


MAIN REPORT ON THE MANAGEMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT



MAIN REPORT ON THE MANAGEMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(Phase II - first year : Report No.1)

by

THAILAND DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOUNDATION

Prepared in accordance with the terms of reference

of project supported by

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

ISBN 974-85579-5-2

Main Report on the Management of Economic and Social Development Project
Thailand Development Research Institute Foundation

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Published by Pinklao Press, Co., Ltd. Editor : Surin Maneedul

457/57 Arunammarin Street, Bangyikhan, Bangkoknoi, Bangkok 10700

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PREFACE

As Thailand advances in its economic development and enters into the realm of newly industrialized nations, she is faced with an administrative system that is not well equipped to assist the country in its economic development. Mainly, the administrative system is in need of reform to increase its flexibility, capacity and efficiency to cope with increased complexities and demands of the environment. No longer could the administrative system advance at its own leisurely pace, making minor adjustments as it sees fit, and aiming primarily for its own survival and expansion.

It is to this developmental issue that this research project addresses itself. Although administrative reform had been recognized as important and a number of attempts had been made in the past to improve the administrative system, past efforts had been done in a piecemeal fashion which failed to bring about changes for the system as a whole. Too, as reforms or changes were introduced to specific agency/agencies, little positive results occurred in a linkage manner to other agencies but the contrary may even be the case.

It is therefore conceived that administrative reform must be done in a concerted manner--at the macro level, involving many agencies and aiming for changes at the systemic level.

Thus, the National Committee on Administrative Reform resolved in its meeting on January 15, 1986, that an intensive study on administrative reform be made, with special emphasis on "The Management of Economic and Social Development." To obtain the maximum benefit of such a study, it was recommended that the study be divided into two phases. Phase I, lasting about a year, should focus on three areas; administrative reform, privatization, and laws and regulations related to critical development issues. This study should provide recommendations for short and medium-term solutions. Phase II would be a more intensive study aiming at long term solutions and the formulation of a comprehensive long term plan for administrative

reform. The Committee also designated the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) to undertake the study.

A research proposal was drawn up accordingly and funding for Phase I subsequently obtained from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The first phase of the project started on August 1, 1986, and ended on December 31, 1987.

This main report represents the first year product of the two and a half year project - Management of Economic and Social Development Project - Phase II. It is again carried out by TDRI with Office of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) as the executing agency.

The Phase II Project will focus on three levels of analysis: a) problems of the administrative system which contribute to its lack of performance in a newly acquired role--to assist in the economic management of the country; b) Problems that are endemic to the administrative system as a whole which contribute to its lack of performance in an accountable, responsive, responsible, and timely manner; and c) problems that are specific to agencies which are a function of evolutionary or particular nature of said agencies.

The project proposes to study these problems through an examination of the followings: 1) agencies' bureaucratic environments, 2) resource management, 3) decision making, and 4) implementation process.

Proposed solutions from the study are intended to be workable solutions containing generalized as well as specific and concrete solutions which will be implemented at the micro/agency level as well as at the macro/government administrative reform committee level. Included in this study are exchanges of ideas about problems and proposed solutions and solution alternatives with agencies under studied to procure understanding and consensus on suggested reform measures.

This main report concerns the major findings of the first year study of Phase II which is to cover the main results of 14 agencies as well as recommendations for administrative reform.

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PART I

FINAL REPORT

I. SUMMARY OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES

This part of the main report is prepared in accordance with the UN/DTEC's development contract requirement. It aims are to summarize project activities, to assess the project's contribution and to offer recommendations regarding the planning of future projects with similar objectives. It should be read in conjunction with Part II., the "Summary of Project Outputs" in which detailed findings, recommendations and outputs are described.

1. Composition of the Study Team

The TDRI study team consists of 13 research fellows and 8 research assistants. The research team comprises the following:

| | |
|----------------------------|--|
| Dr. Phaichitr Uathavikul | TDRI President/Project Advisor |
| Dr. Thinapan Nakata | Project Director |
| Dr. Chai-Anan Samudavanija | Project Advisor/ Team Leader Module 1 |
| Dr. Voradej Chandarasorn | Team Leader Module 2 |
| Dr. Bidhya Bowornwathana | Research Fellow |
| Dr. Chartchai Na Chiangmai | Research Fellow |
| Dr. Juree Vichit-Vadakan | Research Fellow |
| Dr. Likhit Dhiravegin | Research Fellow |
| Mr. Manoot Watanakomen | Research Fellow/Consultant |
| Mr. Pakorn Priyakorn | Research Fellow |
| Dr. Patan Suwanamongkol | Research Fellow |
| Dr. Patom Manirojana | Research Fellow |
| Dr. Pratyā Vesarach | Research Fellow |
| Mr. Sethaporn Cusribituck | Research Fellow/Consultant |
| Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai | Research Fellow |
| Miss Piyanart Watanakun | Executive Assistant |
| Mr. Chaowana Traimas | Research Assistant |
| Miss Jiraporn Thopaiboon | Research Assistant |

| | |
|------------------------------|--------------------|
| Mr. Nijjasarl Junpootragool | Research Assistant |
| Miss Petch Nudjavitayaporn | Research Assistant |
| Miss Roypim Therawong | Research Assistant |
| Miss Suchada Pattrachokchoui | Research Assistant |
| Miss Suntharee Tubtimthai | Research Assistant |
| Mr. Visa Pulsirirat | Research Assistant |
| Miss Chutima Ardharnpichit | Secretary |
| Miss Songsiri Suwanchinda | Supporting Staff |

The responsibility of the project director (Dr. Thinapan) is to supervise and monitor the progress of the whole project. The project advisors (Dr. Phaichitr and Dr. Chai-Anan) provide overall direction to the research. The team leaders (Dr. Chai-Anan and Dr. Voradej) are responsible for the execution of the project. Dr. Chai-Anan is also assigned to be in charge of the study of the Secretariat of the Cabinet and the Economic Cabinet. Dr. Voradej is also responsible for the study of the Ministry of Public Health. Other researchers are assigned the following studies:

- The Comptroller - General's Department
(Dr. Praty Vesarach)
- The Office of the National Environment Board
(Dr. Patan Suwanamongkol)
- The Joint Public and Private Consultative Committee
(Mr. Manoot Watanakomen)
- The Office of the Board of Investment
(Mr. Sethaporn Cusipituck)
- The Ministry of Interior
(Mr. Pakorn Priyakorn)
- The Ministry of Education
(Dr. Likhit Dhiravegin)
- The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
(Dr. Bidhya Bowornwathana)
- The Department of Agriculture
(Dr. Patom Manirojana)

- The Department of Agricultural Extension
(Dr.Chartchai Na Chiangmai)
- The Department of Public Welfare
(Dr.Juree Vichit-Vadakan)
- The Department of Foreign Trade
(Dr.Surakiart Sathirathai)

2. Project Execution

The execution of the project was carried out in four phases :

Phase 1 covering January 1 - July 31, 1988

Phase 2 covering August 1-31, 1988

Phase 3 covering September 1 - November 16, 1988

Phase 4 covering November 17, 1988 - January 31, 1989

Four sets of activities undertaken can be described according to the four phases of project as follows:

2.1 January 1, 1988 - July 31, 1988 : Completion of the first draft of individual reports.

The activities performed in this phase included :

(1) Assumption, arrangement requirements and key variables employed in the study of selected agencies were reviewed by the team leader and colleagues.

(2) Relevant documents and literature such as laws, regulations, minutes of meetings, on organizational setting and work process of selected agencies were collected. Resource persons who have knowledge and access to information on the management of each agency under the target of study were identified and contacted.

(3) In-depth interview guidelines and sets of questionnaires were constructed and pretested in particular agencies.

(4) In-depth interviews were conducted and questionnaires were mailed to relevant officials of the agencies under study.

(5) A number of field trips to various provinces representing five regions of Thailand were made to collect first hand information on the performance of the agencies under study.

(6) The collected data and information were processed and analyzed. The first draft of individual reports was then completed.

2.2 August 1-31, 1988 : In-house seminar

The first draft of each individual report was circulated to other members of the research team and two external resource persons to elicit opinions and comments. A deliberation session on the first draft of reports was then held in August 27, 1988.

2.3 September 1, 1988 - November 15, 1988 : Revision of the draft report and workshop

The research team revised the draft report by taking proceeding of the in-house seminar and additional data collected from relevant agencies into account. The workshop was then held during November 3-16, 1988. At the workshop, the research team presented the preliminary findings and recommendations to a group of senior representatives of 14 agencies under study as well as a number of invited academicians and resource persons. The workshop achieved a great degree of consensus as well as suggestions on the findings and recommendations from the representatives of agencies under study. The highlights of the workshop were reported separately in a document entitled "Summary Proceedings : Workshop on the Management of Economic and Social Development."

2.4 November 16, 1988 - January 31, 1989 : Completion of the final report

This last period was devoted to review and analysis of comments and suggestions generated at the workshops. The resulting conclusions from this analysis were used in the writing of the final version of the report, which was finished at the end of the research period.

II. IMPACT OF THE PROJECT

At the very beginning, almost all agencies selected for investigation by the research team were quite reserved with regard the project. This attitude, however, changed to a great extent when the Project Director, the Team Leaders, and the researchers responsible for investigation of the agencies held their first meetings with the agencies high authorities (the Directors-General and the Deputy DGs).

These first meetings were very important and significantly contributed to the success of the research. During the meetings, the Project objectives, scope, methodologies, procedures and expectations were clearly spelled out. Questions were openly raised, comments were welcome, and suspicions died out. As a result of these initial meetings, the agencies either appointed their working groups or assigned specific individuals to assist the researchers. Their assistance was helpful in the data collection and analysis of the research.

Of more importance, the working groups and assigned individuals had the opportunity to work closely with the researchers. They themselves could view the situations and problems of their own organization and share their ideas with the researchers. Mutual exchanges of information and opinions between the two parties and between the researchers and other members of the agencies formed the basis for practical guideline for improvement of the agencies. Thus, even before the completion of the project, some key members of the

agencies already developed certain remedial measures for their agencies.

By the end of the Project, it was evident that the responsible authorities of the agencies clearly saw the needs and direction for the improvement of their agencies. Their eagerness was reflected in the setting up of working groups to implement the recommendations from the research. The Project researchers were called upon for more detailed guidance in the implementation process.

III. SOME LIMITATIONS OF THE PROJECT

Even though most agencies welcome the Project team's investigation, two agencies could not avail itself for the study. The Bank of Thailand and the Secretariat of the Prime Minister which were concerned with the confidentiality of their work, made an excuse not to be included in the project. Therefore the Project Director and the team leader had to choose the Economic Cabinet and the Office of the National Environment Board instead.

Another limitation was found in the expectation of the investigated agencies themselves. In a sense, not until later stages of investigation high ranking officials of the agencies began to reveal "confidential" stories of their agencies in an open manner. These stories were helpful for the researchers to draw a more reliable picture of the organizations, identify the symptoms of the problems and offer appropriate recommendations for the cure. In addition, realizing that the findings would be submitted to the National Committee on Administrative Reform, various agencies would rather see their yet unanswered needs appear in the research report. On this issue, the researchers were skillful enough to stand with the fact and professional judgments which fortunately were respected by the agencies.

PART II

SUMMARY OF PROJECT OUTPUTS

I. INTRODUCTION

The following summaries of project outputs present the findings, analysis, and recommendations of all reports generated in Phase II of the project. The order of the reports is as follows:

- Report #1 : "Main Report on the Management of Economic and Social Development Project - Phase II" ;
- Report #2 : "Main Report on the Management of Economic and Social Development Project - Phase II : The Thai Version" ;
- Report #3 : "The Secretariat of the Cabinet," by Dr.Chai-Anan Samudavanija ;
- Report #4 : "The Economic Cabinet," by Dr.Chai-Anan Samudavanija ;
- Report #5 : "The Comptroller General's Department," by Dr.Pratya Vesarach ;
- Report #6 : "The Office of the National Environment Board," by Dr. Patan Suwanamongkol ;
- Report #7 : "The Joint Public and Private Consultative Committee," by Mr. Manoot Watanakomen ;
- Report #8 : "The Office of the Board of Investment," by Mr. Sethaporn Cusripituck ;
- Report #9 : "Management for the Development of the Ministry of Public Health," by Dr. Voradej Chandarasorn ;

- Report #10 : "The Ministry of Interior : Strengths and Weaknesses of Ministerial Level Agencies in Development Administration," by Assistant Professor Pakorn Preeyakorn ;
- Report #11 : "The Ministry of Education : Problems and Reform Proposal," by Dr. Likhit Dhiravegin ;
- Report #12 : "The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives," by Dr. Bidhya Bowornwathana ;
- Report #13 : "The Department of Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives," by Dr. Patom Manirojana ;
- Report #14 : "Management Improvement Study of Department of Agriculture Extension, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives," by Dr. Chartchai Na Chiangmai ;
- Report #15 : "The Department of Public Welfare, Ministry of Interior," by Dr. Juree Vichit-Vadakan ;
- Report #16 : "The Department of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce," by Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai ; and
- Report #17 : "Summary Proceedings : Workshop on the Management of Economic and Social Development."

II. SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL REPORTS

The research carried out in Phase II of the project yields both findings and recommendations which are presented in detail in individual reports. In this main report the findings and recommendations of the individual reports are summarized and organized into 14 parts, as follows :

1. The Secretariat of the Cabinet ;
2. The Economic Cabinet ;
3. The Comptroller - General's Department ;
4. The Office of the National Environment Board ;
5. The Joint Public and Private Consultative Committee ;
6. The Office of the Board of Investment ;
7. Management for the Development of the Ministry of Public Health ;
8. The Ministry of Interior : Strengths and Weaknesses of Ministerial Level Agencies in Development Administration ;
9. The Ministry of Education : Problems and Proposed Reforms ;
10. The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives;
11. The Department of Agriculture
12. Management Improvement Study of the Department of Agricultural Extension ;
13. The Department of Public Welfare ; and
14. The Department of Foreign Trade.

1. The Secretariat of the Cabinet

Introduction

The Secretariat of the Cabinet is an extremely important agency which coordinates activities and links the Cabinet, the ministries, agencies, and public enterprises within a national decision-making network. This is accomplished through screening and preparing the agenda for Cabinet level decisions.

Realizing its important role, the research team selected the Secretariat of the Cabinet for analysis and paid particular attention to the external and internal environments (its mandate, organization, and work process) which impact on its decision making, implementation, and resource management. The main purpose of this study was to evolve recommendations to improve the Secretariat's and compare it to other central policy agencies in order to formulate an appropriate model for improving the Thai bureaucracy.

Documents, case studies, interviews, observation, and workshop participants provided significant sources of information for the research which was conducted from January to December 1988.

The Findings

In general, it was evident that a political regime in which power is concentrated in the Prime Minister has impacts strongly on the role of the Secretariat of the Cabinet.

Within the past three years (after the present Secretary took up his post) there has been significant restructuring of the Secretariat. This has resulted in the increasing capability of the Secretariat to welcome, screen, and propose matters to the Cabinet for decision. Judgments made by the Secretariat were within the legal framework (laws, regulations, orders, and Cabinet resolutions).

The decision-making process. The Secretariat assigned coordinators to collect information, follow-up, and check on the reliability of data. The coordinators reported regularly to high ranking officials. This process -- and the information gathered -- equipped superiors with bases on which to make decisions and prepared them well to cope with various problems in advance. Using this method, the Secretariat could analyze and offer decision alternatives to the Cabinet whenever needed. Thus, the role of the Secretariat of the Cabinet has changed -- from simply collecting proposals from government agencies and public enterprises and preparing an agenda -- to a real mechanism supporting Cabinet decision making.

In following the above approach the Secretariat of the Cabinet relied on the Policy and Plan Co-Ordination Division which reviewed issues and followed up on Cabinet decisions. Its work was further supported by the Information Center. Though still early in its development, it was expected that such a management process would result in the construction of a coordinating and planning system and, in the long run, a complete information center. The Secretariat was making positive headway toward such arrangement.

