Xiem army and killed very many soldiers. Phi Nha Tan [Taksin] fled down to Ha Tien. Nac Ong Non fled to Kampot. The Vietnamese army occupied Cambodian cities such as Nam Vang and
La Biec [Longvek]. Nac Ong Ton ascended his throne again. Cao Man [Cambodia] was completely pacified.

According to the MTGP:

Cong [Mac Thien Tu] went to Gia Dinh to meet the mandarins of the Ngo Doanh. Then he reported to the throne [of Quang Nam] to request punishment for himself. But in that year, Nhac’s brothers in Qui Nhon began a revolt against the Quang Nam court [the Tay Son insurrection, led by Nguyen Van Nhac], and transportation was therefore very difficult. Ngo Truong Nam Vanh [officer] Huan carried his letter to the capital [Huê].

The king ordered Doc Chien Dam Luan Hau and Tham Tan Hieu Hanh Hau to command the fleets in Binh Hoa and Binh Thuan and take more than 100 battleships to Gia Dinh. ...They mobilized more than 100,000 soldiers of two prefectures and five armies to recapture Ha Tien. Then the two commanders marched to Cambodia and attacked Trinh Tan and totally defeated him. Many Siamese soldiers were wounded and killed. Trinh Tan fled to Ha Tien.

According to the BK:

Sdec Tepda Yuon [the Vietnamese king] Yalong [sic, Gia Long] sent reinforcements to Okña Yomareac Tol. They defeated the Siamese army. Neak Ang Non Cea Somdec Preah Ream [Ang Non] retreated to Kampot with 500 Siamese soldiers and based himself there. Somdec Preah Ream gathered pol [soldiers] in khaet Treang and Banteay Meas and then led them to Peam Roka, 58 where they fought the army of Okña Yomareac Tol.

According to the VJ (p. 612):

that time, King Tak was based at Phnom Penh, had captured more than 20,000 Cambodians and had sent them to Krong Thon Borei [Thonburi]. After that, he ordered Preah Ang Non Preah Ream [Ang Non] to rule Krong Kampuea Chipadei [Cambodia] and stay in Udong, guarded by Poñea Cakrei Duon. Poñea Kosa Chipadei occupied khaet Kampong Som and Kampot, which a minister of Siam was defending.

The Quang Nam forces began the counter-offensive against the Siamese army in July 1772. They marched to Cambodia along three routes: the first along the Mekong, the second by sea, and the third along the Bassac to the Chau Doc River. The third division had to retreat because of the commander’s ill health. The second division was defeated by the Siamese army and had to evacuate to Rach Gia, probably by crossing Ha Tien Bay.

Only the first division, which went along the Mekong and was joined by the forces of Okña Yomareac Toy [Nhan Lich], was successful, defeating Phraya Chakkri in the Prey Veng region and occupying Phnom Penh. Taksin retreated from Udong to Ha Tien along either the Bassac or the Chau Doc River, which is an old canal flowing parallel to the Bassac.

Cambodia had become divided into four military commands. First, the western region, including Posat (Pursat), was under the Siamese army commanded by Phraya Chakkri. Second, the southern region, including Kampot, Kampong Som and Udong, was under Ang Non and his followers. Third, the southeastern region was under the influence of the Teochiu Chinese leader, Tran Lien, along the Bassac or Chau Doc River, and had its center at Banteay Meas. And fourth, the eastern region along the Mekong, including Prey Veng, was under the control of the Vietnamese army, supported by Ang Ton and his followers. The second, third and fourth of these forces confronted each other in the Kandar region.

*Taksin’s Return to Thonburi*

Subsequent troop movements, defensive measures and Taksin’s departure for Thonburi are described in several sources. According to the GDTC:
Phi Nha Tan [Taksin] returned to Ha Tien and sent a letter to Ton Duc Hau [Mac Thien Tu], but he [Mac] did not reply. Phi Nha Tan then reasoned [as follows]: that although he was gaining control of Xiem [Siam], his rule was not stable; that he had failed to expand outside [of Siam]; that if he continued the expansion policy, he would have to spend much time; and that he was very fearful of some conspiracy to steal power from him in Xiem, which would prevent him from returning home. He thus left the chieu khoa Lien to hold Ha Tien and returned to Siam by dap [battleship] with his main force, the captive Mac family and Chieu Chui [Prince Chui]. The last-named was killed in Siam. In the eighth month [end of August or September 1772], he arrived at Vong Cac [Bangkok, meaning the Thonburi capital].

According to the MTGP:

Then he [Taksin] sent a Ha Tien subordinate official, who had previously been taken prisoner, to Cong [Mac Thien Tu] to negotiate for peace. Cong refused. Tan [Taksin] thought that, if the expedition to a distant land failed, an insurrection might take place at home. He stationed Tran Lien in Ha Tien and then hurried to return to his country by dap [Siamese battleship].

According to the VJ (p. 612):

King Tak [Taksin] retreated along the Tonle Moat Cruc [the Chau Doc River] to khaet Peam Banteay Meas and then returned to Krong Thon Borei Srei Ayuthya [Thonburi].

According to the VJ (p. 612):

After King Tak retreated, Preah Sotoat [Mac Thien Tu] and Okña Reacea Sethi marched to khaet Banteay Meas from srok Tuk Khmau and defeated the Siamese army. The Siamese ministers and the commander in charge of the defense of Banteay Meas retreated to khaet Kampot, where they gathered soldiers and succeeded in recapturing khaet
Banteay Meas. Preah Sotoat and Okña Reacea Sethei retreated to srok Tuk Khmau again.

According to the VJ (pp. 617–8):

At that time Preah Ang Non Preah Ream [Ang Non] was staying at Udong. He knew the difficulty of defending Udong without King Tak, so he retreated to khaet Kampot and Kampong Som. From there, he governed the people in khaet Bati, Kong Pisei, Phnom Sruoc, Treang, Banteay Meas, Peam, Kampot, Kampong Som and Thpong.

After returning to Ha Tien, Taksin tried to negotiate with Mac Thien Tu, but Mac Thien Tu refused to negotiate, probably at the suggestion of the Quang Nam side. Taksin sailed back to Thonburi with the people he held captive: the Ayutthayan Prince Chui, the former governor of Chanthaburi (de Fels 1976 i: 113), who had fled to Ha Tien in 1767, and Mac Thien Tu’s family. Ang Non retreated from Udong and went to the Kampot and Kampong Som region.

Peace between the Two Cambodian Kings

While the opposing forces were still confronting each other, political negotiations began. According to the BK:

Preah Nreay Reacea Thireac [King Utey Reacea (Ang Ton)] in Bot Anean Trolong Khos moved to Prek Moat Kondor [Kandar]. Sdec Tepda [the Quang Nam king] ordered Dong Doy Cin Cea Bao Ho to guard Preah Nreay Reacea Thireac.

According to the VJ (p. 620):

During the war, Preah Utey Reacea returned to Cambodia but stayed at Prek Moat Kondor, because Udong was near the battlefield. In 1772, the king moved to phum Khleang Sbaek and sent a mission to the Siamese commander in Roka in khaet Kandar. They retreated to khaet Kampot
and took the Cambodian mission to Krong Srei Ayuthya [Thonburi]. Preah Tak [King Taksin] was pleased to welcome them and sent them back to Cambodia with many gifts. Ang Ton sent a second mission to Thonburi to conclude a peace treaty in 1773.

Then the king met two ong Yuon [Vietnamese generals] at the Mekong to ask them to retreat to Vietnam. The two Vietnamese generals took their leave of the king and evacuated to Vietnam with their soldiers by boat.

After the peace, Preah Ang Non Preah Ream [Ang Non] continued to rule khaet Treang, Banteay Meas, Peam, Kampot, Kampong Som and Thpong. The people of those regions did not obey the preah reac acña [royal commands of Ang Ton]....

Both sources show that the war between the Siamese and Vietnamese continued into 1772 and that they were confronting each other at Roka in the Kandar region. Ang Ton started peace negotiations with the Siamese commander, who was in Roka. Also, he sent a mission to Thonburi in 1772. After Taksin agreed that his army would retreat from Cambodia, the Vietnamese army evacuated the area in 1773. Meanwhile, in the coastal area of Kampot and Kampong Som, Ang Non retained his influence and ruled there. According to the VJ, Ang Ton abdicated and gave the throne to Ang Non in 1775. Ang Ton then became Moha Uphpayoreac, or “second king.”

The DNLS (vol. 32) states that Ang Ton was restored to the throne and then he abdicated in favor of his younger brother (called Nac Vinh in the Vietnamese records), for the sake of peace in his country. Then Ton became the “second king.” His second brother, Tham, became the “third king.” Probably the Vietnamese did not know that Non, who had been a principal adversary of Vietnam during the war, was the new monarch but ruling under the name Vinh.

According to the DNLS, King Vinh took advantage of the Tay Son insurrection in Vietnam, which began in the 1770s, and stopped sending tribute to the Quang Nam kingdom. This measure, as well as the change from the pro-Vietnamese king, Ang Ton, to the pro-Siamese king, Ang Non (also known as Vinh), can be attributed to the decline of the Quang Nam kingdom
(Khin Sok 1991: 39).

Tran Lien's Retreat from Ha Tien

The Siamese forces under Tran Lien’s command remained in control of Ha Tien, while further negotiations were taking place. According to the DTTB (vol. i 1), in the second month of the year quy ty (February/March 1773):

The king [of Quang Nam] ordered Mac Thien Tu to send a mission to Xiem [Siam] to negotiate peace between the two countries. But its main purpose was to investigate the real situation in Xiem. Mac Thien Tu sent a xanhcan [follower], Mac Tu, to Xiem with his letter and gifts. Trinh Quoc Anh [Taksin] was very pleased to receive his mission, and so he released Mac Thien Tu’s family captured in Ha Tien and sent them back home. Furthermore, Taksin recalled Tran Lien from Ha Tien.

According to the MTGP:

In the thirty-second year of Canh Hung, the year quy ty [1773], [the Quang Nam king] ordered Cong [Mac Thien Tu] to send a mission to Xiem, with the ostensible aim of negotiating for peace, but at the same time its main aim was to observe their real situation secretly. Cong ordered his xa nhan [follower] Trinh Tu to carry his letter and presents to Xiem and to conclude a peace.

Tan [Taksin] was pleased to tell [the following to Tu:] that heaven had wanted to punish his master [Mac Thien Tu] because he had enjoyed wealth and peace for a long time; that Taksin had defeated him; that he [Mac Thien Tu] then regretted his past fault; and that Taksin therefore pitied and forgave him.

Taksin ordered his royal secretary to record his response [to Mac Thien Tu] and released the fourth wife and a four-year-old daughter of Mac Thien Tu as a mark of favor. He told Tu to report his real pity for Mac Thien Tu when Tu returned to his home country.
...He ordered Tran Lien to retreat from Ha Tien and give Ha Tien back to Mac Thien Tu.... In that year, Prince Tu Hoang entered Ha Tien to rule it. Tran Lien dissolved his army and retreated to Xiem.