The Implementation Process. Many changes occurred as a result of the Secretariat's leadership in terms of implementation. The present Secretary has the know-how and strong interest in development. He paid strong attention to the Council of Ministers Meeting Division, the Legal Affairs Division, and the General Affairs Division. A new analytical section was established within the Council of Ministers Meeting Division. Knowledgeable and competent personnel were recruited to strengthen the Secretariat. Systematic procedures were set for screening matters before submission to the cabinet. In addition, coordination mechanisms with other related agencies such as the Secretariat of the Prime Minister were improved. Also a handbook on procedures for submitting matters to the Cabinet for decision was prepared and released to all government agencies. These efforts

contributed to the efficiency of the Secretariat of the Cabinet. Nonetheless, the work of the Secretariat was always constrained by limitations of time and personnel.

Recommendations

A number of recommendations were made based on the findings. There is a need to review, improve, and revise the decree which established the Secretariat. Further, the scope of the Secretariat's duties and responsibilities should be clearly spelled out. The Secretariat should follow up on the work done by the Budget Bureau on reclassifying the major functions of the government. This would increase the analytical quality of the Secretariat analysts. The Secretariat should set up a system -- a coordinating network for the evaluation of urgent matters; it should also establish a pool of analysts to support its work. The information center should be part of the national information system and should be responsible for initiating policy opinions for the Cabinet; organizing projects to promote interagency and intergovernment knowledge and understanding; and designing Cabinet submission forms on which matters needing Cabinet decision are described. It should organize a complete government agency-Secretariat coordination system under which working committees would be set up to review the laws, rules, regulations, orders, and resolutions which involve submissions to the Cabinet. Further, the role of related control policy agencies should be reviewed and revised to support and conform to the role of the Secretariat of the Cabinet.

2. The Economic Cabinet

Introduction

The Economic Cabinet is a recent phenomenon in Thailand. It was created amidst the rapid social and economic changes of the 1970s which resulted in the extensive expansion of the bureaucracy at all levels. At the same time central policy agencies also increased their role in the national economic and fiscal planning; however what was lacking were the mechanisms to manage national economic policy. Within this context the Economic Cabinet was created in 1980.

This study was made with the following objectives.

1. To study the environment which produced a new decision-making structure for economic policy and measures (the Economic Cabinet).
2. To analyze the role of the Economic Cabinet and the outcome of its role.
3. To analyze the institutionalization of the Economic Cabinet and make recommendations regarding its acceptance.
4. To compare findings of this study of the Economic Cabinet with findings involving other central policy bodies.

As there is a dearth of literature/information on the Economic Cabinet, the researcher mainly relied on accessible documents and in particular on information collected through interviews with individuals involved. It goes without saying that the issue of confidentiality which shadowed the activities of the Economic Cabinet was a major constraint in obtaining information for this study.

Major findings

The Economic Cabinet was created out of the pressing need to cope with rapid world and national economic change. Initially (in 1980), it was designed to serve as an inner cabinet administering national economic policy and as a monitoring mechanism for policy

implementation. Therefore the early Economic Cabinet was a small informal body offering economic advice to the government. It was chaired by a Deputy Prime Minister.

Two years later, a new Economic Cabinet was formed. This time the Prime Minister himself served as chairman and the Economic Cabinet grew in size. Also, as its role somewhat overlapped with other central policy agencies (such as the National Economic and Social Development Board, and the Budget Bureau,) it had to steer its course very carefully in order to avoid conflicts with these agencies. This was successfully achieved because of two factors: (1) the Prime Minister made a personal effort to push operations; and (2) the secretariat staff (the NESDB) was skillful and sensitive in supporting the Economic Cabinet. Obviously, technocrats played major roles in the Economic Cabinet while participating political bodies were diverse; thus, there was a lack of dominance by or power concentration in any particular party.

The Economic Cabinet functioned through compromise among participating agencies. The Secretariat helped to screen the agenda and set priorities on issues to be reviewed. During Economic Cabinet discussions, the Prime Minister made compromises, reduced conflicts, and avoided political deals. Open and extensive debate in the Economic Cabinet gave way to adjusted ideas and conclusions. The adopted resolutions were submitted for acknowledgment by the Cabinet. In this sense, the Economic Cabinet could make its own economic policies. It was evident that leadership on the part of the Prime Minister played a significant role in the Economic Cabinet decision. Thus due to his role, critical information needed to support Economic Cabinet decisions was aimed mainly at the Prime Minister rather than at the Economic Cabinet as a whole.

Economic technocrats and academics prepared and fed information; therefore, the performance of the Economic Cabinet depended on the cooperation among technocrats and between technocrats and other civil servants or ministers.

The NESDB, which served as the secretary of the Economic Cabinet had an additional role added to its planning function. It could now supervise and administer economic policies without intervention or pressure from political bodies and without competition from other central policy agencies which did not participate in the Economic Cabinet. Members of the secretarial staff, however, did not regard this role as their major function. Also, due to personnel limitations, the NESDB could not devote enough time to do this job as efficiently as it should have been done. The staff lacked clear direction as to the expectation of high officials on the role and authority of the Economic Cabinet. They could not expand their role to monitor the Economic Cabinet resolutions. And, other bureaucratic agencies felt that the NESDB took too dominant a role in economic policy.

Recommendations

Based on the above findings, it was recommended that the resolutions made by the Economic Cabinet needed approval (not mere acknowledgment) by the Cabinet. In fact, the Cabinet should appoint its own committee, small in size, consisting of economic ministers. The Secretary of the Cabinet should serve as the secretary of the committee. This committee might set up working groups or sub-committees drawing members from experts or representatives from various agencies. At the present time, as the Secretariat of the Cabinet lacks sufficiently skilled staff, the secretarial staff of the Economic Cabinet might function on a joint secretarial basis. On the one hand, the Secretariat of the Cabinet could take care of meetings and follow-up on Economic Committee resolutions. On the other hand, the NESDB could assist in preparing information and analyzing decision alternatives. Adopting this recommendation would reduce the level of political and bureaucratic hostility toward the NESDB. It would also help the Economic Committee receive information, opinions, and alternatives from various other sources.

In general, it is found that the most appropriate alternatives are those which allow politicians and technocrats-academics to work in a conducive environment. Both parties could work within their respective domains. The politicians would make decisions while the technocrats-academics proposed data, opinions, and alternatives as the bases for decision. In this context the Economic Cabinet would continue to function as a principal mechanism in the management and coordination of economic policy.

3. The Comptroller General's Department

Introduction

The CGD is one of the most important central departments responsible for overseeing and controlling public revenue and expenditures. Its main task is to ensure that rules and regulations are strictly observed by all public agencies when receiving revenue and spending their budgets. In addition it plays a significant role in supplying fiscal and monetary information, opinions, and alternatives to support the decision-making process of the government and other policy-making bodies.

There were two major objectives in studying the CGD:

1. To analyze the environment, the decision-making process, the implementation process, and the management of resources so that appropriate recommendations could be made to improve the department's efficiency.

2. To compare the results of these findings with those of other departments so that meaningful recommendations to improve the Thai bureaucracy can be made.

To fulfill the above objectives, various techniques were used to collect and analyze data. These included analyzing documents (laws, regulations, orders, memos, working documents, texts, and articles); conducting interviews (of administrators at all levels); doing case studies (both issue-specific and function-specific); administering questionnaires; observing; holding seminars and conferences; and getting feedback from CGD working groups and administrators.

Major findings

For the most part, the CGD's major effort is to oversee and check on the real expenditures of public agencies. This is done through two important mechanisms: (1) laws and regulations; and (2) authority

vested under the umbrella of the Ministry of Finance. Implementing units include provincial and district CGD offices.

Another CGD task is more technical and involves supplying data, opinions, analyses, and alternatives to the government, the Ministry of Finance, and other policy-making bodies, with regard to public debts, public salary structures, permanent employee management etc. The policy aspect of CGD is generally not publicly evident as CGD is generally perceived as an implementing department whose final decisions are made by other departments, the Ministry of Finance, or the Cabinet.

Conclusions on each of the four research variables were reached as follows :

The environment

CGD's environment offers certain support. The department is rather free from political pressure or interference. It is also free from attractive fringe benefits. Thus, CGD staff members are usually secure about their working conditions. They follow clear guidelines and rely on laws and regulations in making judgments.

On the other hand, however, the environment has made operating procedures routine, and the staff relies little on personal discretion. The situation has caused relative lack of (1) initiative, (2) comprehensive overview of issues, and (3) attempts to modernize its management system. The department is trapped in daily operations and is little interested in adapting itself to suit external development efforts, needs, and the changing environment.

Also, relying too strictly on laws and regulations has limited the CGD's flexibility. It is thus quite difficult to change procedures as this will require a chain of improvement -- in laws and various other regulations.

In 1985, the CGD was restructured. Underlying this effort was an attempt to sharply separate technical divisions from daily implementing divisions. Under this scheme, technical divisions were

staffed with more educated personnel (most hold at least a B.A. degree) while implementing divisions were allotted non-degree holders. The separation had some negative impact. Improvements or recommendations for improvement are not initiated by personnel familiar with the divisions. At the same time, the technical divisions are increasingly swamped by other routine jobs and special assignments. Special assignments have created pressure for already overburdened personnel. Thus, work quality and development tasks are affected.

The decision-making process

Decision making in the CGD can be categorized into two types: (1) decisions which end within the CGD; and (2) decisions which end outside--for instance, at the Ministry level, in the Cabinet or in other D.M. bodies. Most type 2 decisions are urgent matters requiring the CGD to supply information, opinions, or decision alternatives.

In general, the CGD's D.M. process relies on clear discretion mechanisms, mostly legal. It also goes through well-defined lines of command. This has made considerations more cautious. Nonetheless, the process is slow. Also CGD technical personnel still lack experience and have too narrow a view to suggest alternatives that sufficiently cover dimensions for development.

In addition, personnel lack initiative in giving opinions or suggesting new approaches to facilitate change and development. They still wait for orders from their supervisors.

The implementing process

This process is similar to the D.M. process. The "line of command" is the basic work principle. Its advantage lies in standard patterns and procedures; yet, relying too heavily on laws, regulations, and strict guidelines has caused an inflexibility in making judgments. Also, there is a strong attitudinal preference for preventative measures, which encourages the issuance of various

regulations and measures which cause an unnecessary increase in the burden and prevent CGD from moving toward a development role -- giving advice, suggesting preventative measures, and promoting the efficiency of other public agencies.

Inseparable from the implementing process is coordination. If other units are not concerned with supplying necessary materials and information, the process will be stalled.

Resource management

People, materials, and money are significant resources beyond management. There are not many complaints raised regarding financial support as the CGD's budget is usually allotted at a definite limit. Personnel and materials, however, are matters of concern.

In general, CGD personnel are honest, highly responsible, and loyal to the department. Though there are fewer personnel than are needed, they are able to handle their assignments well enough, except for occasional slowness. However, only about 20 percent of CGD personnel hold degree. This results in low analysis quality. Also the technical staff is overburdened, and most provincial staff members cannot aptly serve as advisers to other provincial officials.

Further, the CGD lacks sufficient technological information and materials. It is still not advanced in such technology and in many areas relies heavily on human resources for data analysis and processing. With sufficient information technology support (for example, access to or its own computer network) CGD's efficiency would be greatly enhanced.

Recommendations

From a macro view, although the CGD must continue with its present duties, it needs to change its role and attitude. Its role should move to prevention and development and away from control. This

means that the department should delegate more of the "checking and controlling" task to the public agencies and other responsible bodies such as the Office of the Auditor General. The CGD's role should be to emphasize predictive analysis for prevention purposes rather than to solve problems. It should pay more attention to its developmental role by initiating systems and regulations which promote public agency spending efficiency and make them more responsible and cautious. This type of work is technical and requires better-quality staff.

To change its role, the CGD should :

1. Survey and analyze its present duties and adjust them to fit into a new development approach. Duties falling within the responsibility or capability of other public agencies should be relinquished to those agencies.

2. Shorten its procedures and require less paperwork.

3. Review its present duties within a preventative and development framework (which will reduce some types of work) and pay more attention to new functions such as generating information and system design.

4. Allocate human resources and develop a human resource development plan in accordance with new direction.

5. Speed up information networking within the entire department.

6. Set up working groups to handle the CGD's development plan and mobilize support resources.

4. The Office of the National Environment Board

Introduction

The Office of the National Environment Board, founded in 1975, is a relatively new agency; it is presently attached to the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Energy. Its mission is threefold : to formulate policies and plans on environmental management; to give advice and make recommendations to government agencies, state enterprises and the public sector on all environment matters; and to coordinate with other agencies on environmental issues.

The sources of information for this research were related documents, interviews, case studies, and observations.

The Findings

The external environment of the Office is, by nature, highly political as environmental issues often involve various societal groups with differing objectives and interests. Such differences sometimes lead to conflicts which affect government policy. Thus, the highest political decision-making body (the Cabinet) often makes both technical and political decisions on the environment. Therefore the Office of the National Environment Board must perform carefully, examining technical principles, maintaining neutrality, and relying heavily on the technical strength, experience and skills of its staffs. The careful performance of its role was important in reducing political pressure and enabled the Office to be effective in its advisory role to national decision-making bodies.

During the past thirteen years, the Office has played an increasingly important role in national environmental management.

The Office was strengthened and supported by its leadership--the high-ranking authorities--and the clarity of the Office's legal mandates. Further, more than half of the staff members are degree

holders possessing the technical and professional skills required by the Office. Though working within personnel and budget constraints, the staff worked patiently and stood firm on principle. In addition, there was external support for human resource development and for the purchasing of equipment. Further, the Office had the flexibility to offer project commissions to outside experts and this contributed to the Office's achievement.

However, the Office operated under a number of constraints. First of all, the lack of political will for the long-term protection and improvement of the environment was reflected in the budget allotment to environmental programs (less than one percent of the total national budget). Second, there is a lack of coordination among the related agencies in charge of environment management. The agencies work within their own specific laws and standards. Third, the fact that the Office is attached to the Ministry of Science, Technology and Energy rather than the Office of the Prime Minister to which it had been attached during its first few years of operations had weakened the Office's authority and reduced its status in relation to other central policy agencies such as the Budget Bureau, the NESDB, and the Civil Service Commission--all of which are attached to the Office of the Prime Minister. Fourth, the Office's organizational structure was not responsive to the rapidly changing environment. Fifth, the Office lacked an information center to support decisions by top Office and Board administrators. Sixth, the quality of the analysis /synthesis skills of staff member varied. Seventh, there were too few subordinate staff members to assist analysts and technicians in handling meetings and administrative matters. Finally, some systems (for instance, sorting mail and follow up procedures), were not streamlined for effective performance.

Recommendations

Recommendations are separated into immediate and long-term recommendations.

The immediate recommendations include, among others:

1. The expansion of the target audience for public relations-- to include national and local politicians and government agency executives.
2. Giving more emphasis to monitoring, evaluation, and meeting functions. Appropriate personnel should be allocated accordingly to these functions.
3. Expediting the establishment of a central information unit within the Office.
4. Improving filing and documentation procedures.
5. Developing the analytical and research capability of the staff.
6. Emphasizing team-work among staff members.

The long-term recommendations include:

1. Developing long-term organizational restructuring plan for the Office.
2. Decentralizing the environmental management role and authority to the provincial and local levels.
3. The establishment of regional environmental centers in areas seriously suffering from environmental problems.
4. Reviewing and rearranging the major functions of the government so that national central agencies such as the Office of the National Environment Board remain close to the national political and administrative center.

5. The Joint Public and Private Consultative Committee

Introduction

The Main objectives of the study of the Joint Public and Private Consultative Committee (JPPCC) were as follows:

1. To explore the state and conditions of the JPPCC and identify its managerial problems, including those of government and the private organizations concerned.
2. To suggest guidelines for future improvement.