According to the GDTC (vol. 5), in the second month of the year quy ty (February/March 1773):

Ton Duc Hau [Mac Thien Tu] in Tran Giang [Can Tho] sent a mission to Xiem, aiming to investigate the situation of Xiem in secret, and at the same time they negotiated to make peace with Phi Nha Tan [Taksin]. [Taksin] agreed to their proposal. Then he sent the fourth wife and a daughter [of Mac Thien Tu, captured in Ha Tien] back to Ha Tien to show his good faith. He also called the chieu khoa Lien back to Xiem.

But at that time Xiem soldiers had completely destroyed the fort of Ha Tien and plundered the treasures. The people of Ha Tien had scattered. Ha Tien seemed like a wild land. Ton Duc Hau [Mac Thien Tu] had to stay at Tran Giang [Can Tho] and sent Mac Tu Hoang to Ha Tien to put things in order.

Although Tran Lien retreated, Mac Thien Tu never went back to Ha Tien. During the 1770s, the Gulf trade declined rapidly because of the confused situation in all three countries: Vietnam, Siam and Cambodia. According to statistics in the Phu Bien Tap Loc (vol. 4) for the port of Hoi An, which was south of the city of Hue, sixteen ships from Siam arrived in 1771, and the amount of tax collected from them was 38,000 ligatures (a Vietnamese monetary unit). In 1772 twelve ships paid 14,300 ligatures, and in 1773 the number shrunk to eight ships, which paid a mere 3,200 ligatures.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the historical role of Ha Tien, as an emporium for trade between the South China Sea and the Gulf, had disappeared completely. Probably Mac Thien Tu tried to change his polity from one based on transit trade to a port based on exports. (Saigon, My Tho and Can Tho, for example, were to develop dramatically as centers of paddy exports to China, based on Cantonese commercial activities after
the early nineteenth century.) Can Tho (Tran Giang), where Mac Thien Tu settled after the fall of Ha Tien, was his last capital—not of the "Ha Tien kingdom" but of the "Mac Thien Tu kingdom." Probably, Ha Tien city was abandoned during this time. Banteay Meas was governed as a local port of the coastal polity under Ang Non, who regained the throne of Cambodia in 1775.

In the early nineteenth century, a Fukienese Chinese sailor, Xie Shi Gao, visited a place he called Ban Di Quoc, or the state of Banteay, and his observations are recorded in the *Hai Lu* as follows:

Ban Di state is situated to the south-southeast of Vietnam; another name for it is Kan Ming. Probably it was Champa in former times. Although the state is very small, it can mediate between two countries: Vietnam and Siam. The complexions of the people are blacker than those of the Vietnamese. The sound of their language is a little bit different from Vietnamese.

From this description, it is very difficult to imagine the prosperous and sophisticated Chinese kingdom that Ha Tien had been. By this time, it seems to have become a semi-independent region of the Khmer people.

John Crawford visited this area in 1823, after finishing his diplomatic and commercial mission to Siam. He reported that there was an important city called Kang Kao or Ha Tien, often written "Athien," on the right bank of the river Kang Kao and about two miles upstream. It contained 5,000 inhabitants, consisting of Cambodians and southern Vietnamese, with a few Chinese and Malay (Crawfurd 1967: 458). This is a description of Ha Tien city during the early Minh Mang period, when its official Vietnamese name was Ha Chau *phu*. But in the same paragraph, Crawford mentions another place he called Ponteamas:

...there existed upon this river a town of considerable trade, called by Europeans, Ponteamas, where a considerable foreign trade existed for the supply of the old capital of Kamboja [Cambodia], between fifty and sixty leagues distant, and situated on the great river [the Mekong]. This place has, properly written, Po-tai-mat, is about a day’s journey up
the river, and has never been of any consequence, since destroyed in 1717 by the Siamese, in an attempt made by them, at that period, to conquer Kamboja.

Crawfurd was mistaken on two points. First, he confused phum Banteay Meas with old Ponteamas (Po-tai-mat, Phutthai Mat or Ha Tien). Second, he mistook the Siamese invasion of 1717, reported by Hamilton, for the one in 1771. His misunderstanding underlines the fact that Ha Tien—the international Chinese port known also as Phutthai Mat or Ponteamas—had long since disappeared before Crawfurd visited this region.

**Epilogue: After the Fall of Ha Tien and Death of Mac Thien Tu**

It is well known that the Tay Son revolt started in central Vietnam in 1771, while the Quang Nam army was fighting with Taksin in the Mekong delta. In 1773 the rebels occupied Qui Nhon, and in 1775 the Trinh army from northern Vietnam sacked Hué the capital of the Quang Nam kingdom. Due Ton (the king of Quang Nam) and the royal family fled to Gia Dinh by sea and then stayed at Ben Nguu.

Mac Thien Tu and his sons visited Ben Nguu to meet the king at his temporary palace. The king was pleased to receive him and awarded the following titles: (1) Do Doc Quan Cong to Mac Thien Tu, (2) Chuong Ky to Hoang, (3) Thang Thuy Cai Ky to Thuong and (4) Tham Thuong Cai Ky to Dien. Then he instructed them to return to Tran Giang (Can Tho) and defend it. These official titles had been used for local officials in Ha Tien Tran for a long time. This means that King Due Ton recognized the members of the Mac family only as Quang Nam mandarins. The king underestimated the military strength of Mac Thien Tu after the fall of Ha Tien, so he did not expected to rely on Mac Thien Tu. The Mac family must have felt isolated among the Quang Nam mandarins, and therefore they returned to Can Tho.

In the eleventh month of the year binh than (December 1776 or January 1777), King Due Ton abdicated in favor of the crown prince, Tan Chinh Vuong (literally, the “Renovation King”). In the fourth month of the year dinh dau (May or early June 1777), Nguyen Van Hue, the second of the Tay Son brothers, attacked Gia Dinh. The new king fought the Tay Son
forces in Dinh Tuong Province and was killed in the eighth month (September 1777). Meanwhile, the ex-king escaped to Can Tho in the fourth month, where he joined the army of Mac Thien Tu. Mac Thien Tu then ordered his son, Tham Tuong Dien, to take his soldiers, march to Dong Khau Dao (Sadec) and mobilize soldiers of any divisions who were loyal to the king, for an attack on the Tay Son army. But the Tay Son forces defeated Dien. Immediately after he returned to Tran Giang, the Tay Son army attacked him there.

Mac Thien Tu advised the ex-king to move to Kien Giang (Rach Gia) along the Can Tho River, because Tran Giang was not an unassailable position for resisting the enemy. In the autumn of the year Đình Dậu (1777), Mac Thien Tu escorted the king to Rach Gia, and then his son Dien cut large trees and let them fall into the river, to block the waterway. The king was so anxious that he summoned Mac Thien Tu and asked him how to restore the kingdom, considering that the enemy’s power was increasing. Mac Tien Tu advised him to summon an ocean-going ship (Duong Tang) that belonged to one of his followers, Quach An, which could take the king to Guangdong Province in China, to ask for the support of the Chinese emperor. The king agreed to follow this advice.

Mac Thien Tu sent his follower, Ngo Nhung Ky Khoan, to escort the king to Long Xuyen. (This place was not present-day Long Xuyen city but present-day Ca Mau city.) Mac Thien Tu then waited for Quach An’s ship at the port of Kien Giang (Rach Gia). But in the ninth month of the year Đình Dậu (October 1777), Nguyen Van Hue ordered an attack on Long Xuyen (Ca Mau) by Chuong Ky Thanh, who captured the ex-king, took him to Gia Dinh and killed him.

After the fall of Long Xuyen (Ca Mau), the Tay Son sent a mission to Mac Thien Tu and asked him to surrender. Mac Thien Tu refused and fled to Phu Quoc Dao, where he heard that the Tay Son had taken the ex-king to Gia Dinh. The records say he attempted to go into exile to Dong The Chau Phu in Xa Ba (the Malay-speaking world). At that time, King Taksin (Trinh Quoc Anh in the Vietnamese texts) sent four ships to invite him to Siam. Mac Thien Tu was so fearful of Taksin’s anger, if he refused, that he fled to Chanthaburi and then to Thonburi in the twelfth month (at the end of December 1777 or in January 1778).
In the sixth month of the year canh tý (July 1780), Nguyen Phuoc Anh (a surviving prince of the Quang Nam royal family and the future Emperor Gia Long) sent his followers to Siam to establish friendly relations. While they were visiting Thonburi, a merchant ship belonging to Taksin sent a message that it had been plundered by some Vietnamese when it passed through Ha Tien waters. Taksin became so angry that he arrested the Vietnamese messengers and put them in prison. At that time, one of Taksin’s Khmer subjects, Pho Ong Giao, came back from Cambodia and reported that he got a secret letter from Nguyen Phuoc Anh to order Prince Tong That Xuan (who was staying in Thonburi with Mac Thien Tu) to betray Taksin and to occupy the Thonburi fort.

On the fifth day of the tenth month (1 November 1780), Taksin arrested Mac Thien Tu and his family. Mac Thien Tu committed suicide. On the twenty-fourth day (20 November), fifty-three people were executed, including Prince Xuan, the envoys of Nguyen Phuoc Anh and Mac Thien Tu’s sons and grandsons. But Tu Sinh, Tu Tuan and Tu Diem, along with Cong Binh, Cong Du and Cong Tai—who were sons of Tu Hoang and Cong Tai, respectively—were so young that a Siamese minister, the Kalahom (Kha La Ham in the Vietnamese records), took pity on them. They were thus sent to a distant place on the periphery of the kingdom.63

In the year nhâm dan (1782), a retainer (called Mien San in the Vietnamese records) killed King Taksin. General Chakkri (called Trat Tri in Vietnamese records) ascended the throne as the Phat Vuong (literally, the “Buddha King”). He summoned Tu Sinh and the others back to Thonburi and made provisions to care for them.

According to the DNLS (vol. 6), some descendants of Mac Thien Tu became followers of the future Emperor Gia Long, while he was staying in Siam (1783/4 to 1787), and accompanied him on his return to Vietnam. In 1787, Gia Long appointed his son Tu Sinh to be acting governor (luu thu) of Ha Tien, but Tu Sinh died in 1788.64 Cong Binh, a son of Tu Hoang and a grandson of Mac Thien Tu, became luu thu of Long Xuyen. After Cong Binh died, Mac Thien Tu’s son, Mac Tu Diem, became luu thu of Ha Tien. In 1808, after Tu Diem went to Siam, his son, Cong Du, took his place and status. Cong Du was promoted to be governor (hiep tran) of Ha Tien in 1816 and governor-general (tran thu) in 1818. His younger brother, Cong Tai,
became Ha Tien Thu Quan Thu in 1830.

When Le Van Khoi rebelled against Emperor Minh Mang in 1833, Cong Du, Cong Tai and their followers supported him. Ultimately, Minh Mang arrested all of them. Cong Du and Cong Tai died in prison. One of Cong Tai’s sons went to Siam, and another son disappeared in a mountainous area of Nghe An.

The Mac family did not manage to survive in the nineteenth century. Ha Tien and Mac Thien Tu’s accomplishments there were finished by the time of Minh Mang, who unified the three parts of Vietnam and established the pre-modern centralized state called Dai Nam (literally, the “Great South”). In the new political order, Ha Tien was only a small province. Moreover, in the commercial order of the new century, Singapore was established as a major center for Chinese trade.