The scope of the study covers four variables: the bureaucratic environment; resource management; the decision-making process; and implementation. The researchers did a review of the literature, conducted in-depth interviews, analyzed questionnaire responses , conducted non-participation observations, and did case studies to generate the data used in this study.

Major Findings

The Bureaucratic Environment

The bureaucratic environment has three sub-variables: The organizational mandate, structure, and work process. Major findings were as follows:

1. Generally, the JPPCC plays an important role in the promotion of mutual understanding between the government and the private sector.
2. In principle, the JPPCC is an economic consultative committee of the government, but in practice it usually passes resolutions and assigns work and responsibilities to government organizations. The JPPCC is, therefore, perceived to be a decision-making committee. Most government officials are not content with its resolutions and practices; and the private sector is also expects the JPPCC to play a role in making decisions on important economic problems.

3. Being the secretariat of the JPPCC, the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) set up a division (PPCD) to be responsible for the secretarial work of the JPPCC. Considering its organizational structure and economic expertise, the NESDB should continue to act as the JPPCC's secretariat. Furthermore, the NESDB should not, as a central policy agency, be responsible for promoting and following-up of the Provincial Joint Public and Private Consultative Committee (PJPPCC) as these are operational activities. However, the structure of the Public and Private Cooperation Division (PPCD) is not suit for these tasks. Divisions are divided into "branches" and the PPCD now has three "Branches" -- the industrial plan coordinating branch, the commercial plan coordinating branch, and the public enterprise branch -- and one ad-hoc unit called the "Work Group" that is responsible for public and private cooperation.

4. According to the JPPCC resolution of early 1987, the Ministry of Interior, being in charge of the cooperation and promotion of the PJPPCC has assigned the responsibility of cooperation to the Office of Policy and Planning (OPP). However, the present structure of the OPP is not suit to this responsibility.

5. Private institutes cooperating with the JPPCC system are the Thai Chamber of Commerce (TCC), the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI), the Association of Thai Banks (ATB) and the Joint Standing Committee on Trade, Industry and Banking (JSCTIB). The JSCTIB is responsible for reviewing private institute opinions and making suggestions before submitting recommendations to the JPPCC.

6. Both the TCC and FTI reorganized to facilitate and support the JPPCC.

7. The JPPCC network at the provincial level consists of the PJPPCC, the Provincial Chamber of Commerce (PCC), and the Provincial Sub-committee of FTI (PSFTI). At the end of July 1988, 63 PJPPCCs, 72 PCCs and 7 PSFTIs were established.

8. Most of the members of PJPPCCs, both from the private and the public sector, still misunderstand the concept of public and private cooperation. That is, government officials perceive that the PJPPCC is a committee to serve the business community while the business community expect the PJPPCC to solve its problems.

9. Most of PJPPCCs have too many members. Furthermore, on most of the PJPPCCs, there are more government members than private members.

Resource Management

Resource management involves personnel, finance, and equipment. Major findings were as follows:

1. The NESDB has an adequate number of qualified personnel and personal computers to do the work on public and private cooperation. To carry out this work, the NESDB is not given a government budget allocation but has received financial support from the U.S. government.

2. There are two people responsible for public and private cooperation in the OPP. At the provincial level, none of the PGO officials is directly responsible for such work. In mid 1988, the Office of the Civil Service Commission approved the three-year human resources plan which specified one position (Policy and Plan Analyst P.C. 3-5) for each Provincial Governor Office (PGO) which would be responsible for such work. This position is yet to be filled; PGOs do not yet receive an allocation to cover this position.

3. The ATB has appointed one consultant to its executive committee to coordinate and to be responsible for public and private cooperation. The TCC and the TFI have also set aside personnel to carry out these responsibilities. Further, these three private institutes have contributed Baht 420,000 a year to the JPPCC for public relations and seminars.

The Decision-making Process

The three sub-variables here are the information system, analysis/synthesis, and decision-making. Major findings were:

1. As the secretariat, the NESDB goes through the inflow accounts sent from public and private organizations before passing them on to the sub-committee on Agenda Review and the JPPCC (in that order) for consideration. Occasionally, the sub-committee makes decisions instead of submitting a request directly to the JPPCC.

2. When going through the inflow accounts, the PPCD of the NESDB has to collect data, information and comments from related divisions in the NESDB and from other public and private organizations. Two methods of data collection are used: personal contracts; and inter-organizational meetings.

3. The PPCD principles of analysis and recommendations are based on government policy, development plans, national economic returns, and government revenue.

4. The JPPCC prefers to pass resolutions and assign responsibilities to government organizations this causes dissatisfaction among government officials from the agencies mentioned above.

The Implementation Process

The implementation process consists of the four following sub-variables: The information system, pre-operations, operations and feed-back. Major findings were:

1. The JPPCC and the majority of PJPPCCs prefer to play a problem-solving rather than development role.

2. The NESDB tends to play a role in coordinating the industrial investment plan at the provincial level instead of encouraging PJPPCCs to handle this activity.

3. The OPP lacks personnel and organizational readiness to take charge of promoting and following-up on PJPPCCs.

4. The results of NESDB and OPP promotion and follow-up operations have not been made known to the PJPPCCs.

Recommendations

1. The JPPCC

(a) The JPPCC must be reconstituted as a consultative committee, and relinquish its decision-making role. Therefore, its terms of reference should be clearly defined. In practice, the JPPCC should deal with economic issues in principle. Its resolutions and recommendations should go as orders to government organizations for implementation, but should be submitted directly to the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Economic, or the Cabinet for consideration.

(b) The JPPCC should emphasize its developmental role and also encourage PJPPCCs to play this role.

2. The NESDB

(a) The NESDB should continue as Secretariat after the JPPCC's terms of reference are improved. The NESDB should pave the way for transferring PJPPCC promotion and follow-up responsibilities to the OPP and also find additional funding for the OPP to carry out these responsibilities.

(b) The NESDB should coordinate with the public and private organizations concerned in order to establish an information system for public and private cooperation, including information exchange networks.

(c) The monitoring results of the PJPPCC should be compiled and submitted to the JPPCC, the agencies concerned, and to the provinces as feed-back.

(d) The NESDB must transfer the entire responsibility for coordinating industrial investment plans from the PPCD to PJPPCCs, e.g.

- Improve the capability of PGOs to study and survey the feasibility of industrial, agricultural, and agro-industrial promotion.
- Analyze provincial studies and coordinate with private institutes to attract the interest of national investors.

- Encourage and promote PGOs, the Secretariat of PJPPCCs, to formulate a public and private investment plan based on positive-sum game concepts.

(e) The NESDB's reconsideration of the intra-unit arrangement of the PPCD in the revision of the next three-year human resources plan is necessary. The "branch" devoted to public and private cooperation should be set up instead of the existing ad-hoc unit so-called the "Work Group".

3. The OPP

(a) By issuing a department regulation, an informal section for public and private cooperation should be established within the Social and Vocational Development Division. Human resource allocations from other divisions to this new section also necessary. The OPP can ask the Office of the Civil Service Commission to adjust the next three-year human resources plan if PJPPCC promotion and follow-up activities continue to expand.

(b) The OPP should develop an information system on the PJPPCC; however, it is necessary to coordinate this with the NESDB as the responsibility of data collection is set aside.

(c) Promoting public and private cooperation at the provincial level will not be effective unless emphasis is placed on both public and private organizations. The OPP should link with the TCC and the FTI in the form of a joint committee on public and private cooperation promotion in the Ministry of Interior.

4. The PJPPCC

(a) A PJPPCC should have small number of members, comprising an equal number of members from both the public and private sector. Also the PJPPCC should appoint sub-committees on business or production to garner wider private participation at the provincial level.

(b) The NESDB should work closely with the OPP to help PJPPCCs realize their proper role in development which must be based on the positive-sum game concept.

(c) PGOs' administrative constraints must be eliminated. Human resource shortages will be rectified after the three-year human resources plan is adopted. The OPP should closely cooperate with the NESDB to hold regular seminars on public and private cooperation at the provincial level and find at least Baht 5,000 p.a. as additional budget for each province for this purpose.

(d) The TCC should cooperate with the OPP in formulating guidelines and following-up on PCCs as well as PJPPCCs and PGOs to ensure PCCs' development.

(e) NO PCC should ask for financial support from the government because they will be bureaucratized by other government agencies.

5. Other

(a) The government should allocate monies to concerned government organizations especially the NESDB, the OPP and PGOs.

(b) The Parliament should set up an extraordinary committee pertaining to public-and private-sectors cooperation.

Conclusions

The above recommendations will affect the profile of the JPPCC system in the future as follows:

(1) The JPPCC will assume responsibility as a consultative committee whose role is to give advice and make suggestions to the government on economic matters.

(2) Understanding of the concept of public and private cooperation will be broadened.

(3) Cooperation between the two sectors will strengthen rural industrial development efforts which will have a direct impact on production and employment in the agricultural and agro-industrial sectors.

6. The Office of the Board of Investment

Introduction

The Office of the Board of Investment (OBOI) is an important agency which serves as a vital tool for national economic and social development. It was necessary to establish this body to draw investment funds from abroad and its main task is to promote and control investment. In addition, it plays a significant role in supplying investment information, opinions, and alternatives which support Board of Investment and government decision making.

The main objectives of the study on the OBOI were as follows:

1. To analyze the bureaucratic environment, decision-making process, implementation process, and the management of resources so that appropriate recommendations can be made to improve the efficiency of the OBOI.

2. To compare these findings with those on other central policy agencies so that meaningful recommendations to improve the Thai bureaucracy can be made.

To fulfill the above objectives, various techniques were used to collect and analyze data. These included analyzing documents (laws, rules and regulations, orders, memos, working documents, texts, and articles); conducting in-depth interviews (of administrators at all levels); doing case studies; observing; participating in meetings, seminars and conferences; and getting feedback from OBOI administrators.

The Findings

The mandate

The OBOI performs within the mandate of the Investment Promotion Act 1977 which extensively empowers the Board to make decisions on all issues regarding investment. However, the Act is too detailed and

thus could not be completely implemented; indeed, some articles were not flexible enough to apply to present conditions. Also, on the investment promotion certificate, no expiration date was set. This created an insurmountable task for the OBOI, as every investment project required continuous monitoring as none had a definite end point.

The authority

The OBOI has the power to promote and control. It is broadly empowered to perform a one-stop service on investment matters. However, due to bureaucratic procedures, it cannot completely perform such functions.

The structure

The present structure could not effectively cope with the increasing number of investment requests over the past few years. thus, certain units were assigned the task of handling provincial investment. The Office of the Secretary, the Project Analysis Division, the Incentives Supervision Division, and the Project Control Division were heavily loaded. There was not enough staff support for the Secretary-General, his deputies, and his assistants. They had to pull some personnel from other divisions to assist them.

Resource management

The OBOI is staffed with young personnel who have earned advanced degrees, who are eager to take the initiative and who devote themselves to their duties. Further, staff development through overseas training is regularly practiced. However the OBOI is understaffed. The office does not completely assign staff to jobs specified by the Civil Service Commission. Rotation is rare, particularly those in overseas offices. Also, supervisors spend too much time in meetings; not enough support is given to technical and planning functions; and other agencies and investors doubt the honesty of the OBOI staff; and there was no clear training plan.

The Decision-making process

Strong plans were found in the areas of decision decentralization and participative decisions. There was also good supportive information, clear decision frameworks, and good use of forms. However, information weaknesses were found in that useful information was scattered, information was obtained on a personal basis, and the existing computer center had limited potential. There was difficulty in storing information in the same database as information on investment varied and continually changed. Also the OBOI was perpetually under political pressure which affected the discretion of the office.

Implementation process

The OBOI is more effective in its implementation than in its decision making. Experienced individuals from the private and public sectors are commissioned to perform certain tasks and the OBOI has made some adjustments in order to handle the increasing amount of work with more flexibility.

However, there were several weaknesses in the OBOI's implementation process. The OBOI is still slow to review and approve investor's applications for promotion and for the importation of machinery and raw materials under promotional privileges. It has been weak in monitoring and evaluating promoted projects. Thus, there is not sufficient outcome and impact information on investment promotion for the Board review and adjust its investment promotion policy.

Further, provincial investment promotion did not achieve its goal.

Recommendations

Based on the findings, the researcher made several recommendations, including:

1. The revision of the Investment Promotion Act to include
 - the expiration date on the investment promotion certificate
 - prerequisites for more transfer of technology
 - more emphasis on agro-industrial projects
 - the addition of more clauses in the investor's application for tariff privileges
2. The revision of Investment Promotion Policy to include
 - placing more emphasis on campaign strategies and services rather than promotional privileges
 - having more coordination of investment promotion policies, exports, and tourism
 - placing more emphasis on provincial investment promotion measures
 - placing more emphasis on research and development oriented projects
 - eliminating some activities from the Investment Promotion list
3. Improving of the decision-making process
 - improving the investment database, particularly the one at the computer centre
 - placing more emphasis on decentralization, particularly in the area of approvals for the importation of machinery and raw materials under promotional privileges
 - reducing personal discretion through clear decision criteria
4. Improving resource management
 - increasing the staff and budget
 - improving financial rules and regulations
 - placing more emphasis on technical and planning personnel
 - adding more divisions
 - having more coordination between the Civil Service Commission and the Budget Bureau
 - placing more emphasis on the honesty of the staff

5. Improving the implementation process

- emphasizing on the monitoring and evaluation of outcomes and impact of promoted projects to Thai Society
- placing more emphasis on the reviewing the rights and profits Thailand earned from promotion efforts
- using more forms and manuals
- revising rules and regulations

7. Management for the Development of the Ministry of Public Health

Introduction : Objectives and Model of the Study

This research is an in-depth study of the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH). It attempts to fulfill two major objectives : (1) identification of key areas of strength and weakness in the existing management system of the MOPH ; and (2) development of pragmatic recommendations for the improvement of the MOPH administrative system.

To carry out this research, the so-called "bureaucratic behavior" model was employed. It emphasizes the functional relationships among four key variables :

1. The Bureaucratic Environment of MOPH. The major elements of this variable are: (1) mandates : legal and political; (2) organizational structure and the interaction among various organizations; and (3) work process.

2. Resource Management of MOPH. This variable consists of the following elements: (1) human resources; (2) financial resources; and (3) physical resources.

3. The Decision-Making Process of MOPH. This variable covers the following elements: (1) the information system; (2) analysis/synthesis; and (3) decision-making.

4. The Policy Implementation of MOPH. The main elements of this variable are: (1) the information system; (2) pre-operations; (3) operations; and (4) feedback.

Investigative Tools

The following investigative tools were used in the field study of the MOPH.

1. Intensive Interviews. The researcher conducted intensive interviews with various individuals at all relevant levels such as the

Permanent Secretary, Director-Generals, senior MOPH officials, middle-level officials, and field officials in 12 provinces representing four regions of Thailand.

2. Questionnaires. The researcher mailed 1,540 questionnaires to key MOPH officials at all relevant levels in Bangkok and other 21 provinces representing five regions of Thailand and received 886 of them in return. The analysis of data was then conducted through statistical methods.

3. Case and Documentary Analysis. Five major cases were selected to analyze the performance of the MOPH. They were: (1) the decision-making process of epidemiology; (2) health card project; (3) family-planning programme; (4) primary health care policy; and (5) consumer protection policy on community pharmacists. Various documents including MOPH annual reports, plans, committee reports, technical papers, minutes of meetings, and other related materials were also collected and analyzed.

4. Observation. The researcher had the opportunity to observe actual MOPH work processes. The MOPH kindly provided the researcher with office space in the health planning division of the office of the Permanent Secretary. The researcher had the chance to observe a number of selected committee meetings.