Conclusions

The period of florescence of Chinese port-polities in the region of the South China Sea in the eighteenth century can be regarded as a stage in the post-“Age of Commerce,” which can be characterized as follows. (1) It belongs to a late stage of early modern administration of long-distance trade, based on the relationship between the Chinese tribute system and Southeast Asian statecraft. (2) The market in China for the main goods produced in mainland Southeast Asia was limited. (3) Shipping and capital, as well as market control, were monopolized by Chinese maritime merchants in this system. These three factors stimulated the establishment of the Chinese port polities in Southeast Asia, such as Pontianak, Songkhla and Ha Tien. The autonomy of the rulers of these Chinese polities was recognized by local kingdoms, in the sense of being governors-general of their respective port cities, exercising full independence and sending nominal tribute.

In the case of the Ha Tien kingdom, however, as shown in local records such as the Cambodian chronicles, the Cang Khau (Ha Tien) king was never appointed governor-general by the Cambodian sovereign. The local Khmer administrators regarded Ha Tien as a Chinese settlement, whose leader, Mac Thien Tu, was known to them by a Khmer title: Preah Sotoat. Though he was an influential person, he was a completely different person from the local
governor of the port city of Banteay Meas (Peam Banteay Meas), whose title was Okña Reacea Sethei.

In the neighboring countries, by contrast, Mac Thien Tu was called a “Regional Commander” and “Governor-General” of “Ha Tien Division” by the Vietnamese and was known as “Phraya Ratcha Setthi,” the “Governor of Phuttai Mat” by the Siamese. Neither of these neighbors was aware of the existence of the local Cambodian official, Okña Reacea Sethei. The Ha Tien government thus had two faces: one for the Khmer people and another for the Chinese, as well as two faces for internal and external affairs. This can be termed a dual political structure.

After the fall of Ayutthaya, because of the confused situation in the kingdoms along these coastlines, the port polities were able to assert greater independence and expand their territories. The progress of this trend was halted by the two big states that emerged at the end of eighteenth century as the result of state consolidation: the Siam of Thonburi and Bangkok, and the Vietnam of the Tay Son and Nguyen rulers. International trade in this period came under the control of the state in the form of royal monopolies. The history of Ha Tien should be regarded as a typical case of the rise and fall of Chinese port polities between the post- “Age of Commerce” and the pre-colonial stage of history.

Notes

1. The fifth chapter of the Phu Bien Tap Loc states that an official message written by Chieu Phi Nha Khu Sa (Thai title Chao Phraya Kosa) and sent to Huế in 1755 proposed friendship between Quang Nam and Siam, partly for the purpose of protecting Siamese ships proceeding homeward from China across the South China Sea. But the Vietnamese refused the request, deeming it unnecessary to develop diplomatic relations.

2. Kitagawa is preparing a paper on the confrontation between the Mekong and the Tonlesap powers.

3. The Khmer term cauvay srok was usually translated as “governor” during the French colonial period (Kitagawa 1994: 54, n. 21).

4. Hupoan (also romanized haupean) means one thousand, which was used
as the indicator of relative status in official titles in the post-Angkor period. The highest official had a title with ten *hupoan*, whereas the lowest status was one *hupoan* (Kitagawa 1994: 48–9 and the KS, pp. 25–7, art.108–14). Even in the nineteenth century, the governor of Kampot played a minor role in the commercial sector. A Chinese lieutenant governor, *Sinky*, with the title Bandar Thaom, managed trading affairs, and a Malay merchant, Tuanku Tay, managed the shipment of royal trading cargoes to Singapore as supercargo.

5. According to Moura (1833 ii: 183), in 1621 the Siamese general Phraya Thai Nam occupied Ponteay Meas (the French spelling) with 20,000 soldiers. This action shows that Ponteay Meas was a very important and strategic port for entering Cambodia from the sea in the post-Angkor period.

6. The place name Ha Tien is preserved in the names of the province and provincial center in South Vietnam, in the northwest corner of the Mekong delta along the seacoast, abutting on Cambodia’s Kampot District. The Ha Tien kingdom centered at present-day Ha Tien city. The city stands at the foot of a small hill called Loc Tri, on the west bank at the mouth of the Vinh Te Canal, where there are remains of many great graves of the Mac family. The name Ha Tien appeared for the first time in 1711 (in the GDTC, vol. 3): for example, the passage Ha Tien Tong Tran Cuu Ngoc Hau Mac Cuu, meaning “Mac Cuu, Governor-General of Ha Tien and Duke of Cuu Ngoc.” Ha Tien must be a Chinese style eulogistic name for Banteay.

7. Aubaret (1893) translated most of this information into French.

8. A *khaet* is an administrative unit in traditional Cambodia. The term was translated as “province” during the French period.

9. The term *Xa Ba* may have been borrowed from *Cvea* in Cambodian, meaning Malay Muslim people.

10. *Caúy srok* is the Cambodian term for the governor of a *khaet* or *srok* in the post-Angkor period.

11. Kampong Som (Sihanouk Ville) is the most important seaport in present-day Cambodia. Since the 1960s, it has had direct communications with Phnom Penh by a highway, built with American aid.

12. The Vinh Te Canal connected the Giang Thanh (Banteay River) with
Chau Doc. According to Dai Nam Nhat Thong Chi (1973), a geography of Viet Nam, it was constructed late in the reign of Gia Long. Crawford reported on the construction of the canal. But the Vietnamese name Vinh Te could be borrowed from the Khmer word Banteay, so this canal was the renovation of the natural river (mentioned by Hamilton) that connected the Bassac and Banteay Meas.

13. Leclère (1914: 373) and Fujiwara (1986: 231). Chen Chingho identified it as Koh Ream, a small island near Kampong Som (HMGP, p. 84). According to the Dai Nam Nhat Tong Chi (1973: 14a), the Lung Co River is in Ha Chau Huyen (Ha Tien). Probably Lung Co is near Mount Srei Ambel in Ha Tien.


15. Chen Chingho identified Chan Sam as Chen Don, a place name in Trang Province (MTGP, p. 99). According to the Dai Nam Nhat Tong Chi (1973: 14b), however, Mount Chan Sam is along the middle segment of the Vinh Te Canal, where Vietnamese, Chinese and Khmer settled to establish a town. There is now a small town named Phum Tnaot Chong Srang along the Cambodian bank of the Vinh Te River, which must be the Chan Sam mentioned in the GDTB.

16. According to the Dai Nam Nhat Tong Chi (1973: 9a), Mount Say Mat is 140 li to the north of Ha Tien. Probably present-day phum Banteay Meas is the Say Mat mentioned in this passage.

17. Chen Chingho identified Linh Quynh or Ninh Quynh (in the MTGP) as a place on the Prek Pata Buy, on the left bank of the Giang Thanh. According to the Dai Nam Nhat Tong Chi (1973: 9a), Mount Linh Quynh is 120 li to the north of Ha Chau (Ha Tien) and is a site where Vietnamese and Khmer settled. The same source (1973: 13b) states that the Giang Thanh has three sources: the second is Mount Linh Quynh, which can be identified as Tuk Meas, the center of Banteay Meas Prefecture. There is a hill near Tuk Meas called Phnum Kuhea Luong, which might be Mount Linh Quynh.

18. The Vietnamese kingdom of Quang Nam encompassed the central part of Vietnam and, from the early seventeenth century to the end of eighteenth century, was ruled by the Nguyen family.
19. According to the DLTB (vol. 4), the name Ha Tien (which literally means the "Wizard’s River") derives from the legend of a wizard associated with the upper segment of the Banteay Meas River. But probably the name was adapted from the name Ban Teay.

20. Mac Thien Tu, the eldest son of Mac Cuu, was born in Lung Co in 1718.

21. See the description of Kang Khau in Wen Hsien Tong K’ao (collection and notes of documents, vol. 297); see the MTGP (p. 97).

22. The Chinese called Ha Tien the “Port Mouth Kingdom” (Cang Khau in Vietnamese), and it was one of the states that sent tribute to China. The name Cang Khau was well known among Westerners as a semi-independent port state which they called Cancao or Cancar. See the MTGP (p. 84).


24. Chen Chingho identified Nac Bon as Thoamma Reacea Saur (King Sor), but there is no evidence. According to Dai Nam Nhat Tong Chi (1973: 9a), Mount Say Mat served as a base for Nac Bon. It is at present-day phum Banteay Meas.

25. Probably these terms can be identified as Cam Sai Tran Ninh and Bao Ho. But these titles do not appear in the Vietnamese chronicles.

26. Xoi Lap is identified as Tan Hoa Prefecture, Dinh Tuong Province, during the Nguyen period; see Aubaret (1863: 13). According to Phan Khoang (1970: 443), Tam Bon and Xoi Lap (Tam Don and Loi Lap) are present-day Go Cong and Tan An Districts, respectively. Even now, the mouth of the Vam Co River is called Cua Soi Lap.

27. The Cham were migrating to Chan Lap during that century. A footnote in the GDTC mentions that the old name of Con Man was Chien Thanh (Champa). They should be called Cham, though Aubaret (1893: 13–4) identified them as Moi.

28. According to the DNTB (vol. 10), twelfth year of The Ton, Con Man was the name of an ethnic minority who had settled in Thuan Thanh Tran (present-day Binh Thuan Province).

29. According to Phan Khoang (1970: 442), Kha Tung is present-day Katum, to the north of Tay Ninh.
30. According to Phan Khoang (1970: 442), Binh Thanh is present-day Go Vap, near Saigon, but his identification is not believable.

31. The history of the migrations of the Cham people in Cambodia has hitherto been unstudied. The authors think Quang Nam’s policy of resettling the Cham in Cambodian territory was an important factor in this process.

32. Probably, Ha Tien kept a connection with the Land King, who was based in Udong, Longvek and Posat (Pursat).

33. According to the VI, King Cei Cet died in 1755, and Moha Uphayoreac (the “second king”) Ang Tong ascended the throne. The Vietnamese mistakenly recorded that Cei Cet died in 1756 and did not mention Tong. Ang Tong was 65 years old at the time of his accession in 1755. Even in the VI, his accomplishments are not recorded, and they were probably not reported to Quang Nam. He died in 1757 in Posat (Pursat). Vietnamese reports state that Nac Nguyen (Cei Cet) died in 1757. Probably the Vietnamese confused Cei Cet with Ang Tong.

34. Two questions must be addressed here: first that Ang So died in 1753 (before Nac Nguyen’s death in 1755) and second that Nhuan does not appear to be identified with any of the names by which Ang So is known. According to the VI, King Ang Tong, successor of King Nac Nguyen, died in 1756. As mentioned in footnote 33, the Vietnamese confused Tong with Nguyen. At the same time, they must also have confused Ang Ton with Ang So.

35. According to the KS, the governor of Treang was Okna Pisanulok (an official of 10 hupoaan status), the governor of Banteay Meas was Cau Poinea Yothea Thireac (7 hupoaan), the governor of Prey Krabas was Preah Sorin (6 hupoaan) and the governor of Bati was Poinea Thireac Vongsa (8 hupoaan).

36. According to the Vietnamese, Okna Uong killed him. Uong can be identified as Srei Anucit Uong (later Somdei Cau Hva Uong), who was a loyal subject of Ang Ton, as shown in the VI.

37. He presented An Giang (present-day Long Xuyen city), according to the Dai Nam Nhat Tong Chi (vol. 15).

38. Generally, the Vietnamese in the seventeenth century had little information about Ayutthaya, except affairs related to Cambodia.
The first part of the chapter on Siam in the *DNLS* (vol. 33) states that Xiem La [Siam] was called Xich Tho in ancient times. Afterwards, it was divided into two states: namely, Xiem and La Hoc. The soil of Xiem was very poor for cultivating paddy, whereas that of La Hoc was rich and flat, suitable for getting a good harvest of paddy. Xiem had to import rice from La Hoc. The Chinese court in the Sui dynasty [which ruled from 581 to 618] sent a mission to a state called Xich Tho. The name of the king was known as Cu Dam. Xiem also sent tribute missions to the Yuan court many times. After that, La Hoc became stronger and annexed Xiem. For this reason, the new state called itself Xiem La. When it sent a tribute mission to the early Ming court, it received a royal seal with the title “King of Xiem La.” This is the first use of the name “Xiem La.”

During the years of Long Khanh [an era name, referring to 1567–72 during the Ming dynasty], a king of a neighboring state named Dong Man Nguu [literally “Toungoo barbarians”] asked to marry a Xiem La princess. Xiem La refused. Dong Man Nguu invaded Xiem La, defeated its king and took his crown prince to Dong Man Nguu. After that, Xiem La was under the rule of Dong Man Nguu. But its second prince succeeded to his father’s title and added great strength his army to take revenge against the enemy. During the years of Van Lich [1573–1619], Xiem La became stronger, defeated Dong Man Nguu and then invaded Chan Lap [Cambodia]. Chan Lap surrendered. At last he [the king of Xiem La] became head of the barbarian states.

This description is nothing more than an abridgement of the chapter on Siam in the *Ming Xu*, the Chinese history of the Ming dynasty edited in 1735. It is assumed that, up to the end of the eighteenth century, the Quang Nam government took little interest in the political situation of Siam, although the two countries had close economic relations in the form of maritime trade in the early eighteenth century. According to the fifth chapter, an official letter from Trieu Phi Nha Khu Sa (the Thai minister, Chao Phraya Kosa) was sent to Huế in 1755, requesting friendship with the Quang Nam kingdom, for the purpose of protecting
Siamese ships from pirates in the South China Sea, while sailing home from Chinese ports. But the Hué court refused the request, because it saw no reason to develop such interchange.

39. *Dap* in Vietnamese (*ta* or *da* in Chinese) could be identified as a *dhow* or *dow*, an Indian Ocean term designating a ship of western design.

40. *Ton Duc Hau* was a kind of peerage bestowed on Mac Thien Tu by the Quang Nam court in 1731 (GDTC).

41. According to information provided by Kennon Breazeale, Chao Chui is mentioned as a son of Somdet Chao Fa Aphi in Thai records.

42. MTGP (p. 100). Jacques-Nicholas Morvan's 1771 letter to the director of the Paris Seminary, cited in Maitre (1913: 168–9).

43. Mount Bach Ma is mentioned in the *Dai Nam Nhat Tong Chi* (vol. 16) as being 20 *li* to the west of Ha Tien city. Its Cambodian name is unknown.

44. The following biographical notes about King Taksin are recorded in the GDTC (vol. 5), in the year *mau tu* (1768):

Trinh Quoc Anh was originally from Trieu Chau Phu in Quang Dong Tinh and was called Phi Nha Tan [Pi Ya Hsin in Chinese, or Phraya Sin]. He accompanied his father, Yen, from China to Xiem [Siam] and succeeded to his father’s status to become governor of Vong Sat, which is the name of a place in Xiem. Another name [for him] was Phi Nha [a mandarin’s title] Sat.

When there was no master in Xiem [after the fall of Ayutthaya] and many robbers rose up, Xiem was in great confusion. He rose up to unify the country. Then, he called himself the King of Xiem and requested tribute of gold and silver flowers from Chan Lap [Cambodia]. The [Cambodian] king, Nac Ton, refused to send tribute to Phi Nha, because he was not a legitimate successor of the Xiem king.

This Vietnamese version of Phraya Taksin’s background is quite peculiar. According to Chinese information about Taksin, his Chinese name was not Trinh Quoc Anh but Cheng Chao (Trinh Chieu in Vietnamese). His father’s name was not Yen but Cheng Yung (Trinh
Dung in Vietnamese) or Jia, and his father was born in Huafu village, Cheng Hai Prefecture, Choa Chow District, Guangdong Province. According to the GDTC, his father was the governor of Vong Sat in Siam. This is quite different from the information in Thai materials about Taksin. Vong Sat must be Muang Tak. Taksin was appointed a deputy governor (a position known as the Luang Yokkrabat) of Muang Tak in 1758, after he became an adapted son of Phraya Chakkri by the order of the king. Later he was promoted to the governorship of Muang Tak. Probably Ha Tien was misinformed about his adoptive father's status and thought he was the former governor of Muang Tak. This interpretation suggests that Taksin's background was unknown among the Cantonese group in the Gulf in 1768. The rise of Taksin thus must not have been anticipated by Ha Tien.

45. The Thai chronicles do not differentiate between Phraya Ratcha Setthi and Mac Thien Tu. But according to the Cambodian chronicles, Phraya Ratcha Setthi was the Khmer governor of Peam Banteay Meas and thus not the same person as Mac Tien Tu.

46. Trat is east of Chanthaburi, near the present border between Cambodia and Thailand. At that time, it was a center of Chinese trade in the eastern part of the Gulf.

47. Chien Chun can be identified as Jiang Jun (Tuong Quan in Vietnamese), according to the late Professor Chen (1977). According to the DLTB (vol. 6), the Quang Nam king gave Mac Thien Tu his appointment as Do Doc Dai Thoing Quan in 1737.

48. In Thai materials, Phraya Ratcha Setthi is the title of the governor of the town known in Thai as Phutthai Mat (i.e., Banteay Meas) and thus appears to be the same person as Mac Thien Tu. In fact, there was another Phraya Ratcha Setthi in Peam Banteay Meas, as mentioned above. In communications with Taksin, Mac Thien Tu called himself Phraya Ratcha Setthi.

49. According to information provided by Charnvit Kasetsiri in the Ha Tien Symposium in Kyoto, 1977.

50. According to Moura (1883), after occupying Chanthaburi in 1767, Taksin sent an army to Cambodia by way of the northern route, while he and the Cambodian princes Preah Ang Non and Preah Ream invaded by
the sea route. Taksin’s army drove out the chief of Ha Tien, and he went to Tuk Khmau. Then they attacked Udong, and the Cambodian king (Utey) hastened away to Trolong Klos Bat Anchien. Taksin went back to Siam but left Prince Preah Ream with 500 soldiers at Compot (Kampot). The Siamese army that arrived from the north carried away 10,000 Cambodians to Siam. This story is quite similar to the Vietnamese description of the Siamese invasion in 1769. But, as will be seen later, these events took place in 1771 according to the Cambodian chronicles VJ and BK. Probably, the editors of the GDTC and the DNLS confused events in 1769 with those in 1771, judging from the Cambodian information on which Moura based his account.

51. Both dieu khien quan (Khoi Khoa Hau and Mien Truong Hau) were commanders in the 1767 expedition to Ha Tien.

52. Personal letter from Kennon Breazeale to Sakurai, 14 November 1998.

53. A royal port on the Tonlesap River near Udong.

54. Peam Bañcho was a place in Prey Veng to the east of Phnom Penh (de Fels 1976 i: 169).

55. According to the VJ, the Siamese prince Cau Si San (Ayutthaya Prince Chieu known as Trieu or Di Xoang in Vietnamese), who escaped from Ayutthaya to Cambodia and Cau Col, died in the third month of the year of the rabbit (4 February to 3 March 1772 in the Cambodian calendar).

56. According to Aubaret (1863: 35), Bat Long Khuyen Long is “Bat Kien sur le territoire de Long Quet” (Bat Kien in the territory of Long Quet). Bat Long Khuyen Long might be identified as srok Trolong Khaos, which is recorded as Trolong Klos Bat Anjen in Moura (1883: 86–90) and Bot Ancean Trolong Khos (in another part of VJ). This is Sralong Khos, a village on the border between Cambodia and Vietnam (de Fels 1976 i: 168).

57. According to the DNTB (vol. 12), under the fourth month of the year dinh dau (1777), Can Tho is the name of the place (Tran Giang Dao) where Mac Thien Tu had remained since the fall of Ha Tien.

58. Peam Roka was a village in srok Kandal Sting (de Fels 1976 i: 169).

59. As mentioned above, the Cambodian chronicle mistakes Due Ton for Gia Long.

60. According to the DTTB (vol. 11), his official title was Nhan Lich and his
personal name was Toi. Probably Nhan Lich was Yomareac, and Toi was Toy or Tol.

61. This is the Khmer rendering of a Vietnamese official title, which can be identified as the *dong khau dao cai doi* Chinh Che Bao Ho. At that time, the *dong khau cai doi* was Nguyen Huu Thin.

62. The *Phu Bien Tap Loc* was written in Hanoi in 1776 by Le Qui Don, after Trinh forces from the north captured Huế, the capital of the Nguyen-ruled part of Vietnam. It was a report to the Trinh government on socio-economic conditions in central Vietnam, based on documents preserved at the Nguyen court.

63. The *VJ* (pp. 700–2, 724–5] recounts a very strange story about Mac Thien Tu:

In 1782, the Yvon *cauvay srok* Koiyun [the Vietnamese ruler of Qui Nhon] named Kai Saun [Tay Son] attacked Krong Hve [Huế]. Sdec Yalong [Gia Long] was defeated. He abandoned Krong Hve and fled to Koh Tnaot in *khaet* Banteay Meas in Krong Kampucea by sea. He asked for help from Somdac Caufa Mu, a powerful minister in Cambodia. Somdac Caufa Mu sent Okña Krolahom Bang to attack Kai Saun, but he was defeated in Veal Ba Yang Ko. Okña Reacea Sethei Meas, who was *cauvay srok* of *khaet* Peam, and Preah Sotoat advised the Yvon [Vietnamese] king to give up Cambodia and to rely on Siam. Okña Reacea Sethei sent his son to escort the Yvon king to Krong Tep Srei Ayuthya [Bangkok].

It is very difficult to believe this story. By the time Nguyen Phuoc Anh (the future Emperor Gia Long) took refuge in Bangkok, Mac Thien Tu had already died in Thonburi. No Vietnamese chronicle states that Mac Thien Tu and the future emperor ever met in Vietnam. Thus, the person called Preah Sotoat in the 1782 events could not be Mac Thien Tu.