5. Participation. Whenever possible, the researcher directly participated in the work of the MOPH. In particular, in March of 1988 the researcher was appointed as an adviser to the MOPH on primary health-care policy. The advisory role enabled the researcher to take part in the work process of the MOPH from a new perspective.

In brief, these investigative tools helped the researcher achieve a maximum degree of involvement in the work process of the MOPH. This close involvement also made the researcher familiar with key personnel at all relevant levels which will, hopefully, make it easier to build a consensus indispensable for implementing recommendations for administrative reform.

Major Research Findings

1. Bureaucratic Environment

The major strength of the MOPH is reflected in its ability to continuously perform its major role and function -- providing health and medical services to the rural-poor. The MOPH health plan is a case in point. The first plan (which came into effect in 1961) marked the first official attempt at accelerating the growth of rural health and medical care and improving existing services, especially for low-income groups. The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth five-year health development plans were rational-comprehensive plans and were admired and used as typical examples by other ministries. In those plans, especially the temporary plan, health development was incorporated into the human resources, social, cultural development plan and the rural development plan with the overall objective of improving both the physical and mental quality of life of the Thai people --to attain the long-term goal of "Health for All." Problems, solutions, and the work process in response to existing fundamental needs and future tendencies have been identified through a number of strategic plans and projects.

The organizational structure of the MOPH is recognized as a strong structure. Planning and overall administration of programs are under the supervision of the office of the Permanent Secretary while other departments perform largely technical functions. Most program activities are delivered through the permanent secretary's network offices and by health workers. This kind of structure, in short, enables the MOPH to coordinate activities of various central and provincial level agencies toward the same ultimate objective and thus, the structure helps consolidate overall MOPH output.

However, there remain some weaknesses in the external organization environment that have caused several major problems which still confront the MOPH. They are:

(1) The lack of effective mechanisms to streamline and coordinate the policy direction and actions of all relevant public and private-sector agencies. The existence of such mechanisms, in other words, will minimize health, accident, and environmental problems.

(2) The behavioral health pattern of the average citizen that has been characterized as "physician-dependency" rather than "self-reliance."

(3) The lack of clarity of national pharmaceutical policy in areas such as 1) drug procurement; 2) role and involvement of the private sector; 3) promotional policy of local drug manufacturers; 4) supervisory and monitoring measures on the pharmaceutical industry; and 5) the role of pharmaceutical transnational-corporations in responding to national development.

2. Resource Management

The MOPH has been successful in spending its limited budget on the expansion of health infrastructure throughout the country. At present, almost 90% of all districts have a community hospital. About 100% (or 7,432) tambons have a health center. These numbers reflect a continuous MOPH effort in bridging the gap between urban and rural areas. In addition, the MOPH has a number of highly qualified personnel -- especially physicians -- who help upgrade its prestige as one of the most advanced technical ministries in the Thai public bureaucracy.

Nevertheless, the MOPH is constrained at the implementing level, namely at the level of Tambon health centers. The effectiveness of health service delivery is severely limited due to: (1) the lack of personnel both in quantity and quality; (2) the conflicting demands placed upon the role and functions of Tambon health officials that, in some cases, lead to the utilization of personnel in the wrong direction; and (3) the inadequacy of both financial and physical resources. In short, the most critical concern now and in the future is at the Tambon level.

3. Decision-making Process

The MOPH has had several accomplishments in applying techniques and medical measures to the decision-making process. The coverage of the Expanded Programme on Immunization has gradually been increased. And the morbidity rates of vaccine preventable diseases have decreased. Control of communicable diseases such as malaria and diarrhoeal diseases, is another area of success.

There are also a number of problems which the MOPH is not in a position to handle effectively. These concern environmental problems, physical environment, social behavior, prevention of accidents. The causes of these problems come from the aforementioned bureaucratic environment. Another fundamental weakness is the lack of effective coordinating mechanisms for the exchange of information between the public and private sectors. The use of this kind of information in the MOPH decision-making process is therefore limited.

4. Implementation Process

The MOPH has shown its major strength in identifying and formulating a number of sound programs and projects and has achieved continuous financial support from many international organizations. These kinds of support account for the success of some innovative programs, such as the national family planning program. However, the success and or failure of MOPH's policies depends not only on this factor but also many other factors in the implementation process.

A number of innovative policies launched over this decade have therefore achieved some limited outcomes. This can be explained as follows:

(1) It is extremely difficult for top-down MOPH policies to be adopted from local implementing units at the micro level. The lack of broad participation between the policy-makers and implementors has been the main reason for these results. Hence, many provincial level to Tambon level implementing units were forced to implement a number of policies and projects.

(2) Although some projects have been successfully implemented in limited areas on an experimental basis, their too rapid nationwide expansion led to undesirable results.

(3) Even some fully-adopted projects, had limited success due to the lack of continued project support from the top and the shortage of financial and physical resources at the implementing level, especially in district and Tambon health offices.

(4) MOPH's approach to project supervision, monitoring, and evaluation have been quantitatively oriented rather than qualitatively oriented, and thus feedback on the policy process was weakened.

Recommendations

The study evolved a series of recommendations to strengthen MOPH performance both at the macro and micro levels. Based on the MOPH experiences, the study also developed a series of conceptual propositions to reform the Thai bureaucracy as a whole (see details in the final chapter of the research report). For the MOPH recommendations, some brief examples are as follows :

1. The MOPH should play a more offensive role in the process of formulating, controlling, and coordinating relevant health policies. This can be done by :

(1) Mobilizing support from the cabinet and the prime-minister in particular;

(2) Fully and continuously utilizing the following mechanisms

- o the national health assembly,
- o the joint public and private health consultative committee,
- o the national primary health care committee, and
- o the provincial governors.

2. Attempts should be made to review national pharmaceutical policy. The promotion policy of local drug manufacturers, and the role of transnational pharmaceutical corporations are examples of policy issues that need to be clarified.

3. Relevant MOPH agencies which play a major role in the planning and budgeting process should cooperate and share more information on the issue of resource distribution. Those relevant agencies include the inspector-general's office and the six divisions in the office of the under secretary of public health: (1) health planning division; (2) epidemiology division; (3) rural health division; (4) provincial hospital division; (5) health statistics division; and (6) the office of the primary health care committee.

4. In the process of allocating resource from the provincial level to the district and sub-district levels, a working committee from each province should be set up, to be in charge of grading the degree of health problems in particular areas. Through this mechanism, the allocation of resources, especially per diem and gasoline expenses, is likely to be managed in accordance to the nature of the problems.

5. Relating to the above recommendations, more decentralization in financial management and more relaxation of some regulations and procedures are also needed to help strengthen the management capacity at particular levels in dealing with primary health care development.

6. The capacity of the Tambon health offices should be urgently improved. This can be done through training and personnel development as well as increasing the number of personnel. In particular, adequate financial and physical resources should be provided so those officials can perform necessary functions.

7. Policy on and work assignments to Tambon health officials should be reviewed in order to reduce unnecessary workloads and to let them have more flexibility in adjusting their functions according to the problems of particular areas.

8. Terminating unsuccessful innovative projects should be encouraged. In addition, provincial public health offices should be granted more power to initiate and implement their own projects.

9. Joint public and private health consultative committees should be urgently established at the provincial and district levels. It is believed that such a mechanism will enhance public and private cooperation in ways that will benefit health policy implementation.

10. Supervising, monitoring, and evaluating MOPH's project should occur more often, at points of service delivery, especially at the Tambon level. In addition, performance indicators concerning citizens' satisfaction with health services should be given more emphasis and more objectivity. These kinds of measures hopefully will help strengthen the quality of the project as well as provide the feedback on the policy process.

8. The Ministry of Interior : Strengths and Weaknesses of Ministerial Level Agencies In Development Administration

Objective, Scope and Method of Study

The major objective of the study was to analyze key strengths and weaknesses in the existing management system of the Ministry of Interior (MOI). It focused mainly on the roles of the Office of the Permanent Secretary (OPS) and the Office of Policy and Planning (OPP) in development administration. Obviously, the two agencies have been significant linkages between the political incumbents and the bureaucracy at the line department level. The study then developed pragmatic requirements and recommendations for short-, medium-, and long-term improvement.

The four investigative tools employed for data collection were: analyzing background materials, technical papers, minutes of meetings and other related documents; making observations of participants at selected meetings and during actual work processes; conducting in-depth interviews of key individuals at the central and provincial levels; and using three functional specific cases and two issue-specific cases. The study was carried out by relying on four key variables. These were (1) the Bureaucratic Environment; (2) the Resource Management Process; (3) the Decision-making Process; and (4) the Implementation Process. These variables were examined using the tools mentioned earlier.

Major Research Findings

1. The Bureaucratic Environment

The legal and political mandates of the MOI have helped it become a leading Thai public sector agency in the management of socio-economic development. Its major functions also included the promotion of political and administrative improvement, the delivery of public

utility services and infrastructural development, as well as functions involving primary justice administration: The MOI's contributions has been significant. A large number of central agencies, state enterprises, and local government authorities under the MOI umbrella have been responsible for the implementation of significant policies in regard to the well-being of both the urban and rural population.

The OPP capably formulated a clear master plan covering the broad-spectrum functions of the MOI. Further, the OPS was successful in its effort to coordinate the work and performance of line departments, provincial and local government agencies, state enterprises, and other grassroots organization toward MOI's developmental goals.

However, the major areas of weakness that lead to serious problems between and within the two agencies were as follows:

(1) As a result of spacious authorities and responsibilities, the MOI has never come up with a viable social development policy and guidelines. Thus, redundancies in the performance of activities among internal line agencies as well as other line ministries have become apparent.

(2) Laws and regulations on such prominent issues as general administrative procedures, the delivery of public services, the collection of local income taxes, the distribution of rural resources etc., were found to be somewhat outmoded and incongruent with the existing socioeconomic environment.

(3) The lack of unity of command and the improper decision-making power of provincial governors have led to uneasiness, inflexibility and inefficiency in the provision of new social and economic services created at the provincial level.

(4) The Engineer and Architect Professional Board Division in the OPS and the Office of Land Traffic Management Committee in the OPP should be removed from the MOI. In fact, the activities performed by these divisions require different professional skills than those

traditionally practiced at the MOI. Significantly, the division of work in the OPP is also old fashioned when compared with the standards and the nature of the departmentation of other MOI agencies.

(5) Regarding unsystematic interaction with grassroots organisations and the private sector, several policies and plans were formulated more as a result on bureaucratic influence than from public opinion or need.

(6) The long-term, so-called "self-reliance" social development goal has been unable to be achieved because the Offices of Provincial Administration have been incapable of producing positive and productive provincial development plans.

2. The Resource Management Process

MOI's major strength has been its effort to make manpower (human resources) and budgetary planning conform to work programs. On the one hand, this effort was capitalized through the Committee of Manpower Planning with the Division of Personnel Administration, OPS, as the major linkage. On the other hand, the Committee of the Interior Development Plan (vis-a-vis sub-committees and other task forces) has had the main responsibility for setting up the budgetary framework. In consequence, personnel utilization has been in congruent with work plans. However, in general, agency and public enterprises budgets have been kept under control by the ministerial ceiling -- especially in the fiscal year 1989.

Some minor strength can be seen as resulting from personnel development efforts both at the ministerial level and in line department agencies. Apparently, the continuity of such activities has for sometime helped promote the MOI as the leading civil agency in the establishment of training institutes. In addition, the existence of several Service Commissions has been relatively useful for the MOI's ability of bargain for more human and financial resources. Further, there have been initiatives to equip both agencies with more new physical technology for better management.

Nevertheless, major areas of weakness which should be resolved immediately were as follows:

(1) Lack of common means and methods among agencies to train and develop general management personnel at the lower and middle levels.

(2) The shortage of policy analysts, human resource analysts as well as project and financial analysts both in the OPS and the OPP have been gaining in importance.

(3) Methods for analyzing and monitoring projects, finances and resource utilization have not been designed to be systematic.

(4) The insufficient collective utilization and maintenance of physical resources among divisions was very distinctive; further, some new, modern instruments were not operating at full capacity.

3. The Decision-making Process

Traditionally, the decision-making power structure and level of discretion in the MOI, particularly the boundaries between key personnel were very clear. Analysed and synthesized information in conjunction with decision-making was always hierarchically top-down -- from Ministers, Permanent Secretary or their Deputies, Department Heads, Provincial governors, Division Chiefs, District Officers, and others. Discretionary actions taken by top executives were welcomed by middle and lower managers. Actually, there have been no open conflicts between bureaucrats and Ministers in decision-making process.

It should be noted that Division and Section Chiefs with full administrative experiences and personal talent have had ample opportunity to express their judgments as well. Generally, the sensible alternatives generated by them were based mainly on legal practices, academic principles, and comparative analyses.

Major areas of weakness, however, were as follows:

(1) Lack of a database system encompassing both major and minor functions in the form of a MOI management information centre.

(2) Analyses of policies, programs, projects as well as fiscal plans have relied chiefly on legal requirements and traditional experience. Inevitably, ways in which decision alternatives were generated tend to be rather conservative in nature.

(3) The constraints of administrative centralization in conjunction with lack of internal and external agency participation in problem formation have led to monopolistic practices of the MOI's decision-making process.

4. The Implementation Process

The OPP has been quite successful in working collaborately with other OPS agencies to convert macro policies into master and annual operational plans. Objectives, means' programs and projects as well as activities have been well organized and systematically planned. In addition, as mentioned earlier, manpower and annual fiscal plans were in accordance with work programs. Hence, it was easy for the MOI to inform its bureaucrats and to produce operation manuals and work schedules for better implementation and evaluation.

Furthermore, as a powerful Ministry with an extensive structure and the ability to make rapid internal administrative adjustments, the MOI has had a relatively clear management system which enhances its role as a major coordinating organ of other line Ministries. In contrast, Provincial Administration Offices may act as their own linkages to match top down policies and use bottom-up project ideas for planning.

Major management gaps and areas of weakness were as follows:

(1) The present implementation process relied more strictly on legal and administrative procedures than on local, concrete situations. It has therefore been difficult to accomodate creative ideas and practices in solving sensitive problems and overcoming obstacles. Accordingly, the balanced development of material well-being vis-a-vis people's attitudes cannot be easily achieved. As a consequence, social self-reliance as a significant developmental goal would not be reached in the near future.

(2) Limitations of monitoring and evaluation measures, as a result of shortages in qualified personnel, have led to unsystematic policy development. Hence, there remained strong negative attitudes toward evaluative research.

(3) Utilization of a public inspection and audit system to improve socio-economic development policy has been impractical. At present, the status/position of Ministerial Inspectors has not been helpful as a mechanism for gathering and disseminating qualitative feedback on the whole system.

Recommendations for Administrative Reform

The following recommendations are proposed to help the MOI solve some of its management problems. They are composed of seven policy guidelines plus eighteen short- and fifteen medium- and long-term measures. It is recommended that the MOI:

1. Place more emphasis on the overall improvement of its authority and responsibility in order to focus on major functions to correspond to the present socio-economic situation and to reduce function redundancies. The revision of laws and regulations applying to this particular matter is essential.

2. Scrutinize the situation and then support and encourage administrative unity at the provincial level. Facilitate processes so that governors have full authority in the control of managing economic and social development. Also promote the decentralization of other measures, i.e. personnel, financial, and administrative procedures.

3. Reorganize and improve the personnel development strategy to facilitate the integration and coordination of the OPS and the OPP in managing research and development. Promote the capacity and readiness of the two agencies to systemically analyze and synthesize data and information.

4. Set up and utilize MOI's management information centre to support better social policy and plan development.

5. Place more emphasis on the utilization of the monitoring and evaluation system at both the central and provincial levels. Establish qualitative measurements by employing evaluative research methods for the analysis and assessment of social impact on the general public.

6. Encourage and facilitate the establishment of the Provincial Centre for Rural Development Coordination to accelerate long-run regional and local development.