64. After the massacre of the Quang Nam royal family at Long Xuyen (Ca Mau) in 1776, Nguyen Phuoc Anh (the third son of the former Quang Nam king Hung To), who later came Emperor Gia Long, continued the resistance against the Tay Son in Ca Mau, Vinh Long and even in Saigon.
But Nguyen Van Hue attacked him in Saigon in 1783. He was defeated and fled by way of My Tho and Con Dao (Poulo Condor) to Phu Quoc island. Then he went into exile in Bangkok, where he came under the protection of King Rama I, from 1783/4 to 1787. He returned to Can Tho in the ninth month (October/November) of 1787 and recaptured Saigon in the eighth month (September) of 1788. By 1791 he had succeeded in pacifying all of the Mekong delta. Ultimately, in 1802, he unified all of Vietnam.

During Gia Long’s first period of residence in Saigon, from 1777 to 1783, the diplomatic situation was complicated, because neither the Siamese nor the Tay Son had abandoned their efforts to expand into Cambodia and the Mekong delta. Gia Long had to enter into an alliance with Taksin to resist the Tay Son, but at the same time he also had to maintain a stand against Taksin to protect the Mekong delta. Diplomatic relations between Gia Long and Taksin, with regard to the Mekong delta and Cambodian affairs, will be discussed in another study.
Glossary of Sino-Vietnamese and Chinese Terms
Most terms are transliterated according to Vietnamese romanization (but without accent marks). Chinese terms are transliterated according to the Wade-Giles system.

A Ma 阿摩
Ba Thac 波歹
Bac Lam 北藩
Bach Ma 白馬
Bakufu 幕府
Ban Di Quoc 本底国
Bat Long Khuyen Long Khuat 八龍騏龍窟
Binh Hoa 平和
Binh Luan 評論
Binh Thanh 平清
Binh Thuan 平順
Bon Ma 奔馬
Ca Mau 哥毛
Cai Bo 蔡薄
Cai Co 蔡奇
Cai Doi 蔡隊
Cai Doi Sa 蔡隊沙
Cai Doi Tan Long Hau 該隊翼龍侯
Can Bot 花渤
Ca La Ham Dot Loc Man 高羅獻突靈曼
Ca Man Quoc 高靈國
Cau Nam 求喃
Chan Bon 真奔
Chan Bon 真奔
Chan Lap 真韜
Chan Lap 真麗
Chan Sam 真森
Chau Doc Dao 朱離道
Cheng Ke Sang 鄭克爽
Cheng 鄭
Chieu Chui 昭𡆈
Chieu Chuy 昭鍾
Chieu Di Xoang 昭修煌
Chieu Doc 昭督
Chieu Hoa 昭華
Chieu Khoa Lien 昭科聯
Chieu Khoa lien 昭科侯
Chieu Thuy Ech 昭錫鯤
Chieu Ong Ton 昭鴻尊
Chinh Binh 正兵
Chou Tai Hau 丑才侯
Chua That Huong 廬梁香

Chuong Ky Thanh 掌奇誠
Chuong Ky 掌奇
Co Binh 奇兵
Co Cong 南公
Co cot 南骨
Con Man 昆蛮
Cong 公
Dai Giang 大江
Dai Nam Chinh Bien De Nhat Ky 大南正編第 —期
Dai Nam Chinh Bien So Tap 大南正編初集
Dai Nam Chinh Bien Tien Bien 大南正編前
Dai Nam Thuc Luc Tien Bien 大南實錄前編
Dai Nam Thuc Luc 大南實錄
Dam On Hau 潭恩侯
Dan Kham 官坎
Dien 听
Diep 厝
Dieu Khien Quan 調遣官
Dinh Quoc Cong 定國公
Do Doc Quan Cong 都督郡公
Doc Chien Dam Luan Hau 督戰譲侯
Doi 僨
Dong giang 東江
Dong Khau Dao Cai Doi 東口道該隊
Dong Khau Dao 東口道
Dong Khau 東口
Dong Phu 東浦
Dong The Chau Phu 東世州府
Don 敦
Du Chinh Hau 首政侯
Du Chinh Hau 首正侯
Du Lang 童樓
Duc Nghiep 德業
Dung 餘
Duong Ngan Dich (in Vietnamese) or Yang Yen (in Chinese) 楊彦迪
Duong Tang 洋塘
Duy Tai Bac 款才伯
En 深
Giac Binh 賴兵
Giang Thanh 江城
Guangdong 広東
Ha Tien Tran Hiep Tran Mac Thi Gia Pha 河邊鎮叶鎮趙氏家譜
Ha Tien Tran Tong Binh 河邊鎮総兵
Ha Tien 河邊
Hai Lu 海鲈
Hau Giang Chau Doc 後江朱節
Hien Chuong Hau 崇章侯
Hien Vuong 賢王
Hien 舜
Hiep Tran 協鎮
Hiep Tran 協鎮
Hieu Vu Hoang De 孝武皇帝
Hoa Tho 花壯
Hoac Nrien 霍然
Hoang 潭
Hua-Kang Hseuh-Pao(Chinese).華岡學報
Huan 熱
Huu Bo Quan Tri Cong Dung O Nghia 右步官知公勇於義
Kan En Chih (Chinese) 甘恩勳
Kan Ming 崇明
Ke Thien Hau 雍善侯
Kha Tung 哥貞
Khan 賢
Khoi Khoa Hau 魁科侯
Khoi Nghia Hau 起義侯
Kien Giang Dao 坚江道
Kien Giang 礦江
Kinh Chan Hau 旌善侯
Kinh Thin Hau 敬慎侯
La Biec 蕭壁
Lei Zhou 雷州
Linh Quynh 法雲
Lo Fang Pai 羅芳伯
Lo Khuat Suc 磨廍勿潘
Long Ho Doanh 龍湖營
Long Ho Doanh Luu Thu 龍湖營留守
Long Ho Don Doanh 龍湖屯營
Long Xuyen Dao 龍川道
Lu En Don 爐演屯
Luc Con 六屈
Lung Co 聖祺
Luu Thu 留守
Ma Phong 麻瘋
Mac Cuu 姜珍
Mac Khoan 建寬
Mac Si Lam 莫士麟
Mac Sung 建崇
Mac Tu Hoang 建子潢
Mac Tu Lac 建子落
Mac Tu Thuong 建子湘
Mac Tu 建秀
Mien Dien Lang 緬甸郎
Mien Dien 緬甸
Mien Truong Hau 總長侯
Nac Bon 化盆
Nac Hinh 化馨
Nac Nguyen 化原
Nac Non 化寧
Nac Ong Nguyen 化蟠原
Nac Ong Nhan 化蟠和
Nac Ong Non 化蟠謙
Nac Tham 化深
Nac Tha 化他
Nac Ton 化隆
Nagasaki (Japanese)長崎
Nam Vanh 南榮
Nam Vanh Phu 南榮府
Nghi Tu 誠子
Nghia Bieu Hau 儀表侯
Ngo Doanh 五營
Ngo Ho 五虎
Ngo Nhung Ky 五戎奇
Ngo Nhung To Hau 五戎餘侯
Ngo Truong 伍長
Nguyen Cuu Dom 阮久謙
Nguyen Cuu Khoi 阮久魁
Nguyen Cuu Trinh 阮廷貞
Nguyen Huu Doan 阮有允
Nguyen Huu Minh 阮有محمد
Nguyen Huu Nhan 阮有仁
Nguyen Khoa Toan 阮科顯
Nguyen Trieu Chau Bon 阮朝崇本
Nhan Rach 杖霆
Nhan Tinh Hau 仁聲侯
Ninh Quyinh 峪瓊
O Tho 恥壯
Oc Nha Uong 厲牙汪
Oc Nha 屋牙
Okna 屋牙
Phat Vuong 仏王
Phi Nha Tan 帝雅新
Phien Vuong 潜王
Pho Ong Giao 襲姑廖
ho/<table width="100%" height="100%" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" border="0">Phu Bien Tap Loc 播边雜錄
Phu Ma 扶麻
Phu Quoc Dao 富国岛
Phuc Thuyen Son 普垫山
Phung Tham 漕清
Phuong Thanh 芳城
Quach An 郭恩
Que Vuong of Minh 明桂王
Quoc Su Quan 国史館
Rach Gia 歷架
Sadec 沙的
Sai Mat Phu 柱未府
So Si 斯仕
Suc 潘
Suu Lien Toc 池連途
Tam Bao 尕熙
Tam Bon 尕奔
Tam Mau 参謀
Tam Phong Long 尋楓龍
Tam Phong Thu 尋楓徵
Tam Phong Xiem 尋楓暹
Tan Chau Dao 新州道
Tan Chinh Vuong 新政王
Tan Don 尋敦
Tan Li Bac 秦犁北
Tan Phong X 萝尋楓背
Tham Cong 三公
Tham Tan Hieu Hanh Hau 参贊孝行侯
Tham Thuong Cai Ky 参将戡奇
Tham Thuong Dien 参将延
Tham Tuong 参将
Thang Thuy 勝水
Thang Thuy Cai Ky 勝水戡奇
Thang Thuy Doi 勝水隊
Thang Thuy Tran Hau 勝水陳侯
The Gia Dinh Thong Chi 嘉定通志
The To of Nguyen 元世祖
Thien Chinh Hau 潛政侯
Thong Xuat 统率
ThuAn Thanh 順城
Thuong 浚
Tien Giang Cau Lao 前江ToLeft
Tien Giang Tan Chau Dao 前江新州道
Tien Giang 前江
To Chau 蘇州
To Dung 徐勇
Tra Vinh 茶榮
Trach Van 淵汶
Tran Di 錦彝
Tran Giang 鎮江
Tran Lai 陳來
Tran Lien 陳聯
Tran Nghiet 陳儂
Tran Thai 陳太
Tran Thuong Xuyen (Chen Shang Chuanin Chinese) 陳上川
Tran Thu 鎮守
Tran Van Phuong 陳文方
Trat Tri 質知
Trieu Chau 潮州
Trieu Chau 潮州
Trieu Chui 召翠
Trieu Di Xoang 召修橈
Trieu Doc 召督
Trinh Hoai Duc 鄭懷德
Trinh Tan 鄭新
Truong Phuoc Du 張福獻
Vang Tham 蒲薰
Vo Ta On 無斜恩
Voong Cac 望閣
Vong Kham 忙坎
Vong Sat 茫薩
Vu The Thuong 武世常
Vu Vuong Duc Vung 武王德勝
Wu Jang 呂讓
Xa Ba 哈巴
Xa Nhan 舍人
Xa Nhan Trinh Tu 舍人鄭秀
Xie Shi Gao (Chinese) 茅世高
Xieu Nghia Hau 趙義侯
Xoi Lap 散黎
References


Aung Thein, U [Luang Phraison Salarak (Thien Subindu)]. 1908–18 and 1959.


Botero, Giovanni. 1630. *Relations of the Most Famous Kingdomes and Common-
References


Cushman, Jennifer Wayne. 1993. Fields from the Sea: Chinese Junk Trade with
Siam during the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries. Studies on Southeast Asia no. 12. Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.


Dhiravat: see Pombejra.


FAD. See Fine Arts Department.

Federici, Cesare. 1588. The Voyage and Traveile of M. Caesar Frederick, Merchant of Venice, into the East India, the Indies, and beyond the Indies. Translated from Italian by Thomas Hickock. London: Richard Jones and Edward White. Reprinted in a facsimile edition by Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (Amsterdam) and Da Capo Press (New York), 1971.