7. Activate and create real opportunities for nongovernmental development organizations, grassroot organizations and the private sector to fully participate in social development both in urban and rural areas.

9. The Ministry of Education : Problems and Proposed Reforms

The performance of the Ministry of Education has both positive and negative aspects. The positive side includes its contribution toward nation-building starting in the reign of King Chulalongkorn. Indeed inculcating loyalty to the new political unit known as Siam -- and later Thailand -- can be described as a success. Further, the Bangkok dialect is today the lingua franca of the Thai nation, thanks to the strenuous efforts of Thai educators. Also through a variety of campaigns launched by the Ministry of Education, the Thai people today (including those in rural areas) now use forks and spoons at meal. The list can be extended.

But beyond this positive contribution, there are also problems which must be seriously addressed. In fact, the problems were summarized aptly by the Office of the Permanent Secretary as follows :

1. Problems of Educational Management

There still exist unequal opportunities between urban and the rural areas as educational opportunities for youngsters in rural areas are still inadequate. Moreover, educational training is still not satisfactorily in line with social conditions and social needs.

2. Problems of Educational Quality

There is still a difference in the standard and quality of urban and the rural education. The rate of failure in examinations among children in the pre-primary and primary schools is still high. In the rural areas curriculum is not fulfilled and educational aids and instruments are still inadequate.

3. Health Problems

Rural adults and youth still need to know more about sanitation and keeping health. And sports facilities and dietary support are still lacking.

4. Problems of Educational Administration

There is still a lack of coordination and cooperation between the various agencies dealing with regional education and this leads to the severe waste of human and physical resources -- and time. The problem

of over-centralization is also acute despite the fact that most educational activities take place in areas outside of the capital. Further, the structure of the various departments within the ministry differ as do operations; this leads to the undesirable duplication of functions and problems of coordination. Checking, follow-up, and evaluation of performance cannot be carried out efficiently and effectively. Operations are department-specific; and, the lack of adequate instruments and measures to check, following up and evaluate has exacerbated problems with the overall efficiency and effectiveness of Ministry operations. Existing rules and regulations also prevent private-sector and NGO cooperation and participation in educational activities. In addition the public sector competes unnecessarily with the private sector in educational activities.

5. Problems of Support

Regional budget allocations are not congruent with provincial plans, making plan policy objectives unattainable. This is buttressed by the lack of coordination among the various regional agencies dealing with education. And perhaps, most importantly, departments and divisions in the Ministry in Bangkok attach very little importance to plans and proposals sent by the regions. Thus, these plans or proposals are not incorporated into the master plan.

6. Other problems

There is no unity in matters regarding religion, art, and cultural activities, which are important functions of the Ministry of Education. Further, the information system still needs improvement; this problem especially requires qualified personnel.

The above problems stem from a number of factors, but according to our findings, the problems can be analyzed as follows.

The Milieu

The Ministry of Education neither exists nor operates in a vacuum. It is positively or negatively affected by the environment. The MOE is affected by internal politics as well as external politics. Within the Ministry, the politicking of the various departments and

divisions for resources and for position is rampant. Outside of the ministry, national-level politics bears directly on the Ministry. When the country is governed by the military, the nature of the impact differs from that when it is under a democratic rule -- in particular, after the October 14, 1973 uprising a different kind of impact was felt by the Ministry. At the present time, primary school teachers make various demands and this political bargaining is a great problem for the ministry.

Economically, rural poverty is still a great obstacle for educational expansion; indeed, many primary school graduates must terminate their secondary education for lack of means. On the other hand, efforts to turn Thailand into a newly industrialized country and the influx of investment from abroad have led to the need for a modernizing country's vocational training system. This economic impact is a reality which must be taken into account when dealing with educational planning.

From the societal perspective, many seemingly unrelated policies (such as the attempt to develop major cities outside of the capital) have direct effect on educational activities. Funds must be allocated for new schools in new areas. Urbanization and community expansion have led to increased demand for the education of people in the rural areas. Between 1965 and 1975, for example, more technical schools were built and Ram Khamhaeng University was opened in 1971.

External influences also account for educational direction and planning. Support from UNESCO, USOM and the World Bank, in a number of areas, have contributed to Thailand's educational system.

Because the Ministry of Education is affected by political, economic, social, and external factors, we can conclude that the task of the Ministry is a herculean one -- because, apart from its legal mandate, the ministry, without plans or inclination, has to meet the requirements of the other mandates entrusted to it. The following discussion of legal and other mandates will explain the matter further.

MOE Mandates

Legal Mandate

The Ministry of Education's legal mandate is specified in Proclamation of the Revolutionary Party No. 216 dated September 29, 1972. Item 23 empowers the Ministry to carry out its functions regarding education, religion, and cultural activities. This broad job description is spelled out in detail including such functions as the management and operation of public education in accordance with the national education plan from kindergarten through primary, secondary, vocational, teachers's training, adult education, special programs and welfare education. The control and supervision of private schools and the general education of the people are also part of its function.

The Ministry of Education is charged with promoting religious affairs and cultural activities (to include the upkeep of the cultural heritage, the promotion of art, fine arts and the propagation of Thai culture both at home and abroad).

The Office of the Permanent Secretary is charged with the control, supervision, and coordination of departments in the ministry in order to ensure that these agencies perform the functions designated by the government or the Ministry.

The Political Mandate

The Ministry's political mandate includes political socialization (making certain that various ethnic peoples are loyal to the Thai nation); national security (such as the assimilation of minorities and people of other religions) and rural development program in which the Ministry of Education participates as one of the four principal ministries).

Extra-bureaucratic Mandate

Ministry officials are subject to personal requests for appointments, promotions, transfers; this often leads to the

misplacement of personnel. The building of educational institutions, and sport facilities as well as other budget requests may be guided by political demand -- most especially when the pressure is applied by politicians. Indeed, at election time, local teachers may be asked to help with the campaign. Further, that the children of high-ranking officials may be admitted to a higher quality school is also part of the extra-bureaucratic mandate.

Political and extra-bureaucratic mandates work to deviate the Ministry from its legal mandate. This affects its performance, its decision-making process, and the implementation of its policy and the employment of its resources.

From the research, problems of the Ministry of Education can be classified into three areas :

1. Problems in structure and internal organization
2. Problems in the Bureaucratic System
3. Problems evolving from political and extra-bureaucratic factors.

Problems in Structure and Internal Organization

The bulky structure. The ministry has 14 inadequately coordinated departments. One observer compared the 14 departments to "Sipsee Ongchai" -- or the 14 princes -- to connote the lack of power of control over them on the part of the Ministry or the Office of the Permanent Secretary.

Departmental Autonomy. The ministry has a loose structure. The 14 departments operate autonomously. Many departments (such as the Office of the National Primary Education Commission and the Teachers' Training college unit operate under their own laws. Which gives them leeway to liberally interpret a situation and allows them autonomy of action.

Incoherent Structure and Organization. In contrast to the Ministry of Interior which has a coherent organizational structure -- central, provincial, and local administration -- the Ministry of Education, (with the exception of the Office of the Permanent Secretary's (OPS) Office of Provincial and District Education) has no provincial educational agencies activities. With the exception of the OPS, all other agencies carrying out educational activities in the provinces, districts, communes, or villages are accountable to their individual department in Bangkok. This highly centralized structure allows very little coordination with the OPS Offices of Provincial and District Education.

Duplication of Agency and Function. Because the MOE legal mandate is broad, and because of the autonomous nature of departments, many departments carry out duplicate functions as each attempts to be self-contained.

Problems of Coordination. Since each department is autonomous and self-contained, there is very little coordination. It can be argued that vertical coordination within each department does exist while horizontal coordination among the various departments still leaves much to be desired. And as the Offices of Provincial and District Education have no formal authority, there is not much the two offices can do to foster coordination except exercise the art of personal relationships and fill requests.

Problems of Personnel Administration. Personnel administration for teachers is embroiled in confusion. Different officials fall under several different laws. Some fall are under the Civil Service Commission, some the Teachers' Commission, some the University Affairs Commission, some the Municipal Service Commission.

The Lack of Shared Information. Different departments have different databases and with conflicting information. Indeed the information of a given department is guarded as privileged information. Thus, the problem of sharing and comparing information is severe.

The Absence of a Common Educational Philosophy. Within the MOE there are a number of contending educational philosophies and there is no law governing educational direction. Liberal interpretations and advocacy of educational objectives are tolerated. The result is experimentation and shifts of policy.

The Centrifugal Force. Many units in the Ministry of Education are prone to secede and become independent agencies. The 36 teachers' training colleges, and Technology and Vocational Colleges, if they had a choice, would secede from the Ministry. Indeed, the Srinakharinwirot University System was once under the Ministry of Education. This tendency to secede and become a separate entity is very apparent. The centrifugal force works to undermine the morale of those who are in charge.

Problems of the Bureaucratic System

1. Lack of coherence between the Educational Administrative System and the National Administrative System. According to the Proclamation of the Revolutionary Party No. 218, the country is to administered at three levels: central, provincial, and local. However, in contrast to the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Education has only one department (the Office of the Permanent Secretary) which has a provincial arm. But more importantly, all the central agencies are legally under the Office of the Prime Minister but when it comes to provincial administration, the agencies of the Ministry of Education are under the Governor who is an official of the Ministry of Interior.

2. The Inability of the Office of the Permanent Secretary to Exert Control on Plans and Funding. Each department is autonomous and all of its officials are accountable to that department. Teachers in the provinces, for example, are accountable to their immediate department in Bangkok. There is no provision for the Office of the Permanent Secretary to exert control on educational plans, programs, or projects. Traditionally, as for the control of funding, a given department and the Budget Bureau will deal directly with each other, bypassing the Office of the Permanent Secretary.

3. The Absence of Administrative Power of the Ministry's Provincial Representatives. The lack of Office of Provincial and District Education administrative power over agencies or personnel of other departments is well-known. But more serious is the case of primary school teachers who are part of the national rural development program -- a joint project of the principal ministries. Thus, the representatives of the Office of the Permanent Secretary have no commanding power over the school teachers who come under the Office of National Primary Education Commission.

4. Functions Removed by Other Ministries. Not all schools fall under the aegis of the Ministry of Education. Many schools are operated by universities, municipal governments, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, the Border Police, and the Public Welfare Department of the Ministry of Interior (the schools for hill-tribes).

5. Problems of Coordination with Universities. The two agencies, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Universities Affairs, entertain somewhat different philosophies. The Ministry of University Affairs, for example, puts a great emphasis on the result of entrance examinations, while the Ministry of Education puts more emphasis on the continuing progress made by students.

Problems of Extra-bureaucratic and Political Factors.

1. Appointment of High-ranking Officials by the Minister. The Permanent Secretary, Deputy Permanent Secretaries, the Director-General, and the Deputy Directors-General are appointed by the Minister. As a result, there is no commanding authority in the position of Permanent Secretary. This has made the personnel administration process quite problematic. In case where the Minister is keen to accommodate party policy or is returning a political I.O.U., interference in the personnel administration process (such as someone being given a promotion) will occur.

2. Political Power and Political Bargaining became acute after the mass uprising on October 14, 1973. *School teachers made political demands which led to the establishment of the National Primary Education Commission. Political demands have led to deviation from rational decision-making.

3. Confusion in Administration Resulting from Political Factors. As politicians hold important positions in the Ministry -- and they are in positions to grant rewards -- some permanent officials try to curry favour with them. The spoil system (as opposed to the merit system) has caused poor morale among officials and has also led to administration problems.

4. The political mandate of the ministry has caused time and resources to be wasted. Plans are affected by political interference.

5. Extra-bureaucratic Mandate Leading to Negative Consequences. The extra bureaucratic mandate has led to the misuse of resources, the inefficient operation of functions, and the violation of rules and regulations.

All the above problems have negatively affected the management of resources, the decision-making process, and the implementation of policy at the MOE. The Office of the Permanent Secretary, given the above weaknesses, can hardly function as the coordinating agency.

Policy Recommendations:

Long-term Policy

1. There must be an educational covenant to serve as a guide for the administration of national education. The Proclamation of the Revolutionary Party No. 216 is simply too broad. The covenant has to be more specific: it must state the direction and the ultimate aim of education in concrete and practical terms. Further educational aims must be connected to the type of society toward which the country is moving. This is important given the tendency to decentralize. There must be a framework within which educational administration is carried out.

2. Structural and organizational reform is imperative if educational administration is to be coherent. Vertical and horizontal coordination is necessary. The Office of the Permanent Secretary has to be given a proper role with the appropriate authority to carry out its function as the central department of the ministry. There must be a ministry plan to which all other departments subscribe. Provincial and District Education Offices should have roles and functions appropriate to their legal mandate.

3. The decentralization of educational administration is unavoidable given present trends in societal change. Three models must be considered.

(1) There should be a Provincial Educational Commission served by the Provincial Education Office as Secretary-General. All other departments will have their regional offices under this body. But the commission would still be under the Ministry of Interior.

(2) The Office of Provincial Education should serve as provincial headquarters and would supervise all other regional agencies of the various departments. This Office would be accountable to the Office of the Permanent Secretary in Bangkok.

(3) The Head of the Office of Provincial Education will be equivalent to a Deputy Governor while the Governor would be under the

Office of the Prime Minister instead of the Ministry of Interior. All departments will have divisions in the province under the Head of the Office of Provincial Education.

Short-term Policy

1. The Office of Policy and Planning, one of five offices recently set up, has been established as an internal organization in the Office of the Permanent Secretary. If this office can begin to function, it may help coordinate the process of MOE policy and planning.

2. The Information Center of the Office of the Permanent Secretary should be improved. Both hardware and personnel need to be upgraded if this center is to serve as the database for policy, planning and decision-making. Further, there should be a survey conducted to determine the immediate needs for reform.

3. The Offices of Provincial, District, and Sub-district Education need to be improved. They should be given more funds and human resources for carrying out their assignments, pending long-term reform.

4. Primary school teachers functioning in the rural development program should be transferred to the Office of the Permanent Secretary for reasons of administrative coherence. This undertaking is in process.

10. The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives

Research design : Purpose and Scope

Thai leaders have long been aware of the key role bureaucracy plays in successful social and economic development. An efficient bureaucracy facilitates the successful implementation of a nation's economic and social development goals. And for a bureaucracy to efficiently discharge its development mandate, its bureaucrats must have the appropriate management skills to design, develop, implement and monitor the country's economic and social development plans.

This research report is part of a major research project on the "Management of Economic and Social Development" conducted by the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) whose purpose is to study public-sector management systems, covering central policy agencies and central line agencies. The researcher's responsibility was to study the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (the MOAC), a central line agency.

As a central line agency, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives is responsible for implementing government agricultural and cooperative policy. A preliminary research assumption was that central line ministries operate under conditions in which "ministries," namely ministers and officers of the permanent secretary, do not exercise much control over policy implementation and it is the departments which are in real and meaningful control of operations and implementation. Initially, the research team also argued that "the Departments have more influence over the process of policy determination than do Ministries as most departments are in a position, in practice, to deal directly with the central allocation agencies such as the Budget Bureau and the National Economic and Social Development Board." This situation, the team reasoned, may represent a major problem area in the present management system as it would tend to render the Ministries almost powerless in controlling

department operations to ensure that the major policy objectives of the government are adequately met in actual operations." Therefore, the objective of this study on the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives was to analyze the relationship between political incumbents (Cabinet Members) and the office of the Permanent Secretary and Line departments. More specifically, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives served as an empirical case study for the researcher to test the project assumptions. Is there empirical evidence to substantiate our contention that Ministries are almost powerless in controlling the department operations? If the research findings indicate that line departments are more active than the Ministry in policy making and implementation, what then are the consequences of such a situation? To what extent is the existing management system affected by such a situation? What are the weaknesses and strengths of the present public management system? How can we improve the government's management system? How can we devise practical solutions for improving the management system?

Methodology

The Framework

This is an in-depth study of the management process in a selected agency, namely the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. In accordance with project terms of reference, the study relied on four key variables:

1. The Bureaucratic Environment. The major elements of this variable are: (1) legal and political mandate; (2) organizational structure; and (3) work process: rules, and regulations, procedures.

2. Decision-Making. This variable consists of the following elements: (1) information system; (2) analysis/synthesis; and (3) decision-making.

3. Implementation Process. The main elements of this variable are: (1) information system; (2) pre-operations; (3) operations; and (4) feedback.

4. Resource Management. This variable covers the following elements: (1) human resources; (2) financial resources; and (3) physical resources.

Investigation tools

Several investigation tools were employed to study the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.

1. Interviews of various individuals at all relevant levels (the Minister, senior MOAC officials, middle-level officials, and field officials).

2. Observation of the actual ongoing work of the MOAC. The MOAC provided office space in the personnel division of the Office of the Permanent Secretary where the researcher had a chance to observe selected committee meetings (such as the policy and agricultural development planning committee and the land reform committee).

3. Documentary Analysis. The researcher collected and analyzed various MOAC documents, including annual reports, plans, committee reports, cabinet decisions, technical papers, and other related materials.

4. Participation. Whenever possible, the researcher directly participated in the work of the MOAC; indeed on September 1988 the researcher was made a member of the advisory board to the Minister of the MOAC. The role as an advisor enabled him to participate and observe the work process of the MOAC from a new perspective.

In short, the four investigation tools facilitated the researcher's efforts to achieve a "maximum degree of involvement" in the MOAC work process. He had a chance to test his understanding and ideas about the work of the MOAC with key MOAC personnel. This in turn, hopefully, will make it easier to build the consensus necessary for implementing the project recommendations for administrative reform and restructuring.

Phasing

The research was divided into five phases.

Phase 1 (1st - 2nd month). Project familiarization.

Phase 2 (2nd - 5th month). Documentary research, interviews, observations, and participation.

Phase 3 (6th - 7th month). Data analysis and writing the first draft of the report.

Phase 4 (8th - 10th month). Revision of the report draft one. Additional data collection and interviews were done.

Phase 5 (10th - 12th month). A seminar was held in which project research findings were presented to MOAC officials, academicians, and other related persons. The researcher revised the draft report after hearing comments and reactions from the seminar participants.

Research Findings

The research findings on the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives indicate that the management of agricultural development is more the power and responsibility of the line departments than of the Ministry. Each MOAC Department has a tendency to do work in the interest of the department rather than for a Ministry as a whole. In sum, this study of the MOAC confirms our initial belief that central line agencies at the ministerial level do not actually exercise much control over the line Departments and Offices. Indeed, the departments have more influence over the process of policy determination than the ministry. Further, the ministry does not exercise much control over policy implementation and line departments operations either. Thus, the phenomenon of "departments playing a more active role in policy making and implementation than the ministry" was therefore confirmed by this study on the MOAC.

Why Departments are more active than the Ministry is function of the nature of the MOAC's bureaucratic environment which supports the creation of autonomous departments which act independently -- from the

Ministry, the office of the Permanent Secretary and other departments. There are several reasons for this. First, the MOAC operates under a number of different mandates. Departments and offices have their own specific legal mandates and each works within the framework of its particular mandate. Second, the organizational structure of the ministry and Office of the Permanent Secretary is weak and the organizational structure of the departments and offices is strong. Therefore, departments and offices are very independent. Third, the work processes of the MOAC are departmentally-based. Each department has its own work process.

These characteristics of the MOAC bureaucratic environment cause departments to be more active than the ministry. In practice, departments and offices carry on their work independently, exercising control over the management of resources, decision making, and implementation. The Office of the Permanent Secretary cannot coordinate the work of all the departments and offices. The Minister and other central policy agencies choose to bypass the office of the Permanent Secretary and, instead, make contact directly with the departments and offices concerned.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made to improve the management of agricultural development even though such an undertaking involves a fairly high degree of subjectivity.

The researcher believes that it is possible to improve the management system of the MOAC. In particular, special attention should be given to the relationships between the Minister, the Office of the Permanent Secretary, and the line departments. At present MOAC departments are very independent and exercise control over their work processes; the office of the permanent secretary, on the other hand, does not play a critical role in coordinating the MOAC departmental activities. And, the political incumbents do not closely monitor the performance of the line departments and offices.

Based on the information collected by the researcher through in-depth interviews with MOAC officials, document research, direct observation, participation in certain of the MOAC activities, and the researcher's advisory role to the minister, the researcher believes that efforts to improve the MOAC management system should be made. Since the findings indicate that the bureaucratic environment is the most important factor, the recommendations will therefore focus on this area.

1. The Bureaucratic Environment

The bureaucratic environment is an important factor which determines the relationships between the minister, the Office of the Permanent Secretary, Line Departments and Offices. "Departments play a more active role than the ministry"; they are independent not only from the Minister and the Office of the Permanent Secretary but from each other. Thus, there is insufficient coordination. Second, in general the Minister and central policy agencies choose to directly contact departments instead of using the formal channels through the Office of the Permanent Secretary. Third, the Office of the Permanent Secretary does not have the necessary administrative power to effectively monitor the operations of the departments and offices and does not act as a coordinating agency for the MOAC.

The fact that the mandates of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives are numerous, disorganized, and sometimes uncertain because of frequent political changes, senior MOAC officials such as the Permanent Secretary and the directors-general are faced with an uncertain situation. Further, MOAC bureaucrats are not entirely sure which of the MOAC mandates takes priority over which. Also, MOAC officials are not confident that the work they are doing really fulfills the objectives of the MOAC. The uncertainties and unclear nature of the policy goals at the ministerial level have led MOAC officials, especially middle level officials such as directors-general and division heads, to rely on the particular legal mandates of their

respective departments and divisions. Therefore, the uncertainty of ministerial mandates indirectly supports the autonomy of line departments and offices in the MOAC.

The researcher believes that there is an urgent need for the MOAC to make its policy goal(s)/mandate(s) clear so that everyone knows what they are. (For example, the Ministry of Public Health proclaimed primary health care to be its major policy goal.) This new policy mandate should be clear enough for departments to use as guidelines for determining goals and operational plans at the departmental level. MOAC bureaucrats should be made aware of the seriousness of the problems arising from the lack of cooperation between departments and offices because each is operating under a different legal mandate. To successfully evolve a new, clear mandate successfully, the MOAC needs the cooperation of various outside agencies such as the Cabinet, Parliament, and central policy agencies such as the Office of the National Economic and Social development Board, the Office of the Civil Service Commission, and the Budget Bureau. National leaders must understand that the successful solution to agricultural problems cannot be achieved solely by improving the MOAC administration, but depends also on the work of other related agencies such as the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Industry.

Once the new ministerial mandate has been established, the next step is for the MOAC to change the disposition or attitude of MOAC officials, especially senior bureaucrats, so that officials become receptive toward the new policy goals and transform their loyalty toward their respective departments into loyalty to the Ministry as a whole.

The researcher believes that the MOAC needs to change the nature of the relationship between the Minister, the Office of the Permanent Secretary, and the Departments so that, after the new ministerial mandate has been determined, both agencies can coordinate the work of all departments and offices to follow the new unified mandate. There is a need to develop the ministry's management information system so

that political incumbents may utilize it for effective decision making and monitoring departmental work.

The Office of the Permanent Secretary has to be reorganized so that its main duty is congruent with the new mandate. Several divisions will have to be abolished and some new divisions will have to be added to the Office of the Permanent Secretary so that the agency can perform its new functions more efficiently.

2. Resource management, decision making, and implementation

After the new ministerial mandate has been established and accepted by MOAC officials, the next step is to improve the Ministry's management of resources, the decision making process, and implementation process.

The Ministry of Agricultural and Cooperatives should manage its human resources, financial resources, and physical resources in accordance with the new ministerial mandate; further, the Minister and the Office of the Permanent Secretary should have more say in the administration of resources. For example, departmental and office manpower planning should be guided by the new mandate. Outside agencies which are involved in the MOAC resource management process must also adjust their work according to the new mandate.


There is a need for the MOAC to set up a management information system at the ministerial level so that the ministry can act as an information center. A policy-making system should be set up at the ministerial level. The MOAC committee system should be improved. This can be accomplished by reducing the number of committees and making the committee on policy and planning the ministry's sole policy-making organ.

The MOAC should restructure its policy implementation machine to accord with the new mandate as there must be unity in ministry policy implementation. For example, the MOAC could create the position of provincial agricultural officer whose duty is to head all MOAC officials who work in that particular province. MOAC tambon level officials may have to be under the Office of the Permanent Secretary

so that the Ministry will be able to coordinate its grassroots level activities more effectively.

The main recommendations are summarized and depicted in Figure I.

Figure 1 : RESEARCH RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS



11. The Department of Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture & Cooperative

This analysis of the Department of Agriculture (DOA) is part of a larger research project on "The Management of Economic and Social Development of Thailand" (EMT) conducted by the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI). The EMT project was divided into three phases, and embraced a number of public agencies. The major objective of the study was to review, analyze, and assess the Thai public management system in an effort to come up with some suggestions and recommendations for each agency as well as to evolve an overall system at the macro level.

The results of the study are presented in terms of four major variables: the bureaucratic environment, the management of the resources, decision-making process, and the implementation process of the DOA. The substance of the study can be summarized as follows:

Background and characteristics of the DOA

The DOA was the direct result of a major reorganization in the MOAC in 1972. The reorganization involved the rearrangement and transformation of the former DOA and the Department of Rice into the current DOA and the Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE). The pre-1972 activities of the DOA included both research and development (R&D) and the extension of all major crops other than rice. Currently, the mandate of the DOA includes R&D on all crop production; farm management (and such related activities as seed multiplication, technology transfer, providing services and consultations); technical aspects of area development; and the enforcement of five related Acts. DOA activities are closely related to those of the DAE whose major activities involve the extension and transfer of R&D results to farmers.

The entire DOA structure and system are part of the central administrative system. In spite of the fact that numerous DOA agencies of the are located in provinces throughout the Kingdom, none of them is under the jurisdiction of the provincial administrative system. A distinguishing characteristic of the structure of the DOA that reflects the technical orientation of its mission is the role of the six DOA research institutes in addition to 12 regular divisions (five administrative divisions and seven technical divisions). The research institutes are the Rice Research Institute, the Rubber Research Institute, the Field Crop Research Institute, the Horticulture Research Institute, the Agriculture Research Institute, and the Farm Management Research Institute. These Institutes are composed of 100 agencies (25 research centers and 75 experimental stations) located throughout the country. Each research center and experimental station is regularly charged with task to perform on a range of specific and narrowly defined commodities or crops.

The DOA decision-making system can be separated into (1) normal administrative functions; and (2) the R&D function. The decision-making system in regular administrative operations comprises periodic reporting systems, agency databases, and forms and procedures for processing, screening and reviewing work according to general standard bureaucratic practices. Occasionally, the committee system (generally employed in other bureaucratic agencies) is also utilized in the DOA. In comparison, the decision-making system for technical matters, involves a network of multi-level committees and sub-committees set up to formulate technical policies and plans, to screen and approve projects, and to monitor and evaluate ongoing projects. In particular, this system requires a special information system that is comprehensive, up-to-date, and efficient. The system is now being developed.

DOA resource management is divided into operating agencies, personnel, finance, material, and equipment. The coverage, responsiveness and utility of service of DOA's operating agencies --

because of their very large number and widespread of location -- can be considered somewhat limited due to the very narrow and specific mission of each unit relative to the wide diversification of community demands. DOA agencies are generally staffed with ample and qualified personnel more of whom are stationed at the provincial units than at the central office. However, the proportion of the budget allocated for R&D activities is quite low relative to general standards. Further, provincial units are not adequately equipped with modern and sophisticated equipment and facilities.

Findings

The major findings of the study are summarized and presented according to the analytical framework and the group of variables mentioned earlier. The strength and limitations of each issue is also identified.

1. The bureaucratic environment of the DOA, with particular regard to its current mandate and structure has an apparent strength in its departmental status. The legal departmental status of a bureaucratic agency in the Thai administrative system is of a juristic person empowered to enjoy a large degree of discretionary authority backed by ample resources to carry out its functions. Some limitations of the DOA, however, can also be noted. An apparent limitation is the fact that R&D management must rely on the common bureaucratic framework, a system with procedures not conducive to nor compatible with an organization whose objective is to perform a highly professional and technical mission. Simply put, the DOA's mission comes closer to that of a university rather than that of a typical bureaucracy.

2. The duties and responsibilities of the DOA and the DAE are closely related in terms of substance, process, and functional interdependence. In this case, the independent and exclusive nature of the departmental status of these two separate organizations tends

to significantly prohibit their close collaboration in the areas of policy, planning, activities, projects, and operations. Existing coordination mechanisms were found to be inadequate and, thus, far more effort to cooperate is greatly needed.

3. The research centers, under the jurisdiction of the research Institutes and mostly located in the countryside, are technically organized to pursue a narrowly and specifically determined goal to emphasize their specialization. However, the needs and expectations of most rural communities are naturally broad and numerous. The structure and role of the research centers -- professionally determined to be narrow and specific -- are too narrow and too specific to respond adequately to the needs and problems of the surrounding community.

4. The highlight of DOA resource management is its human resources --its strong pool of highly qualified scientists. Indeed DOA's staff development plan has partially been assisted by foreign sources; however, the many constraints influent in bureaucratic hurdles tend to limit the provision of appropriate incentives or opportunities for career advancement along for DOA scientists. Consequently, in the long run, it is very difficult to retain them in the organization. Currently, under the existing circumstances, incumbent executives attempt to promote and motivate technical personnel by any possible means, sometimes at the expense of non-technical personnel. For instance, the number of research projects has been substantially enlarged in order to match central personnel agency criteria for expanding the ceiling for opportunities for advancement. This additional research quantity, however, has generated some concern that resource utilization may be distorted in the sense that many low priority projects may be launched and the top priority project quality may be negatively affected. Further overall, the proportion of the budget allocated for R&D activities is very small relative to general standards.

5. The current decision-making system is distinctive in its strong comprehensive network of multi-level committees -- the system set up to screen, scrutinize, and control the quality of technical or professional matters that cannot be processed and acted upon using regular, bureaucratic channels. R&D activities of this scale generally require an adequate back-up information system. So far, the DOA's inadequate information system is still considered a limitation; however DOA executives are well aware of this problem and current attempts are being made to work on the shortage of personnel and equipment needed for the informations system.

6. The implementation of the DOA's mission is greatly strengthened by the fact that the DOA has appointed many qualified scientists to station the provincial agencies. This move will certainly help to upgrade the capacity of those units. However, most provincial agency operations still face that limitations of their narrowly defined role, their inadequate resources, and the lack of equipment.

Recommendations

On the basis of the findings summarized above, a number of suggestion and recommendations are made, as follows:

1. With particular regard to the structural and procedural requirements impeding professional and technical operations in the DOA's bureaucratic environment, the DOA should attempt to emphasize the uniqueness of its technical mission. First, the superior authorities concerned should be provided with lucid explanations and convinced that the nature, atmosphere, conditions and facilities required for successful achievement of the unique DOA mission differ by far from those required by a typical bureaucracy. For instance, in order to promote the scholarly creative atmosphere common in most R&D institutions, the DOA needs to be structured so that it has some degree of autonomy and flexibility, much like that granted to such

agencies as local authorities, universities, and public enterprises. As for short-run considerations, one concrete feasible strategy would be the formulation of a medium-term DOA human resource plan specifying the personnel system, personnel composition, career development, personnel redeployment and development plan shaped by the philosophy and distinguished by the mission of the department. Further this system will certainly provide a basis for future improvements of the kind of performance evaluations appropriate for R&D enterprises.