References


References

of the Siam Society (Bangkok) 60 (1): 21–152.


Iwao, Seiichi. 1941. “Taijin no tainichi Kokko boeki fukkatsu undo” [The Siamese...
References


française d'Extrême-orient. In French.
Lancaster, James. 1940. *The Voyages of Sir James Lancaster to Brazil and the East


Li, Tana, and Anthony Reid, eds. 1993. Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on the Economic History of Cochinchina (Dang Trong), 1602–1777. Sources for the Economic History of Southeast Asia, data paper no. 3. Canberra: Economic History of Southeast Asia Project, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University; Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.


Luang Prasoet: See Prasoet Aksoranit, Luang.

Introduction. I. Jusqu’à l’arrivée en Cochinchine. II. Le collège de Hon-dat. III. Le collège à Pondichéry. IV. Séjour au Cambodge et à Hâ-tiën.”


Nakamura, Tadashi. 1995. “Kinsei ni okeru Nihon, Chugoku Tonan Ajia kan no
sankaku boeki to musurimu" [Triangular Trade between Japan, China and Southeast Asia and the Muslims]. In Shi’en [Historical Journal, Kyushu University, Faculty of Letters] 132: 35–63. In Japanese.


Phongsawadan niaa [A Chronicle of the North]. In Prachum phongsawadan phak thi 1 [History Series Part 1]. Bangkok: Krom Sinlapakon (Fine Arts Department). In Thai.


Phraison Salarak, Luang: see Aung Thein.


Rong: see Syamananda.


Thiphakorawong Maha Kosa Thibodi, Chao Phraya. 1939. *Chotmaihet prathom wong sakun bunmak riapriang doi than phraya chula ratchamontri (sen) than phraya worathep (thuan) than chao phraya thiphakorawong maha kosa thibodi (kham bunmak)* [Records of the Beginning of the Bunnag Lineage, Compiled by Phraya Chula Ratchamontri (Sen), Phraya Worathep (Thuan) and Chao Phraya Thiphakorawong Maha Kosa Thibodi (Kham Bunnag)]. Published by Phraya Si Thammasan (Thaen Bunnag) on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, 5 May 1939. Bangkok: Maha Makutta Ratcha Witthayalai Press. In Thai.


Turpin, François Henri. 1771. *Histoire civile et naturelle du royaume de Siam, et des révolutions qui ont bouleversé cet empire jusqu'en 1770* [Civil and Natural History of the Kingdom of Siam and of the Revolutions That Have Kept This Empire in Confusion up to 1770]. Two volumes. Paris: Costard. In French. Volume 2 (on political history and trade) was translated by B. O. Cartwright and published under the auspices of the Committee of the Vajiranana National Library with the title *History of the Kingdom of Siam and of the Revolutions That Have Caused the Overthrow of the Empire up to AD 1770*. Compiled by M. Turpin from Manuscripts Received from M. the Bishop of Tabraca, Vicar Apostolic of Siam and from Other Missionaries in the
Notes

---

Van Linschoten: see Linschoten
Van Vliet: see Vliet
Vu The Thuong. ms. 1818. Ha Tien Tran Hiep Tran Mac Thi Gia Pha [History of the Mac Family, Governors-General of Ha Tien Division]. Published in Chen (1956: 77–139). In Chinese.
Wenk, Klaus. 1968. The Restoration of Thailand under Rama I, 1782–1809. Translated from the German by Greeley Stahl. Published for the Association for Asian Studies. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
Wolters, O. 1966. “The Khmer King at Basan (1371–3) and the Restoration of the
Cambodian Chronology during the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries.” *Asia Major* (London) 12 (1): 44–89.


'Abbās I, Safavi ruler (r. 1587–1629) 122, 126–7, 129, 135, 136
'Abbās II, Safavi ruler (r. 1642–66) 126, 135
Abdul Jalil, Sultan of Johor 139
Aceh 1, 9, 36–7, 114, 129, 132–3, 139, 147
administration: see External Relations Ministry
Afghans 124
Ai Phraya, Prince 82, 86
Akbar, Mughal Emperor (r. 1556–1605) 123–4
alcoholic drinks 21, 72, 107
Aleppo 123
'Ali 136
aloes wood (Aquilaria agallocha, Thai kraitsana and trakhan) 20–1, 69, 72, 90, 98, 103
alum 134
ambassadors 16
ambergris 20
Amoy: see Xiamen
Andaman Sea 3, 15, 104, 106
ang, nac, nak, neak: honorific prefix for Khmer royal names
Ang At 168
Ang Ci (Satha, King Borom Reacea) 160–3
Ang Duong 151
Ang Hing 168–9
Ang Non (Ang Vinh) 169, 184–5, 191–3, 196, 198–9, 202
Ang Sguon 163–6, 169
Ang Saur 160–2
Ang So 169
Ang Ton (Nreay Reacea, King Utey Reacea) 158, 166–71, 175, 184–5, 189, 191–3, 195–6, 198–9
Ang Tong 165, 169
Angkor 46, 55, 59–60, 77, 86–8, 105, 184
Aphai Phiphit: see Phiphit
Arab trade and traders 1, 2, 9, 12, 19, 38, 39, 53, 59, 86, 107, 108, 111, 121, 123, 133
Arakan 105, 109, 115, 129, 133
Armenians 12, 126, 128
arms 72, 85, 112; artillery 19, 33, 146; bladed weapons 19, 27, 38; firearms 19, 28, 33, 90
aromatic substances 20, 21, 108; see also aloes wood and gum benjamin
arrack 72
artillery: see arms
Assam 105
Astrakhan 126
At: see Ang At
Athitwong, King (r. 1629) 93
autonomous history: see history
Ava 104–5, 109, 118
avatar 75–7
Awrangzeb, Mughal Emperor (r. 1658–1707) 124
Ayōdhya 59, 60, 62–3
Azimuddin I, Sultan of Sulu 145–6
Bahika Raja, King 109
Bahmanī dynasty of central India 123, 126
Balambangan Island 145
Bali 138
Ban Müang 82
Bandar Abbas: see Hormuz
Bang Pakong River 56
Bantan: see Banten
Banteay Meas 4, 31, 46–7, 150–217 passim
Banten 1, 36, 114, 131–2, 139, 144, 147
Barom Reacea: see Ang Ci
Barommakot, King (r. 1733–58) 40
Barommaracha I, King (Pha-ngua, r. 1370–88) 67–81, 83, 88, 109
Barommaracha II, King (r. 1424–48) 67, 86
Bassac Province 162
Bassac River (Hau Giang) 156
Batavia 42, 44–5, 96, 100, 138, 140–1, 144–5
Battambang 184
Bayin-naung, King 105, 115
bear, gall bladders 21
Beijing 7, 23, 24, 69, 70, 71
Index

bendahara 139
Bengal 69, 112, 124
Bengal, Bay of 104, 106, 108, 109, 111, 115, 129, 133, 147
Bengalese trade and traders 1, 39, 42–3, 121, 125, 132
benzoine: see gum benjamin
bezoar stones 21
Bihar 124
Bijapur 123–4, 129, 131–2, 134
birds’ nests (edible) 19
Borneo 36, 138, 140, 145–6, 154
Borom Reacea: see Ang Ci
brahmans 53, 60, 75
brass and brass wares 19, 44
bronze 21
Brunei 139, 145
Buddhism 1, 40, 59–61, 75, 77
buffaloes: see skins
Bugis traders 139–40, 144, 147–8
bunga mas 37
Bunnag family 12
Burma 33, 45–6, 104–5, 116, 152; invasions 7, 28, 33, 46, 173–5; trade 107, 130, 133–4; see also trade rivalry

Cairo 123
calambac: see aloes wood
Calcutta 138
Calicut 112
Camau Peninsula 150
Cambodia 30–1, 46–7, 55, 70, 88, 91, 93, 138, 150–207 passim; succession disputes 30–1, 169–99 passim; trade 4
camphor 19
Can Tho 190, 200–4
Cancao, Cancar, Cang Khau: variant spellings of Gangkou
cannons: see arms
Cantonese Chinese 31–2, 154, 157, 189–92, 201–2
cardamom 21, 108
carpets 19, 27
centralist history: see history
ceramic wares 20, 21, 33, 84, 107, 108; see also porcelain
Ceylon: see Sri Lanka
Chaghatay Turks 123
Chainat 57, 82
Chakri, Chao Phraya (later King Rama I) 184–5, 189, 195–6, 205
Cham migrants in Cambodia 163–4; traders and community in Ayutthaya 53, 83–4; see also Pathakhucham
Champa 29, 30
Champasak 45, 105
Chanthaburi 76, 160, 176, 178–87 passim, 198, 204
Chao Phraya River system 2, 16, 56, 84
Chau Doc 169, 188, 190–1
chaulmoogra seeds 21
Chaya Shirojiro 90
Cheng Ho: see Zheng He
Chettha, King (r. 1628–9) 93
Chiang Mai 45, 61, 76, 105
Chiang Rai 61
Chiang Rung 45
China, envoys to Ayutthaya 23, 67–8; maritime expeditions (1405–33) 67, 77, 83, 120–1, 137; trading regulations and tax regime 14, 17, 24–6, 73; trading relations 1–2, 19, 23–6, 42; see also tribute
Chinese community in Ayutthaya 7, 8, 10–1, 14, 24, 64–7; Chinese language use in administration 7, 27, 91, 95; Chinese role in external trade of Ayutthaya 7–8, 10–1, 14–5, 24–5, 39, 65, 68, 73, 85–6, 98, 120; Chinese traders 2–4, 8–9, 18, 24–9, 30–2, 34, 46–7, 65–6, 120–1; see also Cantonese Chinese, Hokkien Chinese, junks, Mekong (Chinese settlement), Teochiu Chinese and tribute-trade
Chodik Ratcha Setthi 50, 75
Chonburi 179–81
Chula Ratcha Montri 49, 75, 90, 94
Chulia traders 131, 133–5
civet 20, 72
Civil Hierarchy Law 5, 12–6, 38, 48–51
(translation), 74–5, 78
cloth trade 14, 18–20, 27, 42–3, 108, 129, 131, 133–5; see also satin and silk
goal trading: see trade
coconut oil 21
coinage in Ayutthaya 41
copper and copper wares 19, 21, 111, 134
coral 21, 98, 99
Coromandel Coast 14, 18, 44, 108, 128–34
cotton, raw 20
cowries 41
crockery 19
crown junks and ships: see junks (crown) and trade (crown)
Cuddalore 131
Cupangsoap 155
cutch (Thai si-siat) 20–1

Daeng Kamboja 140
Daknhs 123
Damascus 123
dammar 22, 72
Deccan 123–4, 126, 135
deer: see skins
Danish traders 44
Dhammacedi, King of Pegu 117
diamonds 146
diplomatic affairs: see External Relations
Doi Toshikatsu 97
Due Ton, King of Quang Nam 193, 203
Dutch relations 36–7
Dutch traders in Ayutthaya 7–8, 10, 12, 14, 28, 34, 44–5, 50, 66, 75, 96–7, 101–2, 128, 130–2, 140–4; in Japan 94, 141; in Malay-Indonesian ports 138–40, 148
Dvaravati period 56–8, 62, 105–12
Dyes 20–2, 69, 72, 78, 103, 108

eagle wood: see aloes wood
ebony-like woods 22, 72, 78
economic interpretations of historical events 38, 44–7, 88, 107; see also trade rivalry
Edo 90, 83
Egypt 126–7
English traders 10, 28, 43–5, 50, 128, 131, 138, 140, 142, 145–6
entrepot role: see trade
era name “Tenun” 91–2
exported goods of Thai origin 6, 19–22, 72–3, 84
External Relations and Maritime Trading Affairs. Ministry of: administration of coastal provinces 15–6, 52, 112; administration of maritime trade 4-16, 77–8, 112, 115–6, 143; diplomatic functions 16, 74; jurisdiction over foreigners 5, 10–2; minister (Kosa Thibodi, the Phra Khlang) 5, 48, 52, 74, 95, 103, 112, 125, 127–8, 143, 185; ministry structure 5–16, 38–9, 48–51, 74–8; see also junks (crowns), trade (trade agents, crown trade, monopoly goods) and warehouses (royal)

farang (ethnic term) 53
feather exports 20
firearms: see arms
fireworks 19, 27
fish, dried fish exports 21
food, exports 21, 72–3; imports 19; see also alcoholic drinks and rice
Foquia Kiza 93
foreign affairs: see External Relations
frankincense 19, 38
French traders 43–5, 50, 131–2, 142
Fujian Province 68; see also Xiamen

Gajah Madah 87
Gama, Vasco da 111
gambling dens 155, 158
gamboge 21, 156
Gangkou: Chinese pinyin name for Ha Tien
gemstones 19
geo-body 171
Ghadir khumm 136
Gia Dinh 161–2, 166, 176, 191, 193–5, 203–4
Huế 30, 98, 165, 195, 201, 203
Hung-wu, Emperor of China (r. 1368–98) 120
Hyderabad 39, 132
Ibrahim Qutb Shah of Golconda (r. 1550–80) 123
imported goods in Ayutthaya’s markets 6, 18–9, 22, 42, 44, 53
incense 21, 69, 98–9, 103
India, exports to Ayutthaya 1–2, 19, 38; see also South Asians
Indian Ocean 1, 13, 15, 38, 59, 106–7, 124
indigo 20
Indonesian archipelago and traders 1–2, 7, 8–11, 19, 21–2, 36–9, 49–50, 70, 75
ink 21
interpreters 8, 11, 13–4, 50, 90, 93–5; see also Chinese, Malay and Portuguese languages
Intharacha, King (Nakhon In, r. 1409–24) 67, 80–8
Iran: see Persia
Iraq 122
iron and iron wares 19, 21, 108
Irrawaddy basin 114
Iṣfāhan 123, 126–7
Ishin Suden 90–3, 97
Islam, cultural centers in South Asia 122–4; Shi‘i Islam 124, 129, 136; Sunni Islam 122–4, 129, 136
Ismail, Safavī ruler and founder of the Persian Empire (r. 1500–24) 122; see also South Asians
Ito Kyudai 90
Ito Toshikatsu 91
ivory 20, 32, 69, 72, 82, 91, 108, 134, 155
Jambi 1, 36–7, 139, 144, 147
Janissaries 122
Japan, diplomatic relations 27–9, 89–95
Japanese, community in Ayutthaya 7, 27–8, 39, 93–102; traders and trading relations 1, 2, 4, 7–8, 19–22, 24–30, 33, 39, 46, 89, 95–103; see also vermilion-
seal licenses
Java 2, 7, 19, 21, 37, 87, 100, 125, 132, 138–9, 144
Java, “Red-Sky” 76
Javanese community in Ayutthaya 37–8; traders 37, 50, 53
Jayavarman VII 60
jewellery 19, 21
Johor 69, 114, 132, 139–40, 147
Jolo 146–7
Julfa 126
junks, construction and repairs 8, 17, 22, 24, 68; see also ship construction
junks, crews 8–9, 14, 25, 50–1, 53, 65, 99, 142; Muslim crews 13, 120
junks, crown junk operations in China 2, 7, 14, 44, 105; in Japan 2, 7, 94, 97, 99, 101–3; in Sumatra 37; in Vietnam 7; see also ships (crown)
junks, Crown Junks Division 7–9, 13, 14, 50; see also ships (crown)
jurisdiction over foreigners: see External Relations

Kaempfer, Engelbert 100
Kalaliom Ministry 15–6
Kalinga 127
Kampong Trach 157
Kampot 151, 156–7, 160, 169, 182, 194–6, 199
Kanchanaburi 16
Kayalpatnam 133
Kecil, Raja 139
Kedah 15, 37, 111, 132, 134, 139–40, 148
Kelantan 105
khaek (ethnic term) 50–3, 75, 125
Khorat plateau 56
Khuråsán 122
Kimura Hanjemon 100–1
kitchen wares 19
Kiya Jazaemon 90
Kling traders 53, 121, 127
Konchiin 90
Korea 1, 90, 92
Kosa Thibodi, Thai Minister 48–9; see also

External Relations
Kra Isthmus 15
Krom Tha Khwa 12, 49, 75, 125
Krom Tha Klang 75
Krom Tha Sai 12, 50, 75, 125
Kui 9
Kyoto 90
labor, forced: see tax
lac, insect 21, 32, 72, 155
lacquer, raw 21, 72; lacquered goods 19
Land Kings of Cambodia 150
land transformation 56–60, 63–4
Lanna 70
Lansang 70
Lao 39, 75
Le Van Khoi 206
lead 21, 32, 72, 134
leather goods 20
Leper King: see Suriyamarin
leprosy 21
Lim Ko-nia 66
Lo Fang Pai 154
Longvek 151, 163, 195
Lopburi, House of 109, 120; political roles 59–67
Lopburi period 56–67
Lopburi River 56, 59
Lü kingdom 45
Luang Prabang 45, 152
lucranab seeds 21

Mac Cong Binh 205
Mac Cong Du 205–6
Mac Cong Tai 205–6
Mac Cuu (pinyin Zheng Mei) 151–2, 154, 156, 158–9, 160–1
Mac Dien 204
Mac Thien Tu (pinyin Zheng Tianci) 151–2, 157–218 passim
Mac Tu Diem 205
Mac Tu Dung 187–8
Mac Tu Hoang 187–8, 201
Mac Tu Lac 187
Mac Tu Sinh 205
Mac Tu Thuong 187–8
Mac Tu Tuan 205
Mac Xuan 205
Macon 11, 44–5, 100
Madras 41, 43–4, 138
Mae Klong River 56
Magellan, Ferdinand 111
Maha Thamaracha, Phra 82
Mahmud Gâvân 126
Mahmud, Sultan of Johor 139
Malabar coast 120
Malacca: see Melaka
Malay language, use in administration 8, 11
Malay peninsula 1, 3, 9, 13, 19, 37, 65, 70, 75, 77–8, 87, 100, 106, 120, 139, 141
Malay transpeninsular route: see trade
Malay traders and community in Ayutthaya 12, 50, 53, 121
Maldive Islands 3, 9, 41
Maluku 9, 41, 145
mandala (circle of power) 111
Mangrai 61
Manila 2–3, 33–5, 52, 100, 146–7
Manipur 105
manpower: see tax (labor)
manufactured goods of Thai origin 19–22
maps 37–8, 59, 107
Marriage Law 76
Marrikkar, Nallabuka 131–2
Martaban 105, 109, 114
Martaban jars 107
Masulipatnam 41, 128–9, 130–4
medicines 19, 21–2, 27, 103
Mekka 111, 123
Mekong delta, Chinese settlement 154, 170–1; extension of Vietnamese control 160–70; inland waterways 4; Vietnamese settlement 4, 30, 47, 150
Mekong valley states 45–6
Melaka, sultanate 37, 67, 69, 73, 87, 106, 108, 109, 114, 120–1, 125, 139; Portuguese possession 36, 37, 44, 87, 88, 105–6, 108, 111, 114, 126, 139; Dutch possession 44, 138–40; British possession 140
Mempawa 140
merchants: see trade and traders
mercury 111
Mergui 3, 9–10, 13, 15, 17, 22, 38, 40–1, 43–4, 52, 104–18, 129, 132–3; see also South Asians (at Mergui) and Tenasserim
Mexico 35
Mindanao 33, 145
Minh Mang, Emperor of Vietnam (r. 1820–41) 151, 206
ministry for trade and foreign affairs: see External Relations
missionaries, French 10–1, 31, 35, 45, 52; others 52
Mno Sethei Phuv: see Reaea Sethei
Mon 11, 45, 114, 116–7, 120
Mongkut, King (r. 1851–68) 83, 117
monopolies: see trade
monsoon winds: see sailing seasons
mother of pearl 32
Mrauk-u 129
Mughal Empire 1, 39, 122–4, 126, 132; trading relations 1, 39, 42–3, 128
Muhammad Astarâbâdi, Aqâ 127–8
Muhammad Sayyid Ardestani, Mir 130
Muharram 136
musk 19, 72, 111
Muslim traders and trading networks 2, 9, 10, 12, 36–44, 50, 52–3, 120–1, 124–36; see also trade
My Tho 154, 162–5, 201
nac (Vietnamese), nak (Thai), neak (Khmer): honorific prefixes to names of Khmer princes; see ang
Nagasaki 2, 7–8, 29, 90–1, 93–4, 96, 99–103
Naha 26
nai (master): see social organization
Nakhon Chaisi River 56
Nakhon In: see Intharacha
Nakhon Pathom 57
Nakhon Ratchasima 160, 185
Nakhon Sawan 57
Nakhon Si Thammarat 13, 16, 60, 93, 105, 109, 111, 140–3, 147–8, 185–7
Nan 45, 70
Nang Rong 160
Nanzenji 90
Narai, King (r. 1656–88) 36–7, 39, 42–3, 122, 125–6, 128, 132–3, 136
Naresuan, King (r. 1590–1605) 28, 33, 36
Narsinga 112
Ngam Müang 61
Nigoemon 93
Ningbo 24–5
nipa-palm wine 21, 107
Nontha Ket 12, 150, 75
Nreay Reacea: see Ang Ton