2. Attempts should be made to devise appropriate channels, mechanisms, and systems that encourage closer collaboration between the DOA and the DAE at all levels -- ranging from the policy, corporate planning, program, project and operational levels. This coordination may be accomplished through such measures as joint-projects in field operations, and the occasional assignment or appointment of staff from these two departments on either a joint or an exchange basis.

3. The role of the research centers, which has been traditionally defined on a narrow specific commodity basis, should be more liberally redefined to cover a wider scope and include more diverse responsibilities. Thus, the farm management research projects that to date have been undertaken exclusively on separate project sites (because of their broad, interdisciplinary nature) should thus be incorporated into the regular functions of the newly organized research centers. This proposed reorganization scheme would tend to open up more opportunities for personnel circulation and interaction. Further, more diversified responsibilities would certainly enable the centers to better respond to the wide range of local needs.

4. Assuming the acceptability of the reorganization scheme proposed above, it is likely that the resource management and the decision-making systems would become much more appropriate and would thus contribute to the more effective operation of DOA's technical mission. Several aspects of the personnel system and a number practices such as remuneration, personnel evaluation, and merit

ratings, for instance, should also be upgraded to better function in the newly revised structure.

5. The development of the management information system (MIS) should be accelerated by conducting a comprehensive feasibility study on which to base and the design of the entire system. The scope of the study should be wide. The range of survey and the analysis should include the existing and suggested information structures, substance and procedure, technical analysis (on both hardware and software elements), personnel and training requirements, action plans, and an overall financial analysis. This should detail the entire system -- from establishment to operations and maintenance.

6. The policy-making system and policy making process should be strengthened. Detailed, thorough policy on R&D activities should be established in order to streamline the entire enterprise to ensure that high-priority projects are responsive to farmers' needs, problems, and demands.

7. The research centers (which are mostly located in the provinces and which are already staffed with sufficient and qualified technical personnel) should be upgraded more efficient, effective, and responsible. For instance, they should be equipped with enough modern and capable facilities to either perform research, and/or services, and/or tests.

12. Management Improvement Study of the Department of Agricultural Extension Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives

Introduction

This report is a summary of a study of the administrative system of the Department of Agricultural Extension (DOAE), Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, aiming to analyze the advantages and disadvantages in the present agricultural extension administration system according to four major aspects, namely, (1) administrative environment; (2) resource management; (3) the decision-making process; and (4) the operational process.

Findings

1. Administrative environment

(1) The External environment

Overall policy of promoting agricultural production in the First to the Fourth Plan periods prompted DOAE to emphasize the increase of production and the reduction of production costs for certain kinds of crops, rather than to develop an appropriate farming system for each particular area, devise appropriate technology transfer techniques, promote marketing activities, and develop farmers' self-reliance capacities. Hence, since the onset of several negative conditions from the beginning at the time of the Fifth Plan periods, (such as the deterioration of price and marketing conditions) present agricultural problems have become highly complex and extremely difficult to manage. It is a highly challenging task for DOAE to improve the direction of its activities in order to accommodate the immediate needs of and to solve the problems faced by farmers in each area.

Since several agencies, both within and outside the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, are assigned

agricultural development tasks and responsibilities, agricultural extension can not be monopolized by the DOAE, as the success of its operations is very much dependent upon the good will of and cooperation from the other government agencies concerned. At present, systematic and continued cooperation between the DOAE and other government agencies is still lacking.

Although the DOAE can boast an extensive network of agricultural extension services at every Tambon level, vast socio-economic differences among the farmers themselves are a major obstacle to effective and truly comprehensive services. The extension practiced thus far has resulted in unfair extension and use of technological know-how among rich and poor farmers.

(2) Internal conditions

(2.1) Tasks and Responsibilities

Although DOAE's tasks and responsibilities are fairly comprehensive and well-established, its legal mandate could also cause problems of high-expectations from the other agencies and people involved. And as the situation has become more complex, DOAE has been increasingly obliged to solve a large number of problems. Under present circumstances, the DOAE has not yet effectively revised its roles and functions to accommodate the changing situation or to solve the enraging problems which are occurring with more frequency.

(2.2) Organizational structure

DOAE headquarters is divided into ten divisions according to their main functions which is quite appropriate considering their specialization in the agricultural extension process. The present organization, however, is directed mainly toward promoting agricultural production. There is still no group of divisions which promotes of agro-business and marketing, two highly necessary functions for both present and future agricultural development. At the regional level, there also exist problems of the division of responsibility and administrative lines, especially at the provincial

agricultural extension office which has not yet been assigned marketing and plant-protection functions.

The assignment of duties to the three deputy director-generals has also caused a lack of unity and has created confusion in administrative work. As a result, the deputy director-general for development and training controls the regional and provincial offices in name only, not in reality.

(2.3) Operational Procedures

In general, DOAE operations follow the rural development administrative system of the National Rural Development Committee and emphasize integrating "bottom-up" and "top-down" rural development plans -- which can be considered as one strong point in its favor. However, in practice, the plans have not yet been effectively implemented. More importantly, the real needs of the farmers rarely appear in the annual rural development plans prepared by the provincial offices. Even though an interdivisional cooperation system and operational procedures for the support of agricultural extension officers in the field have been quite clearly set up, in practice there is little cooperation among operational divisions. Regional office extension procedures have also been well planned. However, the present training and visit system is used more as a system to control regional extension officers operations than to provide effective services to farmers, especially the poorer ones.

2. Resource Management

DOAE has adequate resources necessary for operations, namely, personnel, budget, and equipment. However, resource administration and development is not yet fully effective because of the following main reasons:

(1) Most central office staff members tend to regard themselves as technical specialists in their particular fields rather than as agricultural extension officers.

(2) A considerable number of high-level provincial and district agricultural extension officers lack the qualifications needed to fulfill their roles and functions as executive managers of agricultural development work.

(3) Personnel Development still lacks definite plans and objectives, personnel development, despite a large number of annual training programs.

(4) Most of the annual budget is spent on promoting of crop production instead of promoting appropriate farming systems, promoting marketing abilities, and developing farmers institutions-groups and small farmers. Further, the budget allocation system does not fully correspond to the Department's policies and the actual needs of operational units. There is also no adequate checking system before the budget is released.

(5) Equipment and materials are usually not properly registered, accounted for, and utilized, especially those belonging to regional offices.

3. Decision-making Process

The decision of the DOAE to readjust its roles and functions according to the changing agricultural situation in the Sixth Plan period, in the form of agricultural extension plans with six main operational plans, is considered to be an appropriate action. However, the said plans have not yet been fully carried out by all the parties concerned, due to the lack of common understanding and the acceptance necessary for the transformation of the plans into actual practice.

There are certain criterias and guidelines to facilitate decisions on routine activities. Those criteria and guidelines, however, are usually technical guidelines instead of socioeconomic conditions of farmers in a given area. DOAE has not yet established a central information management system to make all the necessary information available to all the internal and external agencies concerned.

4. Operational Process

(1) The existing training and visit system does not permit direct contact with the farmers at large. Neither does it facilitate close coordination between the extension officers and different farmers groups in planning and executing work plans.

(2) Headquarters support of field staff is still slow and inadequate. The centralized control of budget, personnel, and equipment does not allow the regional and provincial offices adequate flexibility to reorganize their work plans to suit the conditions in the areas under their supervision.

(3) Most of the provincial and district agricultural extension offices spend most of their time, effort, and budget administrating projects designated by DOAE headquarters and conducting training and visits instead of concentrating on improving strategies for the development of target groups, making appropriate extension plans, and cooperating with other government agencies and the private sector to ensure successful operations.

(4) The monitoring, evaluation, and supervision of provincial extension officers activities are not yet regularly carried out by central headquarters. Provincial officers still do not supervise and monitor the performance of the district extension offices and Tambon extension offices as efficiently as they should.

Recommendations

In order to improve the DOAE administrative system it is recommended that DOAE and MOAC reorganize their administrative systems and operations as follows:

(1) New role and direction of DOAC

DOAE should take a more active approach in its operations by emphasizing on the area approach on a self-reliance basis, instead of only promoting the production of certain cash crops.

(2) Agricultural extension policy

In order to carry out operations according to the new role and directions mentioned, the DOAE should adopt policies that aim at (1) increasing farmer income and quality of life; (2) the reorganization of the crop production structure; and (3) the promotion of self-reliance among target groups, especially the poor farmers.

(3) Duties and responsibilities

The principal duties of the DOAE should consist of the following:

- o Development of appropriate farming systems and marketing for each agricultural area
- o Development and transfer of production technology
- o Development of farmer institutions

The secondary duties of the DOAE are as follows:

- o Provision of production inputs and facilities
- o Solutions to production and marketing problems in specific areas

(4) DOAE organizational structure

DOAE headquarters should consist of 19 divisions, compared to the existing 16, which can be divided into 4 main groups as follows :

(4.1) Farming system and agro-business development

(4.2) Crop promotion and technology development

(4.3) Agricultural marketing promotion and farmers institution development

(4.4) Administration and general support.

(5) Operational procedures

(5.1) In order to ensure that each annual provincial agricultural development plan truly reflects the problems and needs of the farmers, a monitoring and supervision system should be established. For every region, three to four monitoring and supervision teams, consisting of technical experts from DOAE headquarters, and the regional and provincial agricultural extension offices, should be organized to carry out the said duties.

(5.2) In every village the main target groups to be especially supported by the tambon agricultural extension officers should be the learning groups, various activity groups, and the "Sam Kor" groups. The fortnightly visit schedule should be planned in accordance to the planned activities of every group mentioned.

(6) Budget administration

The DOAE Annual Project and Budget Considerations should be chaired by the DOAE Director-General himself. Budget allocations should be considered according to the priorities of the Department's primary and secondary duties as specified in (3). Special emphasis should be given to the regular internal auditing of all projects accounts according to regulated procedures in order to ensure that the budget is effectively used according to project plans and objectives.

(7) Personnel administration

New policies to support five-year personnel development plan should be established with appropriate details on annual training programs and target groups. This plan should be based on the actual training needs of the staff at every level in all the important fields, namely, management, agricultural technologies, and agricultural extension.

(8) Decision-making process

The working group for every program should prepare its annual program in accordance with national-level policies and guidelines. Program objective will then become the basis for developing the annual project goals, objectives, and activities which will be well-integrated and socioeconomically justified. Agricultural extension projects should be planned on a large scope to provide effective support for complete production and marketing processes.

(9) Operational procedures

All of the central divisions should be instructed to inform operational units about budget provisions and transfer the necessary funds to them, at the latest, within the first fifteen days of each operational period. A detailed and itemized budget for each plan/activity should be clearly specified in budget transfer forms.

(10) The monitoring and evaluation process

The monitoring and evaluation Sub-Division of the DOAE Planning Division should cooperate with the office of Agricultural Economics, MOAC, to prepare and carry out the monitoring and evaluation of those on-going projects which require intensive implementation in specific target areas according to the government's Intensive Rural Development Plan.

(11) Recommendation for Implementation by MOAC

(11.1) The MOAC should be advised to designate the Office of Agricultural Economics to operate as the center of agricultural production and marketing information at the ministerial level, with the cooperation of the Department of Business Economics, of the Ministry of Commerce, in collecting data on and analyzing local and international market needs in order to provide reliable crop demand estimations as well as to plan for crop production over the next two-three years. The information should be used by the DOAE, Department of Agriculture, and other related agencies for the planning of agricultural development activities.

(11.2) The MOAC should play a stronger role in coordinating with other major decision-making agencies such as the Bureau of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission office and the office of the National Economic and Social Development Board so that DOAE's new agricultural development programs are supported appropriately and in a timely manner in terms of required budget, personnel, and other supporting measures.

13. The Department of Public Welfare

In its nascent stage, the Public Welfare Department (PWD) was to be the instrument to handle whatever the government perceived to be "social ills". Hence, in addition to providing basic relief to the needy (orphans and abandoned children, the handicapped and disabled, senior citizens) through assistance via institutions or homes for each target group, the PWD is also expected to perform other functions. Chief among these expected functions are: fostering the national image through the curtailment of vice and abject poverty; helping to build up Thailand's image as modern and civilized; and acting as an arm in overall nation-building efforts. It is of little wonder then, that the PWD has had many varied functions and assignments. Notwithstanding this history, however, and with ever changing social and political conditions, the PWD has changed very little over the 48 years of its existence. In other words, although it has expanded in size and it has added on more functions over the years, it exhibits relatively little structural and substantive change.

Some major problems facing the PWD today are summarized as follows:

1. The lack of clear policy guidelines and directions as to what its major roles and functions ought to be. The PWD, on the one hand, continues to carry on its customary functions, many of which are irrelevant to present-day requirements and conditions, while, on the other hand, the PWD must verbally espouse new thinking on social services and must justify its activities by arranging its functions to fit into the groupings or headings of the various national social development plans. Needless to say, this creates a situation in which inconsistencies and incongruencies prevail between what is said and written on the one hand and what is practiced on the other.

2. As the PWD continues to carry out its too numerous functions (many of which are no longer relevant) it faces problems relating to assigning proper priorities to its functions. Since weightings of importance are not assigned, the PWD suffers from inappropriate allocation of resources. Two examples of this follow: (1) more than a third of its annual budget is given to one function -- the self-help community, a supposedly low priority function which was designed to be phased out; (2) for an important function which the PWD must perform in coordinating and cooperating with the approximately 2,000 social service NGOs, only ten staff members are allocated to this function.

3. The evolution of the PWD has emphasized the expansion of its Divisions, perhaps at the expense of the PWD as a whole. As a result, the Divisions were accustomed to (1) single-minded planning to extend their domains; (2) zealous protection of their functions, irrespective of their relevance; (3) too self-centered guarding of their resources with little willingness to share them with other Divisions; and (4) petty squabbling and competition with other Divisions which effectively deterred coordination and cooperation among Divisions.

4. The work of the PWD is Bangkok-centric: all Divisions -- which are centers of decision-making, power, and resources -- operate from Bangkok. In comparison, the 72 provincial offices which in principle are in charge of most of the nation are not given enough resources (as money, staff, and equipment) to carry out their functions. Each provincial office is given an average 70,000 - 80,000 baht annual operating budget which is unjustifiably way below adequate. In addition, where institutions such as homes for the aged or handicapped or orphanages are located in a province, they do not fall under the jurisdiction of the provincial office, but report instead directly to the central (Bangkok) divisions they fall under.

5. Staff morale and spirits are less than desirable for a number of reasons:

a) There is a pervasive feeling that the PWD is given low priority by its Ministry -- the Ministry of Interior -- which results in (1) low budget allocation priority; (2) lack of promotion of high level PWD personnel (as evidenced by the appointment of non-PWD persons as Directors-general and Deputy Directors-general of the PWD) within the PWD and (3) little of the reverse, e.g. the appointment of PWD persons to directorships or deputy-directorships of other departments within the Ministry;

b) The existing reward and incentive system is not effective. The PWD staff has little to look forward to as top positions in the department tend to be filled by outsiders. Too, a large number of PWD staff members hold positions other than "social worker" and "social welfare worker" (there are 61 job titles in this department alone). Thus, non-mainstream job title holders feel demoralized within the system and lack hope for significant promotion;

c) Staff members tend to be immersed in routine work which engulfs them to the point of losing vitality in appreciating the meaning of their work and the goals of their organization. Particularly in the lower echelons of the personnel system, poor understanding and lack of commitment to social services may be factors to consider.

6. The PWD is unprepared and lacks readiness to confront new challenges in the area of social work. It must have ways and means to deal with NGOs and local and international donors and donor agencies. It must improve its management, accounting and foreign language skills and competencies. More importantly, it must be outward-oriented and forward looking. This will not and cannot be possible if it persists in using outmoded bureaucratic traditions for operation and in using conventional "bureaucratic mentality" for decision-making.

The study proposes a series of recommendations to alleviate these problems, the highlights of which are summarized below:

- That the PWD should set up a committee or working group to determine its policies and future direction.