Okinawa 26
opium 108, 111
Orang Laut 139
Ottoman empire 122–4, 126, 129, 136

Pagan 104–5, 119
Pahang 105–6, 111
Paknam 50, 77
Palatine Law 110
Palembang 1, 37, 139
Panay 33
Pasak Rivers 56, 59
Patani 15, 17, 26, 37, 66, 105, 114, 141
Pathakhucham 81–4, 88
Pegu 43, 45, 104–5, 109, 114–5, 117–8, 126, 129, 133
Penang: see Pinang
pepper, black 21, 69, 72, 98, 120, 141, 157
Perak 139
perfumes 19–20, 22, 72, 103
Persia 39, 122–4; trading relations 1, 2, 9, 15, 19, 38; see also Safavî empire
Persian community in Ayutthaya 125–7, 130, 132, 135
Peru 35
Phanan Choeng Monastery 61, 66
Phang-nga 76
Phaulkon, Constantine 128
Phayao 61
Phet Racha, King (r. 1688–1703) 42
Phetburi 3, 9, 15, 57, 105
Phetchabun 57
Philippines 1–3, 7, 10, 32–5, 41, 100, 145
Phiphat Kosa 49, 52
Phiphit (Phraya Aphai Phiphit, Chiam) 179–89 passim
Phitsanulok 82, 111, 115
Phnom Penh 154–67 passim, 191–6 passim
Phra Khlang: see External Relations (Minister)
Phra Ruang 60, 67
Phrabang 82
Phraek Siracha 82
prai: see social organization
Phuket Island 13, 42, 107, 133, 142: see also Ujong Salang
Phukhao Thong Monastery 81
Phuong Than (Phuong Fort): see Say Mat
Phutthai Mat: see Banteay Meas
Pinang Island 15, 148
Ping River 56
pirates 7, 32, 76, 96, 133, 144–5, 147, 165, 177
Pondichery 44, 131–2
Pontemas, Ponteamass, Poncey Meas: variant spellings of Banteay Meas
Pontianak 154, 206
population: see settlement patterns
porcelain 6, 19, 27, 44, 70, 72, 80, 108, 126, 133
port master: see harbor master
port revenues: see External Relations (administration) and tax
Porto Novo 131–2, 134
Portuguese 14, 36, 102; community in Ayutthaya 11, 12; traders 10–1, 28, 44–5, 50, 100, 107, 114, 117, 142; language use in administration 8, 11
Prachinburi 184–5
Pranburi 2, 9
Prasat Thong, King (r. 1629–56) 29–30, 93–5, 101–2
Prasoet, Luang 80
Quang Nam, Quinam (pinyin Guangan): see Vietnam (Nguyen-ruled south)

radix china 134
Rajput states 124
Ram, Phraya 82
Ramaracha, King (r. 1395–1409) 80–2
Ramathibodi I, King (Uthong, r. 1351–69) 66, 67, 109, 120
Ramathibodi II, King (r. 1491–1529) 105, 106
Ramesuan, King (r. 1369–70 and 1388–95) 67
Ramkhamhaeng, King (r. 1279–98) 61, 71
Ratburi 57, 84
Ratcha Montri 12, 50
Ratchaburana Monastery 86, 88
Ratchasetthi, Phraya: Thai title for Reacea Sethei
rattan 22
Rayong 179
rays: see skins
Reacea Sethei, Okña (governor of Banteay Meas) 155, 157, 159, 182, 185, 191–2, 198, 207
rhinoceros, horn 21; skin 20
Riau 1, 36, 138–40, 144, 146–7
rice exports 21, 25–6, 30, 32, 37, 73; see also food
rose dew 19; rose water 111; rose wood 22
Rūm 129
Ryukyu Islands 1, 2, 7, 26–7, 68, 71, 80, 84, 86

Safavi empire (Persia) 122–7, 129–30, 135–6
sago flour 21
Saigon 4, 47, 150, 163, 165, 172, 194, 201
sailing seasons 2–4, 69, 70
Sakai 90–1
Sakai Tadayo 93
sakkina ranks 48–9
salt 21
salt peter 19, 32, 72
Sam Phraya, King (r. 1424–48) 66, 82
San 82
San Thomé (São Tomé) 41, 131–2
sandal wood 22
sapan wood (Caesalpinia sappan, Thai fang) 6, 20, 22, 32, 69, 72, 78, 80, 96, 98, 103, 134, 143
Saraburi 57
Satha: see Ang Ci
satin 19, 67, 70, 72
Sawankhalok 67, 108
Say Mat (Phuong Thanh) 155, 156–7, 159, 171
sea people: see Orang Laut
sealing wax: see wax
Seiganji Temple 90
Selangor 140
settlement patterns at Ayutthaya 56–67; settlement policy 61–3; see also Mekong delta
shahbandar 6, 52, 79
Shahr-i Naw 59, 121, 136
Shan states 45
Shanghai 24
Shantou (Swatow) 24
Sharī’ah 122
sharks: see skins
shellac: see lac
Shī’ī Islam: see Islam
Shinkodaw pagoda 117
ship construction and repairs 13, 22, 34, 43, 108; technology 141–2; see also junks
shipping: see sailing seasons, straits and vermillion-seal licences
ships, types of ocean-going vessels 4, 13, 22, 138; see also trade (crown)
Shiraz 123
shuín trading system and shuín sen junk: see vermilion-seal licenses
Si Phaphat 51
Siak 139–40
silk 19, 27, 32, 44, 67, 70, 72, 111, 126, 133
silver 17, 19, 35; silver coins 17, 41, 70, 99
Singapore 87, 148, 206
Singburi 57
Sinhalese: see Sri Lanka
Sipsong Panna 45
Tokugawa leyasu 89, 90, 92
Ton Duc Hau: Vietnamese title for Mac
Thien Tu
tortoise shells 21, 112
Toungoo: see Taung-ngu
Toyotomi Hideyoshi 90
trade, complementarity barriers (Phillippines and Vietnam) 32, 35; crown trade 2,
6–9, 13–6, 19, 24–6, 29, 31–2, 37, 41;
entrepôt role of Ayutthaya 43–4, 68, 76,
98, 120–1, 124, 134; free-trade era of
Sukhothai and Ayutthaya 71; inland
trade 65, 68, 70; intra-Asian coastal
networks 1–4, 10, 30–1, 35–40, 43–5,
65, 119–21, 128, 131–6; monopoly-
goods regime 6, 15–6, 19, 29, 42–3,
71–4, 80, 84–7, 143; see also China and
India
trade, Thai trade agents 41; in China 1–2,
16; in India 16, 41–2, 128; in Japan 1–2;
in Java 42; see also tribute trade and
warehouses (royal)
trade, transpeninsular, Mergui-Phetburi
route 3, 9–10, 13, 15, 18, 38, 43–4, 107,
133, 148; other routes 38, 64, 68, 148;
see also straits
trade rivalry, with Burma 38, 44–5, 115–6;
with Cambodia 46–7; with Mergui 113
traders: see Arabs, Armenians, Bengalese,
Cantonese Chinese, Chinese, Chulias,
Danes, English, French, Gujaratis,
Japanese, Javanese, Klings, Muslim
traders, Persians, Portuguese, South
Asians, Spanish and Teochiu Chinese
Trailok, King (r. 1448–88) 67, 74–5, 78, 110
Tranquebar 44
Trat Province 178–9, 182
Trengganu 105
tribute, to China 23, 38, 65, 67–71, 83, 88;
tribute-trading 17, 23–6, 67–71; 1754
summer trading edict 14, 26
Tuban 144
turtles 67; turtle shells 21

Udong 151, 162, 164, 167–9, 185, 192–3,
196–8
Ujung Salang (Thalang): 13, 107, 132–3,
142; see also Phuket
Utey Reacea: see Ang Ton
Uthong, House of 109–10; town 57
Uthong, King: see Ramathibodi I
Uthumphon, King (r. April–May 1758) 175
vermilion 111
vermilion-seal licenses (shuín trading
system) 90, 92, 96, 102
Vespucci, Amerigo 111
Vientiane 45, 105, 152
Vietnam; 30, 32, 47, 87; Nguyen-ruled south
(Dong Trang, Quang Nam, Quinam)
30–2, 98, 138, 150–218 passim; trading
relations 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 19, 29–32, 39, 50,
100; Trinh-ruled north (Dongjing) 30,
150; see also Mekong delta
Vietnamese community in Ayutthaya 10–2,
31; see also missionaries
Vijayanagar 123, 126
Vinh Long 190
Vinh Te Canal 157
warehouses, royal (khlang sinkha) 5–6, 15–7,
24, 29, 51, 54, 69–70, 72–4, 97, 101,
143
Water Kings of Cambodia 150
wax, sealing wax 21, 72
weapons: see arms
wine imports 35
wood exports 21–2
Wu Jang 154
Xiamen (Amoy) 24, 26, 121
Yamada Nagamasu (Okya Sena Phimuk)
93, 96–7, 102
Ye 114
Yemen 108
Yi Phraya, Prince 82, 86
Zheng He (Cheng Ho) 83–4, 137
zinc 134
Message from

Toyota Thailand Foundation

Toyota Thailand Foundation—TTF was established in October 1992 on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of operations in Thailand. The Foundation operates all activities in isolation from the social contribution of the company. It operates by using the interest gained from capital of 250 million baht under three main purposes,

1. Promote and support education at every level
2. Enhance the quality of life of Thai people and environmental conservation
3. Collaborate with other charitable organizations for benefits of the public.

Toyota Thailand Foundation has been highly honored from qualified professionals to be the Board of Directors who have taken part in the activities of the Foundation.

The Foundation believes that strengthening community and society lay on consolidated education and quality of life of people. Such important mission can be done together with development of other areas on corporation basis. Since the Foundation has established, it has organized various activities and provided support to governmental and non-governmental organizations for social benefit. Furthermore, the Foundation is very honored to be able to work academic services with high respected educational institute in generous academic activities. Our supports are indicative of the Foundation’s awareness, which is crucial for any meaningful and stable social development, finally for a better and more humane society.
TTF’s Board of Directors

Police General Pow Sarasin Chairman
Mr. Yoshiaki Muramatsu Vice Chairman
Dr. Snh Unakul Director
Dr. Phisit Pakkasem Director
Dr. Jetn Sucharitkul Director
Associate Professor Naris Chaiyasoot Director

Rector of Thammasat University
Professor Dr. Thienchay Kiranandana Director

President of Chulalongkorn University
Dr. Charnvit Kasetsiri Director
Mr. Yoshinori Omori Director

Chairman of Toyota Corporation Club
Mr. Chalao Kositsakul Director

Chairman of Toyota Dealer Club
Mr. Ninnart Chaitrirapinyo Director
Mr. Hiroshi Imai Director
Mr. Katsuyuki Yamada Director
Mr. Ekachai Rattanachaiwong Director and Secretary
TTF Executive Committee

Mr. Yoshiaki Muramatsu  President of Toyota Motor Thailand Co.Ltd.
Mr. Katsuyuki Yamada  Executive Vice President
Mr. Ninnart Chaitrirapinyo  Executive Vice President
Mr. Hiroshi Imai  Senior Executive Advisor
Mr. Ekachai Rattanachaiwong  Director
Mr. Mingkwan Sangsuwan  Director
Mr. Suthi Chanwimaluang  Associate Director
Mr. Narongchai Siriratmanawong  General Manager of Public Affairs Department
                            Secretary of Executive Committee
From Japan to Arabia: Ayutthaya’s Maritime Relations with Asia

From the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the period now known as “the Age of Commerce”, the Thai capital emerged as a flourishing entrepot in Southeast Asia. The kingdom had convenient access, to the Bay of Bengal and the Coromandel Coast, by way of Mergui and Tenasserim, and to the great Chinese markets by way of the South China Sea. During the Ayutthaya period (1351-1767) of Thai history, the kingdom was known as Siam to the various European East-India companies, as Xien-Lo to the Chinese imperial court, as Sarnau or Shahr-i Naw to Arab traders and as Shamro to Japan’s “Vermilion-Seal” merchant marine. The capital city was undoubtedly one of the most powerful port-polities in this part of the world.

Yoneo Ishii
Charnvit Kasetsiri