- That the PWD should systematically phase out a number of out-dated functions which are no longer central.

- That the PWD decentralize operations by granting provincial offices greater resources and power.

- That the PWD revamp its personnel system by trimming the numerous job categories to a few relevant titles.

- That the PWD initiate the separation of itself from the Ministry of Interior so that it can wield greater autonomy over budget allocations and policy direction. This would also improve its staff morale.

- That the PWD improve its staff development and training programs.

14. Department of Foreign Trade

Ministry of Commerce

Findings

The results of the study of the Department of Foreign Trade (DFT) can be summarized as follows:

1. DFT has a broad legal mandate specified by written provisions and by the various laws under its responsibility. This has resulted in political demands, known as political mandates, being made on the department. These political demands are even executed through the sanction of legal provisions.

2. DFT's structure was more suitable for the trade systems (both domestic and foreign) that existed fifteen years earlier. However, since Thailand has embarked upon an export promotion strategy as the pattern of its economic development, this structure -- which is characterized by an emphasis on control rather than on conducting research and promotion of trade -- is now incongruent with the current role that DFT is expected to play. The result has been an informal administrative adjustment, which affects the agency's personnel in general. The practice of seconding (on loan) officials from one unit to another has led to a lack of personnel in the affected units. This has had an impact on the career patterns of individual officials, especially when there has been a change in the top-level administrators in the department.

3. DFT is in need of three types of personnel: general administrators, who are involved in establishing routine procedures; specialists, who are concerned with analysis of specific issues and negotiation with foreign counterparts; and officials who are capable of speaking, reading, and writing in foreign languages, an area that is crucial for the modern operation of an agency concerned with foreign contact.

Personnel shortages have had a severe impact on the efficiency of the synthesis and analysis of data, which is an important vehicle for decision making and policy implementation. This, in turn, has impacted on DFT's overall operation.

4. DFT has a wide range of legal authority, which is vested in the department's high-ranking administrators and in the Minister of Commerce. The significant legal acts under DFT's responsibility carry no specific policy framework. Hence, policy formulation lies with the ministry or department that is authorized to promulgate by-laws that serve as the basis for implementing provisions contained in the acts. This situation has created hundreds of proclamations, rules and regulations that have been created by the ministry and by the department. Frequent changes in these legal provisions and the lack of any set framework or guidelines have caused uncertainty for those who depend upon legal provisions for their business operation.

5. As discussed above, DFT's decision making -- especially regarding policy -- can be affected by political demands endorsed through the by-laws that allow the top-ranking decision makers to exercise their discretionary power. It allows them to formulate policies that deviate from the established policy. The existence of an "escape clause" has severely affected the decision-making and implementation processes.

6. Within DFT's subunits, there is an absence of the mechanism necessary in a governmental agency that has varied and conflicting interests. That is, no checks and balances exist among the various subunits in the main structure. For example, technical matters are handled by the same division whose main function is policy implementation. The result is the absence of checks and balances between two functions. Moreover, there is no cross-checking of data between or among the various divisions in DFT. The fact that two different functions exist in the same division under one division head makes it impossible for the division head to evade accommodating demands made through political intervention. Further, there are no checks and balances between DFT and other departments in the ministry, nor between DFT and the ministry itself, for that matter.

7. DFT's operation takes place without systematic and extensive participation from outsiders. Policy formulation still lacks systematic participation from the people in the form of public hearings, consultations, public inquiries, etc.

A process through which people who are affected by the DFT's decision making are allowed participation will be beneficial to the state. It will enable the government to gain access to data and to become knowledgeable about the people's attitudes toward certain policies, leading to cooperation and compliance. This is especially so for DFT, whose present main exercise of authority is to exert control despite the fact that it should supervise and promote export than otherwise. Consequently, it is imperative to have a mechanism that will serve to systematically and extensively receive or collect data in order to guarantee fairness in the department's operation. Being reception to the various recommended measures will serve as an excellent data base for those who need data as the basis for decision making. This is because all parties concerned will present their data in the utmost extent for DFT's analysis and study. Otherwise, only those having a close connection with high-level agency heads will have a privileged access to data.

Furthermore, DFT also lacks a mechanism that enables the public to check its operation which will serve as a supervising device, checks and balances, creating a framework for the discretion exercised by the agency as well as a means to improve its efficiency. For example, all important judgments should be publicized, with a clear statement of the specific reasons or rationales. This procedure will prevent officials from granting favors to certain individuals without justifiable causes. By reducing the degree of political demand (political mandate), it should create a more favorable atmosphere and enable officials to feel more comfortable with their jobs.

Policy Recommendation

Policy recommendation is divided into three plans: short-range, middle-range, and long-range recommended plans.

The short-range plan

1. The three-year personnel development plan should help mitigate the personnel shortage problem. There is also a need to restructure the subunits to bring them in line with the new reality. This plan should be expedited.

2. Due to the fact that the three-year personnel development plan is aimed at increasing the efficiency of personnel administration, budget, and the bureaucratic system itself, there is no consideration for checks and balances, which are important in the administrative structure of a benefit-bearing department. That is why both the technical and the implementation functions are incorporated into the same division. From this study, it is concluded that there should be a system of checks and balances. Such a system will be useful to DFT's overall performance, with a concomitant effect on the country's economic development. Under the three-year personnel development plan, there should be a dynamic personnel administration carried out through separating the technical unit from the operational unit. The first unit that needs to be improved is textiles and apparel. The technical unit on textiles and apparel, whose function is data collection, should be separated from the office of textiles and apparel, which is concerned with routine quota distribution which is to be restructured as a division under the three-year personnel development plan.

3. The study indicated a need to emphasize the technical aspect, and the personnel development plan should emphasize the development of specialists. For example, specialists on textiles and apparel should have a thorough knowledge of techniques such as the production system, trade, the production movement, major producers, etc. They should be knowledgeable about trade law, economics, the basic problems regarding certain merchandise, and measures against dumping in the form of tariffs or CVDs. Staff who possess a working knowledge of English and French would be of help to the department's high-ranking administrators (director-general and deputy directors-general) in analyzing and negotiating with foreign counterparts.

4. The public should be encouraged to provide data to the department. Cross-checking of data from the private sector should be worked out to obtain a broad range of data collection and to maintain impartiality. This would also ensure that there will be more options available to the decision-makers.

These short-term measures should be carried out through the issuance of departmental rules and regulations or announcements by the department in accordance with the Act of B.E. 2522 (1979). There must be a system through which private individuals can present their data on various cases in detail. For example, how many days will be allowed for consultation before a decision on a case is reached? How early must the points of argument be presented in order for them to be incorporated as usable data? DFT must study all of these details to determine their feasibility as an experiment, starting with the textile and apparel case as an example. The objective is to clarify the principle by which an individual can gain or lose his right (such as to export). The implementation process should be automatic and not subject to discrepancy in individual cases.

The Middle-range Recommendation (1-4 years)

1. There should be a consideration for revising the B.E. 2522 (1979) Act concerning import and export with more detailed provisions that will clarify the law. Presently, the act provides a broad framework that permits a great deal of discretion to be exercised by the top administrators. There is so much ambiguity in the present act that at times it is not known what principles are being applied and for which case. Thus, there should be specific principles that can be applied to certain situations. This will enable enforcement of the law to become an automatic process. Consideration of the scope of authority, accountability, and responsibility should be part of the legal reform program.

2. There should be a ministerial regulation to serve as a mechanism covering public participation in various forms. This should include announcing a decision, with the reasons clearly stated as well as the interest involved. This will guarantee continuity and

systematization of the policy or measures adopted. As the rules and regulations of a department can be modified or changed by the department's administrators while ministerial regulation can only be modified or changed by the minister with the consent of the Cabinet, a change in the ministerial regulation is thus more complicated than a change in the department's by-laws. Enacting a ministerial regulation should help streamline the system.

3. There should be a separation of the various divisions in the department, with an appropriate checks and balances mechanism installed. There should be a system of checks and balances between the department and the ministry and between the Ministry of Commerce and other ministries. This is to ensure that each official will be more comfortable with policy implementation. They will also be protected from accusations from outsiders or from their colleagues in the same agency. This will achieve the greatest benefit for export promotion and for the Thai economy as a whole.

4. Appointing C-10 specialists to serve as negotiators in trade should be considered. These officials would be placed under the Office of the Permanent Secretary. This new agency will use all the available information from all the departments in the ministry that is pertinent to the function. This will lighten DFT's current responsibilities in negotiation. These specialists would also be charged with coordination with other departments that require a linchpin to bring about integration of functions. The areas of negotiation that require a concerted effort on the part of the various agencies are, for example, the Uruguay Round, anti-dumping tariffs, and CVDs. These issues are more pronounced between Thailand and the United States or the European Community.

The Long-range Recommendation (over 3 years)

1. There should be a revision of the B.E. 2522 (1979) Act in order to restructure the mechanism to involve public participation. During this phase, the department will have gained two to three years of experience from the short-range and the middle-range plans. Based upon this experience and coupled with the lessons drawn from

comparative studies with other countries regarding strengths and weaknesses, a revision of the act can then be initiated. Revision of the act has been listed in the long-range plan because such a revision is under the jurisdiction of the ministry, not the department. Time to make the revision understood and accepted by those who are concerned with the issues is also a requirement.

2. In the long run, there should be a review of the attitudes of people in all socioeconomic levels toward DFT's performance, including attitudes toward the department itself regarding its functions and roles in international economic relations. One question to be asked is whether the Ministry of Commerce should have a separate department that deals with trade negotiation and which consists of specialists, with the necessary data furnished by the technical units. This would strengthen bargaining power in the negotiation process -- be it an offensive or a defensive negotiation. The department would be charged with bilateral and multilateral trade relation negotiations. The new department will assume some part of the function presently undertaken by DFT (including the various bilateral relations agreements and the multilateral relations on textiles and apparel) and by the Department of Business Economics (multilateral agreements).

Through this structure, DFT will be able to focus its work on import and export activities with a system of checks and balances among the division within the department. It would have the logistic support from the technical division for the short-term purpose of checking and exerting supervision upon the operation divisions; the Department of Business Economics will function as a genuine technical service department for all the units in the Ministry of Commerce, including the long-term and short-term trade policies of Thailand.

The proposal recommended above should be further investigated, as it could be useful for improving DFT's performance. But implementation of such a proposal will be contingent upon the government's decision. A change of the structure of the Ministry of Commerce by law is also required. Equally important, there must be cooperation from other ministries that are concerned with the issue of trade.

Appendix

THE MANAGEMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

At the request of the government, and in close collaboration with the National Administrative Reform Committee, TDRI has undertaken a two-phase project on "The Management of Economic and Social Development." The first phase of the project was funded by the UNDP. It developed a framework for the design of a comprehensive development management reform program and did preliminary investigations in selected, basic problem areas. A long-term research plan was developed, test-runs of research approaches and methodologies were conducted, and central line agencies, local governments, law and regulation reform, and the privatization process were investigated.

Phase I of the project yielded recommendations that will have a significant impact on the operations of individual agencies and understanding the issues being analyzed. This is the direct result of the research methodology employed and the manner in which the recommendations were tested. The research design placed much emphasis on the need to understand the role, work process, decision making, internal resource management of a given organization, as well as its bureaucratic environment in order to identify relevant problems. Placed in the perspective of development management, the nature of the problems could be used to draw implications for the types of solutions suitable to the agency. Moreover, information was based on all available means of data collection: document review, questionnaire (including an in-depth interview of the officials working at the agency and other qualified resource persons), and participatory and non-participatory observations.

Phase II of the project aims at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector in the management of the economy. This phase was designed to formulate a comprehensive plan for the reformation of the government management system in two substantive areas: (1) central policy and staff agencies; and (2) central line agencies.

The Study Team – Phase I

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| Dr. Thinapan Nakata | Team Leader |
| Dr. Likhit Dhiravegin | Laws and Regulations Advisor |
| Dr. Kraiyudht Dhiratayakinant | Privatization Advisor |
| Dr. Voradej Chandarasorn | Public Administration Advisor |
| Dr. Vinit Songpratoom | Research Fellow |
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| Dr. Surakiart Sathirathai | Research Fellow |
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| Miss Suntharee Tubtimthai | Research Assistant |
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| Miss Chutima Ardharmpichit | Secretary |
| Miss Songsiri Suwanchinda | Supporting Staff |

**Outputs of
The Management of Economic and Social Development Project :
Phase I**

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|--|--|
| 1. Proposed Research Plan : Management of Economic and Social Development | by Dr.Phaichitr Uathavikul |
| 2. Main Report on the Management of Economic and Social Development Project | |
| 3. The Management of the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (in Thai) | by Dr.Thinapan Nakata |
| 4. Allocation for Development : the Role of the Budget Bureau | by Dr.Likhit Dhiravegin Dr.Krai Yudht Dhiratayakinant |
| 5. A Study on the Performance of the Fiscal Policy Office (in Thai) | by Dr.Voradej Chandarasorn |
| 6. Privatization : An Analysis of the Concept and Its Implementation in Thailand | by Dr.Krai Yudht Dhiratayakinant |
| 7. Laws and Regulations Concerning Natural Resources, Financial Institutions and Export : Their Effects on Economic and Social Development | by Dr.Surakiart Sathirathai |
| 8. Central Line Agencies: Problems and Reform (in Thai) | by Dr.Voradej Chandarasorn Dr.Vinit Songpratoom |
| 9. The Performance of Local Government : Problems and Recommendations (in Thai) | by Dr.Pratan Suvanamongkol |
| 10. Administrative Reform (in Thai) | by Dr.Voradej Chandarasorn |
| 11. Administrative Reform : A Selective, Annotated Bibliography | by Dr.Voradej Chandarasorn |
| 12. Summary Proceedings : Workshop on the Management of Economic and Social Development, March 13-15, 1987 and July 17-19, 1987 | |

Outputs of
The Management of Economic and Social Development Project :
Phase II – first year

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| 1. Main Report on the Management of Economic and Social Development Project – Phase II | |
| 2. Main Report on the Management of Economic and Social Development Project – Phase II: The Thai Version | |
| 3. The Secretariat of the Cabinet | by Dr.Chai-Anan Samudavanija |
| 4. The Economic Cabinet | by Dr.Chai-Anan Samudavanija |
| 5. The Comptroller General's Department | by Dr.Pratya Vesarach |
| 6. The Office of the National Environment Board | by Dr.Patan Suwanamongkol |
| 7. The Joint Public and Private Consultative Committee | by Mr.Manoot Watanakomen |
| 8. The Office of the Board of Investment | by Mr.Sethaporn Cusripituck |
| 9. Management for the Development of the Ministry of Public Health | by Dr.Voradej Chandarasorn |
| 10. The Ministry of Interior : Strengths and Weaknesses of Ministerial Level Agencies in Development Administration | by Mr.Pakorn Preeyakorn |
| 11. The Ministry of Education : Problems and Proposed Reforms | by Dr.Likhit Dhiravegin |
| 12. The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives | by Dr.Bidhya Bowornwathana |
| 13. The Department of Agriculture, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives | by Dr.Patom Manirojana |
| 14. Management Improvement Study of Department of Agricultural Extension | by Dr.Chartchai Na Chiangmai |
| 15. The Department of Public welfare | by Dr.Juree Vichit-Vadakan |
| 16. The Department of Foreign Trade | by Dr.Surakiart Sathirathai |
| 17. Summary Proceedings : Workshop on the Management of Economic and Social Development | |


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THE MANAGEMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

At the request of the government, and in close collaboration with the National Administrative Reform Committee, TDRI has undertaken a two-phase project on "The Management of Economic and Social Development." The first phase of the project was funded by the UNDP. It developed a framework for the design of a comprehensive development management reform program and did preliminary investigations in selected, basic problem areas. A long-term research plan was developed, test-runs of research approaches and methodologies were conducted, and central line agencies, local governments, law and regulation reform, and the privatization process were investigated.

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